IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCSC-63
No. 359A20
Filed 17 June 2022
BRUCE ALLEN BARTLEY
v. CITY OF HIGH POINT and MATT BLACKMAN in his Official Capacity as a Police Officer with the City of High Point, and Individually.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel
of the Court of Appeals, 272 N.C. App. 224 (2020), affirming a trial court order
partially denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment entered on 21 October
2019 by Judge Eric C. Morgan in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the
Supreme Court on 23 March 2022.
The Deuterman Law Group, by Seth R. Cohen, for plaintiff-appellee.
Poyner Spruill LLP, by David L. Woodard and Brett A. Carpenter, for defendant-appellant.
EARLS, Justice.
¶1 The sole question we consider in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of Defendant Officer Matt Blackman’s
(Officer Blackman) motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff Bruce
Bartley’s (Mr. Bartley) claims against him in his individual capacity based upon the
defense of public official immunity, concluding that genuine issues of material fact BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
Opinion of the Court
exist as to whether Officer Blackman acted with malice when he arrested Mr. Bartley
for unlawfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer in discharging or
attempting to discharge a public duty in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-223. We hold that
when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Bartley, genuine issues
of material fact do exist as to whether Officer Blackman acted with malice in the
performance of his duties when he allegedly used excessive force in arresting Mr.
Bartley. Therefore, Officer Blackman is not entitled to summary judgment based
upon the defense of public official immunity. We affirm the Court of Appeals’
affirmance of the trial court’s order.
I. Background
¶2 Mr. Bartley was driving to his home in the afternoon on 23 August 2017 when
he crossed a double yellow line to pass the pickup truck that was traveling on Old
Mill Road directly in front of him. Mr. Bartley testified in his deposition that he
believed passing the slow-moving truck on a double yellow line was legal because the
car was traveling at a low rate of speed and impeding traffic. Officer Blackman, a
police officer with the City of High Point, testified in his deposition that he was
traveling behind Mr. Bartley in an unmarked patrol car when he observed Mr.
Bartley pass the truck over the double yellow line. Officer Blackman testified that
at that point he activated his blue strobe lights, air horn, and siren, and began
catching up to Mr. Bartley’s car. Mr. Bartley testified that he did not see anyone BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
behind him when he looked in the rearview mirror, that he did not see blue lights
flashing, and that he did not hear a siren or air horn as he proceeded in the direction
of his home.
¶3 When Mr. Bartley eventually reached his driveway, he parked, got out of the
car, and walked toward the back of his car to retrieve his pet cat. At that moment, he
heard someone, whom he identified as a male dressed in plainclothes, twice order him
back inside his car. While Officer Blackman testified that he was wearing his
departmental issued handgun on his right hip, handcuffs, and an additional
ammunition magazine on his left side, that he was carrying his department issued
radio in his left hand, and that his badge was on his belt and visible from the front,
it is uncontested that Officer Blackman was not dressed in his police uniform and
that he did not immediately identify himself as a police officer when he approached
Mr. Bartley’s driveway and issued commands. Mr. Bartley testified that because he
had no reason to know that the person giving him a command was a police officer, he
thought that he had done nothing wrong, and suspected that perhaps Officer
Blackman was at the wrong address, Mr. Bartley told Officer Blackman that he was
on private property and that he was not going to get back into his car.
¶4 Officer Blackman testified that after Mr. Bartley twice ignored his
command, Officer Blackman used his hand radio to report the traffic stop to
law enforcement communications. He gave a description of his location, Mr. Bartley, BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
and Mr. Bartley’s vehicle. Officer Blackman further testified that he requested
backup because he believed that there was an officer safety issue based on Mr.
Bartley’s response to his command to get back into his vehicle “in the face of a traffic
stop.” Mr. Bartley testified that when he turned his back on Officer Blackman after
telling Officer Blackman, who from Mr. Bartley’s perspective, was an unidentified
trespasser, that he was on private property and that he would not get back into his
car, “the next thing” [Mr. Bartley] knew, he was “body slammed” against the trunk
of his vehicle, handcuffed, and told he was being detained.
¶5 Mr. Bartley testified repeatedly that “[Officer Blackman] slammed me against
the back trunk lid of my vehicle and handcuffed me.” Officer Blackman testified that
he put Mr. Bartley in handcuffs because (1) Mr. Bartley ignored his commands and
told him that he was on private property, which Officer Blackman believed to create
a safety issue because he had no way of knowing Mr. Bartley’s intentions, and (2)
Officer Blackman believed that Mr. Bartley’s refusal to comply with Officer
Blackman’s commands to get back in the car constituted probable cause to charge Mr.
Bartley with resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer. Officer Blackman
denied that he body slammed and tightly handcuffed Mr. Bartley when he carried out
the arrest.
¶6 Mr. Bartley testified that following his arrest, he remained in handcuffs in his
driveway in full view of his neighbors for 20–25 minutes even after he was patted BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
down by Officer Blackman and even though a backup officer had been called to the
scene. Mr. Bartley further stated that he asked Officer Blackman to loosen the
handcuffs because they were too tight and were hurting his wrists, but Officer
Blackman refused and insisted that if Mr. Bartley had done as he was initially told,
then he would not have been in this situation. Mr. Bartley claims that the forcefully
applied handcuffs left red marks and bruises on his wrists, which he photographed
on the day of the incident.
