Petramala v. Arizona, State of

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Michael Petramala, No. CV-19-00029-PHX-DWL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 State of Arizona, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 INTRODUCTION 15 In 2004, a judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court issued an order concluding 16 that Plaintiff Michael Petramala was incompetent to stand trial. Although this finding 17 resulted in the dismissal of the criminal charges that were pending against Petramala at the 18 time, it also resulted in the placement of Petramala’s name in the National Instant Criminal 19 Background Check System (“NICS”)—meaning that Petramala is identified as a prohibited 20 possessor when firearm dealers conduct background checks. 21 In the 16 years since this finding of incompetency, Petramala has filed a blizzard of 22 lawsuits in an attempt to restore his firearm rights. This is one such lawsuit. Although 23 Petramala’s pro se complaint has gone through several iterations, his core allegation has 24 remained the same: he seeks to challenge a $398.50 “filing fee” that, in his view, effectively 25 prevents indigent litigants such as himself from pursuing state-court restoration actions. 26 As it turns out, the alleged “filing fee” doesn’t exist. In 2017, a judge of the 27 Maricopa County Superior Court issued a $398.50 sanction award against Petramala and 28 held that Petramala couldn’t file any more restoration-related lawsuits until he satisfied the 1 award. This sanction award, not some “filing fee” of general applicability, is what 2 Petramala seeks to challenge in this lawsuit. The true nature of the sanction award wasn’t 3 revealed until the sole remaining defendant in this case, the City of Scottsdale (“the City”), 4 filed a motion to dismiss and asked the Court to take judicial notice of it. 5 The revelation that Petramala is actually complaining about a sanction award issued 6 by a state-court judge means this lawsuit must be dismissed. Although Younger abstention 7 arguably applies in this circumstance, the most obvious jurisdictional impediment is 8 standing—because the City did not impose the sanction award, Petramala’s injury is not 9 fairly traceable to the City and an injunction and/or declaration directed at the City would 10 not redress Petramala’s alleged injuries. Accordingly, the City’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 11 24) will be granted, Petramala’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 28) will be 12 denied, and this action will be terminated. 13 BACKGROUND 14 The facts set forth below are derived from the operative complaint and from matters that are subject to judicial notice.1 As noted, some of the key factual allegations in the 15 complaint are contradicted by judicially noticeable materials. Although “the inquiry” at 16 the motion-to-dismiss stage is usually “limited to the allegations in the complaint, which 17 are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff . . . [courts] 18 need not accept as true allegations contradicting documents . . . that are properly subject to 19 judicial notice.” Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). 20 I. Underlying State Proceedings 21 In September 2004, a judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court issued an order 22 dismissing certain criminal charges against Petramala, which had been initiated by the City, 23 based upon a determination that Petramala “is unable to understand the nature of the 24 proceedings and/or is unable to assist counsel in [his] defense, and is therefore criminally 25

26 1 “A court may . . . consider certain materials [including] matters of judicial notice . . . without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” 27 United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). “It is well established that 28 federal courts may take judicial notice of related state court orders and proceedings.” ScripsAmerica, Inc. v. Ironridge Glob. LLC, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1136 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 1 incompetent.” (Doc. 24-1 at 8.) Petramala’s name was subsequently added to NICS. (Doc. 2 22 ¶ 9.) 3 Since September 2004, Petramala has filed an array of lawsuits in an attempt to 4 overturn this incompetency finding and/or restore his firearm rights. See, e.g., State v. 5 Petramala, 2015 WL 4538384, *1-*2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that Petramala initiated 6 separate proceedings in 2007, 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2013 in an effort to restore his firearm 7 rights, that Petramala failed to prevail in any of those proceedings, and that at one point 8 “the superior court found Petramala to be a ‘vexatious litigant’ and entered an 9 administrative order prohibiting him from filing any actions in Maricopa County without 10 prior court approval”). 11 In June 2016, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of one of 12 Petramala’s restoration petitions. State v. Petramala, 2016 WL 3360415 (Ariz. Ct. App. 13 2016). 