MEMORANDUM DECISION RESOLVING DISCOVERY DISPUTES AND ISSUE OF WHETHER LIQUIDATION OF AOHL IS A FOREIGN PROCEEDING FOR PURPOSES OF 11 U.S.C. SECTION m
JAMES L. GARRITY, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.
Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) authorizes a “foreign representative” in a “foreign proceeding” to petition the United States Bankruptcy Court to enjoin actions by creditors against a debtor or property of the estate, to compel the turnover of estate property, or to obtain other appropriate relief. 11 U.S.C. §§ 304(a) and (b).
See In re Petition of Trakman,
33 B.R. 780, 783 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1983). This matter arises out of the § 304 petition, as amended, filed on behalf of a liquidator jointly overseeing the voluntary liquidation of Asian Oceanic Holdings Limited (“AOHL”), a Cayman Islands corporation, pursuant to §§ 131-148 of the Cayman Islands Companies Law (Revised 1990), as amended (the “Companies Law”). [Hereinafter, the “Cayman Liquidation”]. The issues presented are whether the Cayman Liquidation is a “foreign proceeding” for purposes of §§ 101(23) and 304(a) of the Code, and if it is, whether Frances O. Hunnewell, a creditor herein, is entitled to in-depth discovery with respect to the liquidators’ conduct of the Cayman Liquidation. As explained below, we hold that the Cayman Liquidation is not a foreign proeeed-ing. Accordingly, the § 304 petition, as amended, must be dismissed. The discovery issues are moot and will not be addressed.
Facts
The facts are not in dispute. Asian Oceanic Holdings Limited is a corporation organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands, with its principal place of business in Hong Kong. On or about June 16,1992, the shareholders of AOHL passed a Special Resolution pursuant to and in accordance with § 131 of the Companies Law and Article 40 of AOHL’s Articles of Association that AOHL be wound up voluntarily. The Special Resolution also appointed Nicholas P. Etches and G.C.K. Tam, both of KPMG Peat Marwick Hong Kong, as liquidators, jointly and severally, for the purpose of winding up the affairs and distributing the assets of AOHL.
Among AOHL’s assets is its interest in a cooperative apartment located at 30 E. 62nd Street, Unit 4C, New York, New York, together with 700 shares in and of Cumberland House Corporation (collectively, the “Coop”), pursuant to a Declaration of Trust dated December 4, 1989, that was executed in AOHL’s favor by Frances 0. Hunnewell, an individual who served AOHL and Asian Oceanic Capital Corp. (“AOCC”), its affiliate, in different executive capacities between 1986 and May 31, 1992. On or about January 18, 1994, Hunnewell commenced a lawsuit (the “Hunnewell Action”) against AOHL and AOCC in the New York State Supreme Court, New York County, seeking approximately $205,000 allegedly due under a severance agreement among Hunnewell and AOHL and/or AOCC. In connection with that litigation, Hunnewell moved pursuant to §§ 6201(1) and 6212 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules for an order of attachment of the Co-op. As filed, that motion was returnable on March 4, 1994.
The liquidators desire to sell the Co-op and distribute the sales proceeds to creditors in accordance with Cayman law. On or about March 3, 1994, G.C.K. Tam, as joint liquidator of AOHL, filed a Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304 to Commence a Case Ancillary to a Foreign Proceeding (the “§ 304 Petition”). Among other things, Tam seeks the entry of an order enjoining the continuation of, and staying and suspending all proceedings in, the Hunnewell Action as against AOHL. That day, Tam also moved by Order to Show Cause for an order pursuant to §§ 304 and 105 of the Code preliminarily enjoining Hunnewell from continuing to prosecute the Hunnewell Action against AOHL. That motion also sought the entry of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) preventing Hunnewell from taking action against AOHL in the Hunnewell Action pending a hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction. Hunnewell was given notice of the presents ment of the TRO but declined to oppose it. After concluding that the underlying papers supported Tam’s request for a TRO, we signed the Order To Show Cause (which incorporated the TRO) and scheduled the preliminary injunction hearing for March 8, 1994. On the return date, Hunnewell, by his counsel, consented to the entry of a preliminary injunction pending resolution of the § 304 Petition.