¶7 Mr. Bartley was charged with violating N.C.G.S. § 14-233 (resisting, delaying,
and obstructing a public officer) for exiting his vehicle and refusing to obey
commands.1 He also was cited for passing another vehicle in a prohibited passing
zone over a double yellow line pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 20-146(a). Mr. Bartley hired an
attorney who advised him to take a driving class and complete twenty hours of
community service, both of which he did. It is uncontested that the charges against
Mr. Bartley were dismissed.
¶8 On 20 December 2018, Mr. Bartley filed a civil suit against Officer Blackman,
in both his official and individual capacities; and against the City of High Point; for
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment/arrest, and assault and battery.
1 The dissent asserts that “[i]t is undisputed that Officer Blackman had probable cause to arrest Bartley.” 2022-NCSC-63, ¶ 46. However, that is disputed. Among his other claims, Mr. Bartley sued Officer Blackman for false arrest whereby he challenges the lawfulness of his detainment. The issue of whether Officer Blackman had probable cause to arrest Mr. Bartley for violating N.C.G.S. § 14-223 is not before us. BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
Defendants answered the complaint on 25 January 2019, asserting the defenses of
governmental and public official immunity, among others. In his complaint, Mr.
Bartley alleged that he was forcibly thrown against the trunk of his car, handcuffed,
and charged with resisting an officer in the driveway of his residence after passing a
slow-moving vehicle on Old Mill Road and being followed by Officer Blackman, a
plain-clothes High Point police detective driving an unmarked vehicle.
¶9 On 19 September 2019, defendants filed a general motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure on the
grounds that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that defendants
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On 21 October 2019, the trial court
dismissed with prejudice Mr. Bartley’s claims against the City of High Point and
Officer Blackman in his official capacity on the ground that sovereign immunity
barred those claims. The trial court denied defendants’ summary judgment motion
as to the claims against Officer Blackman in his individual capacity “finding that
there are genuine issues of material fact as to these claims that preclude summary
judgment as a matter of law.” Officer Blackman appealed from the order partially
denying his motion for summary judgment as to the claims against him in his
individual capacity.
II. Court of Appeals Opinion
¶ 10 On appeal, Officer Blackman argued that the trial court erred in denying his BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
motion for summary judgment based upon the defense of public official immunity. He
also asked the Court of Appeals to address the merits of the claims against him. On
7 July 2020, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order,
concluding that Officer Blackman was not entitled to summary judgment on
the ground of public official immunity, and declined to reach the merits of the
underlying claims because Officer Blackman had no right to interlocutory review on
the other issues he sought to raise. Bartley v. City of High Point, 272 N.C. App. 224
(2020). The court explained that “[p]olice officers engaged in performing their duties
are public officials for the purposes of public official immunity [and] enjoy absolute
immunity from personal liability for discretionary acts done without corruption or
malice.” Id. at 227–28 (cleaned up). The court noted that a police officer is therefore
generally “immune from suit unless the challenged action was (1) outside the scope
of official authority, (2) done with malice, or (3) corrupt,” id. at 228, and ultimately
concluded that the facts of this case as alleged with respect to each claim were
sufficient to raise an issue of genuine material fact as to whether Officer Blackman
acted with malice.
¶ 11 In dissent, Judge Tyson concluded that Mr. Bartley “did not carry his ‘heavy
burden’ to survive Officer Blackman’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of
his individual liability under public official immunity.” Id. at 239–40 (Tyson, J.,
dissenting). Judge Tyson reasoned that some of Mr. Bartley’s admissions about a BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
civilian’s right to ignore an officer’s directives during an investigatory stop and his
general admissions about some of his alleged movements during the encounter were
“sufficient to defeat [his] claims.” Id. at 237. The dissent further opined that Mr.
Bartley had “not met his ‘heavy burden’ ‘to produce a forecast of evidence
demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at
least establish a prima facie case at trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Leete v. Cnty. Of Warren, 341
N.C. 116, 119 (1995); Draughon v. Harnett Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 208, 212
(2003)). In Judge Tyson’s view, the majority’s opinion misapplied the standard of
review and purported to shift the “heavy burden” Mr. Bartley must carry to prevail
in this context. Id. Judge Tyson concluded that “[no] genuine issues of material fact
exist in the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits served and entered in this matter
to overcome defendant’s motions and to deny summary judgment,” and that the trial
court’s ruling should have therefore been reversed and remanded for entry of
summary judgment in favor of Officer Blackman. Id. at 240.
¶ 12 Officer Blackman appealed the Court of Appeals’ decision to this Court as a
matter of right based on Judge Tyson’s dissent.