14 Undeterred, “[i]n June 2016, Petramala filed another petition to restore his right to possess firearms. The court held a hearing on the petition . . . [and] subsequently denied 15 the petition stating it was ‘unable to find by clear and convincing evidence that [Petramala] 16 is not likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to public safety or that the requested relief 17 is not contrary to the public interest.’” State v. Petramala, 2017 WL 2180391, *1 (Ariz. 18 Ct. App. 2017). In May 2017, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at *3. 19 In September 2017, the Maricopa County Superior Court issued an order requiring 20 Petramala to pay $398.50 in sanctions to the City, as reimbursement for the City’s 21 attorneys’ fees and costs. (Doc. 24-1 at 2-3.) Among other things, the order stated that 22 Petramala “shall be precluded from filing another petition or motion regarding clearance 23 of records, NICS removal, or competency until the awarded fees have been paid.” (Id.) 24 Petramala subsequently pursued review of this order in the Arizona appellate courts. (Doc. 25 24-1 at 5.) Those appellate proceedings, which were ongoing at the time Petramala 26 initiated this action, culminated in April 2019, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied 27 Petramala’s petition for review. (Id.) 28 … 1 II. Procedural History 2 On January 2, 2019, Petramala initiated this action by filing a complaint (Doc. 1) 3 and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). In this iteration of the complaint, 4 Petramala sued three defendants—(1) the State of Arizona, (2) the United States Attorney 5 General, and (3) the United States—based in part on the allegation that “the state of Arizona 6 is violating the dormant commerce clause by adding impermissible fees to a database 7 regulating interstate commerce, which are overly burdensome and preempted by congress.” 8 (Doc. 1 ¶ 8.) 9 On January 30, 2019, the Court issued a screening order dismissing the complaint 10 for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 7.) Although this order concluded the dismissal should 11 be with prejudice, Petramala subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 9.) 12 Among other things, Petramala stated in this motion that “the filing fee[] complained of in 13 this action” was a “recently” enacted “$398.50 filing fee . . . which prevented Petramala 14 from filing any more NICS removals from that point onward.” (Id. at 3.) On February 15, 2019, the Court issued an order granting the motion for 15 reconsideration. (Doc. 15.) Specifically, the Court held that although none of the 16 defendants identified in the original complaint were proper (the federal defendants could 17 not be sued for alleged flaws in the Arizona state restoration process and the State had 18 Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit), Petramala’s clarification regarding the “filing 19 fees” meant that it might be possible for Petramala to amend his complaint to state a claim. 20 (Id. at 3-4.) Thus, Petramala was afforded leave to amend. (Id.) 21 On February 19, 2019, Petramala filed his first amended complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. 22 16.) In this iteration of the complaint, Petramala sued the following defendants: (1) Judge 23 Sam Myers of the Maricopa County Superior Court, (2) the Maricopa County Superior 24 Court, (3) Governor Doug Ducey, (4) the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, and (5) 25 the City. (Id. at 1.) Scattered throughout the FAC were various references to the purported 26 “filing fee,” which was described as a fee of general applicability. (See, e.g., id. at 1 [“Sam 27 Myers . . . . has blocked Petramala from obtaining NICS removal . . . due to $398.50 in 28 filing fee and NICS expert witness costs.”]; id. at 3 [“Defendants have enacted an unduly 1 burdensome $398.50 fee, which regulates interstate commerce of NICS removal and is not 2 authorized by congress and such fee is prohibited by article one, section eight of the 3 constitution.”]; id. [“[A]n indigent must be allowed access to the courts without the ability 4 to pay the $398.50 fee required for NICS removal.”].) 5 On April 23, 2019, the Court issued a screening order dismissing the FAC for failure 6 to state a claim but granting Petramala further leave to amend. (Doc. 21.) Among other 7 things, this order held that the FAC was flawed because “it repeatedly lumps together all 8 of the defendants as a collective whole—‘Defendants’—without specifically alleging the 9 role that each defendant played in causing Plaintiff’s alleged injury.” (Id. at 4.) The order 10 also noted that “Judge Sam Myers is the only defendant to which Petramala attributed 11 specific conduct,” yet “the claims against Judge Myers are barred” because “[w]hen a judge 12 determines the proper disposition of a case pending before him, this is undoubtedly a 13 judicial act, for which judges have absolute immunity from liability.” (Id. at 7.) Finally, 14 and most important here, the Court specified that “[t]he Second Amended Complaint must clarify what entity charges the $398.50 filing fee that is at the heart of this litigation.” (Id. 15 at 8.) 