On March 18,1994, Tam filed an Amended Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304 To Commence A Case Ancillary To A Foreign Proceeding (“Amended § 304 Petition”) seeking substantially identical relief to that requested in the § 304 Petition. On or about April 15, 1994, Hunnewell filed his Response and Objection To Amended Petition Filed Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304. Among the defenses to the Amended § 304 Petition asserted by Hunnewell were that the voluntary winding up does not qualify as a “foreign proceeding” for purposes of § 304 and that the liquidators had denied him any information relating to, among other things, the methods employed by the liquidators in selling AOHL’s assets and the prices obtained for those assets.
See
Response and Objection To Amended Petition filed Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304, pp. 4-5 at ¶¶ 1-3.
Thereafter, Hunnewell promptly moved pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 to conduct discovery relating to the liquidators’ conduct of the Cayman Liquidation. Consistent with the issues raised in his response, Hunnewell argued that because the liquidation is not being conducted before a Cayman judicial or administrative tribunal, it is not a “foreign proceeding”. For Hunnewell, if the petition is not dismissed, that lack of supervision justifies his obtaining access to the liquidators’ books and records and the oral testimony of, among others, Messrs. Tam, Etches and Richard M. Bliss, formerly Chief Executive Officer of AOHL and a principal in Bliss Oceanic Holdings Limited, a shareholder of AOHL, to determine whether the liquidation was being conducted in accordance with Cayman law. Tam opposed Hunnewell’s request for discovery. He disputed Hunnewell’s thesis and urged that discovery was improper and unnecessary because the Cayman Liquidation should be recognized and accorded comity under § 304 of the Code. In Tam’s view, matters relating to the conduct of the Cayman Liquidation should be addressed and resolved in the Cayman Islands. The parties agreed that in resolving the discovery dispute, we must determine whether the Cayman Liquidation is a “foreign proceeding” for purposes of § 304. They fully briefed both issues.
Discussion
A company formed and registered under the Companies Law can be wound up at the behest of its members (i.e. shareholders), one or more of its creditors or contribu-tories,
or any combination of the three.
See
Companies Law §§ 93, 131.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION RESOLVING DISCOVERY DISPUTES AND ISSUE OF WHETHER LIQUIDATION OF AOHL IS A FOREIGN PROCEEDING FOR PURPOSES OF 11 U.S.C. SECTION m
JAMES L. GARRITY, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.
Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) authorizes a “foreign representative” in a “foreign proceeding” to petition the United States Bankruptcy Court to enjoin actions by creditors against a debtor or property of the estate, to compel the turnover of estate property, or to obtain other appropriate relief. 11 U.S.C. §§ 304(a) and (b).
See In re Petition of Trakman,
33 B.R. 780, 783 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1983). This matter arises out of the § 304 petition, as amended, filed on behalf of a liquidator jointly overseeing the voluntary liquidation of Asian Oceanic Holdings Limited (“AOHL”), a Cayman Islands corporation, pursuant to §§ 131-148 of the Cayman Islands Companies Law (Revised 1990), as amended (the “Companies Law”). [Hereinafter, the “Cayman Liquidation”]. The issues presented are whether the Cayman Liquidation is a “foreign proceeding” for purposes of §§ 101(23) and 304(a) of the Code, and if it is, whether Frances O. Hunnewell, a creditor herein, is entitled to in-depth discovery with respect to the liquidators’ conduct of the Cayman Liquidation. As explained below, we hold that the Cayman Liquidation is not a foreign proeeed-ing. Accordingly, the § 304 petition, as amended, must be dismissed. The discovery issues are moot and will not be addressed.
Facts
The facts are not in dispute. Asian Oceanic Holdings Limited is a corporation organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands, with its principal place of business in Hong Kong. On or about June 16,1992, the shareholders of AOHL passed a Special Resolution pursuant to and in accordance with § 131 of the Companies Law and Article 40 of AOHL’s Articles of Association that AOHL be wound up voluntarily. The Special Resolution also appointed Nicholas P. Etches and G.C.K. Tam, both of KPMG Peat Marwick Hong Kong, as liquidators, jointly and severally, for the purpose of winding up the affairs and distributing the assets of AOHL.
Among AOHL’s assets is its interest in a cooperative apartment located at 30 E. 62nd Street, Unit 4C, New York, New York, together with 700 shares in and of Cumberland House Corporation (collectively, the “Coop”), pursuant to a Declaration of Trust dated December 4, 1989, that was executed in AOHL’s favor by Frances 0. Hunnewell, an individual who served AOHL and Asian Oceanic Capital Corp. (“AOCC”), its affiliate, in different executive capacities between 1986 and May 31, 1992. On or about January 18, 1994, Hunnewell commenced a lawsuit (the “Hunnewell Action”) against AOHL and AOCC in the New York State Supreme Court, New York County, seeking approximately $205,000 allegedly due under a severance agreement among Hunnewell and AOHL and/or AOCC. In connection with that litigation, Hunnewell moved pursuant to §§ 6201(1) and 6212 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules for an order of attachment of the Co-op. As filed, that motion was returnable on March 4, 1994.