III. Standard of Review
¶ 13 Summary judgment is proper only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
also Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 464–65 (1972). “An issue is genuine if it ‘may
be maintained by substantial evidence.’ ” City of Thomasville v. Lease-Afex, Inc.,
300 N.C. 651, 654 (1980) (quoting Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 518, 518
(1972)). Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to
persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion. State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 301
(2002). An issue is material if, as alleged, facts “would constitute a legal defense, or
would affect the result of the action or if its resolution would prevent the party against
whom it is resolved from prevailing in the action.” Koontz, 280 N.C. at 518. When
examining a summary judgment motion, “‘all inferences of fact . . . must be drawn
against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion.”’ Caldwell v. Deese,
288 N.C. 375, 378 (1975) (quoting 6 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice §
56.15[3], at 2337 (2d ed. 1971)).2 This standard requires us to refrain from weighing
the evidence or making credibility determinations. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd. 358
N.C. 440, 471 (2004) (explaining that when reviewing a motion for summary
2 The dissent’s statement of the proper standard at summary judgment fails to acknowledge this principle of black letter law and disregards it. It may be true that “[i]t is a difficult time to be in law enforcement” but our task here is not to weigh the competing deposition testimony, decide whose version of the events is correct, substitute our judgment for that of a jury, give preferential consideration to law enforcement officers, or provide them absolute immunity from any liability no matter what they do. At this stage, the question is whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, creates a disputed issue of material fact related to public official immunity. See, e.g., Ussery v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., 368 N.C. 325, 334 (2015) (facts must be viewed in light most favorable to the non-moving party on motion for summary judgment). BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
judgment, it is not the function of the court to weigh conflicting record evidence and
that issues “legitimately called into question” should be preserved for resolution by a
jury); see also Hensley ex rel. North Carolina v. Price, 876 F.3d 573, 584 (4th Cir. 2017)
(observing that in the summary judgment posture, courts must not credit defendant’s
evidence, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes in the defendants’ favor).
¶ 14 We review a trial court's order granting or denying summary judgment de
novo. Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ, 363 N.C. 334, 337 (2009). “Under a de
novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” Id. (cleaned up).
IV. Analysis A. Jurisdiction
¶ 15 Officer Blackman appeals from the trial court’s order partially denying
summary judgment on Mr. Bartley’s claims against him in his individual capacity.
Accordingly, we first address the threshold issue of the reviewability of an order
denying Officer Blackman’s motion for summary judgment.
¶ 16 Ordinarily, the denial of a summary judgment motion is not immediately
appealable as an interlocutory order. See Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 354, 357
(1950). An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which
does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court to settle
and determine the entire controversy. Id. An immediate appeal does not lie to this
Court from an interlocutory order unless it concerns a judicial decision affecting a BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
substantial right claimed in the action or proceeding by the appellant. Id. The
“substantial right” test for appealability asks whether the challenged order “will work
injury to appellant if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.” Stanback v.
Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 453 (1975); see also N.C.G.S. § 1-277.
¶ 17 The denial of summary judgment on the ground of public official immunity is
immediately appealable because it affects a substantial right. Public official
immunity is more than a mere affirmative defense to liability as it shields a defendant
entirely from having to answer for his conduct in a civil suit for damages. See
Thompson v. Town of Dallas, 142 N.C. App. 651, 653 (2001) (quoting Epps v. Duke
University, Inc., 122 N.C. App. 198, 201 (1996)) (explaining that an interlocutory
appeal of an order denying a dispositive motion is allowed because “the essence
of absolute immunity is its possessor’s entitlement not to have to answer for his
conduct in a civil damages action.’’), disc. review denied, 344 N.C. 436 (1996)); see also
Summey v. Barker, 142 N.C. App. 688, 689 (2001); Leonard v. Bell, 254 N.C. App.
694, 697 (2017). If the trial court erroneously precludes a valid claim of public
official immunity and the case proceeds to trial, immunity from trial would be
effectively lost. Corum v. Univ. of North Carolina, 97 N.C. App. 527, 532 (1990) (citing
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985)), rev’d in part on other grounds, 330 N.C.
761 (1992).
¶ 18 Unquestionably, the trial court’s order denying Officer Blackman’s motion for BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
summary judgment is interlocutory; it does not dispose of the action against him and
leaves matters to be judicially determined between the parties which requires further
action by the trial court. However, Officer Blackman asserts a claim of public official
immunity, an immunity from suit that would be compromised if he were required to
go to trial. Therefore, this interlocutory appeal of the denial of summary judgment on
that issue is properly before this Court.
B. Public Official Immunity
¶ 19 Public official immunity, a judicially-created doctrine, is “a derivative form” of
governmental immunity which shields public officials from personal liability for
claims arising from discretionary acts or acts constituting mere negligence, by virtue
of their office, and within the scope of their governmental duties. Since the early
twentieth century, the chief function of public official immunity has long been
understood to shield public officials from tort liability when those officials truly
perform discretionary acts that do not exceed the scope of their official duties. See
generally Hipp v. Ferrall, 173 N.C. 167 (1917); Templeton v. Beard, 159 N.C. 63
(1912). The immunity has been recognized in furtherance of two primary goals. First,
it promotes the “fearless, vigorous, and effective administration” of government
policies. Pangburn v. Saad, 73 N.C. App. 336, 344 (1985). It is presumed that in the
absence of the immunity, liability concerns rather than the public interest may drive
the actions of some public officials. Second, it mitigates the negative impact that BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
trepidation about personal liability might otherwise have on the willingness of
individuals to assume public office. Id. (observing that, without public official
immunity, the “threat of suit could . . . deter competent people from taking office”).
