Opinion by Judge GRABER; Dissent by Judge FERNANDEZ.
GRABER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is the latest chapter in a protracted saga centered around a 43-foot-high Latin cross that stands atop Mt. Soledad in San Diego, California. In an earlier chapter, we held that the presence of the cross in a publicly owned park violates the California Constitution, and we therefore affirmed an injunction forbidding the city from maintaining the cross on public land. In this chapter, we hold that the way in which the City of San Diego sold the cross to a private entity, which now maintains the cross, also violates the California Constitution. Because both the constitutional infirmity and the injunction remain in place, we return the case to the district court to write the next installment.
BACKGROUND
The City of San Diego (City) owns Mt. Soledad, a 170-acre parcel of land that was dedicated to public use in 1916 as “Mt. Soledad Natural Park.” Although most of the park is undeveloped and is maintained in its natural state, the top of the mountain has been cleared. The cross in question, which is constructed of concrete, stands in the center of the clearing where it was erected by the Mt. Soledad Memorial Association (Association) in 1954.
This cross is the third that has stood atop Mt. Soledad. The first was constructed by private citizens out of redwood in 1913. Vandals destroyed it in 1924. In 1934, someone replaced it with a cross made of wood and stucco. A windstorm destroyed that cross in 1952.
The San Diego City Council then granted permission to the Association to construct the current cross. In 1954, in a religious service held on Easter Sunday, the Association dedicated the cross as a tribute to veterans of World War I, World War II, and the Korean Conflict. The Association maintains the cross and obtains a permit from the City each year to host an Easter service at the cross. The cross also has been the site of weddings and baptisms. Although the Association has paid for most of the maintenance costs associated with the cross, public funds have been expended to maintain it as well.
Plaintiff Philip K. Paulson initiated this action in 1989, seeking to enjoin the City from allowing the Mt. Soledad cross to remain on public land. In 1991, the district court ruled that the presence of the cross in a publicly owned park violates the No Preference Clause of the California [1126] Constitution, article I, section 4. Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F.Supp. 1420, 1438 (S.D.Cal.1991), aff'd sub nom. Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518 (9th Cir.1993). The court permanently enjoined the presence of the cross on publicly owned land. In our opinion affirming the injunction, we recognized that the Mt. So-ledad cross, to the extent that it could be characterized accurately as a war memorial, was “[a] sectarian war memorial candying] an inherently religious message and creat[ing] an appearance of honoring only those servicemen of that particular religion.” Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1527.
To remedy the constitutional violation and to comply with the injunction, the City decided to sell the land under the cross to a private organization. In order to accomplish the sale, and acting pursuant to section 55 of the City of San Diego Charter, the City submitted “Proposition F” to the voters in the 1992 election. That proposition provided:
Shall the removal from dedicated park status of that portion of Mt. Soledad Natural Park necessary to maintain the property as an historic war memorial, and the transfer of the same parcel by The City of San Diego to a private nonprofit corporation for not less than fair market value be ratified?
(Emphasis added.)
The City’s mayor and deputy mayor and several City Council members submitted a statement to the Voter Information Pamphlet in support of Proposition F. They explained that the purpose of Proposition F was to authorize the transfer of the land under the Mt. Soledad cross to the Association in order to “SAVE THE CROSS.” The argument described the cross as a “historic landmark and a dedicated war memorial,” and they urged a “YES” vote on the measure to “SAVE THE MOUNT SOLEDAD CROSS. SAVE OUR HISTORY.” The voters approved the measure by a 76 percent majority.
Thereafter, the City sold approximately 222 square feet of land under the cross to the Association, in a negotiated sale for fair market value. Consistent with the statement in support of Proposition F contained in the voter pamphlet, the City sold the land to the Association, which had stated its intention to maintain the cross. The City did not solicit offers or consider proposals from any other prospective purchasers.