16 On April 29, 2019, Petramala filed his second amended complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. 17 22.) In this iteration of the complaint, Petramala sued all of the defendants identified in 18 the FAC except for Judge Myers (i.e., the Maricopa County Superior Court, Governor 19 Ducey, the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, and the City) and asserted two causes 20 of action: (1) a claim for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities 21 Act (“ADA”) and (2) a § 1983 claim for “Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and 22 Dormant Commerce Clause violations.” (Id. at 3-4, capitalization omitted.) 23 On July 18, 2019, the Court issued a screening order dismissing Count I of the SAC 24 for failure to state a claim and, as for Count II, dismissing the Maricopa County Superior 25 Court (because it is a non-jural entity), Governor Ducey (because the SAC failed to allege 26 any facts concerning his role in the imposition of the filing fee), and the Maricopa County 27 Board of Supervisors (same reason as Governor Ducey). (Doc. 23.) This meant that the 28 only remaining defendant was the City and the only remaining claim was Count II. (Id.) 1 On September 4, 2019, the City filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 24.) 2 On September 9, 2019, Petramala filed a response. (Doc. 26.) 3 On September 16, 2019, the City filed a reply. (Doc. 27.) 4 On December 20, 2019, Petramala moved for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 28.) 5 On January 3, 2019, the City filed a response. (Doc. 29.) 6 On January 6, 2020, Petramala filed a reply. (Doc. 30.) 7 DISCUSSION 8 The City moves to dismiss the SAC for various reasons, including that Younger 9 abstention bars the Court from reviewing a sanction award imposed by a state-court judge. 10 (Doc. 24 at 3-4.) As discussed below, although Younger abstention likely precludes the 11 Court from deciding any claims related to the sanction award, Petramala’s lack of standing 12 provides an even stronger basis for dismissal. 13 I. Younger Abstention 14 As discussed, judicially noticeable documents establish that Petramala isn’t being assessed a $398.50 “filing fee” in order to pursue a restoration petition—instead, Petramala 15 was sanctioned by a state-court judge and was ordered by that judge not to file any more 16 restoration actions until he satisfied the $398.50 award. Thus, as a practical matter, 17 Petramala is seeking in this lawsuit to raise a constitutional challenge to a state-court 18 judge’s sanction award. 19 Federal courts “have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 20 given, than to usurp that which is not given.” Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 21 (1821). “Younger abstention remains an extraordinary and narrow exception” to this 22 general rule. Cook v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). 23 “Circumstances fitting within the Younger doctrine . . . are exceptional; they include . . . 24 state criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement proceedings, and civil proceedings involving 25 certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their 26 judicial functions.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013) (quotations 27 omitted). “[T]hese three ‘exceptional’ categories . . . define Younger’s scope.” Id. at 78. 28 Here, the third category is likely applicable—a sanction award, such as the one 1 imposed against Petramala, is an order uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability 2 to perform their judicial functions. Other courts have held that “interfering with a state 3 court’s ability to impose . . . sanctions and fees, for instance by enjoining the parties before 4 the state court from seeking execution of final judgment, would . . . constitute an 5 exceptional circumstance in which the relevant state proceedings involve an order uniquely 6 in furtherance of the state court’s ability to perform its judicial functions.” Dandar v. 7 Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1193 (M.D. Fla. 2014). 8 See also Jou v. Chang, 350 F. Supp. 2d 862, 864, 866 (D. Haw. 2004) (abstaining under 9 Younger where the federal plaintiff, who was the subject of a pending motion for attorneys’ 10 fees in state court, sought to challenge the constitutionality of the state statute under which 11 the fee motion was brought: “[T]he Constitutional question involves both the state’s 12 important policy interest in discouraging frivolous and vexatious litigation, as well as the 13 state’s interest in the functioning of its judicial system. As such, this Court concludes that 14 Plaintiff's case does involve an important state interest.”). Granting the relief sought by Petramala would interfere with a state-court sanction award and undermine the process by 15 which the award obtained. Thus, the underlying litigation likely qualifies as an exceptional 16 circumstance in which the Court may consider whether Younger abstention is appropriate. 