Pigott v. City of Wilmington
This text of 273 S.E.2d 752 (Pigott v. City of Wilmington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 331, 222 S.E.2d 412, 430 (1976), Chief Justice Sharp, writing for our Supreme Court, stated the following:
[A]s this Court said in Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 7, 68 S.E. 2d 783, 787 (1952), “It is settled law in this jurisdiction that a public official, engaged in the performance of governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, may not be held personally liable for mere negligence in respect thereto. The rule in such cases is that an official may not be held liable unless it be alleged and proved that his act, or failure to act, was corrupt or malicious (citations omitted), or that he acted outside of and beyond the scope of his duties.” (Emphasis added.) As long as a public officer lawfully exercises the judgment and discretion with which *403 he is invested by virtue of his office, keeps within the scope of his official authority, and acts without malice or corruption, he is protected from liability.
The Court in Smith, applying the foregoing statement in ruling on the denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss, found that while the allegations there did not in totidem verbis allege malice or corruption on the part of defendants, they were “in the broad and general terms permitted by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 8(a)” sufficient to withstand the motion.
Plaintiffs’ complaint here, like the complaint in Smith, fails to allege in totidem verbis that the actions of defendant Rowan were “corrupt or malicious.” In comparing the complaint here with that in Smith, we find that it also lacks allegations such as those which the Court there found sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss. 1 Moreover, plaintiffs’ answers to interrogatories and affidavit in response to the motion for summary judgment in no way forecast evidence of malice or corruption in Rowan’s actions. See Cone v. Cone, 50 N.C. App. 343, 274 S.E.2d 341 (1981); Best v. Perry, 41 N.C. App. 107, 109-110, 254 S.E.2d 281, 284 (1979); 2 McIntosh, N.C. Practice and Procedure § 1660.5 (2d ed. Phillips Supp. 1970). There being, then, neither sufficient allegation nor forecast of evidence that Rowan acted maliciously or corruptly, he could not be liable to plaintiffs, and the granting of summary judgment dismissing the action as to him was thus proper, if at the time he performed the actions complained of he: (1) was “a public official” of the city of Wilmington, and (2) was “engaged in the performance of governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion.”
Our research discloses no North Carolina cases determinative of these issues. By way of general authority, in 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 463 at 895-896 (1949), we find the following:
The courts have stated certain tests and distinctions [for deciding whether a person is an officer or merely an agent or employee of a municipality], such as that a municipal office is created only by legislation ... while the relation of an employee to a municipal corporation is based solely on contract; that an officer is generally required to take an *404 oath of office ... while an agent or employee is not required to do so; that an officer performs public functions delegated to him as part of the sovereign power of the state ... while no share of the sovereign powers or functions of the government is vested in an employeee; that official trust or responsibility is imposed by law on an officer ... but not on an employee; that the law prescribes and imposes the duties of an officer ... but not those of an employee; that an officer is charged with fixed, public duties . . . while the duties of an employee are of nongovernmental nature, and are neither certain nor permanent; that an officer is sometimes ves ted with a certain measure of discretion ... whereas the duties of an employee are purely ministerial; and that an officer is empowered to act in the discharge of a duty or legal authority in official life, whereas an employee does not discharge independent duties, but acts by the direction of others.
In applying these tests to the position of chief building inspector for the city of Wilmington, we find that the position accords with the criteria set forth. First, the position of chief building inspector is “created ... by legislation” which authorizes every city in North Carolina to create a building inspection department, to appoint inspectors and to give the inspectors so appointed titles “generally descriptive of the duties assigned.” G.S. 160A-411 (Supp. 1979). Second, the chief building inspector is “required to take an oath of office.” Wilmington City Charter § 9.6 (Supp. 1979). 2 Third, the chief building inspector performs “public functions delegated to him as part of the sovereign power of the state”; “official trust or responsibility is imposed by law” on him; “the law prescribes and imposes the duties” he must perform; and he is “charged with fixed, public duties” and “empowered to act in the discharge of a duty or legal authority in *405 official life.” See G.S. 160A-411 to -438; Wilmington City Code § 6-8 (Supp. 1979). 3 Fourth, the chief building inspector is “vested with a certain measure of discretion.” North Carolina General Statutes, Chapter 160A, part 5 contains numerous provisions which can only be interpreted as placing discretionary powers in the inspectors designated and appropriately entitled by the cities of this State. 4
We thus conclude, and so hold, that the chief building inspector for the city of Wilmington is “a public official” of that city. We further conclude, and so hold, that at the time of the acts complained of here defendant Rowan, as chief building inspector for the city of Wilmington, was acting in the performance of duties assigned to him by General Statutes chapter 160A, part 5, and by the Wilmington City Code, which duties involved the exercise of his discretion in determining whether plaintiffs’ greenhouses were constructed in compliance with applicable law. 5 He was thus “engaged in the performance of governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion.”
Because the defendant Rowan was at the time he performed the acts complained of “a public official ... engaged in the performance of governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion,” plaintiffs were required to allege and to forecast evidence tend *406 ing to prove “that his act ... was corrupt or malicious ... or that he acted outside of and beyond the scope of his duties” in order to withstand the motion for summary judgment. Smith, 289 N.C. at 331, 222 S.E.2d at 430. This they failed to do.
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273 S.E.2d 752, 50 N.C. App. 401, 1981 N.C. App. LEXIS 2117, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pigott-v-city-of-wilmington-ncctapp-1981.