In September 1997, ruling on Paulson’s motion to enforce the injunction, the district court held that this method of sale violated the No Preference Clause of article I, section 4, of the California Constitution. Murphy v. Bilbray, No. 90-134, 1997 WL 754604 (S.D.Cal. Sept.18, 1997) (unpublished decision). The court found that the sale complied with the City Charter and other policies governing negotiated sales. Id. at *7-*8. However, the court also found that the City’s failure to consider other prospective buyers created the appearance that the City preferred the Christian religion and that the City’s primary purpose for the sale was to preserve the cross. Id. at *10. The court further ruled that the amount of land sold was too small to remedy the City’s original constitutional violation. Id. at *11. It reasoned that, because the parcel 'of land sold was so small, and was surrounded by land owned and maintained by the City, most visitors would not be aware that the City did not own and maintain the cross. That being so, the City had not remedied the appearance of preference. Id. The court entered an order stating: “Both the method of sale and the amount of land sold underneath the Mt. Soledad cross do not cure the constitutional infirmities outlined in this Court’s previous Order.” Id.
[1127] Following the district court’s 1997 order, the City again attempted to dispose of the land beneath the cross. It expanded the size of the parcel available for purchase to 0.509 acres, and it published a notice that the City was inviting bids on the land. The City arranged for the Association “to quit-claim any property interests it may have in Mt. Soledad Natural Park, through escrow, to a future buyer as authorized by City Council.” In exchange for the Association’s agreement to quitclaim its interests in Mt. Soledad Natural Park, the City authorized an expenditure of $14,500 to refund to the Association its purchase money for the first sale.1 The City received 42 requests for the bid proposal packets.
The introduction to “The City of San Diego’s Invitation for Purchase Proposals!;] Mt. Soledad Memorial Site” stated:
The City of San Diego is inviting proposals from private non-profit corporations interested in purchasing approximately one-half acre of property in the Mt. So-ledad Natural Park for the purpose of maintaining an historic war memorial. The property is presently the site of a large, concrete, Latin cross. The City is neither requiring nor precluding the retention or maintenance of a cross in its invitation for proposals.
(Emphasis added.) The Invitation clarified that the parcel of land for sale included land on which the cross stands. It further informed potential buyers of the Association’s agreement to quitclaim its interests in the parcel for sale.
The Invitation explained that prospective purchasers had to submit four items. First, a proposal was required to include a “summary of the experience of the proposer and its qualifications to maintain the property as an historic war memorial.” (Emphasis added.) The Invitation did not elaborate on what sort of qualifications were relevant to the maintenance of “an historic war memorial.” Second, a proposer was required to submit a financial statement listing the proposer’s current assets and liabilities and establishing the proposer’s “financial ability to fund the full amount of the bid.” Third, a proposer was required to describe the “Proposed Use” in a “[d]etailed outline for the maintenance of an historic war memorial, as authorized in the June, 1992, election.” (Emphasis added.) Fourth and finally, the proposer was asked to submit a $5,000 deposit.
The Invitation outlined the criteria on which proposals would be evaluated:
1. Bid on the sale price.
2. Financial capability.
3. Expertise regarding the proposed use.
4. The use proposed — without regard to whether or not such proposal includes the retention or maintenance of a cross.
The Invitatiomdid not explain how each factor would'be weighted in the selection process, nor did it explain the criteria against which the proposed uses would be measured.
In response to the Invitation, five entities submitted proposals: the Mt. Soledad Memorial Association, Horizon Christian Fellowship, National League for the Separation of Church and State, St. Vincent DePaul Management, and Freedom From Religion Foundation. Three proposers— the Association, Horizon, and St. Vincent DePaul — stated that they intended to retain the current cross as a war memorial. The National League for the Separation of Church and State proposed a memorial to honor veterans and the Bill of Rights. [1128] The Freedom From Religion Foundation proposed a memorial to honor atheists and freethinkers.
