[773]*773O’Hara, J.
This is an appeal of right by plaintiff1 from an adverse summary judgment. Such a judgment, as the opinions of appellate courts in this state show, is becoming increasingly rara avis.
The case arises out of an injury to a minor plaintiff who was using a slide in the defendant’s playground which was immediately adjacent to the school proper. The record rests in part upon a stipulation of fact, and in part upon the testimonial record. The child was seriously and painfully injured. It cannot be gainsaid that absent the doctrine of governmental immunity defendant might well have been subject to a summary judgment against it on the question of liability, leaving only the assessment of damages to the jury. Here is what happened.
The minor’s parents were visiting in Manistique, a charming community in the Upper Peninsula nestled tight on the shore of Lake Michigan. The plaintiffs injury occurred on July 17, 1971. The defendant school was closed for the summer vacation. No classes were being conducted. The playground was unattended, unfenced, and completely accessible. The child was not a trespasser. The doctrine of attractive nuisance is inapplicable. Plaintiff was some 11 or 12 years old when injured. He climbed up the slide and slid down in the fashion in which the slide would be expected to be used. The sideboards of the slide were wooden, attesting to its venerable vintage. They were in disrepair, with ragged slivers projecting. Plaintiff sliding down, caught an 11-inch sliver in his thigh. He was rushed to the hospital. Emergency surgery was required to remove the sliver. The treating physician, with commendable and [774]*774understandable concern, called the city police. The slide was immediately cordoned off. The following day the slide was knocked down. It had been imbedded in a concrete footing. The remnants were hauled away to the city dump.2
The trial judge favored us with a terse but comprehensive written opinion. He found first that conducting a school is a governmental function. He pointed out that under the traditional tests the maintenance of the playground by the school was not proprietary in nature because it was not conducted for profit or for the school’s private advantage or emolument. He held that the purchase of public liability insurance by the school did not constitute a waiver of any of its defenses under the governmental immunity doctrine for the simple reason that the Legislature by statute said so.3 Finally, he found that the slide, though anchored to the realty by concrete, was not a "building” within the contemplation of the statute4 and thus no exception to the shield of governmental immunity. He faced and answered every basis for recovery by plaintiff save one which we will discuss in detail later herein.
The controlling statutory enactment provides:
"Except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107).
The other applicable statutory excerpt here involved reads:
[775]*775"The existence of any policy of insurance indemnifying any governmental agency against liability for damages is not a waiver of any defense otherwise available to the governmental agency in the defense of the claim.” MCLA 691.1409; MSA 3.996(109).
We will address ourselves to the grounds of appeal asserted. We do not treat them in the order chosen by plaintiff in his brief because some call for more decisional discussion than others. We note at this point also that there is no useful service to trial bench or bar by launching into an historical analysis of opinions of by-gone days dealing with the turbulent course of governmental immunity in this state. We take the law as we find it today and leave the discussion of "trends” and legal-philosophical preferences to jurisprudential academia and our Supreme Court. Such we think is the proper role of an intermediate appellate court in situations where clear statutory enactments (not unconstitutional) and decisions of the Supreme Court prevail. This irrespective of our own views to the contrary.
So we take up the specifications of error. The first one we discuss is a two-in-one question. First, says plaintiff, if we hold that the defense of governmental immunity is not waived by the purchase of general liability insurance, then in that event, defendant’s employees are liable for their own negligent acts dehors the shield, of immunity.
It seems to us that the stated question contains a non seguitur. We are unable to relate part one causally or sequentially to part two. We answer thus.
As to part one, no, defendant did not waive any immunity by the purchase of liability insurance because the statute says so in language so clear and unequivocal that discussion is not warranted. [776]*776As to part two, while the school may be immune, the agent or servants might well be personally liable. We do not discuss this nor decide it. The agents or servants, whoever they may be, were not designated defendants. No specific allegations of negligence against any particular person functioning in a representative capacity are made. No such party is a named defendant. The issue simply isv. not before us.
We reject plaintiffs argument that the slide in question was a "building” within the statutory exemptions. We read this exemption to mean that in the present-day complex relationship between citizens and governmental agencies the citizen must of necessity go into public buildings for an infinity of reasons. He must do so to get a permit to put an addition on his house, to license his dog, to pay certain of his tax bills, even in some cases to build a bonfire in his backyard. This, we think, is the reason the Legislature required that public buildings be safely maintained. We do not believe that in the usual commonly accepted sense of the term a slide in a playground,'anchored in concrete or not, is a public "building”, statutorily speaking, and we so hold.