17 “Younger abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial 18 proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicate[s] important state interests; (3) there is an 19 adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the 20 requested relief seek[s] to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state 21 judicial proceeding.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotations 22 omitted). “However, even if Younger abstention is appropriate, federal courts do not 23 invoke it if there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary 24 circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.” Id. at 765-66 (quotations 25 omitted). 26 As for the first factor, “[t]he critical date for purposes of deciding whether abstention 27 principles apply is the date the federal action is filed.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 28 965, 969 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004). Petramala filed his complaint on January 2, 2019. At that 1 time, the state-court litigation arising from the sanction award was still ongoing. The 2 sanction award was issued on September 5, 2017 (Doc. 24-1 at 3) and the Arizona Supreme 3 Court did not deny Petramala’s petition for review until April 1, 2019 (id. at 5). 4 As for the second factor, the “key to determining” whether an important state 5 interest is implicated “is to ask whether federal court adjudication would interfere with the 6 state’s ability to carry out its basic executive, judicial, or legislative functions.” Potrero 7 Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cty. of Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 883 (9th Cir. 2011). “The importance 8 of the interest is measured by considering its significance broadly, rather than by focusing 9 on the state’s interest in the resolution of an individual case.” Baffert v. California Horse 10 Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, an important state interest is 11 implicated. Other courts have found that the imposition of attorney-fee awards “involves 12 both the state’s important policy interest in discouraging frivolous and vexatious litigation, 13 as well as the state’s interest in the functioning of its judicial system.” Jou, 350 F. Supp. 14 at 866. To forbid the collection of the fees at issue would undermine the state’s ability to administer its judicial system and raise serious federalism and comity concerns. 15 As for the third factor, “Younger abstention does not turn on whether the federal 16 plaintiff actually avails himself of the opportunity to present federal constitutional claims 17 in the state proceeding, but rather whether such an opportunity exists.” Herrera v. City of 18 Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1046 (9th Cir. 2019). “[T]he burden on this point rests on the 19 federal plaintiff to show that state procedural law barred presentation of [its] claims.” 20 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987) (quotation omitted). Here, Petramala 21 makes no argument that state procedural law barred him from presenting his federal 22 constitutional claims during his state-court appeal of the $398.50 sanction award. 23 As for the fourth factor, the “requested relief must seek to enjoin—or have the 24 practical effect of enjoining—ongoing state proceedings.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. 25 State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014). “Younger applies to requests 26 for declaratory relief because ordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the 27 same interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy 28 limiting injunctions was designed to avoid.” Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 971 (quotations 1 omitted). Here, the SAC requests a declaration that “NICS removal fees not explicitly 2 authorized by Congress violate federal law and/or are void” (Doc. 22 at 10) and Petramala 3 additionally states that he is “seeking an injunction against [the City] to order it to . . . waive 4 collection of the $398.50 NICS fees.” (Doc. 26 at 6.) Thus, Petramala is seeking relief 5 that will enjoin, or have the practical effect of enjoining, ongoing state proceedings. 6 Notwithstanding all of this, Petramala argues that this case “falls into the 7 exceptions” of Younger because (1) the City’s refusal to “remove an innocent person on 8 NICS due to poverty is a bona fide instance of ‘great and immediate irreparable injury’” 9 and (2) “[b]ut for the malice of Defendant Scottsdale, the NICS case would not have 10 occurred.” (Doc. 26 at 6.) The City does not respond to these arguments in its reply. 