Using forms entitled “Proposal Evaluation Notes,” a three-member committee assessed the proposals based on the offer made, the proposer’s financial capability both to fund the bid and to maintain a memorial, the proposer’s experience, the proposer’s operating plan, the proposer’s responsiveness, and “other strengths or weaknesses.” After conducting its review, the committee recommended that the City Council approve the sale to the Association. Speaking to the Gity Council on behalf of the committee, Will Griffith, the City’s Acting Director of the Real Estate Assets Department, reported that the committee had determined that the minimum acceptable bid was $35,000. He then said:
Based on our analysis and, and looking at these four categories, the RFP committee will be making a recommendation to choose the Mt. Soledad Memorial Association. The reason for this is that they put together overall the most comprehensive, well thought out proposal of all of the -bids. Also, their bid price was the highest. Although they did make some statements that $106,000 was going to substantially deplete their reserves in their organization, they haye shown a very strong track record over the 46 years of being involved in the memorial to being able to go out and solicit funds. They have ties with some of the veterans groups and have been able to solicit funds for maintenance of the, of the existing memorial.
The City Council members who were at the meeting voted unanimously to approve the sale to the Association.2
Paulson again brought a motion to enforce the injunction against the presence of the cross. He again argued that the method of sale violated the California Constitution because it favored the Association. He also argued that the amount of land sold was too small to cure the appearance of a preference.
This time, the district court denied Paul-son’s motion. The court concluded that the sale was not structured to prefer the Association, based on its determination that the City had established a “neutral” process for evaluating bids and that the City had sold the land to the Association because it was the highest bidder. Finally, the court held that, because the sale involved an “open and apparently neutral bidding process,” the method of sale “did not violate the California Constitution’s prohibition against the preference of religion.”
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision not to enforce an injunction. Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 12 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir.1993). The district court abuses its discretion if (among other things) it bases its decision on ah erroneous legal standard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact. Id. at 907-08.
We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of state law. Churchill v. F/V Fjord (In re McLinn), 739 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc). When interpreting state law, we are bound to follow the decisions of the state’s highest court. Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1565(9th Cir.1991). ‘When the state supreme court has not spoken on an issue, we must determine what result the court would reach based on state appellate court opinions, statutes and treatises.” Id.
[1129] DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the second sale of the land violates two provisions of the California Constitution: article I, section 4, which guarantees “[f]ree exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference,” and article XVI, section 5, which prohibits aid to “any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose.” The district court recognized that Plaintiff premised his motion to enforce the injunction on those similar, but distinct, constitutional provisions, yet the court failed to analyze the sale separately under each provision. The California Supreme Court has made clear that the determination whether government conduct violates article I, section 4, requires a different analysis from the determination whether the same conduct contravenes article XVI, section 5. See E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. California, 24 Cal.4th 693, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 280, 13 P.3d 1122, 1139-40 (2000) (analyzing the No Preference Clause of article I, section 4, by reference to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), while analyzing article XVI, section 5, under a separate, state-law framework), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1008, 121 S.Ct. 1735, 149 L.Ed.2d 660 (2001). The district court thus made- an error of law (and consequently abused its discretion) when it failed to analyze separately the requirements of article XVI, section 5.3 To address that error, we examine article XVI, section 5, of the California Constitution.
Under California law, “[w]hen construing a constitution, courts view as the paramount consideration the intent of those who enacted the provision at issue. To determine that intent, courts look first to the language of the constitutional text, giving the words their ordinary meaning.” Leone v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 22 Cal.4th 660, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 61, 995 P.2d 191, 194 (2000) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we begin with the constitutional text at issue.
Article XVI, section 5, of the California Constitution4 provides, in pertinent part:
Neither the legislature, nor any county, city and county, township, school district, or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or pay from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or sectarian purpose, or help to support or sustain any school, college, university, hospital, or other institution controlled by any religious creed, church, or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of personal property or real estate ever be made by the state, or any city, city and county, town, or other municipal corporation for any religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever.
(Emphasis added.)
