PharMerica Mountain LLC v. Arizona Rehab Campus LLC

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided August 9, 2022·No. 4:20-cv-00493·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2

8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 10

11 PharMerica Mountain LLC, No. CV-20-00493-TUC-RM 12 Plaintiff/Counter Defendant, ORDER 13 v. 14 Arizona Rehab Campus LLC, 15 Defendant/Counter Plaintiff. 16

17 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff/Counter Defendant PharMerica Mountain 18 LLC’s (“Plaintiff” or “PharMerica”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 58)1 and 19 Defendant/Counter Plaintiff Arizona Rehab Campus LLC’s (“Defendant” or “ARC”) 20 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 60).2 The Motions are fully briefed. For the 21 following reasons, PharMerica’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be granted 22 and ARC’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be granted in part and denied in 23 part. 24 I. Background 25 Defendant ARC has operated a drug and alcohol rehabilitation facility in Tucson, 26 Arizona since 2017. (Doc. 58.) The Arizona Department of Health Services has licensed 27 1 The record citations herein refer to the docket and page numbers generated by the Court’s 28 electronic filing system. 2 The Court finds the parties’ Motions suitable for decision without oral argument. 1 the facility as a B6 Subacute Behavioral Health Inpatient Facility. (Doc. 60 at 3.) During 2 the period at issue, Plaintiff PharMerica was the sole provider of pharmaceutical goods and 3 services to ARC. (Id.) The parties entered into an agreement—the Pharmacy Services 4 Agreement, or “PSA”—effective August 1, 2017, that gave PharMerica the exclusive right 5 to supply ARC with the pharmaceuticals needed to treat ARC’s clients. (Doc. 58 at 2.) The 6 pharmaceutical medications that PharMerica provided mostly consisted of psychotropic 7 medications used for detoxification and sobriety maintenance. (Doc. 60 at 3.) PharMerica 8 provided ARC with medications that ARC ordered for the facility itself, known as “house 9 drugs,” as well as those that were prescribed to ARC’s individual clients. (Doc. 58 at 3.) 10 A significant portion of ARC’s clients are insured through the Arizona Heath Care 11 Cost Containment System (“AHCCCS”), the Arizona state Medicaid benefit that provides 12 health insurance to indigent Arizonans. (Doc. 73 at 2.) Third-party companies provide 13 managed-Medicaid health insurance plans that are governed by Arizona Medicaid 14 regulations. (Id.) Specifically, ARC contracts with Banner University Family Care 15 (“Banner”) to provide services to its AHCCCS-insured clients. (Doc. 60 at 4-5.) The 16 agreement between AHCCCS and Banner provides for a negotiated payment (the “per 17 diem” payment) to ARC for each day that an AHCCCS-insured client is admitted at ARC’s 18 facility. (Id.) Banner executes its pharmaceutical agreements through its pharmacy benefit 19 manager, MedImpact, and PharMerica billed MedImpact for the prescriptions it provided 20 ARC for ARC’s AHCCCS-insured clients. (Doc. 60 at 5.) Banner refused to pay many of 21 those claims. (Id.) A key dispute between the parties is whether, as a matter of law, the per 22 diem payment covers pharmaceuticals. (See Docs. 60, 73, 78.) PharMerica contends that it 23 does, and that therefore ARC is liable for the unpaid claims because ARC was already paid 24 by Banner for the prescription drugs via the per diem payments. (Id.) ARC contends that, 25 as a matter of law, the per diem payments did not cover pharmaceuticals and that therefore 26 Banner or another third-party payor, and not ARC, is responsible for those claims. (Id.) 27 The parties also dispute which laws or regulations should govern the enforcement of their 28 contractual agreement. (See Docs. 58, 60, 73, 75.) 1 In this breach of contract action, PharMerica alleges that ARC owes it 2 approximately $775,000 in outstanding payments, as well as approximately $83,000 for 3 pharmacy goods and services that it acquired allegedly without intending to pay for them. 4 (Doc. 1.) ARC filed a counterclaim for $60,000 plus interest thereon. (Doc. 6.) ARC alleges 5 that the $60,000 in payments it made to PharMerica from January 10, 2020 to June 12, 6 2020 were unjustified because the PSA stated that PharMerica would be compensated by 7 the client, a private insurance carrier, or AHCCCS, and thus PharMerica was unjustly 8 enriched by ARC’s payments. (See id.) 9 II. Summary Judgment Standard 10 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 11 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 13 movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 14 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 15 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 16 If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 17 produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Co., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102–03 18 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the 19 nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and to show (1) that the fact 20 in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 21 governing law, and (2) that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a 22 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 23 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 24 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact 25 conclusively in its favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288– 26 89 (1968); however, it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a 27 genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 28 587 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 1 At summary judgment, the Court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 2 determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 3 477 U.S. at 249. Pure questions of law, where there is no disputed issue of fact, are 4 appropriate for summary judgment. Schrader v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 768 F.2d 5 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1985). “The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining 6 whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual 7 issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably 8 be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. “[T]his standard mirrors 9 the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is 10 that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one 11 reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PharMerica Mountain LLC v. Arizona Rehab Campus LLC, (D. Ariz. 2022).

PharMerica Mountain LLC v. Arizona Rehab Campus LLC (PharMerica Mountain LLC v. Arizona Rehab Campus LLC) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co.
391 U.S. 253 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Shattuck v. Precision-Toyota, Inc.
566 P.2d 1332 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1977)
Southwestern Iron & Steel Industries, Inc. v. State
597 P.2d 981 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1979)
Ervco, Inc. v. Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc.
422 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (D. Arizona, 2006)
Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co.
68 F.3d 1216 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)
BMW of North America, LLC v. Mini Works, LLC
166 F. Supp. 3d 976 (D. Arizona, 2010)
Fraser v. Goodale
342 F.3d 1032 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)