See also Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 610 (1999) (“Public officials receive
immunity because it would be difficult to find those who would accept public office or
engage in the administration of public affairs if they were to be personally liable for
acts or omissions involved in exercising their discretion.” (cleaned up).
¶ 20 Public official immunity has therefore never been extended to an official who,
clothed with discretion, commits acts that are at odds with the protections afforded
by the doctrine and which underlie its utility. An individual will not enjoy the
immunity’s protections if his action “was (1) outside the scope of official authority, (2)
done with malice, or (3) corrupt.” Wilcox v. City of Asheville, 222 N.C. App. 285, 230
(2012) (citing Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 331 (1976)), disc. review denied and appeal
dismissed, 366 N.C. 574 (2013). Generally, public officials have been recognized as
individuals who occupy offices created by statute, take an oath of office, and exercise
discretion in the performance of their duties. Pigott v. City of Wilmington, 50 N.C.
App. 401, 403–04 (1981); Gunter v. Anders, 114 N.C. App. 61, 67 (1994). North
Carolina courts have deemed police officers engaged in performance of their duties as
public officials for the purposes of public official immunity: “a police officer is a public
official who enjoys absolute immunity from personal liability for discretionary acts BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
done without corruption or malice.” Campbell v. Anderson, 156 N.C. App. 371, 376
(2003).
¶ 21 Our precedent instructs that “[i]t is well settled that absent evidence to the
contrary, it will always be presumed ‘that public officials will discharge their duties
in good faith and exercise their powers in accord with the spirit and purpose of the
law.’ ” Leete v. Cty. of Warren, 341 N.C. 116, 119 (1995) (emphasis added) (quoting
Huntley v. Potter, 255 N.C. 619, 628 (1961)). This Court has never regarded the
presumption of good faith that attends a public officer’s actions as conclusive. When
read in its full context, this language creates a rebuttable presumption that loses its
force when a party produces competent and substantial evidence that an officer failed
to discharge his duties in good faith. Id., 341 N.C. at 119 (plaintiffs have met their
burden to overcome this presumption).
¶ 22 Significantly, our courts have recognized public official immunity as an
affirmative defense that must be properly asserted by the defendant to receive its
protection. See generally Fullwood v. Barnes, 250 N.C. App. 31 (2016); Mabrey v.
Smith, 144 N.C. App. 119 (2001). In other words, the defendant must assert official
immunity as an affirmative defense because
[a]s to such defenses, he is the actor, and hence he must establish his allegations in such matters by the same degree of proof as would be required if he were plaintiff in an independent action. This is not a shifting of the burden of proof; it simply means that each party must establish his own case. BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
Speas v. Merchants’ Bank & Trust Co. of Winston-Salem, 188 N.C. 524, 531 (1924)
(citations omitted); see also, 1 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis and Broun on North
Carolina Evidence § 32 n. 29, at 120 (4th ed. 1993). If the defendant cannot meet this
burden of production, “he is not entitled to protection on account of his office, but is
liable for his acts like any private individual.” Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N.C. 613,
616 (1938).
C. Public Official Immunity Applied in this Case
¶ 23 To survive a motion for summary judgment based on public official immunity,
a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the defendant-official’s tortious
conduct falls within one of the immunity exceptions. Dempsey v. Halford, 183 N.C.
App. 637, 640–41 (2007). A tortious act that is malicious thus pierces the cloak of
official immunity that would otherwise bar suit and liability for the tortious act. Fox
v. City of Greensboro, 279 N.C. App. 301, 2021-NCCOA-489, ¶ 51 (2021). This Court
has held that “[a] defendant acts with malice when he wantonly does that which a
man of reasonable intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and which he
intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another.” In re Grad v. Kaasa, 312 N.C. 310,
313 (1984). Elementally, a malicious act is one which is “(1) done wantonly, (2)
contrary to the actor’s duty, and (3) intended to be injurious to another.” Wilcox, 222
N.C. App. at 289. “An act is wanton when it is done of wicked purpose or when done
needlessly, manifesting a reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Yancey v. Lea, BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
354 N.C. 48, 52 (2001). “Gross violations of generally accepted police practice and
custom” contributes to the finding that officers acted contrary to their duty. Prior v.
Pruett, 143 N.C. App. 612, 623–24 (2001), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 493 (2002).
¶ 24 We have held that “the intention to inflict injury may be constructive” intent
where an individual's conduct “is so reckless or so manifestly indifferent to the
consequences, where the safety of life or limb is involved, as to justify a finding of
willfulness and wantonness equivalent in spirit to an actual intent.” Foster v.
Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 192 (1929). In the context of intentional tort claims, including
assault and battery, “[w]anton and reckless behavior may be equated with an
intentional act.” Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 715 (1985), and “evidence of
constructive intent to injure may be allowed to support the malice exception to
[public official] immunity.” Wilcox, 222 N.C. App. at 291.
¶ 25 Mr. Bartley claims that Officer Blackman acted with malice by body slamming
him against the trunk of his car and tightly handcuffing him without justification.
Thus, we decide whether, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Bartley, the
evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Officer Blackman
acted with malice; that is, whether his actions were wanton, contrary to his duty, and
intended to injure Mr. Bartley. We hold that the evidence in this case does raise an
issue of material fact with respect to this question.