Given the ordinary meaning of those words, the text of the provision has enormous breadth. It is possible for the government’s transfer of “anything” to violate the provision if the transfer is “in aid of’ any “sectarian purpose.” Therefore, all forms'of governmental “aid” are subject to scrutiny. Further, when this provision was adopted in 1879, the term “purpose” commonly meant in this context an “[e]nd; [1130] effect; [or] consequence.” Worcester, Joseph E., A Dictionary of the English Language 1158 (New ed. Supp. 1897). In other words, aid to a sectarian purpose simply meant aid to a sectarian use. Moreover, the section specifically prohibits the transfer of real or personal property for any' “sectarian purpose.”
The relevant California Supreme Court cases confirm our view that the text of article XVI, section 5, is expansive. It “ ‘forbids more than the appropriation or payment of public funds to support sectarian institutions. It bans any official involvement, whatever its form, which has the direct, immediate, and substantial effect of promoting religious purposes.’ ” E. Bay, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 280, 13 P.3d at 1140(quoting Cal. Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 12 Cal.3d 593, 116 Cal.Rptr. 361, 526 P.2d 513, 521 n. 12 (1974)). Indeed, the court has stated that this section is “the definitive statement of the principle of government impartiality in the field of religion.” Priest, 116 Cal.Rptr. 361, 526 P.2d at 520 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). According to the California Supreme Court, this section was intended by its framers “to guarantee that the power, authority, and financial resources of the government shall never be devoted to the advancement or support of religious or sectarian purposes.” Id.
Neither the California Supreme Court nor any California Court of Appeal has considered the application of article XVI, section 5, to facts resembling those presented in this case, even though the decided cases cover a wide range of disparate topics. Nonetheless, we distill three themes from the precedents.
First, article XVI, section 5, is so broad that state or local governments need not provide a financial benefit or tangible aid in order to violate the provision; they violate it by doing no more than lending their “prestige and power” to a “sectarian purpose.” Feminist Women’s Health Ctr., Inc. v. Philibosian, 157 Cal.App.3d 1076, 203 Cal.Rptr. 918, 920-22, 927 (1984) (holding that, although state law authorized the district attorney to dispose of evidentiary fetal tissue by interment, to inter the tissue at a location where a religious memorial ceremony would be held would unconstitutionally “enlist the prestige and power of the state” in the burial ceremony).
Second, even a government act that has a secular purpose can violate article XVI, section 5, if it also has a direct, immediate, and substantial effect of promoting a sectarian purpose. Thus, in Frohliger v. Richardson, 63 Cal.App. 209, 218 P. 497, 500 (1923), the California District Court of Appeal held that article XVI, section 5, bars public aid for the purpose of restoring the California missions, despite the undeniable importance of the missions to the history of California:
We concede that the California missions are of historical and educational interest from a cultural and literary standpoint, but they approach no such classification as would make them the basis of the state’s bounty or the subject of legislative appropriation in the guise of the public interest, public good, or public welfare.
The presence of a financial benefit to the owner of the missions — the Catholic Church — rendered the aid invalid. Id.
Similarly, in County of Los Angeles v. Hollinger, 221 Cal.App.2d 154, 34 Cal.Rptr. 387, 388, 392-93 (1963), the fact that Los Angeles County had a secular purpose- — promoting commerce and tourism— for ordering films of a Christian holiday parade from a parade association did not prevent the contract for the films from violating article XVI, section 5. The arrangement was unconstitutional because the making of the films and the county’s use of them would provide forbidden, “official” support for both the organization and [1131] the religious subject matter of the parade. Id. at 391-92.
Likewise, in California Teachers Ass’n v. Riles, 29 Cal.3d 794, 176 Cal.Rptr. 300, 632 P.2d 953, 964 (1981), the California Supreme Court invalidated a state textbook loan program under article XVI, section 5. Although the program was open to students in all nonprofit, nonpublic schools (not just sectarian schools) and provided the books to the eligible students (not to the schools) the supreme court nevertheless held that the program unconstitutionally aided sectarian schools, because textbooks “are a critical element in enabling the school to carry out its essential mission to teach the students.” Id. at 953 n. 1, 963.