The liquidators desire to sell the Co-op and distribute the sales proceeds to creditors in accordance with Cayman law. On or about March 3, 1994, G.C.K. Tam, as joint liquidator of AOHL, filed a Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304 to Commence a Case Ancillary to a Foreign Proceeding (the “§ 304 Petition”). Among other things, Tam seeks the entry of an order enjoining the continuation of, and staying and suspending all proceedings in, the Hunnewell Action as against AOHL. That day, Tam also moved by Order to Show Cause for an order pursuant to §§ 304 and 105 of the Code preliminarily enjoining Hunnewell from continuing to prosecute the Hunnewell Action against AOHL. That motion also sought the entry of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) preventing Hunnewell from taking action against AOHL in the Hunnewell Action pending a hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction. Hunnewell was given notice of the presents ment of the TRO but declined to oppose it. After concluding that the underlying papers supported Tam’s request for a TRO, we signed the Order To Show Cause (which incorporated the TRO) and scheduled the preliminary injunction hearing for March 8, 1994. On the return date, Hunnewell, by his counsel, consented to the entry of a preliminary injunction pending resolution of the § 304 Petition.
On March 18,1994, Tam filed an Amended Petition Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304 To Commence A Case Ancillary To A Foreign Proceeding (“Amended § 304 Petition”) seeking substantially identical relief to that requested in the § 304 Petition. On or about April 15, 1994, Hunnewell filed his Response and Objection To Amended Petition Filed Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304. Among the defenses to the Amended § 304 Petition asserted by Hunnewell were that the voluntary winding up does not qualify as a “foreign proceeding” for purposes of § 304 and that the liquidators had denied him any information relating to, among other things, the methods employed by the liquidators in selling AOHL’s assets and the prices obtained for those assets.
See
Response and Objection To Amended Petition filed Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 304, pp. 4-5 at ¶¶ 1-3.
Thereafter, Hunnewell promptly moved pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 to conduct discovery relating to the liquidators’ conduct of the Cayman Liquidation. Consistent with the issues raised in his response, Hunnewell argued that because the liquidation is not being conducted before a Cayman judicial or administrative tribunal, it is not a “foreign proceeding”. For Hunnewell, if the petition is not dismissed, that lack of supervision justifies his obtaining access to the liquidators’ books and records and the oral testimony of, among others, Messrs. Tam, Etches and Richard M. Bliss, formerly Chief Executive Officer of AOHL and a principal in Bliss Oceanic Holdings Limited, a shareholder of AOHL, to determine whether the liquidation was being conducted in accordance with Cayman law. Tam opposed Hunnewell’s request for discovery. He disputed Hunnewell’s thesis and urged that discovery was improper and unnecessary because the Cayman Liquidation should be recognized and accorded comity under § 304 of the Code. In Tam’s view, matters relating to the conduct of the Cayman Liquidation should be addressed and resolved in the Cayman Islands. The parties agreed that in resolving the discovery dispute, we must determine whether the Cayman Liquidation is a “foreign proceeding” for purposes of § 304. They fully briefed both issues.
Discussion
A company formed and registered under the Companies Law can be wound up at the behest of its members (i.e. shareholders), one or more of its creditors or contribu-tories,
or any combination of the three.
See
Companies Law §§ 93, 131. Creditors and/or contributories seeking entry of an order winding up a company can do so only by petitioning the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands (the “Cayman Court”).
Id.
§ 95. If the petition is granted and an order is made for winding up the company, the Cayman Court oversees all aspects of the liquidation. This procedure is known as a “Winding Up
By Court”.
Id.
§ 93. The court may appoint an official liquidator to conduct the ■winding up.
Id.
§ 105. The liquidator’s compensation is fixed by the court,
id.
§ 106(2), and all actions taken by the liquidator in furtherance of his statutory duties are subject to court approval.
Id.
§ 108;
but see
§ 109 (court may authorize official liquidator exercise powers enumerated in § 108 without sanction or intervention of the court). For cause shown, the court may remove the liquidator at any time.
Id.
§ 106(1). Creditors and contributories have standing to be heard with regard to all matters relating to the winding up.