11 Younger abstention is inapplicable under “extraordinary circumstances where the 12 danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.” World Famous Drinking 13 Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1987). “Irreparable injury 14 may possibly be established . . . by a showing that the challenged state statute is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., 15 Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 366 (1989) (quotation omitted). Here, 16 Petramala argues that the so-called “NICS fees” violate the Due Process and Dormant 17 Commerce Clauses. But this argument is based on the mischaracterization of the $398.50 18 as a filing fee, when it is actually a sanction award. Petramala has not established that a 19 state court’s ability to award sanctions, or the fact that a state court awarded sanctions 20 against him, is patently or flagrantly violative of the Due Process or Dormant Commerce 21 Clauses. Additionally, the judges in Petramala’s earlier restoration proceedings concluded 22 that, on the merits, he is not eligible for restoration. 23 “If state proceedings are conducted in bad faith or to harass the litigant . . . the 24 district court may exercise jurisdiction even when the criteria for Younger abstention are 25 met.” Baffert, 332 F.3d at 621. Here, Petramala asserts in conclusory fashion that the 26 malice of the City is the but-for cause of his predicament (Doc. 26 at 6), but he alleges no 27 facts to support this allegation. Cf. Baffert, 332 F.3d at 621 (“In the absence of any 28 evidence of bad faith, such as bias against Plaintiff, or of a harassing motive, no exception 1 to the application of Younger abstention is warranted.”). 2 For all of these reasons, there is a strong argument that Younger abstention precludes 3 the Court from addressing Petramala’s claims relating to the sanction award. 4 II. Standing 5 Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the United States to the 6 resolution of cases and controversies. See U.S. Const., Art. III, Section 2, Clause 1. “[O]ne 7 of the controlling elements in the definition of a case or controversy under Article III is 8 standing. The requisite elements of Article III standing are well established: A plaintiff 9 must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct 10 and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Hein v. Freedom from Religion 11 Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 (2007) (quotation omitted). Courts have an 12 independent duty to examine jurisdictional issues such as standing and may raise such 13 issues sua sponte. B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1999) 14 (“[F]ederal courts are required sua sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as standing.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or 15 otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the 16 action.”). 17 Here, the clarification that Petramala is actually challenging a sanction award issued 18 by a state-court judge means that his claims against the City—which is the sole remaining 19 defendant in the SAC—fail for lack of standing. “The causation element” of the 20 constitutional standing test “requires that a proper defendant be sued. That is, a plaintiff’s 21 claimed injury must have been caused by ‘acts of the defendant, not of some absent third 22 party.’” Common Cause v. Biden, 748 F.3d 1280, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 23 Here, the premise underlying the SAC is that the City is responsible for implementing and 24 charging a $398.50 “filing fee” that is unconstitutionally interfering with Petramala’s 25 ability to seek the restoration of his firearm rights. (Doc. 22 ¶ 5 [“The City of Scottsdale 26 is responsible for making monetary decisions regarding NICS removal fees.”].) This is 27 simply not true. The $398.50 sanction award was imposed by a state-court judge, not by 28 the City. Additionally, it was the judge who decided, as part of the sanction order, to bar 1 Petramala from filing future restoration actions until he paid the $398.50. Thus, the City 2 cannot be said to have caused Petramala’s injury. 3 For similar reasons, granting the relief sought in the SAC would not redress 4 Petramala’s asserted injuries. The SAC requests a declaration that “NICS removal fees not 5 explicitly authorized by Congress violate federal law and/or are void.” (Doc. 22 at 10.) 6 But issuing such a declaration as to the City would accomplish nothing—the City isn’t 7 involved in promulgating NICS removal fees and such a declaration would not, in any 8 event, undermine the validity of the sanction award that was issued by the state-court judge. 9 Cf. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 2020) (“To establish Article III 10 redressability, the plaintiffs must show that the relief they seek is both (1) substantially 11 likely to redress their injuries; and (2) within the district court’s power to award. . . . 12 Redress need not be guaranteed, but it must be more than ‘merely speculative.’”). 