Donald LeClair v. Arthur Wood

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 1, 2005
• Docket: 10-04-00232-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-04-00232-CV

DONALD LE CLAIR,

                                                                      Appellant

 v.

Arthur Wood,

                                                                      Appellee

From the 258th District Court

Polk County, Texas

Trial Court # 21040

MEMORANDUM  Opinion

Introduction

          Appellant Donald Le Clair, an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), at the Polunsky Unit in Livingston, Texas, filed a pro se suit in forma pauperis against Appellee Arthur Wood in state district court.  Le Clair alleged that Wood, who at the time was a TDCJ extortion investigator at the Polunsky Unit, wrongfully confiscated Le Clair’s typewriter and typewriter accessories.  Le Clair sued Wood under the Texas Theft Liability Act, Chapter 134 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, asserting damages in the amount of $314.05, the alleged value of the confiscated property.

          Initially, the trial court dismissed the suit, but when Le Clair filed a motion for reconsideration that pointed out that his suit met the procedural requirements of Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governing inmate litigation, the trial court granted his motion and reinstated the suit.

          Wood then filed a “Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Chapter Fourteen.”  The trial court dismissed the suit as frivolous under Chapter 14.  This appeal followed.

          In his first two issues, Le Clair complains that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his case, and his third issue complains of fundamental error in the State’s providing legal representation to Wood.

Background

          Le Clair’s complaint (petition) and brief indicate that, after a disciplinary hearing for allegedly violating TDCJ rules by (1) trafficking and trading, (2) operating an unlawful business within TDCJ, and (3) possession of three bags of commissary coffee, Le Clair was punished with

·        reduction in class

·        240-days’ loss of earned good time (modified to 180 days)

·        45-days’ recreation restriction

·        45-days’ commissary restriction, and

·        45 hours of extra duty (modified to 42 hours).

According to Le Clair, the disciplinary proceeding was investigated by Wood after a mailroom censor alerted prison authorities to a letter addressed to another inmate that contained a $200 money order payable to Le Clair.  Wood impounded Le Clair’s inmate trust account and investigated Le Clair.

          After the disciplinary hearing, Le Clair returned to his minimum security cell, and about an hour after the disciplinary hearing, Wood showed up, confiscated Le Clair’s typewriter and typewriter accessories, and gave Le Clair a confiscation receipt.  The next day, Wood told Le Clair that he had just finished talking to “Step 2” people and that they authorized the typewriter and accessory confiscation.  In his brief, Le Clair alleges that Wood took his typewriter and accessories and also forfeited Le Clair’s $525 trust account in retaliation for Le Clair’s filing of grievances against Wood.  Le Clair did not plead a claim relating to the alleged trust account forfeiture.

          Le Clair completed Steps 1 and 2 of the TDCJ grievance procedure.  The Step 1 grievance response stated that Le Clair’s property had been confiscated for unauthorized usage and that Le Clair needed to contact the property officer to see how much postage it would take to have the property mailed and that the property would be destroyed if the postage was not received within sixty days.  The Step 2 grievance response stated that it was well documented that Le Clair had used his typewriter in the commission of several rules violations and that the confiscation was appropriate.

Le Clair then filed this suit against Wood under the Texas Theft Liability Act, Chapter 134 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, asserting damages in the amount of $314.05, the value of the confiscated property.  The gist of his claim is that the typewriter and typewriter accessories confiscation was wrongful because the confiscation was not one of the punishments assessed at the disciplinary hearing and that Wood wrongfully acted on his own and without authority in confiscating the property.

Jurisdiction

Wood filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the trial court with this motion to dismiss, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Le Clair pled damages of only $314.05.  Rather than addressing Wood’s jurisdictional plea, the trial court dismissed his claim as frivolous under Chapter 14.

Subject matter jurisdiction is essential for a court to have authority to decide a case.  Texas Ass’n Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993).  Subject matter jurisdiction is never presumed, and it cannot be waived.  Id. at 443.  An appellate court may address sua sponte the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 445-46.  Because subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is de novo.  See Mayhew v. Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998).

The amount in controversy is determined by the plaintiff’s petition.  Picon Transp., Inc. v. Pomerantz, 814 S.W.2d 489, 490 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied) (citing Richardson v. First Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 419 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex. 1967)).  Le Clair is suing Wood for $314.05, the alleged value of his typewriter and typewriter accessories.  This fails to satisfy the $500 amount-in-controversy requirement for district-court subject matter jurisdiction.  See Chapa v. Spivey, 999 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, no pet.) (in inmate suit for property damage of $262.50, court held that district court jurisdiction begins at $500, as a 1985 amendment to the Texas Constitution, art. 5, § 8 and recodification of Texas Government Code § 24.007 did not change minimum jurisdictional amount).

          Because the amount sought by Le Clair was less than $500, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case.  See id.  The trial court should have dismissed Le Clair’s suit for want of jurisdiction without addressing whether his claim was frivolous under Chapter 14.  Wilkerson v. T.D.C.J.-I.D., 2004 WL 3021261 at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 30, 2004, no pet.) (holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction of inmate suit that sought $30.92 for property damage).

Conclusion

          Our jurisdiction of the merits of an appeal extends no further than that of the trial court from which the appeal is taken.  Ward v. Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 269 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied); Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Funds Recovery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied).  Because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we do not address the merits of Le Clair’s issues in this appeal  Wilkerson, 2004 WL 3021261 at *2.  Instead, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal order and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.  Id.; Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(e).

            We note that Le Clair owes fees in this case.  Because he proceeded in forma pauperis in the trial court, our attempt to collect fees would essentially be a waste of our resources.  Absent a specific exemption, the Clerk of the Court must collect filing fees at the time a document is presented for filing.  Tex. R. App. P. 12.1(b); Appendix to Tex. R. App. P., Order Regarding Fees (July 21, 1998); see also Tex. R. App. P. 5; 10th Tex. App. (Waco) Loc. R. 6; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 51.207(b), 51.901 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).  Under these circumstances, we suspend the rule and order the Clerk to write off all unpaid filing fees in this case.  Tex. R. App. P. 2.

BILL VANCE

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Reyna

Vacated and dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed June 1, 2005

[CV06]