Now comes the most complex of the assignments of error and the one most difficult of solution. Plaintiff contends that the operation of a school is undoubtedly a governmental function. However, he argues the maintenance of a playground in vacation periods when no classes are in session and no enrolled students are using the playground as an incident to the regular school curriculum for physical training or recreation, is not. As a subdivision of this argument plaintiff urges that there is nothing sacrosanct about the traditional division of the activities of an agency of the state into [777]*777governmental and proprietary functions only. In effect, plaintiff contends there is a gray area which does not possess all the necessary components of either. This, says plaintiff, comes about because the function can vary both in point of time and with the relationship of the injured to the agency. Plaintiff’s brief suggests that both these distinguishing characteristics exist in the relationship between plaintiff and the school in the case at bar. First, says plaintiff, because the injured child in this case is a non-enrolled student in defendant school and a stranger to the governmental function of that school.
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[773]*773O’Hara, J.
This is an appeal of right by plaintiff1 from an adverse summary judgment. Such a judgment, as the opinions of appellate courts in this state show, is becoming increasingly rara avis.
The case arises out of an injury to a minor plaintiff who was using a slide in the defendant’s playground which was immediately adjacent to the school proper. The record rests in part upon a stipulation of fact, and in part upon the testimonial record. The child was seriously and painfully injured. It cannot be gainsaid that absent the doctrine of governmental immunity defendant might well have been subject to a summary judgment against it on the question of liability, leaving only the assessment of damages to the jury. Here is what happened.
The minor’s parents were visiting in Manistique, a charming community in the Upper Peninsula nestled tight on the shore of Lake Michigan. The plaintiffs injury occurred on July 17, 1971. The defendant school was closed for the summer vacation. No classes were being conducted. The playground was unattended, unfenced, and completely accessible. The child was not a trespasser. The doctrine of attractive nuisance is inapplicable. Plaintiff was some 11 or 12 years old when injured. He climbed up the slide and slid down in the fashion in which the slide would be expected to be used. The sideboards of the slide were wooden, attesting to its venerable vintage. They were in disrepair, with ragged slivers projecting. Plaintiff sliding down, caught an 11-inch sliver in his thigh. He was rushed to the hospital. Emergency surgery was required to remove the sliver. The treating physician, with commendable and [774]*774understandable concern, called the city police. The slide was immediately cordoned off. The following day the slide was knocked down. It had been imbedded in a concrete footing. The remnants were hauled away to the city dump.2
The trial judge favored us with a terse but comprehensive written opinion. He found first that conducting a school is a governmental function. He pointed out that under the traditional tests the maintenance of the playground by the school was not proprietary in nature because it was not conducted for profit or for the school’s private advantage or emolument. He held that the purchase of public liability insurance by the school did not constitute a waiver of any of its defenses under the governmental immunity doctrine for the simple reason that the Legislature by statute said so.3 Finally, he found that the slide, though anchored to the realty by concrete, was not a "building” within the contemplation of the statute4 and thus no exception to the shield of governmental immunity. He faced and answered every basis for recovery by plaintiff save one which we will discuss in detail later herein.
The controlling statutory enactment provides:
"Except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107).
The other applicable statutory excerpt here involved reads:
[775]*775"The existence of any policy of insurance indemnifying any governmental agency against liability for damages is not a waiver of any defense otherwise available to the governmental agency in the defense of the claim.” MCLA 691.1409; MSA 3.996(109).
We will address ourselves to the grounds of appeal asserted. We do not treat them in the order chosen by plaintiff in his brief because some call for more decisional discussion than others. We note at this point also that there is no useful service to trial bench or bar by launching into an historical analysis of opinions of by-gone days dealing with the turbulent course of governmental immunity in this state. We take the law as we find it today and leave the discussion of "trends” and legal-philosophical preferences to jurisprudential academia and our Supreme Court. Such we think is the proper role of an intermediate appellate court in situations where clear statutory enactments (not unconstitutional) and decisions of the Supreme Court prevail. This irrespective of our own views to the contrary.
So we take up the specifications of error. The first one we discuss is a two-in-one question. First, says plaintiff, if we hold that the defense of governmental immunity is not waived by the purchase of general liability insurance, then in that event, defendant’s employees are liable for their own negligent acts dehors the shield, of immunity.
It seems to us that the stated question contains a non seguitur. We are unable to relate part one causally or sequentially to part two. We answer thus.
As to part one, no, defendant did not waive any immunity by the purchase of liability insurance because the statute says so in language so clear and unequivocal that discussion is not warranted. [776]*776As to part two, while the school may be immune, the agent or servants might well be personally liable. We do not discuss this nor decide it. The agents or servants, whoever they may be, were not designated defendants. No specific allegations of negligence against any particular person functioning in a representative capacity are made. No such party is a named defendant. The issue simply isv. not before us.
