MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 48 Docket: Cum-15-345 Argued: April 5, 2016 Decided: March 16, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
PETITION OF EDWIN R. JONAS III FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE BAR OF THE STATE OF MAINE
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] In 2013, Edwin R. Jonas III, who had been admitted to the Maine Bar
in 1987, petitioned for reinstatement to the bar from his administrative
suspension for failing to register in 1995. A single justice of the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court (Gorman, J.) ultimately denied Jonas’s petition for reinstatement.
Jonas now appeals to us, in our capacity as the Law Court,1 challenging the
processes employed by the Grievance Commission, the Board of Overseers of
the Bar, and the single justice in reviewing his petition for reinstatement. Jonas
also challenges the single justice’s evidentiary rulings during the de novo
hearing on his petition, and the Board’s and the single justice’s conclusion that
he failed to meet his burden to show that he was eligible for reinstatement.
1 We treat the single justice’s decision on the petition for reinstatement as the judgment of a trial
court and review as an appellate body. See 4 M.R.S. § 57 (2016); In re Williams, 2010 ME 121, ¶ 1, 8 A.3d 666; In re Application of Feingold, 296 A.2d 492, 496 (Me. 1972). 2
[¶2] The record reflects that Jonas has engaged in more than two decades
of litigation with his ex-wife during which he was suspended from the bars of
three states, jailed for contempt, declared a vexatious litigant, and admonished
by a federal court for making frivolous arguments. We affirm the single justice’s
judgment declining to reinstate Jonas to the Maine Bar.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
[¶3] The single justice’s factual findings, reported here, are supported by
witness testimony, the parties’ exhibits, and findings and judgments contained
in the decisions of other courts and disciplinary bodies before whom Jonas was
a party. Preliminarily, we note that this matter is complicated by the fact that,
following the completion of the proceedings, the applicable Maine Bar Rules
were repealed and replaced in their entirety with rules that substantially
changed the procedures for reinstatement since Jonas’s petition was filed.2 See
generally M. Bar R. (Tower 2015) (effective July 1, 2015). Except as otherwise
indicated, all references to the Maine Bar Rules are to the rules that were in
effect at the time of Jonas’s petition. See generally M. Bar R. (Tower 2014).
2 The Maine Bar Rules govern proceedings for attorney discipline and reinstatement, which are
initiated with the Board of Overseers of the Bar. See M. Bar R. (Tower 2014). Proceedings for the admission of new attorneys to the bar are initiated with the Board of Bar Examiners and governed by the Maine Bar Admission Rules, which have not materially changed since Jonas filed his petition. 3
[¶4] Jonas was admitted to the Maine Bar in 1987. Because of his failure
to complete an annual registration, see M. Bar R. 6(b)(1), he was
administratively suspended from the Maine Bar in 1995.
[¶5] In 1990, Jonas and his wife, Linda Jonas, were divorced. Since then,
Jonas and Linda have been involved in highly contentious post-divorce
litigation. In 1995, while the parties were litigating competing post-judgment
motions, Linda alleged that Jonas was secretly liquidating assets and hiding the
proceeds in accounts in the Cayman Islands, and that he planned to move there
with the couple’s children. The New Jersey Superior Court ordered Jonas not
to transfer any assets valued over $15,000 and not to remove the children from
a five-state area.
[¶6] In direct violation of the court’s order, Jonas obtained a loan of
$130,000 secured by a mortgage on his residence and continued efforts to sell
commercial property that he rented out as a 7-Eleven building, eventually
deeding the store to his sister and a friend to be held in trust for the children.
In addition, Jonas secretly kept $438,000 in a bank account in the Cayman
Islands, and on September 15, 1995, he absconded with his children to the
Cayman Islands, where he enrolled them in school. 4
[¶7] After Jonas failed to appear at a hearing, the court issued a warrant
for Jonas’s arrest, placed the children in Linda’s custody, and took a number of
protective measures designed to ensure that Jonas complied with his financial
obligations imposed by previous court orders. Jonas continued to defy the
court’s orders regarding the payment of his support obligations. Shortly
thereafter, Jonas was briefly incarcerated for contempt of court. The New
Jersey Appellate Division upheld the series of actions taken by the trial court,
stating, “As evidenced by the record, [Jonas] time and again failed to abide by
the court’s orders and deliberately avoided paying alimony and other support
to the plaintiff.”
[¶8] As a result of his actions, the New Jersey State Bar suspended Jonas
for a period of six months beginning on September 2, 2005, for conduct
intended to disrupt a tribunal and conduct that was prejudicial to the
administration of justice. Jonas has not been reinstated in New Jersey.
