IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
PHILIP AMMONS, No. 88250-3-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, a Washington corporation; CARMEN D’ARCANGELO, individually and as agent; LIDDY WENDELL, individually and as agent; ELIZABETH HANLEY, individually and as agent, DOES 1-4,
Respondents.
DÍAZ, J. — Philip Ammons sued the law firm Schroeter Goldmark & Bender
(SGB) after it rescinded an offer of employment. He now argues the trial court
erred by granting SGB’s motion to dismiss his claims. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2024, Ammons responded to a job posting for a litigation
paralegal position with SGB and participated in two interviews. On or around
December 12, SGB made a written offer of employment. In relevant part, the letter
stated, “Employment at the firm is ‘at will’ meaning there is no guaranteed duration
of employment and either party is free to end the relationship at any time for any
cause or for no cause at all.” Four days later, SGB notified Ammons that it was
rescinding its offer based on information it received during the reference check No. 88250-3-I/2
process.
Two weeks thereafter, Ammons filed suit, bringing claims for breach of
contract, fraud and misrepresentation, wrongful termination, and promissory
estoppel. He also served discovery requests on SGB. SGB moved the court to
dismiss the action and to stay discovery until ruling on the motion to dismiss.
The court granted the request to stay discovery pending the dismissal
decision. After hearing argument on the dispositive motion, it dismissed Ammons’
complaint with prejudice. Ammons timely appeals both decisions pro se.
II. ANALYSIS
We address the dismissal, under CR 12(b)(6), of each of the four causes of
action, before addressing the court’s decision to stay discovery.
We review orders granting CR 12(b)(6) motions de novo. Rodriguez v.
Loudeye Corp., 144 Wn. App. 709, 717, 189 P.3d 168 (2008). CR 12(b)(6)
provides for dismissal if a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Id. Dismissal is also warranted if the court concludes that a plaintiff
cannot prove facts which would justify recovery. Id. While we presume all facts
alleged in a complaint are true, courts are not required to accept the complaint’s
legal conclusions. Id. at 717-18.
First, Ammons claims that the court erred by dismissing his breach of
contract claim. Specifically, he avers it was error to rule his employment offer
constituted a unilateral contract which could only be accepted by performance—
which had not yet occurred, on the facts.
Even assuming without deciding a contract was formed, SGB’s offer letter
2 No. 88250-3-I/3
explicitly advised that his employment was “at will” and, thus, SGB was free to end
his employment at any time, regardless of cause. In turn, the termination of his
employment could not give rise to a claim for breach of contract. See Andrus v.
Dep’t of Transp., 128 Wn. App. 895, 899, 117 P.3d 1152 (2005) (holding, “even if
a contract had been formed, there was no actionable breach because [the
applicant] admitted that the [ ] job was an at-will position.”); Bakotich v. Swanson,
91 Wn. App. 311, 316, 957 P.2d 275 (1998) (holding that an “at-will employment
contract anticipates that the employer may repudiate at any time without
ramification.”). Thus, this claim was properly dismissed. 1
Second, Ammons claims that the court erred by dismissing his fraud and
misrepresentation claim. Specifically, Ammons claims that “SGB falsely
represented, implied and suppressed the material fact that, despite their
representations by their overtures and implications to the contrary, Ammons had
not in fact been cleared or selected for the position, and their background check
was not in fact completed and he was not cleared for hire.”
Inter alia, to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove the defendant
“made a material misrepresentation of existing fact.” Baker Boyer Nat’l Bank v.
1 In a separate section of his opening brief, Ammons claims that “[t]here is a
plethora of well-settled Washington cases that carve out significant exceptions to the at-will doctrine.” In an accompanying footnote, he cites to three cases creating such exceptions, but nowhere explains how his arguendo discharge is prohibited under, for example, the “Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), . . . RCW 49.60.030 and .180 [disability protections], RCW 49.12.130 (industrial welfare), RCW 49.17.160 (industrial safety and health act), RCW 49.46.100 (minimum wage act), RCW 49.44.090 (violations—prohibited practices).” Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Company, 102 Wn.2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). We decline to make his argument for him. 3 No. 88250-3-I/4
Foust, 6 Wn. App. 2d 375, 381, 436 P.3d 382 (2018) (emphasis added); see also
Havens v. C&D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158, 182, 876 P.2d 435 (1994) (holding
that a “false representation as to a presently existing fact [is] a prerequisite to a
misrepresentation claim.”) (emphasis added).
Here, Ammons nowhere alleges that SGB stated that his background check
had been, in his words, “cleared.” Rather, his complaint merely advanced an
unsupported assumption that certain encouraging or congratulatory statements
made at the time of the initial offer “implied and suppressed” the false material fact
that his background check was complete, simply because the firm later withdrew
its offer. See Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 7. (“This representation was proven false by
their rescission.”).