Id.
§ 104. When the procedure is complete, the court issues an order that the company be dissolved, and from that date, the company is deemed dissolved accordingly.
Id.
§ 123.
A determination by shareholders to liquidate a company can be effected in one of two ways. Shareholders may resolve that the company be wound up by the court. In that event, it is treated as a Winding Up By Court.
Id.
§ 93. Alternatively, shareholders may vote to wind up the company voluntarily.
Id.
§ 131(b). That procedure is undertaken outside the jurisdiction of the Cayman Court. *■
Compare id.
§ 150 (order continuing voluntary winding up “subject to the supervision of the court”, discussed
infra,
vests Cayman Court with jurisdiction over suits and actions as if under a Winding Up By Court). The liquidation is deemed commenced as of the date the shareholder resolution is passed,
id.
§ 132, at which point the company ceases to carry on its business, except as is necessary to effectuate the winding up.
Id.
§ 133. Except as otherwise provided in the shareholders’ resolution, upon the commencement of the voluntary winding up, the company’s directors cease to exercise any power over the affairs of the company. Rather, the liquidator or liquidators — who are selected by the shareholders, who exercise all of the rights conferred on them under the statute without the necessity of court review or order, and whose compensation is fixed by the shareholders— wind up the affairs of the company and distribute its assets.
Id.
§§ 135(b), (c) and (g).
Section 304 empowers a “foreign representative” appointed in a “foreign proceeding” to commence a “case ancillary to [that] foreign proceeding” by filing a petition in the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. § 304(a).
See In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.,
961 F.2d 341, 348 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied,
— U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 188, 121 L.Ed.2d 132 (1992);
In re Rubin,
160 B.R. 269, 274 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1993). The Code defines a “foreign proceeding” as “[a] proceeding, whether judicial or administrative ... for the purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting a reorganization.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(23).
The goal of the Cayman Liquidation is to wind up AOHL’s affairs, liquidate its assets, pay valid claims, distribute remaining assets or the proceeds thereof to shareholders and dissolve the company.
See
Companies Law § 135. That end is consistent with the purposes ascribed to a foreign proceeding by the Code, a point which Hunnewell does not dispute. We are not aware that any court has considered whether it is a “foreign proceeding”.
Compare Universal Casualty & Surety Co. v. Gee (In re Gee),
53 B.R. 891, 897 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985) (a Winding Up By Court under the Companies Law is a “foreign proceeding”, and court appointed liquidator is a “foreign representative”).
Although the liquidators selected by the company in a voluntary winding up are vested with the same powers accorded liquidators appointed by the Cayman Court in a Winding Up By Court,
see
Companies Law §§ 135(g), 108 and 109, they operate free from the supervision and control of the Cayman Court.
Id.
§ 135(g). Accordingly, Tam concedes that the Cayman Liquidation is not a judicial proceeding. He insists that it nonetheless should be viewed as “foreign proceeding” because: (i) the liquidation is conducted under the aegis of the Registrar of Companies (“Registrar”)
who must review and approve the actions taken by the Liqui
dators before the company can be dissolved; (ii) creditors may petition the Cayman Court to review the actions taken by the liquidators; and (in) the winding up is statutorily sanctioned by the Companies Law.
Hunnewell likens the liquidators in the voluntary winding up to a receiver enforcing a floating charge pursuant to a collateralized loan agreement.
He urges that because the receiver under a floating charge should not be viewed as a “foreign representative” with standing to file a petition under § 304, Tam likewise lacked standing to file the petition and it must be dismissed. During oral argument, Tam agreed that a receiver appointed under a floating charge is not a “foreign representative” for purposes of § 304.
He disagreed with Hunnewell’s conclusion that the petition should be dismissed and differentiated between the conduct of a voluntary winding up under the Companies Law, and the acts of a receiver appointed under a floating charge to liquidate collateral. Tam is correct that there are differences. For example, a receiver appointed under a floating charge acts for the benefit of the secured creditor.
See
Rubin,
supra
n. 5 at 472. Conversely, liquidators appointed in a voluntary winding up are fiduciaries who must act in the best interest of the creditor body as a whole.
See In re Corbenstoke, Ltd. No. 2,
[1990] BCLC 60 (High Ct. of Jus., Ch.Div.).
Moreover, while the Companies Law prescribes a methodology (including priorities) for satisfying creditor claims, the enforcement of a floating charge addresses the claim of one creditor which can be satisfied to the detriment of other creditors. Nonetheless, we do not agree that the Cayman Liquidation is a “foreign proceeding”.