We reject plaintiffs argument that the slide in question was a "building” within the statutory exemptions. We read this exemption to mean that in the present-day complex relationship between citizens and governmental agencies the citizen must of necessity go into public buildings for an infinity of reasons. He must do so to get a permit to put an addition on his house, to license his dog, to pay certain of his tax bills, even in some cases to build a bonfire in his backyard. This, we think, is the reason the Legislature required that public buildings be safely maintained. We do not believe that in the usual commonly accepted sense of the term a slide in a playground,'anchored in concrete or not, is a public "building”, statutorily speaking, and we so hold.
Now comes the most complex of the assignments of error and the one most difficult of solution. Plaintiff contends that the operation of a school is undoubtedly a governmental function. However, he argues the maintenance of a playground in vacation periods when no classes are in session and no enrolled students are using the playground as an incident to the regular school curriculum for physical training or recreation, is not. As a subdivision of this argument plaintiff urges that there is nothing sacrosanct about the traditional division of the activities of an agency of the state into [777]*777governmental and proprietary functions only. In effect, plaintiff contends there is a gray area which does not possess all the necessary components of either. This, says plaintiff, comes about because the function can vary both in point of time and with the relationship of the injured to the agency. Plaintiff’s brief suggests that both these distinguishing characteristics exist in the relationship between plaintiff and the school in the case at bar. First, says plaintiff, because the injured child in this case is a non-enrolled student in defendant school and a stranger to the governmental function of that school. Thus, argues plaintiff, as to him the maintenance of the playground is nongovernmental, and its maintenance falls into a new category which should be designated a "nonessential” governmental function. As such, plaintiff contends the school would be denied the shield of immunity.
Second, plaintiff asserts that because classes had been suspended completely for the summer vacation, not to resume until fall, the school could not be exercising a governmental function because it was not functioning at all. In support of both contentions plaintiff adverts to statutes, to case law, and to learned law review articles. The argument cannot be taken lightly. In Daszkiewicz v Board of Education, 301 Mich 212, 223; 3 NW 2d 71, 75-76 (1942), the formula for ascertaining whether a particular function is governmental or proprietary is stated thus:
"The test for determining whether a particular activity engaged in by a public corporation is purely a governmental function or is proprietary in nature is stated in Gunther v Cheboygan County Road Commissioners, 225 Mich 619, 621; 196 NW 386, 387 (1923), as follows:
[778]*778" 'The underlying test is whether the act is for the common good of all without the element of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit. If it is, there is no liability; if it is not, there may be liability. That it may be undertaken voluntarily and not under compulsion of statute is not of consequence.’ ”5
The test is sound enough. The question is whether it is comprehensive enough. Is there indeed, as plaintiff claims, something in between? The test has two components. One is the presence of the common good of all. The other is the absence of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit to the governmental agency involved.
It is manifest that defendant school received no corporate benefit from the maintenance of the school playground. It is equally manifest that it derived no pecuniary profit from the operation thereof. By any test of which we are aware, defendant was not engaged in a proprietary function.
What then of the governmental function test. Was the maintenance of the playground for the common good? We think it was. The question plaintiff raises, however, is "common” to and for whom. In this case should it be limited to the Manistique school district, whatever that includes? Or should it include the residents of Ferndale, 400 odd miles away? If the playground was maintained for the common good of Manistique and its environs, how does that "common good” extend to plaintiff in this case?
Because of the legislative-judicial badminton game with governmental immunity as the shuttle[779]*779cock it is of very doubtful value to discuss past decisions and former statutes. At present the legislature is ahead. It spoke statutorily in the two statutes which we adverted to earlier herein. It also addressed itself to what had long been regarded as a judicial prerogative, namely, defining what a proprietary function is.6 The contest may not yet be over. We note leave has been granted in a published per curiam opinion by this Court released March 22, 1973, which affirmed a summary judgment against a plaintiff suing an agency of government.7 The grounds of appeal contain another constitutional challenge to the legislative declaration of governmental immunity. Whatever the outcome of that case, our task at this point is to decide this lawsuit on its facts and upon its briefed issues.
We think we know what the Legislature meant when it said quite explicitly and clearly "except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function”.
We think it meant that the defendant school was immune from suits against it for tortious acts as long as it was not doing something for its own corporate benefit or for its pecuniary profit. The defendant was doing neither here.
This is not to say that we don’t think it is a crying shame that a blameless youngster is seriously injured on a manifestly negligently maintained slide. This the more so because he was using it almost as an invitee and in the manner in [780]*780which the slide was designed to be used. I speak for the panel when I say that if we could find in judicial conscience some way to submit his claim to a jury we would do so, and require the defendant’s insurer to respond if damages were assessed. After all that’s what the insurer collected premiums for.
This panel is, however, painfully aware that to permit the suit to be maintained to judgment we would have to strike down two statutes that seem to us to be within the constitutional competence of the Legislature to enact. Otherwise we have to carve out an exception that would be more sympathetic than real. With recorded reluctance we affirm. No costs. The case involves the construction of a statute.
Bashara, J., concurred.