Petitt v. Air Line Pilots Association

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: May 17, 2021
• Docket: 2:20-cv-01093
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 KARLENE K. PETITT, 8 NO. C20-1093RSL Plaintiff, 9 v. ORDER GRANTING 10 DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, DISMISS 11 Defendant. 12 13 14 This matter comes before the Court on “Defendant Air Line Pilot Association’s Motion to 15 Dismiss Amended Complaint.” Dkt. # 14. Plaintiff alleges that the Air Line Pilot Association 16 17 (“ALPA”) breached the duty of fair representation it owed her as a union member under the 18 Railway Labor Act. Plaintiff asserts, among other things, that ALPA (a) failed to represent her at 19 an October 15, 2019, hearing in which it sided with the airline in opposing plaintiff’s grievance 20 and (b) allowed language to be incorporated into the arbitrator’s decision that prejudiced her 21 AIR 21 whistleblower claim. Plaintiff further alleges that, but for ALPA’s breach of the duty of 22 23 fair representation (“DFR”), she “would never have been forced into a psychiatric evaluation for 24 reporting safety [violations], if so, she would have only have lost a month of her career, not two 25 years, she would have had her AIR 21 ruling by May 1, 2020, and would not have had to face 26 extensive attorney bills to save her career and defend against Delta’s frivolous motion based 27 1 upon the Wallin[] January 27, 2020 ruling.” Dkt. # 4 at ¶ 164. Defendant seeks dismissal of all 2 of plaintiff’s claims on the ground that the alleged facts do not state a breach of the duty of fair 3 representation claim for which monetary damages can be granted. 4 In the context of a motion to dismiss, the Court’s review is generally limited to the 5 contents of the complaint. Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996). 6 7 Nevertheless, Ninth Circuit authority allows the Court to consider documents referenced 8 extensively in the complaint, documents that form the basis of plaintiff’s claim, and matters of 9 judicial notice when determining whether the allegations of the complaint state a claim upon 10 which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908-09 11 (9th Cir. 2003). The collective bargaining agreement and the record of the relevant grievance 12 and arbitration proceedings are referenced in the complaint, form the basis of plaintiff’s claims, 13 14 and have been cited by both parties in their memoranda. The Court will therefore consider these 15 documents in determining whether plaintiff has stated a viable cause of action. 16 The question for the Court on a motion to dismiss is whether the facts alleged in the 17 complaint sufficiently state a “plausible” ground for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 18 544, 570 (2007). 19 20 A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 21 misconduct alleged. Plausibility requires pleading facts, as opposed to conclusory 22 allegations or the formulaic recitation of elements of a cause of action, and must 23 rise above the mere conceivability or possibility of unlawful conduct that entitles the pleader to relief. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 24 above the speculative level. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely 25 consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility 26 and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Nor is it enough that the complaint is factually neutral; rather, it must be factually suggestive. 27 1 Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and 2 citations omitted). All well-pleaded factual allegations are presumed to be true, with all 3 reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the non-moving party. In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 4 714 F.3d 1141, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2013). If the complaint fails to state a cognizable legal theory 5 or fails to provide sufficient facts to support a claim, dismissal is appropriate. Shroyer v. New 6 7 Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). 8 Having considered the Amended Complaint and the memoranda, declarations, and 9 exhibits submitted by the parties, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff, the 10 Court finds as follows: 11 A. Limitations Period 12 The Amended Complaint contains a “History of Events” dating back to 2011. Dkt. # 4 at 13 14 ¶¶ 9-153. The only events and actions that arguably fall within the six-month limitations period 15 for a DFR claim relate to the October 2019 arbitration and the resulting award. See West v. 16 Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 37-38 (1987); DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 155 17 (1983). Plaintiff is barred from pursuing a DFR claim arising from events occurring prior to the 18 October 2019 arbitration. There is no indication that plaintiff was unaware of the earlier events 19 20 (such as ALPA’s alleged mishandling of Grievance 16-11), and a time-barred claim is not 21 revived simply because plaintiff later learns of additional impacts of the underlying events. 