The term “proceeding” is not defined by the Code. Because there is no evidence to the contrary, we presume that Congress intended that it be given its ordinary meaning.
See Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick
Assocs.
Ltd. Partnership,
— U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1495, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). That term is commonly interpreted as:
the form and manner of conducting juridical business before a court or judicial officer. Regular and orderly progress in form of law, including all possible steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment. Term also refers to administrative proceedings before agencies, tribunals, bureaus, or the like.
Black’s Law Dictionary 1204 (6th ed. 1990).
See also
1 Am.JuR.2d
Actions
§ 3 at 542 (1964) (“[a]s ordinarily used, [the term “proceeding”] is broad enough to include all methods of invoking the action of courts ... and all possible steps in an action from its
institution to the execution of judgment ...”).
Courts have granted § 304 relief in cases where the underlying “foreign proceeding” was not a judicially sanctioned liquidation pending in a foreign court. In those instances, consistent with the commonly held notion of what constitutes a “proceeding”, the liquidation was conducted under the auspices of an administrative authority charged with the duty of regulating the entity being liquidated. Thus, in
In re Banco de Descuento,
78 B.R. 337 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1987), the court held that the out of court liquidation of an insolvent Ecuadorian bank conducted by the Superintendent of Banks of the Republic of Ecuador pursuant to Ecuador’s General Law of Banks was a foreign proceeding.
See
78 B.R. at 338. Significantly, the liquidation was being carried out by the Bank Superintendent under a system which the court found similar to that used in the United States for liquidating insolvent state and national banks.
Id.
In
In re Ocana,
151 B.R. 670 (S.D.N.Y.1993), the court granted injunc-tive relief under § 304(b) to a foreign representative in the reorganization of a Panamanian insurance company. The court took note that the reorganization under Panama law was a “statutory reorganization, a rough equivalent of bankruptcy, under the protection of the Panamanian National Reinsurance Commission.” 151 B.R. at 671.
See also In re Koreag, Controle et Revision, S.A.,
961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied,
— U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 188, 121 L.Ed.2d 132 (1992) (parties stipulated that liquidation of a bank under the auspices of Swiss Banking Commission is a foreign proceeding for purposes of § 101(22),
see In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.,
130 B.R. 705, 711 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1991)).
The Registrar plays virtually no role in a voluntary winding up. Rather, it is conducted without any regulatory oversight and virtually no creditor participation. Under the Companies Law, creditors have no right to be heard on matters relating to the conduct of the winding up and are not entitled to discovery respecting the actions undertaken by the liquidators in connection therewith. The liquidators are under no obligation to report to creditors unless the proceeding continues for more than one year. Then they must conduct a general meeting of the company at the end of that year (and each succeeding year thereafter) and “lay before such meeting an account showing their acts and dealings and the manner in which the winding up has been conducted during the preceding year.” Companies Law § 141. The statute imposes no other duty of disclosure on the liquidators until they complete their task and the affairs of the company are fully wound up. At that point they must “make up an account showing the manner in which such winding up had been conducted, and the property of the company disposed of’,
id.
§ 144, and “call a general meeting of the company for the purpose of having the account laid before them and hearing- any explanation that may be given by the liquidators.”
Id.
Although, as their final act in a voluntary winding up, the liquidators must make a return to the Registrar evidencing that they conducted the general meeting of the company mandated by § 144,
id.
§ 145, the statute merely provides that on the expiration of three months after the date of the liquidators’ registration of the return, the company shall be deemed to be dissolved.
Id.
The Registrar plays the same ministerial role in a Winding Up By Court. After the Cayman Court orders that a company be dissolved,
id.
§ 123, the official liquidator must report the order to the Registrar “who
shall
make a minute accordingly in his books of the dissolution of such company.”
Id.
§ 124 (emphasis added).
The liquidators are conducting the voluntary winding up without oversight from the Registrar, or any other Cayman governmental agency, instrumentality or authority. As such, the Cayman Liquidation is clearly distinguishable from those cases involving non-judicial liquidations in which § 304 relief, or its equivalent, has
been granted.
We find that it is not a “foreign proceeding” for purposes of § 304.
Contrary to Tam’s assertion, during the course of a voluntary winding up, creditors have no right to be heard in the Cayman Court with respect to actions taken by the liquidators.