¶ 26 At common law, a “law enforcement officer has the right, in making an arrest BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
and securing control of an offender, to use only such force as may be reasonably
necessary to overcome any resistance and properly discharge his duties.” Lopp v.
Anderson, 251 N.C. App. 161, 172 (2016). While an officer is vested with such a right,
“[a police officer] may not act maliciously in the wanton abuse of his authority or use
unnecessary and excessive force.” Myrick v. Cooley, 91 N.C. App. 209, 215 (1988). In
similar fashion, our General Statutes dictate that a law enforcement officer is
justified in using force upon an individual when and to the extent that the officer
reasonably believes it necessary to prevent escape from custody or to effect an arrest
of an individual who the officer reasonably believes has committed a criminal offense,
unless the officer knows the arrest is unauthorized. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-401(d).
Accordingly, a civil action for damages for assault and battery is available at
common law against one who, for the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose, such
as justifiable arrest, uses force which is excessive under the given circumstances.
Lopp, 251 N.C. App. at 172(2016) (quoting Myrick, 91 N.C. App. at 215).
¶ 27 Mr. Bartley testified that Officer Blackman approached him from behind and
“body slammed” him against the trunk of his car. Officer Blackman acknowledged
during his deposition that Mr. Bartley did not resist arrest, verbally or physically
threaten him, or try to evade the arrest before he placed Mr. Bartley in handcuffs. It
is also undisputed that Mr. Bartley was unarmed during the encounter. Officer
Blackman’s actions in these circumstances, as described by Mr. Bartley, using a body BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
slam maneuver to subdue an unarmed, nonresistant individual who posed no threat
to him is evidence of malice.
¶ 28 Additional evidence of malice comes from Mr. Bartley’s testimony about how
tightly Officer Blackman handcuffed him, Officer Blackman’s refusal to loosen the
handcuffs, and the red marks and bruises that Mr. Bartley sustained to his wrist as
a result. Furthermore, Mr. Bartley testified that Officer Blackman stated that if Mr.
Bartley had done as he was initially told, he would not be in the situation that
he was in, and that Mr. Bartley remained handcuffed for at least twenty minutes in
front of neighbors, which is evidence of retaliation.
¶ 29 Cases from the federal courts are instructive on the question of whether tight
handcuffing resulting in physical injury indeed constitutes excessive force and
therefore some evidence of malice. The Third Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have
affirmatively recognized the general proposition that excessively tight or forceful
handcuffing, particularly handcuffing that results in physical injury, constitutes
excessive force. See, e.g., Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing
excessively tight handcuffing constitutes excessive force), cert denied, 543 U.S. 956
(2004); Martin v. Hiedeman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1313 (6th Cir. 1997) (construing
“excessively forceful handcuffing” as an excessive force claim).
¶ 30 The Sixth Circuit articulated its test for evaluating whether a handcuffing
claim may survive summary judgment in Morrison v. Bd. Of Trs., 583 F.3d 394, 401- BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
02 (6th Cir. 2009). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must offer sufficient evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact that: (1) the plaintiff complained the handcuffs
were too tight; (2) the officer ignored those complaints; and (3) the plaintiff
experienced “some physical injury” resulting from the handcuffing. Id. See also
McGrew v. Duncan, 937 F.3d 664, 668 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that allegations of
bruising and wrist marks create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
an officer violated plaintiff’s right to be free from excessive force). Cf. Brissett v. Paul,
No. 97-6898, 1998 WL 195945, at *4–5 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (affirming the
district court’s decision that a police officer did not use excessive force because
plaintiff did not offer evidence that he sustained any physical injury from being
handcuffed and arms being held in painful position).
¶ 31 Mr. Bartley’s evidence establishes that he complained of his discomfort, and
Officer Blackman refused to heed his complaints and loosen the handcuffs. To be sure,
Officer Blackman’s testimony offers an entirely different description of the material
facts. He testified that he effectuated Mr. Bartley’s arrest by “merely plac[ing] one
hand on [Mr. Bartley’s] “wrist” and his other hand on [Mr. Bartley’s] “[u]pper back,”
and leaning Mr. Bartley over the trunk lid of his car so that he was “[b]ending at the
waist.” Officer Blackman further testified that he “took [Mr. Bartley] by the left arm
and went to extend his arm and then to put it behind his back.” Officer Blackman
also insisted that when Mr. Bartley refused his multiple orders to get back in his BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
vehicle, he was authorized to place Mr. Bartley in handcuffs to protect his safety and
carry out the traffic stop. He emphasized in his testimony that his use of handcuffs
“remained the least intrusive means reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose
of the stop.” Officer Blackman’s testimony certainly creates a disputed issue of
material fact; however, it is not the version of events that is determinative on
summary judgment, where the question before us is whether the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party is sufficient to establish malice that defeats
a claim of public official immunity.