Yet, in the exhibits Ammons attached to his complaint, SGB notified him
that the rescission was based on information it learned upon discovering additional
information. His complaint failed to allege that, notwithstanding that explanation,
its employees knew the background check was not complete, let alone that the
firm was going to withdraw its offer. Ammons makes no claim of existing fact to
sustain this cause of action.
Third, Ammons argues the court erred by dismissing his claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy. Again, even assuming without deciding that
he had begun employment and was discharged, 2 his complaint did not allege that
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
PHILIP AMMONS, No. 88250-3-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION SCHROETER GOLDMARK & BENDER, a Washington corporation; CARMEN D’ARCANGELO, individually and as agent; LIDDY WENDELL, individually and as agent; ELIZABETH HANLEY, individually and as agent, DOES 1-4,
Respondents.
DÍAZ, J. — Philip Ammons sued the law firm Schroeter Goldmark & Bender
(SGB) after it rescinded an offer of employment. He now argues the trial court
erred by granting SGB’s motion to dismiss his claims. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2024, Ammons responded to a job posting for a litigation
paralegal position with SGB and participated in two interviews. On or around
December 12, SGB made a written offer of employment. In relevant part, the letter
stated, “Employment at the firm is ‘at will’ meaning there is no guaranteed duration
of employment and either party is free to end the relationship at any time for any
cause or for no cause at all.” Four days later, SGB notified Ammons that it was
rescinding its offer based on information it received during the reference check No. 88250-3-I/2
process.
Two weeks thereafter, Ammons filed suit, bringing claims for breach of
contract, fraud and misrepresentation, wrongful termination, and promissory
estoppel. He also served discovery requests on SGB. SGB moved the court to
dismiss the action and to stay discovery until ruling on the motion to dismiss.
The court granted the request to stay discovery pending the dismissal
decision. After hearing argument on the dispositive motion, it dismissed Ammons’
complaint with prejudice. Ammons timely appeals both decisions pro se.
II. ANALYSIS
We address the dismissal, under CR 12(b)(6), of each of the four causes of
action, before addressing the court’s decision to stay discovery.
We review orders granting CR 12(b)(6) motions de novo. Rodriguez v.
Loudeye Corp., 144 Wn. App. 709, 717, 189 P.3d 168 (2008). CR 12(b)(6)
provides for dismissal if a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Id. Dismissal is also warranted if the court concludes that a plaintiff
cannot prove facts which would justify recovery. Id. While we presume all facts
alleged in a complaint are true, courts are not required to accept the complaint’s
legal conclusions. Id. at 717-18.
First, Ammons claims that the court erred by dismissing his breach of
contract claim. Specifically, he avers it was error to rule his employment offer
constituted a unilateral contract which could only be accepted by performance—
which had not yet occurred, on the facts.
Even assuming without deciding a contract was formed, SGB’s offer letter
2 No. 88250-3-I/3
explicitly advised that his employment was “at will” and, thus, SGB was free to end
his employment at any time, regardless of cause. In turn, the termination of his
employment could not give rise to a claim for breach of contract. See Andrus v.
Dep’t of Transp., 128 Wn. App. 895, 899, 117 P.3d 1152 (2005) (holding, “even if
a contract had been formed, there was no actionable breach because [the
applicant] admitted that the [ ] job was an at-will position.”); Bakotich v. Swanson,
91 Wn. App. 311, 316, 957 P.2d 275 (1998) (holding that an “at-will employment
contract anticipates that the employer may repudiate at any time without
ramification.”). Thus, this claim was properly dismissed. 1
Second, Ammons claims that the court erred by dismissing his fraud and
misrepresentation claim. Specifically, Ammons claims that “SGB falsely
represented, implied and suppressed the material fact that, despite their
representations by their overtures and implications to the contrary, Ammons had
not in fact been cleared or selected for the position, and their background check
was not in fact completed and he was not cleared for hire.”
Inter alia, to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove the defendant
“made a material misrepresentation of existing fact.” Baker Boyer Nat’l Bank v.