Compare
Companies Law § 104 (creditors and contributories have a right to be heard on matters relating to Winding Up By Court). The Companies Law does provide that creditors can petition the Cayman Court and request that the winding up be conducted pursuant to court supervision.
Id.
§§ 147, 150. If such a petition is filed and the Cayman Court finds that the rights of the petitioning creditors will be prejudiced by a voluntary winding up, the court may direct either that the company be wound up by the court or be wound up subject to the supervision of the court.
Id.
§§ 147, 149, 151.
In either case, the Cayman Court’s jurisdiction is invoked and the liquidation
does not
continue as a voluntary winding up. Short of that occurrence, however, the Cayman Court does not sanction the actions taken by the liquidators. Filing a § 304 petition does not initiate a case under title 11 of the Code.
See In re Axona Int’l Credit & Commerce, Ltd.,
88 B.R. 597, 606 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1988), aff'
d,
115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y.1990),
appeal dismissed,
924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.1991);
see also In re Petition of Brierley,
145 B.R. 151, 159 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1992) (foreign debtor need not meet the eligibility requirements of § 109(a) of the Code as a prerequisite to obtaining relief under § 304.) Rather, it commences a case ancillary to the foreign proceeding “in which a United States bankruptcy court is authorized to apply its processes to give effect to orders entered in [that] foreign insolvency proceeding.”
Goerg v. Parungao (In re Goerg),
844 F.2d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir.1988),
cert. denied sub nom. Parungao v. Goerg,
488 U.S. 1034, 109 S.Ct. 850, 102 L.Ed.2d 981 (1989). Tam is not merely asking us to give effect to the unsanctioned actions of the liquidators — as opposed to a Cayman judicial or administrative tribunal — he is advocating that we give greater effect to those actions than the Cayman Court would be required to if the winding up proceeded subject to the supervision of that court.
Compare
Companies Law §§ 148,153
(if the voluntary winding up is transformed into a ‘Winding Up Subject To Court Supervision”, the Cayman Court is not bound by the actions taken by the liquidators during the course of the voluntary winding up). This furthers our conclusion that the Cayman Liquidation is not a “foreign proceeding” for purposes of § 304.
Tam is correct that courts have consistently held that laws derived from the British Companies Act, like the laws of. the Cayman Islands,
see In re Gee,
53 B.R. at 902, provide substantially the same protection as the Code and therefore can support a claim for relief under § 304(b).
See, e.g., In re Rubin,
160 B.R. at 282-83 (Israeli law);
In re Axona Int’l Credit & Commerce,
88 B.R. at 610-11 (Hong Kong law);
In re Lines,
81 B.R. 267, 273 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1988) (Bermuda law);
In re Culmer,
25 B.R. at 631 (Bahamian law).
Moreover, there are similarities between the
distribution scheme under Cayman law and the Bankruptcy Code.
Indeed, in the context of a Winding Up By Court, this court has held that although the Companies Law is not a carbon copy of the Code, it is not repugnant to American laws and policies and thus satisfies the criteria specified in § 304(c).
See In re Gee,
53 B.R. at 904. Finally, as Tam notes, if he can avail himself to the injunctive relief available under § 304(b), and stay prosecution of the Hunne-well Action, he will avoid the piecemeal distribution of AOHL’s United States-based assets in favor of the liquidation scheme set forth under Cayman law and thereby promote the economic and expeditious administration of AOHL’s estate.
See Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B.,
825 F.2d 709, 713-14 (2d Cir.1987);
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Services AB,
773 F.2d 452, 454-55 (2d Cir.1985);
In re Koreag,
961 F.2d at 348. It does not follow that Tam’s § 304 petition should be granted. Tam’s argument elides the issue of whether the Cayman Liquidation is a “foreign proceeding”. The statute is clear that “for a 304 petition to be properly filed, there must be both a foreign proceeding to which the 304 case will be ancillary, and a foreign representative who has filed the petition.”
In re Gee,
53 B.R. at 897. Thus, we cannot consider the merits of Tam’s petition — however compelling they may appear — without first finding that the Cayman Liquidation is a foreign proceeding. To do otherwise effectively writes § 304(a) out of the Code in violation of the general rule that “a court should not construe a statute in a way that makes words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous.”
Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co.,
704 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir.1983).
Under these circumstances, we find that the Cayman Liquidation is not a “foreign proceeding” for purposes of the Code.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Amended § 304 Petition is dismissed. Hunnewell’s request for discovery is denied as moot.
SETTLE AN ORDER.