¶ 32 N.C.G.S. § 15A-401(d), as does the common law, prescribes that police officers
have a duty to use only the force that is reasonably necessary in detaining an
individual. The use of unreasonable, unnecessary, and excessive force is prohibited
by law. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Bartley, as we must,
there is a panoply of evidence which establishes that a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether Officer Blackman’s allegedly forcible tactics were contrary to his
duty for purposes of establishing the first element of malice.3 Furthermore, Officer
Blackman’s alleged statement to Mr. Bartley that he would not have been “in this
3 The dissent states that “Officer Blackman had probable cause to arrest Bartley.” 2022-NCSC-63, ¶ 45. Whether there was probable cause for an arrest is disputed, and it is also not determinative on the question of public official immunity. Where, as here, a plaintiff comes forward with evidence that an officer used excessive force to execute an otherwise valid arrest, such evidence may be sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether the officer acted wantonly or contrary to his duty within the meaning of the malice exception to public official immunity. BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
situation” had Mr. Bartley obeyed commands from Officer Blackman raises questions
that can only be resolved by a jury. For example, is “this situation” that Officer
Blackman referenced the situation of having just been body slammed and thrown into
the trunk of a car, tightly handcuffed and bruised, and humiliated in front of
neighbors following the commission of a traffic infraction? This statement creates a
genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Officer Blackman’s allegedly
gratuitous tactics manifested a reckless indifference to Mr. Bartley’s rights and were
so reckless or manifestly indifferent to the consequences, where the safety of life
and limb are involved, as opposed to being necessary for officer safety as Officer
Blackman insists. See Wilcox, 222 N.C. App. at 291-92. Such a question is a factual
one that is typically reserved for a jury. See, e.g., State v. McCombs, 297 N.C. 151,
156 (1979); Leiber v. Arboretum Joint Venture, LLC, 208 N.C. App. 336, 348 (2010).
Mr. Bartley has presented sufficient evidence of malice to create a disputed issue of
material fact that prevents summary judgment on the ground of public official
immunity.
V. Conclusion
¶ 33 To establish that Officer Blackman is not entitled to the defense of public
official immunity, and thus to defeat his motion for summary judgment, Mr. Bartley
produced evidence that Officer Blackman acted with malice when he arrested him.
Viewing the facts that Mr. Bartley has proffered in support of his claim in the light BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
most favorable to him, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Officer Blackman acted with malice in carrying out his official duties.
¶ 34 The purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of claims in which there are
no disputed issues as to any material facts such that “only questions of law are
involved and a fatal weakness in the claim of a party is exposed.” Dalton v. Camp,
353 N.C. 647, 650 (2001). Attempts to make credibility determinations or to resolve
disputed versions of events in the course of prematurely disposing of this case serves
only to confuse the role of a judge and a jury. Crocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 142–
43 (2009) (instructing that it is error for the trial court to enter summary judgment
for defendant when the evidence forecast by plaintiff established a genuine issue of
material fact to be properly decided by a jury). We therefore hold that the Court of
Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court’s order partially denying Officer
Blackman’s summary judgment motion on the basis of public official immunity.
AFFIRMED. Justice BERGER dissenting.
¶ 35 It is a difficult time to be in law enforcement. The majority today makes it
even more challenging by expanding exposure to personal liability for increasingly
common encounters with recalcitrant members of our society. Because the majority
effectively eliminates public official immunity for law enforcement officers in North
Carolina, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 36 On August 23, 2017, at approximately 3:17 pm, Officer Blackman––at the time
an eight-year veteran of the High Point Police Department––was driving in his
unmarked patrol car on routine patrol. At the time, Officer Blackman was wearing
his department “issued handgun on [his] right side, [his] departmental issued badge
on [the front of his] belt, [and his] handcuffs and additional magazine on [his] left
side.” Officer Blackman observed a 2017 Mercedes pass a truck “on the left over the
double yellow line.” The vehicle was operated by Bruce Allen Bartley, a 5’7” white
male. Officer Blackman testified that he viewed Bartley’s moving violation of passing
the truck on the left over a double line as serious and as dangerous as the other
violations he has observed and cited.
¶ 37 Officer Blackman attempted to initiate a traffic stop of Bartley’s vehicle,
however due to oncoming traffic and an upcoming curve, Officer Blackman could not
immediately and safely pass the truck in front of him to catch up to Bartley. As he
overtook the truck, Officer Blackman activated his lights and siren and began BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
Berger, J., dissenting
catching up with Bartley’s vehicle to make the traffic stop. Bartley turned onto Yates
Mill Court, and Officer Blackman testified that he “was concerned that [Bartley] was
aware [Officer Blackman] was behind him and [he] was attempting to make it to the
– a house.”
¶ 38 Bartley pulled into the driveway at 1860 Yates Mill Court and Officer
Blackman pulled in behind Bartley. Officer Blackman left his blue strobe lights on,
but “as [he] was nearing the back of [Bartley’s] car,” he turned off his siren. Bartley
got out of his vehicle and was “[h]eading towards the back” [of the vehicle] when he
saw Officer Blackman. Officer Blackman got out of his vehicle and ordered Bartley
back into the Mercedes. Bartley looked directly at Officer Blackman and ignored the
order.
¶ 39 Bartley testified at a deposition that, in total, Officer Blackman told him to get
back in the car “[t]wice.” Bartley’s response was, “[I] told him I was on private
property” and “I was not getting back in the car”
¶ 40 Officer Blackman testified at his deposition that he “believed that there was
an officer safety issue based on [Bartley] exiting the vehicle, approaching [Officer
Blackman], [and] saying he’s on private property in the face of a traffic stop.” Officer
Blackman testified “ultimately we got within arms reach of [each] other.” Because of
Bartley’s actions, Officer Blackman believed that handcuffing Bartley “was the safest
for both of [them].” At that point, Officer Blackman had no way of knowing what BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
Bartley’s intentions were toward him or toward any other aspect of the traffic stop.
Officer Blackman told Bartley he was being detained, and Bartley admitted that
Officer Blackman placed one hand on his wrist and the other on Bartley’s upper back.
Bartley was “leaning over the vehicle . . . [b]ending at the waist,” when Officer
Blackman went to handcuff him. Officer Blackman “took [Bartley] by the left arm
and went to extend [Bartley’s] arm and then put it behind [Bartley’s] back, and as
[Officer Blackman] did that, [Bartley’s] left arm tensed up and lifted up in a form of
resistance.” At this point, Officer Blackman had probable cause to arrest Bartley for
resisting a public officer pursuant to N.C.G.S. §14-223.
¶ 41 According to Bartley, he was in that position for “seconds” while Officer
Blackman put on the handcuffs. When asked whether Bartley felt any contact with
Officer Blackman’s body, Bartley responded, “[j]ust his hands.”
¶ 42 Summary judgment is “a device to bring litigation to an early decision on the
merits without the delay and expense of a trial where it can be readily demonstrated
that no material facts are in issue.” Kessing v. Nat’l Mortg. Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 533,
180 S.E.2d 823, 829 (1971).
The purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate formal trials where only questions of law are involved by permitting penetration of an unfounded claim or defense in advance of trial and allowing summary disposition for either party when a fatal weakness in the claim or defense is exposed. Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 218 S.E.2d 379 (1975). “The device used is one whereby a party may in effect force his opponent to produce a forecast of evidence BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
which he has available for presentation at trial to support his claim or defense. A party forces his opponent to give this forecast by moving for summary judgment. Moving involves giving a forecast of his own which is sufficient, if considered alone, to compel a verdict or finding in his favor on the claim or defense. In order to compel the opponent’s forecast, the movant’s forecast, considered alone, must be such as to establish his right to judgment as a matter of law.” 2 McIntosh, N. C. Practice and Procedure, s 1660.5 (2d ed. Phillips Supp.1970).
Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467, 470, 251 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1979).
Summary judgment is appropriate “where a claim or defense is utterly baseless in
fact, [or] where only a question of law on the indisputable facts is in controversy and
it can be appropriately decided without full exposure of trial.” Kessing, 278 N.C. at
533, 180 S.E.2d at 829. “[N]o matter how material a fact may be to the determination
of an issue in a case, if it is patently false or its existence defies all common sense and
reason, it is not genuine.” G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure § 56-4 (3d
ed. 2007).
¶ 43 This Court has held that public officials are entitled to a presumption that they
will “discharge their duties in good faith and exercise their powers in accord with the
spirit and purpose of the law.” Leete v. Cty. of Warren, 341 N.C. 116, 119, 462 S.E.2d
476, 478 (1995). The party challenging the validity of a public officials’ actions bears
a heavy burden; competent and substantial evidence is required to defeat this
presumption. Id. For purposes of public official immunity, law enforcement officers
engaged in the performance of their duties are public officials protected from liability BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
“for mere negligence.” See Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 331, 222 S.E.2d 412, 430
(1976). It is uncontroverted that Officer Blackman was performing his duties as a
law enforcement officer when he initiated the traffic stop that led to Bartley’s arrest.
As long as a public officer lawfully exercises the judgment and discretion with which he is invested by virtue of his office, keeps within the scope of his official authority, and acts without malice or corruption, he is protected from liability. A defendant acts with malice when he wantonly does that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and which he intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another. An act is wanton when it is done of wicked purpose, or when done needlessly, manifesting a reckless indifference to the rights of others.
Grad v. Kaasa, 312 N.C. 310, 313, 321 S.E.2d 888, 890–91 (1984) (cleaned up).
¶ 44 As such, the burden now rests with plaintiff to show that Blackman acted with
malice to overcome the presumption, and the trial court must decide “whether
plaintiff sufficiently forecasted evidence for each element of malice.” Brown v. Town
of Chapel Hill, 233 N.C. App., 257, 265, 756 S.E.2d 749, 755. Bartley has failed to
make such a forecast of the evidence, and Officer Blackman is entitled to summary
judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact.
¶ 45 Officer Blackman had probable cause to arrest Bartley. Bartley committed a
traffic infraction by crossing over a double yellow line to pass another vehicle, did not
immediately pull over when Officer Blackman initiated his siren and strobe light, and
resisted arrest after Officer Blackman had issued multiple commands which Bartley
acknowledged he heard. Bartley admitted that refusing to obey a police officer’s BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
command is unlawful and acknowledged that he could understand Officer
Blackman’s perspective in arresting Bartley.