22 B. Duty of Fair Representation 23 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that a labor organization has a 24 statutory duty of fair representation that requires it “to serve the interests of all members without 25 hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and 26 27 honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). See also 1 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944). Plaintiff alleges that ALPA 2 violated this duty in two respects: (1) by failing to object to certain statements made by Delta 3 during an October 2019 arbitration and (2) by failing to prevent the inclusion of unnecessary 4 (and potentially prejudicial) statements in the arbitration award. Each allegation is considered 5 below. 6 7 1. Failure to Object 8 In his preliminary letter brief and during his initial statements at the arbitration, Delta’s 9 counsel, Jeffrey D. Wall, requested “that all proceedings of this Board be conducted on the 10 record, including preliminaries and housekeeping matters that would typically be done off the 11 record, as well as any side bars between the Board, counsel, handling of objections, and other 12 procedural matters as we move forward.” Dkt. # 15 at 77-78. After addressing a number of 13 14 issues including the scope of the arbitration, admission of evidence, the timeliness of the 15 grievances, the substantive arbitrability of the issues presented, and the facts underlying the 16 grievances, the arbitrator noted that he had “a number of impressions” but had not yet had an 17 opportunity to discuss them with the rest of the Systems Board Members. Dkt. # 15 at 116. 18 While the arbitrator did not think the Board would have those discussions on the record, he gave 19 20 Delta’s counsel an opportunity to explain his initial request that all proceedings be recorded. In 21 response, Delta’s counsel stated: 22 This proceeding here, in the view of Delta Air Lines, is not a proceeding in which 23 the Association and Delta are necessarily opposing parties. First Officer Petitt has repeatedly criticized, and I would suggest even defamed representatives of the 24 Association, including representatives of the national organization for ALPA, local 25 counsel for ALPA, and other ALPA representatives, including what’s known as 26 AMAS, of ALPA Aeromedical. 27 1 Ms. Petitt has also seen fit to personally attack representatives of Delta , and has 2 made false statements that question both the ethics and the conduct of Delta representatives, including myself and other attorneys, agents, medical 3 professionals involved in this process. 4 5 I would suggest the Association refrains from saying this to the Board, and so I will say it. It is our belief that the Association is in grave jeopardy in this 6 proceeding of a duty of fair representation claim to be made by Ms. Petitt. She has 7 employed her own counsel at various stages of this process, has used this process 8 publicly, very publicly, to attack Delta Air Lines, its reputation, and certain officers and other former employees of Delta Air Lines. 9 10 Dkt. # 15 at 116-17. Delta’s counsel urged the arbitration panel to conduct the proceedings with 11 the utmost transparency, recording all deliberations that occurred during the hearing so that Ms. 12 Petitt would be fully informed and there would be a complete record on review. Id. at 118. The 13 arbitrator then requested a ten minute break in the proceedings to “sit here and think about things 14 15 for a while.” Id. He promised not to discuss what he had heard with other Board Members and 16 invited them to leave the hearing room. Id. at 118-19. 