The third and final theme to emerge from the California cases construing article XVI, section 5, is a corollary to the second theme: Government conduct that aids religious or sectarian purposes, but that does not have a direct, immediate, and substantial effect, does not contravene the provision. E. Bay, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 280, 13 P.3d at 1140. The section “does not prohibit indirect, remote, or incidental benefits that have a primary public purpose.” Id. For the purpose of article XVI, section 5, a benefit related to a “primary public purpose” qualifies as “indirect, remote, or incidental” if it is available “on an equal basis” to sectarian and nonsectarian organizations and if it “does not have a substantial effect of supporting religious activities.” Priest, 116 Cal.Rptr. 361, 526 P.2d at 521-22. For example, in Priest, the California Supreme Court upheld a statutory program that permitted colleges— both sectarian and nonsectarian — to borrow money at below-market rates for improvements to their facilities, so long as the relevant facilities were not used for sectarian purposes. Priest, 116 Cal.Rptr. 361, 526 P.2d at. 515, 521-22. The supreme court reasoned that any aid to sectarian purposes was merely incidental to the Act’s primary public purpose of encouraging higher education. Id. at 521.
In the same vein, and relevant to this case, the California Court of Appeal held in Woodland, Hills Homeowners Organization v. Los Angeles Community College District, 218 Cal.App.3d 79, 266 Cal.Rptr. 767, 774 & n. 9, 777 (Ct.App.1990), that the long-term lease of land by a community college district to a synagogue did not violate article XVI, section 5. The court characterized the benefit to the synagogue from the lease as “incidental” to the district’s primary public purpose of making money from the land, in part because “[t]he evidence established that religious and secular groups had equal opportunity to obtain the government benefit.” Id. at 776; see also Christian Sci. Reading Room Jointly Maintained v. City & County of San Francisco, 784 F.2d 1010, 1014, 1016 (9th Cir.), amended by F.2d 124 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that the rental of commercial space in a publicly owned airport for use as a Christian Science reading room did not violate article XVI, section 5, because the benefit to religion qualified as incidental: “[T]here is no suggestion that all religions did not have the same opportunity to rent space, or that groups with views opposed to organized religion, or with any other social or philosophical view, were denied that opportunity.”).
In summary, the California appellate cases make clear that article XVI, section 5, prohibits the government from (1) granting a benefit in any form (2) to any sectarian purpose (3) regardless of the government’s secular purpose (4) unless the benefit is properly characterized as indirect, remote, or incidental. A sectarian benefit that is ancillary to a primary secular purpose may qualify as “incidental” if the benefit is available on an equal basis to those with sectarian and those with secular objectives. With those princi-[1132] pies in mind, we examine whether the second sale of the Mt. Soledad land to the Association violated article XVI, section 5.
In view of our holding in Ellis that the Mt. Soledad cross is a sectarian symbol that conveys a religious message, governmental conduct that operates affirmatively to preserve the cross aids a sectarian purpose: the preservation of a symbol that conveys a specifically Christian message.5 Cf. Frohliger, 218 P. at 500(holding that the “meritorious movement” to restore and preserve Catholic missions could not be accomplished constitutionally through public assistance). The question then becomes whether the manner in which the City structured the sale directly, immediately, and substantially aided the sectarian purpose of preserving the cross. Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1385(9th Cir.1994). Because the structure of the sale provided a financial incentive to maintain the cross, the answer is “yes.”