13 Finally, the SAC also seeks a declaration that the City must “appoint a NICS 14 removal expert on Petramala’s behalf.” (Doc. 22 at 10.) The City argues that it “does not have a duty to supply criminally incompetent individuals with free expert witnesses or 15 attorneys” and that it is Petramala’s “sole burden to petition for the restoration of his gun 16 rights,” citing A.R.S. § 13-925 and 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). (Doc. 24 at 4.) Petramala responds 17 that both state and federal law require the appointment of counsel and compensation for 18 expert witnesses, citing A.R.S. § 13-4013 and 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. (Doc. 26 at 4.) The 19 City replies that neither statute pertains to the obligations of a municipality and that 20 Petramala is not entitled to expert witnesses because he is not being charged with a crime 21 and is not the subject of an insanity hearing. (Doc. 27 at 2.) 22 Petramala lacks standing to seek this relief against the City. As an initial matter, 23 Petramala fails to explain how the cited statutes would empower the City (let alone require 24 the City) to appoint and compensate experts and attorneys on his behalf. A.R.S. § 13- 25 4013(A) governs the compensation of court-appointed counsel and expert witnesses under 26 Arizona law and provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f counsel is appointed by the court and 27 represents the defendant in either a criminal proceeding or insanity hearing, counsel shall 28 be paid by the county in which the court presides.” Id. (emphasis added). Nothing in this 1 statute suggests that cities somehow have an affirmative duty to provide litigants with free 2 experts and counsel in restoration proceedings. Nor does 18 U.S.C. § 3006A support 3 Petramala’s position—nothing in that statute indicates that a municipal defendant in a state- 4 court restoration proceeding must appoint and compensate the plaintiff’s experts and 5 counsel. 6 More important, Petramala has alleged elsewhere that the $398.50 fee—which has 7 now been revealed as a sanction award—is preventing him from pursuing a restoration 8 proceeding. Thus, Petramala cannot demonstrate that the City’s failure to provide him with 9 counsel and experts in a hypothetical future restoration proceeding, which he concedes he 10 cannot pursue, has caused him to suffer any injury. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 11 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (to meet the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing . . . the 12 plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ . . . [that is] actual or imminent, not 13 conjectural or hypothetical”) (quotations omitted). 14 III. Leave To Amend Petramala has not, in his response to the City’s motion to dismiss, requested leave 15 to amend in the event of a dismissal. Even if Petramala had made such a request, it would 16 have been denied. 17 “Rule 15 advises the court that leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice 18 so requires. This policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, LLC 19 v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotation marks 20 omitted). Additionally, “[a] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without 21 leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not 22 be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 23 Nevertheless, “liberality in granting leave to amend is subject to several limitations.” 24 United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 25 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Those limitations include undue 26 prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith by the movant, futility, and undue delay.” Id. 27 Also, “when a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in 28 deciding subsequent motions to amend is ‘particularly broad.’” Chodos v. W. Publishing Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 2 Here, these considerations cut against a grant of leave to amend. As noted, Petramala has filed a high volume of restoration-related lawsuits against the City and other 4|| entities over the last 16 years, causing those entities to incur substantial expense. It would || be prejudicial to require the City to continue expending resources on this matter. 6|| Additionally, Petramala has already been afforded several opportunities to craft a viable || complaint and appears unable to do so—as noted, he mischaracterized the nature of the 8 || $398.50 sanction award in the first three versions of his complaint (and in his motion for g|| reconsideration of the first dismissal order). 10 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 11 (1) The City’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 24) is granted. 12 (2) Petramala’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 28) is denied as moot. 13 (3) The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action and enter judgment 14|| accordingly. 15 Dated this 10th day of June, 2020. 16 fT-L 18 "Dominic W. Lanza 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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