17 When the hearing reconvened, the arbitrator offered “a series of thoughts, perhaps 18 impressions, perhaps inclinations, perhaps leanings, and perhaps tendencies, based on what 19 [he’d] heard thus far.” Id. at 119. In his estimation, the claims asserted in two prior grievances 20 had been finally resolved and were not subject to arbitration, the new evidence discovered in the 21 22 separate AIR 21 whistleblower proceeding was simply additional support for the claims that 23 were finally resolved in the two prior grievances, Ms. Petitt was on inquiry notice of all of her 24 claims more than 120-days before the grievances were filed, and the arbitration panel did not 25 have jurisdiction to hear or decide any of the claims asserted in the AIR 21 whistleblower 26 proceeding. Id. at 119-26. ALPA, through attorney Jeffrey Loesel, requested another break in the 27 1 proceedings in order to talk with Ms. Petitt, then argued that, even if there were areas of overlap 2 between the withdrawn grievances and those currently at issue, the arbitration panel needed to 3 hear all of the evidence before determining which claims were precluded and which were 4 sufficiently separable to be decided on the merits in the arbitration.. Id. at 126-27. The arbitrator 5 invited ALPA to show how the claims presented in the current matter differed from that which 6 7 was involved in Ms. Petitt’s earlier grievances. Id. at 128-29. 8 Mr. Loesel then proceeded to discuss the claims at issue in the arbitration, attempting to 9 show that some of the claims had never been raised before and that others, while having some 10 overlap with prior grievances, were actually distinct violations of the collective bargaining 11 agreement that were unknown to Ms. Petitt prior to November 2018. Id. at 130-32; 135-38; 141- 12 45. When the arbitrator expressed skepticism that any remedy was available for the new 13 14 violations alleged, ALPA pushed back, identifying a number of adverse consequences Ms. Petitt 15 suffered as a result of the violations and the delay in resolving the underlying Section 15 process. 16 Id. at 132-35; 145-47. Delta, addressing the delay issue, represented that it had sought to 17 expedite resolution of the various grievances, but that “at every juncture, First Officer Petitt 18 refused, and declined, and manipulated the process to avoid arbitration of her claims.” Id. at 138. 19 20 ALPA again pushed back, showing instances where Delta’s delay in responding prevented 21 grievances from moving forward toward adjudication. Id. at 139-40. 22 Despite Mr. Loesel’s efforts, the arbitrator remained unconvinced. Id. at 147-48. After 23 another brief recess to consult with Ms. Petitt, counsel again requested that he be permitted to 24 put on evidence so that the arbitration panel had a clear understanding of the full scope of the 25 issues in the various grievances. Id. at 149. The arbitration panel met in executive session and 26 27 determined that the hearing should be recessed until the issues related to arbitrability were 1 decided: evidence on the merits of the grievances would not be taken unless and until the panel 2 determined that one or more issues were arbitrable. Id. at 152. At ALPA’s request, Ms. Petitt 3 was given the opportunity to address the arbitration panel and provide context for her various 4 grievances. Id. at 153-65. The proceeding was then adjourned. 5 Plaintiff alleges in the Amended Complaint that Delta counsel’s statement that the 6 7 arbitration “is not a proceeding in which the Association and Delta are necessarily opposing 8 parties” constituted a representation that Delta and ALPA jointly opposed her grievances and led 9 to the arbitrator’s unfavorable rulings on the issues of timeliness and arbitrability. Dkt. # 4 at 10 ¶ 163. She also argues that because ALPA did not object to or correct Delta’s representations 11 regarding (a) ALPA’s interactions with Ms. Petitt and (b) ALPA’s fear of a DFR claim, the 12 arbitrator was convinced of the truth of the statements. As evidence, Ms. Petitt asserts that the 13 14 arbitrator immediately took a recess to reflect on the fact that “both parties were on the same 15 side,” then refused to hear testimony and ruled against her on arbitrability. Dkt. # 19 at 13 and 16 16. Ms. Petitt also argues that ALPA breached its duty of fair representation by failing to object 17 to Delta’s assertion that any delays in the arbitration process were caused by Ms. Petitt. Dkt. # 15 18 at 138. 19 20 The record does not raise a plausible inference that the failure to object to the offending 21 statements breached ALPA’s duty of fair representation. 22 “A union breaches its duty of fair representation only if its conduct is arbitrary, 23 discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Truesdell v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 293 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2002). Mere negligence in the handling of a grievance 24 does not breach the duty of fair representation. See, e.g., Patterson v. Int’l Bhd. of 25 Teamsters, Local 959, 121 F.3d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1997); Stevens v. Moore Bus. 26 Forms, Inc., 18 F.3d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994). The question of whether the conduct is arbitrary is only relevant if the union’s conduct was procedural or 27 1 ministerial and did not require the exercise of judgment; otherwise, the employee 2 must show bad faith or discrimination. See, e.g., Banks v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 870 F.2d 1438, 1442 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 3 1254 (9th Cir. 1985)). 