Phillips v. Town of Brookhaven

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Phillips v. Town of Brookhaven

216 A.D.2d 374, 628 N.Y.S.2d 723, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6270

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 12, 1995

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 216 A.D.2d 374 (Phillips v. Town of Brookhaven) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Phillips v. Town of Brookhaven, 216 A.D.2d 374, 628 N.Y.S.2d 723, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6270 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that the rezoning of the plaintiffs’ property is unconstitutional, invalid, illegal, and void, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Werner, J.), dated May 1, 1992, which [375]*375denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof which denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the defendants’ motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

We agree with the Supreme Court’s conclusions sustaining the majority of the plaintiffs’ causes of action since they generally state cognizable claims for relief stemming from the rezoning of the plaintiffs’ property from business to residential (see, e.g., Detmer v Acampora, 207 AD2d 477). However, we agree with the defendants that the fourth cause of action is defective since it purports to allege a violation of the Sherman AntiTrust Act (15 USC § 1 et seq.). Even assuming that the rezoning was intended to promote established businesses by limiting competition from new shopping centers, such would not give rise to claims cognizable under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (see, City of Columbia v Omni Outdoor Adv., 499 US 365). Insofar as the plaintiffs attempt to challenge the rezoning upon grounds that the defendants violated the provisions of Environmental Conservation Law article 8 (SEQRA), these claims should have been brought in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, which is now time barred (see, Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193; Detmer v Acampora, supra).

We reject the contention of the individual defendants that the plaintiffs’ causes of action to recover damages pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 against them in their individual capacities are barred by the doctrine of legislative immunity. This issue was never raised before the Supreme Court, and it cannot be determined on the instant record that the individual defendants were acting exclusively in a legislative capacity, which is required for immunity to attach (see, Detmer v Acampora, 207 AD2d 475, 476, supra; see also, Donivan v Dallastown Borough, 835 F2d 486, cert denied sub nom. McKinsey v Donivan, 485 US 1035). Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Santucci and Florio, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that the rezoning of the plaintiffs’ property is unconstitutional, invalid, illegal, and void, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Werner, J.), dated May 1, 1992, which [375]*375denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof which denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the defendants’ motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

We agree with the Supreme Court’s conclusions sustaining the majority of the plaintiffs’ causes of action since they generally state cognizable claims for relief stemming from the rezoning of the plaintiffs’ property from business to residential (see, e.g., Detmer v Acampora, 207 AD2d 477). However, we agree with the defendants that the fourth cause of action is defective since it purports to allege a violation of the Sherman AntiTrust Act (15 USC § 1 et seq.). Even assuming that the rezoning was intended to promote established businesses by limiting competition from new shopping centers, such would not give rise to claims cognizable under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (see, City of Columbia v Omni Outdoor Adv., 499 US 365). Insofar as the plaintiffs attempt to challenge the rezoning upon grounds that the defendants violated the provisions of Environmental Conservation Law article 8 (SEQRA), these claims should have been brought in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, which is now time barred (see, Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193; Detmer v Acampora, supra).

We reject the contention of the individual defendants that the plaintiffs’ causes of action to recover damages pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 against them in their individual capacities are barred by the doctrine of legislative immunity. This issue was never raised before the Supreme Court, and it cannot be determined on the instant record that the individual defendants were acting exclusively in a legislative capacity, which is required for immunity to attach (see, Detmer v Acampora, 207 AD2d 475, 476, supra; see also, Donivan v Dallastown Borough, 835 F2d 486, cert denied sub nom. McKinsey v Donivan, 485 US 1035). Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Santucci and Florio, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

216 A.D.2d 374, 628 N.Y.S.2d 723, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6270, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/phillips-v-town-of-brookhaven-nyappdiv-1995.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack