Pg&e v. Ferc

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 7, 2020
Docket19-71615
StatusUnpublished

This text of Pg&e v. Ferc (Pg&e v. Ferc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pg&e v. Ferc, (9th Cir. 2020).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 7 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, No. 19-71615

Petitioner, FERC Nos. EL19-35-000 EL19-36-000 OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS, MEMORANDUM* Petitioner-Intervenor,

v.

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,

Respondent,

NEXTERA ENERGY, INC.; et al.,

Respondents-Intervenors.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

In re: PG&E CORPORATION; PACIFIC No. 19-16833 GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, D.C. No. 3:19-bk-30088 Debtors, ______________________________

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY; PG&E CORPORATION,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS,

Intervenor,

Defendant-Appellant, ______________________________

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES STATE WATER PROJECT,

Intervenor.

In the Matter of: PACIFIC GAS & No. 19-16834 ELECTRIC COMPANY; PG&E CORPORATION, D.C. No. 3:19-ap-3003

Debtors,

------------------------------

PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY; PG&E CORPORATION,

2 v.

AV SOLAR RANCH 1, LLC; et al.,

Intervenors-Appellants,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California Dennis Montali, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 14, 2020 Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, BUMATAY, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Pacific Gas & Electric Corporation (PG&E) petitions for review of two

orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and FERC appeals

an order of the bankruptcy court. The orders all involved the same question:

whether a Chapter 11 debtor can cease performing under its wholesale power

contracts with the approval of the bankruptcy court, or whether FERC’s consent is

also needed. In its orders, FERC declared that it must approve such changes,

whereas the bankruptcy court rejected that position. We need not—and cannot—

reach the merits of this dispute, because the cases became moot when the

3 bankruptcy court confirmed a reorganization plan requiring PG&E to assume,

rather than reject, the contracts at issue. The only remaining question is how to

treat the underlying orders. Applying the rule set forth in Munsingwear v. United

States, 340 U.S. 36 (1950), we vacate all three.

Munsingwear holds that “[w]hen a case becomes moot on appeal, the

‘established practice’ is to reverse or vacate the decision below with a direction to

dismiss.” NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Jud. Council of State of Cal., 488 F.3d

1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520

U.S. 43, 71 (1997)). This “‘clears the path for future relitigation of the issues

between the parties,’ preserving ‘the rights of all parties,’ while prejudicing none

‘by a decision which . . . was only preliminary.’” Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 94

(2009) (quoting Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40). Vacatur is “generally automatic,”

NASD, 488 F.3d at 1068 (quotations omitted), and these principles apply not only

to judicial decisions, but also to agency orders. A.L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v.

United States, 368 U.S. 324, 329 (1961); Oregon v. FERC, 636 F.3d 1203, 1206

(9th Cir. 2011).

The parties generally agree that we should vacate the bankruptcy court’s

order. They disagree, however, over whether we ought to also vacate FERC’s.

Relying on U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18

(1994), FERC and the intervenors urge us to leave the agency’s orders in place.

4 Bancorp instructs us that, absent “exceptional circumstances,” a party that

voluntarily moots its appeal surrenders its claim “to the equitable remedy of

vacatur.” Id. at 25, 29; accord ACLU of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1065-66

(9th Cir. 2012). FERC and the intervenors point out that PG&E proposed

assuming the power contracts in the reorganization plan ultimately confirmed by

the bankruptcy court. They argue that PG&E’s involvement in this process renders

vacatur inappropriate.

We disagree. The circumstances here justify vacatur even accepting that

PG&E had a hand in mooting its petition.1 Importantly, the company did not

intend to circumvent our review of FERC’s orders. See Alvarez, 558 U.S. at 96–

97; All. for the Wild Rockies v. U.S. Forest Serv., 907 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir.

2018) (finding “no reason not to vacate the lower court’s decision” where

“mootness was not caused by the [appellant] in an attempt to evade an adverse

decision”). Rather, PG&E twice moved for expedited consideration of these cases

so that we could resolve them prior to resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings.

1 We reject FERC’s argument that these cases were not ripe for review. The ripeness inquiry asks “whether the issues presented are definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.” Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Here, FERC’s orders directly affected PG&E’s rights within the bankruptcy proceeding. The company has thus established a “definite and concrete” dispute. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1407 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding controversy ripe where a challenged ordinance’s effects were not “confined to the future” but, rather, were presently influencing the parties’ decisions).

5 The company also urged us to hear the cases over FERC’s related ripeness

arguments.

In addition, PG&E’s actions were prompted by outside interference. Cf.

Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29 (noting that the circumstances there did nothing to

“diminish[] the voluntariness of the abandonment of review”). That is, mootness

here is attributable, at least in part, to coercion from California. As the bankruptcy

court explained, PG&E was “under pressure from various sources,” including the

state’s governor, to reach a “prompt and viable reorganization.” In particular, the

state established a $21 billion wildfire-liability compensation fund, which was

critical to PG&E’s ability to reorganize. The state conditioned PG&E’s access to

this fund on the company having a confirmed reorganization plan in place by June

20. The state presumably so pressured PG&E because it thought a speedy

reorganization was in the public interest.

Finally, vacating FERC’s unreviewed orders prevents them from adversely

impacting PG&E or any other utility down the road. At the heart of these cases

lies a dispute concerning FERC’s powers over contract performance, including a

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