4 5 Velez v. Int’l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen’s Union, 64 Fed. App’x 31, 32-33 (9th Cir. 6 2003). The dichotomy between procedural/ministerial acts and judgments about grievance 7 processing is not absolute, however, but “merely a convenient shortcut for segregating acts of 8 judgment from acts of nonjudgment.” Peters v. Burlington N. R. Co., 914 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th 9 Cir. 1990). “While some substantive decisions by unions can be undertaken indifferently enough 10 or recklessly enough to result in union liability, unions will not be liable for ‘actual, rational 11 12 attempts ... to properly interpret a collective bargaining agreement or otherwise handle a 13 grievance.’” Breda v. Oregon Symphony Ass’n, 928 F.2d 408, 1991 WL 36336, at *4 (9th Cir. 14 1991) (quoting Peters, 914 F.2d at 1300). 15 Applying these principles, it is clear that counsel’s in-the-moment decisions not to object 16 to Delta’s statements regarding the need to create a full and complete record of the proceedings 17 or the cause of the delay in the arbitration process involved the exercise of discretion and fall 18 19 squarely on the “judgment” side of the continuum. There was no set procedure to follow or 20 ministerial duty to perform, counsel’s decisions were well within the range of reasonable 21 conduct given the circumstances, there is no indication that Ms. Petitt identified a problem with 22 the statements or requested that counsel take corrective action,1 and counsel’s overall conduct 23 24 1 Plaintiff asserts in her opposition memorandum that she “expressed to Loesel her grave concern 25 for the violation of professional ethics inherent in Wall’s opening statement.” Dkt. # 19 at 7. That 26 assertion is unsupported by a declaration or other evidence, and it is unclear what ethics violation is alleged, how it relates to the claims asserted in this litigation, or what ALPA was supposed to do about 27 it. 1 during the arbitration reflects a fidelity to his client and her arguments that belies any argument 2 that he was indifferent or reckless. That Ms. Petitt would have preferred a different, arguably 3 better, response to Delta’s statements does not give rise to an inference that counsel’s decisions 4 were arbitrary under governing Ninth Circuit law. See Patterson, 121 F.3d at 1349 (“A union 5 acts arbitrarily only if it shows an “egregious” or “reckless disregard” for the rights of its 6 7 members. . . . Further, “[w]e have never held that a union has acted in an arbitrary manner where 8 the challenged conduct involved the union’s judgment as to how best to handle a grievance.”) 9 (citations omitted); Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1254 (“[A] union’s conduct may not be deemed 10 arbitrary simply because of an error in evaluating the merits of a grievance, in interpreting 11 particular provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, or in presenting the grievance at an 12 arbitration hearing.”). Thus, Ms. Petitt’s DFR claim related to counsel’s decisions not to object 13 14 during the arbitration hearing fails as a matter of law unless she has plausibly alleged bad faith 15 or discrimination. See, e.g., Beck v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 99, 506 F.3d 874, 16 880 (9th Cir. 2007). 17 Plaintiff argues that she has adequately alleged discrimination in paragraphs 29 and 31 of 18 the Amended Complaint and/or through a July 2020 EEOC complaint and October 2020 lawsuit 19 20 alleging Title VII violations. The conclusory allegations of discriminatory animus in the 21 Amended Complaint are insufficient. In order to show that a union’s actions are discriminatory 22 for purposes of a DFR claim, plaintiff must provide “substantial evidence of discrimination that 23 is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives.” Amalgamated Ass’n of St., 24 Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971). Both of the instances of 25 discrimination alleged in the Amended Complaint involve events occurring long before the 26 27 October 2019 arbitration and persons other than attorney Loesel. Neither suggests, much less 1 raises a plausible inference, that counsel failed to object at the arbitration because of 2 discriminatory animus. Plaintiff cannot fill the gap with allegations of gender discrimination 3 asserted in another case. See Petitt v. Air Line Pilots Association, C20-1569RSL. Those 4 allegations are not part of the operative pleading in this case, and plaintiff has not sought to (and 5 in fact declined ALPA’s invitation to) amend this complaint to add allegations in support of a 6 7 gender discrimination claim.2 8 In order to support a DFR claim based on allegations of bad faith, the allegations must 9 give rise to a plausible inference that the union engaged in “fraud, deceitful action or dishonest 10 conduct.” Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964). Plaintiff argues that Loesel’s failure to 11 object to Delta’s statement that the arbitration was “not a proceeding in which the Association 12 and Delta are necessarily opposing parties” effectively conveyed to the arbitrator that both Delta 13 14 and ALPA opposed her grievances and, considered with “the history of ALPA’s unfavorable 15 treatment of” Ms. Petitt as described in the complaint, gives rise to a plausible inference that 16 ALPA engaged in deceit or dishonesty by conspiring with Delta to defeat its member’s 17 grievances. The Court disagrees. Delta’s comment came in the context of its request that, based 18 on plaintiff’s history of complaints regarding adverse actions/decisions and the persons involved, 19 20 the arbitration be conducted on the record as much as possible to provide maximum 21 transparency. The statement that ALPA and Delta are not “necessarily opposing parties” 22 involves the request for a full and complete record. It cannot reasonably or plausibly relate to the 23 24 2 Plaintiff rebuffed ALPA’s invitation to consolidate the two cases, instead declaring that her complaint and response to this motion to dismiss set forth all of the facts necessary to determine the 25 viability of her DFR claim and requesting that this motion be resolved before consolidation is 26 considered. C20-1569RSL (Dkt. # 10 at 2 and 6). Plaintiff’s Title VII claim seeks compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the same conduct at issue here and may proceed regardless of the 27 outcome of this motion. 1 ultimate the outcome of the arbitration. Other than the request for a comprehensive record, 2 virtually every other aspect of the case was contested. Mr. Loesel, representing plaintiff’s 3 interests, presented thorough and focused arguments regarding timeliness and arbitrability in 4 both his initial letter memorandum and at the arbitration hearing. Although plaintiff surmises 5 that the arbitrator understood Delta’s statement and Loesel’s failure to object as a coded message 6 7 that the grievances should be rejected, the supposition is unreasonable where the parties spent 8 hours developing written and oral arguments in support of or in opposition to the grievances. 9 There is no indication that the arbitrator thought that ALPA and Delta were on the same side, 10 Mr. Loesel made substantial efforts to counter arguments raised by both Delta and the arbitrator, 11 and plaintiff does not identify any failure in ALPA’s representation related to the issues that 12 were ultimately decided against her, namely timeliness and arbitrability. Plaintiff has not 13 14 plausibly alleged fraud, deceit, or dishonest conduct on the part of ALPA. 15 2. Failure to Control or Edit the Language of the Arbitration Award 16 At the outset of the arbitration proceeding, ALPA made clear that it and Ms. Petitt had 17 concerns about the scope of the issues presented. Ms. Petitt was pursuing a separate AIR 21 18 whistleblower proceeding that challenged Delta’s motivation in subjecting Ms. Petitt to a 19 20 Section 15 procedure for perceived mental health issues. ALPA clarified that the issues 21 presented to the arbitration panel had to do with procedural violations during the Section 15 22 process, not Delta’s motivation in initiating the process. Dkt. # 15 at 78. It specifically requested 23 that proposed exhibits related to the AIR 21 issues be excluded and that the inquiry during 24 arbitration be limited to the grievances at issue. Id. at 78. Delta concurred. Id. at 81. 