Pfeiffer v. Green

102 S.W.2d 1077
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 25, 1937
DocketNos. 3024, 3059
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 102 S.W.2d 1077 (Pfeiffer v. Green) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pfeiffer v. Green, 102 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937).

Opinion

WALKER, Chief Justice.

By the concrete highway connecting the two cities, the city of Beaumont is about 18 miles from the city of Port Arthur; Nederland is a small town on this highway about 10 miles from Beaumont. On the 10th day of November, 1934, Miss Pfeiffer, with Miss Helen Green and Miss Buelah Floye Bledsoe as her guests, was driving her Chrysler car from Houston, by way of Beaumont, to Port Arthur. She had passed Beaumont. At about 4 p. m., when within about 2 miles of Nederland, she had a head-on collision with a Buick car driven by

[1078]*1078O. M. Cuniff. Miss Bledsoe died as a result of the injuries received in the collision. Miss Green and Miss Pfeiffer both received serious injuries. Cause No. 3024, as styled and numbered above, was brought by Miss Green against Miss Pfeiffer for the injuries received by her in the collision, pleading the following acts of negligence against Miss Pfeiffer, submitted to the jury and answered as indicated:

“Special Issue No. 1A: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that danger of impact became apparent to defendant just prior to the collision?”
Answer: “Yes.”
“Special Issue No. 2A: Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that just prior to the collision, deféndant drove her car at such excessive rate of speed that she was unable to control same upon danger becoming apparent?”
Answer: “Yes.”
“Special Issue No. 3A: Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s act, if any, in driving said car at an excessive rate of speed, if any, was in reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights ?”
Answer: “Yes.”
“Special Issue Nó. S: Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that just prior to the collision defendant drove her automobile to her left of and across the center of the road?”
Answer; “Yes.”
“Special Issue No. 6: Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that at such time such road to the left and immediately forward of defendant’s car was occupied by another automobile?”
Answer: “Yes.”
“Special Issue No. 8A: Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that the act, if any, of defendant in attempting to pass another car traveling in the same direction as defendant, if you have so found at a time when said road to the left and immediately forward of defendant’s car was occupied by another car, if it was so occupied, was in reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights?”
Answer: “Yes.”
“Special Issue No. 10: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that immediately prior to the collision defendant attempted to pass to the left of another car traveling on said road in front of
defendant and going in the same direction that the defendant was traveling?”
Answer: “Yes.”
“Special Issue No. 11: Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that at the time defendant attempted to pass to the left of another car going in the same direction as defendant (if you have so found) such road to the left and immediately forward of defendant’s car was occupied by an automobile going in the opposite direction to defendant?”
Answer: “Yes.”
“Special Issue No. 13A: Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that the act, if any, of defendant in attempting to pass another car traveling in the same direction as defendant, if you have so found, at a time when said road to the left and immediately forward of defendant’s car was occupied by another car, if it was so occupied, was in reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights?”
Answer: “Yes.”
“Special Issue No. 15: Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s act, if any, of attempting to pass to the left of another car going in the same direction as defendant (if you have so found) occurred when said road was congested with traffic?”
Answer: “Yes.”
“Special Issue No. 17: Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s act, if any, of attempting to pass to the left of another car going in the same direction as defendant at a time when such road was congested with traffic (if you have so found) was in reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights?”
Answer: “Yes.”
“Special Issue No. 23A: Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that the act, if any, of defendant in driving her automobile to the left of and across the center of the road (if you have so-found) occurred at a time when defendant failed to keep a proper lookout to determine whether or not her left hand side of the highway was clear and free from traffic?”
Answer: “Yes.”
“Special Issue No. 25A: Do you find from the' preponderance of the evidence that the act, if any, of defendant in driving her automobile to the left of and across the center of the road (if you have so found) at a time when she failed to keep a proper [1079]*1079lookout (if you have so found) was in reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights?”
Answer: “Yes.”

The jury also found that these several acts of negligence constituted “proximate cause.” The issues of negligence were submitted to the jury under the following general instructions;

“ ‘Negligence’, as used in the court's charge, means the doing of that which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would not have done, or the failure to do that which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would have done, under the same or similar circumstances.
“The phrase ‘Reckless Disregard of Plaintiff’s Rights’ means more than simple negligence as above defined. Such phrase means something in the nature of a continued or persistent course of action over the protest of the guest and is not confined to mere .momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence or error of judgment.
“ ‘Proximate Cause’, as herein used, means that cause which in natural and continued sequence unbroken by any new and independent cause produces the result complained of, and without which that result would not have occurred,, and in the light of the attending circumstances such result of a similar one ought to have been foreseen by a person of ordinary care and prudence.
“A ‘New and Independent Cause’ is an intervening efficient force which breaks the causal connection between the original wrong and the injury. Such new force must be sufficient of itself to stand as the cause of the injury and be one but for which the injury would not have occurred.

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Bluebook (online)
102 S.W.2d 1077, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pfeiffer-v-green-texapp-1937.