Philip Lorenzo Gallagher v. Director of Revenue

487 S.W.3d 24, 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 145, 2016 WL 720619
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 23, 2016
DocketED102720
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 487 S.W.3d 24 (Philip Lorenzo Gallagher v. Director of Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Philip Lorenzo Gallagher v. Director of Revenue, 487 S.W.3d 24, 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 145, 2016 WL 720619 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., Presiding Judge

The Director of Revenue appeals from the judgment of the trial court reinstating the driving privileges of Philip Gallagher, which were suspended after his arrest for driving while intoxicated. The Director argues that the trial court erred in excluding from evidence the breath sample results showing Gallagher’s blood alcohol content (“BAC”) was over the legal limit. We agree, and therefore reverse and remand. 1

*26 Gallagher was arrested for driving while intoxicated after a traffic stop, during which he performed poorly on field sobriety tests, displayed some indicia of intoxication and told the arresting officer he had “drank a lot.” He agreed to provide a breath sample on an Aleo Sensor IV breath analyzer, the results of which showed his BAC was .152 percent, well over the legal limit of .08 percent. His license was suspended, and Gallagher filed a petition for a trial de novo.

At trial, Gallagher objected to the admission of the breath sample results on the ground that the compressed ethanol-gas mixture used to maintain the breath analyzer was not provided from an approved supplier under Department of Health and Senior Services regulations. On the maintenance report, the inspecting officer had listed “Intoximeters” in the box labeled “Standard Supplier” of the gas mixture. Intoximeters, Inc. is an approved supplier under the regulation. See 19 CSR 25-30.051(6), The certificate of analysis accompanying that report indicated that the gas mixture was manufactured by Airgas Mid America and listed Intoximeters as Airgas’s customer. " The trial court found that Airgas was not an approved supplier under the regulation. The trial court reasoned that because Intoximeters did not manufacture the gas mixture, and instead merely served as a “middleman” between the manufacturer and law enforcement, In-toximeters was not the supplier. On that basis, it excluded the breath sample results and — there being no admissible evidence of Gallagher’s BAC — ordered the Director to remove the suspension and reinstate his driving privileges. This appeal follows.

The Director has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case for suspension of a driver’s license by- introducing evidence that there was probable cause for arresting the driver for an alcohol-related offense and that the driver’s BAC exceeded the legal limit of .08 percent. McGough v. Director of Revenue, 462 S.W.3d 459, 462 (Mo.App.E.D.2015). To establish that a driver’s BAC was over the legal limit, the Director may introduce evidence of the results of a breath analyzer test. Id, To lay a foundation for admission of those results, the Director must establish that the test was performed using the approved techniques and methods of the Department of Health and Senior Services, by an operator holding a valid permit and on equipment and devices approved by the Department. Id. ■.

The Department has promulgated regulations regarding the maintenance of breath analyzers that must be followed in order for the results taken from-that machine to be admissible at trial. In relevant part, they provide that the “[c]ompressed ethanol-gas standard "mixtures used to verify and calibrate evidential breath analyzers shall be mixtures provided from approved ' suppliers.” 19 CSR 25-30.051(5). There are four "approved suppliers listed in the regulation, including Intoximeters; Airgas is not an approved supplier. 19 CSR 25-30.051(6). The Director argues that this regulation does not require that the gas mixture be manufactured by one of the approved suppliers listed therein, only that the gas mixture be provided to law enforcement from one of those approved suppliers. Although Airgas manufactured the gas mixture in this case, Intoximeters v?as clearly listed on the maintenance re *27 port as the supplier. Therefore, the Director contends, the trial court incorrectly concluded that because Intoximeters was not the manufacturer, it was not the supplier. We agree.

Because the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence was based solely on interpretation of this regulation, the issue before us is a question of law that we review de novo. See MeGough, 462 S.W.3d at 462. Administrative regulations are interpreted under the same principles of construction as statutes. Id. Qur goal is to ascertain the agency’s intent and give effect thereto by considering the plain meaning of the words used in the regulation. Missouri Title Loans, Inc. v. City of St. Louis Board of Adjustment, 62 S.W.3d 408, 414 (Mo.App.E.D.2001). We conclude that the plain meaning of “provided from approved suppliers” requires only proof that the entity that provided the gas mixture to law enforcement was an approved supplier; there is no further requirement of proof regarding the manufacturer or any other entity in the chain of supply.

The regulation refers only to the suppliers that provide the gas mixture and says nothing about manufacturers. See 19 CSR 25-30.051(5)-(6). We must presume this choice of wording is not meaningless. See State Board of Registration for Healing Arts v. Boston, 72 S.W.3d 260, 265 (Mo. App.W.D.2002). Choosing the word “supplier” and not “manufacturer” is important because suppliers and manufacturers are distinct entities. A “supplier” is one “engaged, directly or indirectly, in making a product available to consumers”; it “may be the seller, the manufacturer, or anyone else in the chain [that] makes the product available to the consumer.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). .On the other hand, a manufacturer is one “engaged in producing or assembling new products.” Id. Thus, Intoximeters need not have produced the product it provided in order to be considered a supplier under the regulations. It may be reasonable in some eases to infer that if a certain entity manufactured the product, it also supplied it to law enforcement. See, e.g., Selix v. Director of Revenue, 985 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Mo.App.E.D.1999). But here no such inference is necessary — nor would it be reasonable to draw one — because there was evidence to the contrary. The evidence showed that the gas mixture was manufactured by Airgas, which then sold it to its customer, Intoximeters. Then Intoxime-ters supplied the gas mixture to law enforcement, the ultimate consumer of this product. The trial court erred in concluding that because it did not manufacture the gas mixture, Intoximeters could not be deemed the supplier. There is simply no support for that conclusion in the plain language of the regulation.

The evolution of this regulation also demonstrates that the manufacturer of the material used to verify and calibrate the breath analyzer is no longer relevant for purpose of laying a foundation for the admission of results from that machine.

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Bluebook (online)
487 S.W.3d 24, 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 145, 2016 WL 720619, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/philip-lorenzo-gallagher-v-director-of-revenue-moctapp-2016.