¶ 46 The majority holds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether
Officer Blackman acted with malice in performance of his duties when he allegedly
used excessive force in arresting Bartley. Specifically, the majority focuses on
Bartley’s deposition testimony in which he alleged that Officer Blackman approached
him from behind and “body slammed” him against the trunk of his car. The term
“body slam” was used just once by Mr. Bartley in his deposition and twice in a written
statement Bartley prepared for his own benefit. Bartley’s testimony regarding
Officer Blackman’s specific actions is wholly inconsistent with the definition of the
term “body slam.” Merriam-Webster defines body slam as “a wrestling throw in
which the opponent’s body is lifted and brought down hard to the mat.” Body-Slam,
Merriam-Webster Dictionary (11th ed. 2003); see also, Body Slam,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/body-slam (accessed June 7, 2022). While
Bartley’s single reference in his deposition to being body slammed may not be
patently false, it appears to be baseless in fact in that it runs counter to his step-by-
step testimony of Officer Blackman’s actions. According to Bartley, Officer Blackman
had one hand on Bartley’s wrist and the other on Bartley’s upper back. It defies
common sense that from this position Officer Blackman lifted Bartley’s body off the
ground and then hurled him onto the trunk of Bartley’s vehicle, without any other BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
part of Officer Blackman’s body making contact with Bartley. In addition, Bartley
testified that he suffered no harm, perceived, or otherwise, from Officer Blackman
placing him on the trunk of his vehicle. The only purported harm that Bartley
experienced during the entire encounter was related to the tightness of the handcuffs,
not due to a body slam. It is undisputed that Officer Blackman had probable cause
to arrest Bartley, and Officer Blackman was not acting contrary to his duty when he
detained and handcuffed Bartley.
¶ 47 Bartley was also required to produce “competent and substantial evidence”
that Officer Blackman possessed an intent to injure. To establish an intent to injure,
“the plaintiff must show at least that the officer’s actions were so reckless or so
manifestly indifferent to the consequences as to justify a finding of willfulness and
wantonness equivalent in spirit to an actual intent.” Brown, 233 N.C. App. at 269,
756 S.E.2d at 758 (cleaned up). The majority relies on Bartley’s testimony concerning
how tightly Officer Blackman handcuffed him, Officer Blackman’s refusal to loosen
the handcuffs, and the red marks and bruises that Bartley sustained to his wrist in
finding that Officer Blackman’s use of force was done with an intent to injure.
¶ 48 The majority cites federal cases from the Third and Sixth Circuits recognizing
the general proposition that excessively tight or forceful handcuffing, particularly
handcuffing that results in physical injury, constitutes excessive force. Fourth
Circuit cases tend to support the opposite conclusion. For example, in Carter v. BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
Morris, the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s allegation that her handcuffs were
too tight would not support an excessive force claim. 164 F.3d 215, 219 n.3 (4th Cir.
1999). Additionally, in Cooper v. City of Virginia Beach, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
an award of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage in an excessive force
claim based on unduly tight handcuffing. 817 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (E.D. Va. 1993),
aff’d, 21 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 1994). In Cooper, the record indicated that the plaintiff
was allegedly handcuffed so tightly that his hands grew numb. Id. The court found
the excessive force claim deficient because the plaintiff failed to offer sufficient
evidence of actual injury. Id. Notably, the court also stressed that the handcuffing
in and of itself was not unreasonable, particularly in light of the plaintiff’s apparent
intoxication. Id.
¶ 49 Officer Blackman testified that Mr. Bartley’s behavior was threatening and
alarming, and Officer Blackman felt like he was in danger and believed that
handcuffing Mr. Bartley “was the safest for both of [them].” Bartley alleged he
suffered some purported redness to his wrists from the tightness of the handcuffs.
One must strain to observe the purported injury in the exhibits contained in the
record. Nonetheless, Bartley admitted he received no medical treatment and had no
sensitivity, strange feeling, nerve damage, tingling, or lack of use of his wrists.
Bartley could not even remember if the alleged redness on his wrists lasted until the
next day. BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
¶ 50 Finally, as evidence of actual intent, the majority cites Bartley’s testimony that
Officer Blackman made the comment that if Bartley had done as he was instructed,
he would not be in “this situation.” The majority also cites the fact that Mr. Bartley
remained handcuffed for at least twenty minutes in front of neighbors as evidence of
retaliation.
¶ 51 This is not the “competent and substantial evidence” that plaintiff needs to
overcome his heavy burden. Officers routinely make remarks to inform individuals
why they have been placed into handcuffs or in the patrol vehicle. An officer acting
in accordance with his training would attempt to deescalate the situation by
explaining to an individual who refused to follow commands that his or her actions
are the reason for their situation. It certainly is an accurate statement that had
Bartley simply complied with the officer’s instructions he would not have been
handcuffed and arrested. At any rate, this statement is not evidence of “retaliation”
and it is not sufficient for plaintiff to overcome his heavy burden.1
¶ 52 Bartley has not produced “competent and substantial evidence” necessary to
carry his “heavy burden” to forecast specific facts constituting malice, and Officer
Blackman is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To hold otherwise would
1 It is also worth noting that Officer Blackman took the time to turn the ignition of Bartley’s car on so that Bartley’s cat, which was in the back of his vehicle, would not overheat during the encounter. This further negates any notion that Officer Blackman was acting with malice. BARTLEY V. CITY OF HIGH POINT
effectively eliminate public official immunity for law enforcement officers and expose
them to personal liability for every encounter in which an arrest is made.
Unfortunately, the majority does just that, and being a law enforcement officer in
North Carolina just became even more challenging.
Chief Justice NEWBY and Justice BARRINGER join in this dissenting
opinion.