[¶9] In 2006, Jonas was reciprocally suspended from the bar of
Pennsylvania for a period of six months based on the discipline imposed in New
Jersey. Jonas was reinstated to inactive status in Pennsylvania in 2014. In
2007, Jonas was reciprocally suspended from the Florida bar for a period of one
year for committing conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal. 5
[¶10] After his suspension from the New Jersey bar, Jonas’s post-divorce
proceedings in New Jersey continued. Jonas failed to attend multiple hearings
during these proceedings. Based on Jonas’s “obstinate refusal to comply or
properly respond to court orders,” the Appellate Division dismissed an appeal
from Jonas, stating, “[Jonas’s] defiance is especially egregious in light of the fact
that he was an attorney-at-law of this State and was suspended in this state and
others for his willful evasion of court orders.”
[¶11] At some point prior to 2009, Jonas moved to Montana. When Linda
sought to domesticate the New Jersey judgments in Montana, Jonas
unsuccessfully launched a collateral attack on the judgments. The court
granted Linda’s motion to declare Jonas a vexatious litigant and found that in
attempting to defy the New Jersey judgments, Jonas had willfully abused his
litigation skills by filing “harassing, duplicative, vexatious, and frivolous”
lawsuits, had filed appeals in matters in which he had “no objective good faith
expectation of prevailing,” and had caused “needless expense and burden” to
Linda.
[¶12] During litigation that Jonas instituted in the United States District
Court for the District of Montana against Linda, her Montana attorney, and
others, Jonas was ordered to show cause why he should not be sanctioned 6
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for making frivolous
arguments. After Jonas failed to show good cause, the court issued a sanction
in the form of an admonishment dated August 7, 2014. A copy of its
admonishment was forwarded to the state bars of Maine, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. By the time the admonishment was forwarded to the Maine Bar,
Jonas’s reinstatement proceedings were already pending before the Maine
Board of Overseers of the Bar.
B. Procedural History of Jonas’s Petition for Reinstatement in Maine
[¶13] On September 20, 2013, Jonas filed a petition for reinstatement to
the Maine Bar with the Supreme Judicial Court and the Board of Overseers of
the Bar. The matter was assigned to a single justice of the Supreme Judicial
Court. Bar Counsel opposed the petition. On March 4, 2014, the Grievance
Commission held a hearing concerning the petition for reinstatement. The
Commission recommended to the Board that Jonas be conditionally reinstated
to the bar. Both Jonas and Bar Counsel objected to some aspect of the Grievance
Commission’s recommendations. In response, the Board created a “Special
Panel” of the Board to review the evidence adduced at the Commission’s
hearing, seek additional written arguments from the parties, and make a 7
recommendation to the Board as a whole as to whether the Board should
recommend Jonas’s reinstatement.
[¶14] Once the Special Panel completed its work, the full Board met.3 The
Board found that Jonas did not meet his burden to establish that he should be
reinstated. The Board concluded that the Grievance Commission had failed to
consider the necessary factors in determining whether to recommend
reinstatement. On September 24, 2014, the Board recommended to the single
justice that Jonas’s petition for reinstatement be denied.
[¶15] After briefing and argument on several procedural issues, the
single justice scheduled a de novo hearing on Jonas’s petition in which the court
provided the parties an opportunity to present all relevant evidence and make
a record that was to be “created anew.”
[¶16] Prior to the hearing, Jonas filed a motion in limine seeking to
exclude evidence of any issues regarding Jonas’s conduct that were not raised
in the hearing before the Grievance Commission. The single justice denied the
motion, noting that Jonas had the burden to prove that he was eligible for
reinstatement by clear and convincing evidence, and concluding that “[d]ue
process does not require that the Board notify Mr. Jonas of those aspects of his
3 The record does not contain a report or other written record of the recommendation of the
Special Panel to the full Board. 8
burden that it anticipates challenging at the hearing, nor does due process limit
the Board from challenging any aspect of Mr. Jonas’s presentation.”
[¶17] A two-day bench trial was held on April 27 and 28, 2015. At the
trial, Jonas objected to the admission of prior court orders and decisions in
cases that involved him. The single justice overruled Jonas’s objections,
admitted the few orders and decisions ultimately offered by Jonas, and
admitted the many orders and decisions offered by the Board.
[¶18] On June 22, 2015, the single justice issued a judgment finding that
Jonas had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was
eligible for reinstatement. See M. Bar. R. 7.3(j)(5). In reaching this conclusion,
the single justice “considered the testimony of witnesses presented during the
de novo hearing in April, the documents admitted in evidence at that hearing,
the findings and conclusions made by various courts in prior proceedings in
which Jonas was a party, and the parties’ arguments.” The judgment also
indicated, “some of the cases [relied upon] were specifically provided by the
parties at hearing, and others were found in electronic databases that are
publicly available.”