25 As discussed above, the arbitration hearing adjourned on October 15, 2019, with the 26 27 understanding that the arbitration panel would determine whether the grievances at issue were 1 timely filed and arbitrable. On or about January 27, 2020, the arbitration panel3 issued an 2 “Opinion and Award” finding that grievance 18-13 was untimely filed and that grievance 19-05 3 was both untimely and substantively barred by the final and binding resolution of grievance 17- 4 14. Id. at 193-94. In order to make these rulings, the panel deemed it necessary to “not only 5 consider the two grievances, themselves, but also what influence there may be, if any, resulting 6 7 from the disposition of two earlier grievances filed by Grievant.” Id. at 186. On March 3, 2020, 8 Delta filed a motion in the AIR 21 proceeding arguing that language contained in the arbitration 9 award showed that Delta’s motivation for initiating the Section 15 process had been finally 10 determined in its favor in grievance 16-11, and that Ms. Petitt was therefore collaterally estopped 11 from relitigating that issue. Ms. Petitt apparently alerted the APLA-appointed panel members of 12 what Delta was trying to do: they subsequently lodged a dissent objecting to the outcome of the 13 14 arbitration, the “extensive and unnecessary dicta” contained in the order, and the resulting ill- 15 advised interference in the safety culture embedded in the AIR 21 process. Id. at 196. 16 Ms. Petitt asserts a DFR claim against ALPA based on these events, alleging that the two 17 ALPA-appointed members of the arbitration panel “had a duty and obligation to request that the 18 language addressing Delta’s motive underlying the initiation of the Section 15 hearing, which 19 20 had nothing to do with the grievances before the board and could have a deleterious impact on 21 22 3 The copy of the “Opinion and Award” in the record has two signature pages. Both pages have 23 five signature blocks, one for each member of the arbitration panel, but the first is signed only be the neutral member and Chairman, Gerald E. Wallin. Dkt. # 15 at 194. The second signature page is signed 24 by all five members of the panel, but there is reason to believe that at least the ALPA-appointed members signed after March 3, 2020. Their signature blocks refer to an attached dissent which was 25 written after Delta “attempted to submit a partially-executed version of this decision to the 26 Administrative Law Judge in an attempt to have the Grievant’s AIR21 case dismissed.” Id. at 195-96. 27 1 Petitt’s AIR 21 claim, be removed from the ruling. . . . [A]t the very least a written dissent 2 objecting to [the] dictum regarding Delta’s motivation should have been made. It was not.” Dkt. 3 # 4 at ¶ 158. Plaintiff offers no source for the supposed duty of an ALPA-appointed panel 4 member to advocate for or otherwise favor the union member in arbitrations under the governing 5 collective bargaining agreement or federal labor law. In fact, the agreement makes clear that 6 7 each panel member, whether appointed by Delta or ALPA, is “free to discharge his duty in an 8 independent manner, without fear that his individual relations with the Company, the 9 Association or their employees may be affected in any manner or by any action taken by him in 10 good faith.” Dkt. # 15 at 17. Nor does plaintiff allege or provide any indication that the ALPA- 11 appointed panel members drafted the offending language, realized the use to which Delta would 12 put it, or had the power to alter the “Opinion and Award.” When they learned that Delta was 13 14 attempting to use the award to scuttle plaintiff’s separate AIR 21 claim (despite its counsel’s 15 agreement that the arbitration should have no impact on the AIR 21 proceeding), they lodged a 16 dissent clearly opposing the inclusion of the unnecessary language and Delta’s decision to 17 repudiate its prior agreement. Given the circumstances, plaintiff has failed to raise a plausible 18 inference that ALPA’s conduct related to the arbitration award was arbitrary, discriminatory, or 19 20 in bad faith. 21 22 For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff 23 has not alleged facts that give rise to a plausible inference that ALPA breached its duty of fair 24 representation at the October 2019 arbitration or in the execution of the award. The claims 25 asserted in the Amended Complaint are therefore DISMISSED. Based on plaintiff’s submission, 26 27 1 she apparently believes that Mr. Loesel failed to object at the arbitration and that the ALPA- 2 appointed members of the panel failed to champion her cause more aggressively in deliberations 3 because she is a woman, in breach of the union’s duty of fair representation. If plaintiff can, 4 consistent with her Rule 11 obligations, amend the complaint to allege facts in support of such a 5 claim, she may, within fourteen days of the date of this Order, file a motion to amend and attach 6 7 a proposed pleading for the Court’s consideration pursuant to LCR 15. Plaintiff’s Title VII claim 8 remains pending before the Court under a separate cause number and need not be duplicated 9 here. 10 11 Dated this 17th day of May, 2021. 12 Robert S. Lasnik 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27