Picon Transportation, Inc. v. Pomerantz

814 S.W.2d 489, 1991 WL 141017
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 6, 1991
Docket05-90-01366-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 814 S.W.2d 489 (Picon Transportation, Inc. v. Pomerantz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Picon Transportation, Inc. v. Pomerantz, 814 S.W.2d 489, 1991 WL 141017 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).

Opinions

LAGARDE, Justice.

Picon Transportation, Inc. (Picon) appeals from a judgment in favor of Allen Pomer-antz in a personal injury lawsuit. In three points of error, Picon contends that the trial court erred in: (1) rendering judgment in an amount in excess of its jurisdictional limit; (2) denying Picon’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the jury award of $25,000 for medical care is not supported by the evidence; and (3) denying Picon’s motion for new trial because the evidence is factually insufficient to support the $25,000 jury award for medical care. We sustain Picon’s first point and modify the trial court’s judgment. As modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pomerantz filed his negligence cause of action against Picon in a Collin County court at law. Texas statutory law provides that the jurisdiction of a Collin County court at law is as follows:

(a) In addition to the jurisdiction provided by § 25.0003 and other law, a county court at law in Collin County has:
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(2)concurrent jurisdiction with the District Court in civil cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $500 and does not exceed $50,000, excluding interest.

Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.0452(a)(2) (Vernon 1988). The amount in controversy is determined by the plaintiff’s petition. Richardson v. First Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 419 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex.1967). In his first amended petition, Pomerantz sought recovery of damages in an amount “not less than” $49,860. The trial court rendered judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of Pomerantz for $125,000.

A trial court may award damages above its jurisdictional maximum limit only when the additional damages have accrued as a result of the mere passage of time. Mr. W. Fireworks, Inc. v. Mitchell, 622 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.1981) (per curiam); Flynt v. Garcia, 587 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Tex.1979) (per curiam). This rule stands even where the evidence might support an award of greater damages. Longoria v. Atlantic Gulf Enter., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 71, 76 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

The jury awarded Pomerantz $25,-000 for each of the following elements of damages: (1) physical pain; (2) mental anguish; (3) physical injury; (4) physical impairment; and (5) medical care. Thus, the jury’s award of $125,000 exceeded by $75,-000 the trial court’s maximum jurisdictional limit. These additional $75,000 damages did not accrue as a result of the mere passage of time. For this reason, we hold that the trial court erred in rendering judgment in excess of its $50,000 maximum jurisdictional limit.

Not only did the trial court’s judgment exceed the trial court’s maximum jur[491]*491isdictional limit, but it also failed to conform to Pomerantz’s pleading. See Tex. R.Civ.P. 301. A trial court cannot render judgment for an amount in excess of what the plaintiff requested in his last pleading. Thate v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 595 S.W.2d 591, 601 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980, writ dism’d). To obtain a judgment for damages in excess of what he last pleaded, a plaintiff may seek to amend his pleading to conform to the evidence proved at trial or the verdict rendered by the jury. Tex.R.Civ.P. 63, 66; Greenhalgh v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 938, 940-41 (Tex.1990).

Pomerantz’s last live pleading requested “not less than” $49,860 in damages. Pom-erantz did not seek a post-verdict amendment increasing his damages to conform to the jury verdict of $125,000 in damages. We sustain the first point of error. Accordingly, we modify the judgment of the trial court to reduce the damages Pomer-antz recovers from $125,000 to $49,860, excluding interest.

Because of our disposition of Picon’s first point, it is not necessary to address its final two points. As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

BURNETT, J., dissenting.

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Picon Transportation, Inc. v. Pomerantz
814 S.W.2d 489 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
814 S.W.2d 489, 1991 WL 141017, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/picon-transportation-inc-v-pomerantz-texapp-1991.