1 In a separate section of his opening brief, Ammons claims that “[t]here is a
plethora of well-settled Washington cases that carve out significant exceptions to the at-will doctrine.” In an accompanying footnote, he cites to three cases creating such exceptions, but nowhere explains how his arguendo discharge is prohibited under, for example, the “Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), . . . RCW 49.60.030 and .180 [disability protections], RCW 49.12.130 (industrial welfare), RCW 49.17.160 (industrial safety and health act), RCW 49.46.100 (minimum wage act), RCW 49.44.090 (violations—prohibited practices).” Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Company, 102 Wn.2d 219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). We decline to make his argument for him. 3 No. 88250-3-I/4
Foust, 6 Wn. App. 2d 375, 381, 436 P.3d 382 (2018) (emphasis added); see also
Havens v. C&D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158, 182, 876 P.2d 435 (1994) (holding
that a “false representation as to a presently existing fact [is] a prerequisite to a
misrepresentation claim.”) (emphasis added).
Here, Ammons nowhere alleges that SGB stated that his background check
had been, in his words, “cleared.” Rather, his complaint merely advanced an
unsupported assumption that certain encouraging or congratulatory statements
made at the time of the initial offer “implied and suppressed” the false material fact
that his background check was complete, simply because the firm later withdrew
its offer. See Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 7. (“This representation was proven false by
their rescission.”).
Yet, in the exhibits Ammons attached to his complaint, SGB notified him
that the rescission was based on information it learned upon discovering additional
information. His complaint failed to allege that, notwithstanding that explanation,
its employees knew the background check was not complete, let alone that the
firm was going to withdraw its offer. Ammons makes no claim of existing fact to
sustain this cause of action.
Third, Ammons argues the court erred by dismissing his claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy. Again, even assuming without deciding that
he had begun employment and was discharged, 2 his complaint did not allege that
he had engaged in any public-policy-related conduct which motivated the
2 See Korslund v. Dyncorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc., 121 Wn. App. 295, 313, 88 P.3d
966 (2004) (explaining that a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy “applies only when an employee has been discharged[.]”). 4 No. 88250-3-I/5
rescission. The tort only applies to the discharge of an employee for engaging in
protected, public-policy-related conduct. See Rickman v. Premera Blue Cross,
184 Wn.2d 300, 314, 358 P.3d 1153 (2015) (requiring proof that an employee’s
“actions in furtherance of public policy” were a “cause of [a] firing[.]”) (quoting
Wilmont v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 118 Wn.2d 46, 70, 821 P.2d 18 (1981)).
Thus, this claim fails.
Fourth, Ammons asserts that the court erred by dismissing his cause of
action alleging promissory estoppel. However, as with the first count for breach of
contract, Ammons could not prevail on this claim in light of the aforementioned
precedent holding that an at-will contract may be repudiated “without ramification.”
Bakotich, 91 Wn. App. at 316. Relatedly, in order to make out a claim for relief
under an estoppel theory, a plaintiff must show they reasonably relied on a clear
and definite promise of permanent employment which was only subject to
dismissal for just cause. See Havens, 124 Wn.2d at 174 (holding, “there is no
clear and definite promise of permanent employment subject only to dismissal for
just cause.”). But, here, there is no allegation that he received a clear and definite
promise of permanent employment.
In summary, we hold that the trial court did not err by dismissing Ammons’
suit under CR 12(b)(6) because he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Rodriguez, 144 Wn. App. at 717. 3
3 Ammons also avers that the court erred by not holding the individually named
defendants in his complaint personally liable. As his substantive claims fail against the law firm, any similar claims against individuals would also fail for the same reasons. 5 No. 88250-3-I/6
Finally, Ammons also argues that the court erred by staying discovery
pending its ruling on SGB’s CR 12(b)(6) motion. We review a trial court’s stay of
discovery for abuse of discretion. Long v. Snoqualmie Gaming Comm’n, 7 Wn.
App. 2d 672, 690, 435 P.3d 339 (2019). We have specifically held that a court has
“the discretion to stay discovery until after [a] CR 12(b)(6) hearing.” Quinn Const.
Co., LLC. v. King County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 26, 111 Wn. App. 19, 33, 44 P.3d 865
(2002). Ammons fails to explain how the court abused its discretion by staying
discovery here. He largely cites only non-binding or otherwise inapposite
precedent, which generally explains the importance of discovery. While that may
be true, we conclude that he does not carry his burden to show how the court
abused its discretion to stay discovery pending the resolution of SGB’s CR 12(b)(6)
motion. Quinn, 111 Wn. App. at 33. 4
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
4 Ammons also argues that SGB’s “motion for protective order was untimely and
should have been stricken on procedural grounds.” We do not reach this argument as he did not make it before the trial court, where he directed the court’s attention to the timeliness of the motion to dismiss, which is subject to a different remedy, namely, default. Sourakli v. Kyriakos, Inc., 144 Wn. App. 501, 509, 182 P.3d 985 (2008) (holding that an argument neither pleaded nor argued to the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993) (noting we do not “grant special favors to . . . a pro se litigant[.]”)