Samuel Hiester v. Director of Revenue

488 S.W.3d 678, 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 150, 2016 WL 720675
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 23, 2016
DocketED102985
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 488 S.W.3d 678 (Samuel Hiester v. Director of Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Samuel Hiester v. Director of Revenue, 488 S.W.3d 678, 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 150, 2016 WL 720675 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

ROY L. RICHTER, Judge

Samuel Hiester (“Driver”) appeals from the trial court’s judgment, following a trial de novo, sustaining the Director of Revenue’s (“Director’s”) decision to suspend Driver’s license for driving with a blood-alcohol concentration (“BAC”) of 0.08 percent or more, in violation of Section 302.505.1, RSMo (2000). We affirm. 1

I. Background

Driver was arrested upon probable cause to believe he was driving while intoxicated on August 6, 2014. Driver consented to submit to a breath test on an Intox DMT breath analyzer 2 and the results showed his BAC was .164 percent, more than double the. legal limit of .08 percent. This led the Director to suspend Driver’s license, and Driver filed a petition for a trial de novo.

■ At trial, Driver argued the results of the breath test should not be admissible as the compressed ethanol-gas mixture (“the Mixture”) used to perform maintenance checks on the Intox DMT was not provided from an approved supplier under Department of Health and Senior Services regulations. The maintenance report reflected that Officer Matthew Loveless, the officer who performed the maintenance check, marked boxes to indicate the “Standard Supplier” of the Mixture was Intoximeters, Inc. (“In-toximeters”). Intoximeters is one of the approved suppliers listed by the Department of Health and Senior Services. See 19 CSR 25.30.051(6). The certificate of *680 analysis of the Mixture, -as well as Officer Loveless’s testimony, indicated that Intox-imeters was the supplier of the mixture and that Airgas USA, LLC (“Airgas”) was the manufacturer.

The trial court found Officer Loveless’s testimony credible, and in its judgment found .that the regulations “do not make a distinction between supplier and manufacturer. ...” Thus, the trial court found the results of the breath test admissible, and ultimately sustained the Director’s suspension of Driver’s license. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

In his sole point on appeal, Driver argues the trial court erred in overruling Driver’s objection to the admission of his breath test results because the- Director failed to establish the statutory compliance necessary to make the test admissible. Driver claims the Mixture used as the breath analyzer , accuracy standard in the maintenance check of the equipment used was not “provided from” the proper company. •.

Standard of Review

Upon appeal from a court-tried case, we will affirm the trial court’s judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the.evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 307-08 (Mo. banc 2010) (citing Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)).

“The nature of our review is directed by whether the particular issue is a question of fact or law.” Cortner v. Dir. of Revenue, 408 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo. App.EJD. 2013). Driver’s claim involves interpretation of a regulation, and “[a]d-ministrative rules. and regulations are. interpreted under the same principles of construction as statutes.” McGough v. Dir. Of Revenue, 462 S.W.3d 459, 462 (Mo.App.E.D. 2015). Statutory interpretation is a matter of law, which we review de novo. Bender v. Dir. of Revenue, 320 S.W.3d 167, 169 (Mo.App.E.D. 2010).

Analysis

The Director has the .burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case for suspension of a driver’s license by introducing .evidence that there was probable cause for arresting the driver for an alcohol-related offense and that the driver’s BAC exceeded the legal limit of .08 percent. McGough, 462 S.W.3d at 462. To establish that a driver’s BAC was over the legal limit, the Director may introduce evidence of the results of a breath analyzer test. Id. To lay a foundation for admission of those results, the Director must establish that the test was performed using the approved techniques and methods of the Department of Health and Senior Services, by an operator holding a valid permit and on equipment and devices approved by the Department. Id.

The Department has promulgated regulations regarding the maintenance of breath analyzers that must be followed in order for the results taken from that machine to be admissible at trial. In relevant part, they provide that the “[cjompressed ethanol-gas standard mixtures used to verify and calibrate evidential breath analyzers shall be- mixtures provided from approved suppliers,” 19 CSR 25-30.051(5). There are four approved suppliers listed in the regulation, including Intoximeters; Airgas is not an approved supplier. 19 CSR 25-30.051(6). Driver argues that the regulation requires the Mixture to not only be provided to law enforcément from one of those four approved suppliers, but' to also be manufactured by one of those four *681 approved suppliers. Driver claims the trial court erred in finding Intoximeters was an approved supplier when it did not manufacture the Mixture. We disagree.

Our goal in interpreting regulations'is to ascertain the agency’s intent and give effect thereto by considering the plain words used. Mo. Title Loans, Inc. v. City of St. Louis Bd. of Adjustment, 62 S.W.3d 408, 414 (Mo.App.E.D. 2001). We conclude that the plain meaning of “provided .from approved suppliers” 'requires only proof that the entity that provided the gas mixture to law enforcement was an approved supplier; there is no further requirement of proof regarding the- manufacturer or any other entity in the chain of supply.

The regulation refers only to the suppliers who provide the gas mixture and makes no mention of manufacturers. See 19 CSR 25-30.051(5)-(6). We must presume this choice of wording is not meaningless. See State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. Boston, 72 S.W.3d 260, 265 (Mo.App.W.D. 2002). Choosing the word “supplier” and not “manufacturer” is important because suppliers and manufacturers are distinct entities. A “supplier” is one “engaged, directly or indirectly, in making a product available to consumers”; it “may be the seller, the manufacturer, or anyone else in the chain who makes the product available to the consumer.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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Bluebook (online)
488 S.W.3d 678, 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 150, 2016 WL 720675, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/samuel-hiester-v-director-of-revenue-moctapp-2016.