Here, the City sought to sell the land atop Mt. Soledad for the undeniably appropriate secular purpose of ensuring the presence of a war memorial on the site. California law nevertheless requires us to analyze whether the City’s conduct also aided a sectarian purpose. Complicating matters for the City is the fact that the land for sale is the site of the cross, a sectarian war memorial. In the Invitation, the City made clear that (1) the cross would be conveyed to the purchaser of the land,6 (2) the purchaser could satisfy the condition that the site be used as a war memorial by keeping the cross there, and (3) the highest purchase price and the buyer’s financial capability were keys to a successful bid. The City thereby granted a direct, immediate, and substantial benefit in aid of a Christian message. To those potential buyers who wanted to preserve the cross or convey its message, the City gave away for free an economically valuable means of fulfilling the main condition of the sale. By contrast, to those potential buyers who wanted to construct a nonsectarian war memorial, the City conveyed nothing that would help satisfy the obligation to maintain the site as a war memorial. To the contrary, those purchasers would be saddled with the costs of removing the cross and of constructing an alternative memorial.
The immediacy of the benefit is readily apparent; no further action by anyone stood between the City and the beneficiary of the grant. That the benefit was not merely incidental to the City’s primary secular purpose in conveying the land also is readily apparent. Because the sale was [1133] structured to provide a valuable financial benefit to those supporting the preservation of the cross, it cannot be said that the benefit provided by the sale was available “on an equal basis” to potential buyers who had the purpose of constructing a secular memorial.
That the financial benefit to a bidder proposing to preserve the cross was both direct and substantial is best illustrated by an example. Suppose that two similarly situated bidders — Bidder # 1 and Bidder #2 — each had the minimum acceptable amount of $35,000 to bid on the project, and Bidder # 1 proposed to retain the cross, while Bidder #2 proposed to construct a secular memorial. The structure of the sale ensured that Bidder # 1 would be awarded the land. Bidder # 1 could bid the full $35,000 and still demonstrate the financial capability to maintain a historic war memorial because the City would subsidize the cost of Bidder # l’s proposed memorial by conveying the cross. Bidder #2 could not compete successfully with Bidder #1: If Bidder # 2 matched Bidder # l’s bid, then Bidder # 2 could not demonstrate the financial capability to maintain a historic war memorial, because all of Bidder # 2’s resources would have been dedicated to the bid price, and none would have been reserved to fund removal of the cross and construction of a new memorial. Alternatively, Bidder # 2 could reserve the money needed to remove the cross and construct the new memorial. But that option would eliminate Bidder # 2 from the process, because Bidder # 2’s bid in that instance would fall below the minimum acceptable bid.
In short, by establishing a specified use as a condition of sale (the maintenance of a war memorial) and then providing gratis the means to satisfy that condition to only those bidders who supported the preservation of the cross, the City gave a direct, immediate', and substantial economic incentive to advance a sectarian message. An economic incentive of that kind and magnitude qualifies as aid to a sectarian purpose within the meaning of article XVI, section 5; it enlisted the power and prestige of the City in support of the preservation of the cross, devoted financial resources of the City government to a sectarian purpose, and granted City property for a sectarian purpose.
The effect of the City’s aid to a sectarian purpose is evident, as a practical matter, in the outcome of the sale challenged in this action. Because the Association intended to preserve the cross, and thus had no need to reserve funds for removal or construction costs, it was able to bid $106,-000 — the full extent of its resources. Had the Association not been able to rely on the retention of the cross (at no cost) to satisfy the condition that the site be maintained as a war memorial, its bid necessarily would have been lower. Although we cannot tell from the record whether the bid ultimately would have been less than the bids of those who proposed a secular memorial, the advantage to the Association of being able to expend the entirety of its resources on the bid price, while still being able to meet the other criteria for sale, was direct, immediate, and substantial.
CONCLUSION
The second sale of the Mt. Soledad land on which the cross stands was structured to provide a direct, immediate, and substantial financial advantage to bidders who had the sectarian purpose of preserving the cross. For that reason, the sale violated article XVI, section 5, of the California Constitution.7
[1134] No doubt there are several possible ways to cure this violation. We leave it to the parties and to the district court, in the first instance, to devise a remedy for the constitutional violation that we identified in Ellis.
REVERSED and REMANDED.