[¶19] This appeal followed. See 4 M.R.S. § 57 (2016); In re Application of
Feingold, 296 A.2d 492, 496 (Me. 1972). 9
II. DISCUSSION
[¶20] We begin by reviewing the procedures and standards that applied
to Jonas’s petition for reinstatement. In doing so, we interpret the meaning of
the Maine Bar Rules de novo, looking both to the plain language and to the
purpose of the rules. See Bailey v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 2014 ME 58, ¶¶ 16, 19-21,
90 A.3d 1137; Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v. Warren, 2011 ME 124, ¶ 25, 34 A.3d
1103. As we cautioned at the outset, many of the rules applicable here have
been superseded by the Bar Rules that went into effect in 2015.
A. Reinstatement Procedures
[¶21] Pursuant to the bar rules that applied to Jonas’s petition, “[a]n
attorney who ha[d] been suspended for non-disciplinary reasons” could
“petition to the Court for reinstatement.” M. Bar. R. 7.3(j)(4). If Bar Counsel
opposed the petition, the matter would “be immediately referred to the
Grievance Commission” for a hearing. M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5). During the hearing,
it was the petitioner’s burden to
present[] clear and convincing evidence demonstrating the moral qualifications, competency, and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this State[,] . . . [and] that it [wa]s likely that reinstatement w[ould] not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, the administration of justice, or to the public interest. Factors to be considered as to the petitioner’s meeting that burden include[d] evidence that: 10
(A) The petitioner ha[d] fully complied with the terms of all prior disciplinary orders;
(B) The petitioner ha[d] neither engaged not attempted to engage in the unauthorized practice of law;
(C) The petitioner recognize[d] the wrongfulness and seriousness of the misconduct;
(D) The petitioner ha[d] not engaged in any other professional misconduct since resignation, suspension or disbarment;
(E) The petitioner ha[d] the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law; and
(F) The petitioner ha[d] met the continuing legal education requirements . . . .
M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5).
[¶22] After a hearing, the Grievance Commission would “transmit to the
Board and to the petitioner its findings and recommendations by written
report, and provide the Board with any record it ha[d] made.” M. Bar
R. 7.3(j)(6). “After consideration of a party’s timely objection to the [Grievance
Commission’s] report the Board [would] file its recommendations and findings
with the Court, together with any record that ha[d] been made.” Id. After the
Board filed its recommendation and findings, the Supreme Judicial Court
would, “with or without hearing, grant or deny the petition for reinstatement
by written order.” Id. 11
B. Standard of Evidentiary Admissibility
[¶23] Although the Bar Rules provided standards of evidentiary
admissibility that applied to disciplinary proceedings, see M. Bar R.
7.1(e)(2)(C), 7.2(b)(2), they did not expressly address the standards that would
apply in reinstatement proceedings, see M. Bar R. 7.3(j).4 Because attorneys
may petition for reinstatement from either disciplinary or nondisciplinary
suspensions, the same standards of evidentiary admissibility that applied to
disciplinary proceedings did not necessarily apply to all petitions for
reinstatement. Accordingly, we must first determine whether the Rules of
Evidence or the “reasonable person” standard, which applied in disciplinary
proceedings before a Grievance Panel, M. Bar R. 7.1(e)(2)(C), and in attorney
admission proceedings, M. Bar Admission R. 9(d)(5)(C), 9(d)(6)(C), applied to
the trial held by the single justice. See also 5 M.R.S. § 9057(2) (2016).
[¶24] We begin by reviewing the standard that applies to attorney
admission proceedings. If the Board of Bar Examiners holds a hearing on an
application for admission to the bar, “[e]vidence shall be admitted . . . if it is the
4 Similarly, the new Rules do not explicitly provide an evidentiary standard for reinstatement
proceedings before the Commission. See M. Bar R. 29(g) (Tower 2015); see also id. 14(a)(1)-(2) (providing that the Rules of Evidence do not apply to disciplinary hearings before a Grievance Commission Panel). We note, without deciding, that the new Rules appear to indicate that when the Court holds a hearing on the Commission’s findings and recommendations in reinstatement proceedings, the Rules of Evidence apply. See id. 14(b)(1); 29(h). 12
kind of evidence upon which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the
conduct of serious affairs.” M. Bar Admission R. 9(d)(5)(C). In such
proceedings, the new applicant has the burden to prove that the applicant is “a
person of good character,” is “fit to practice law,” and “possesses sufficient
learning in the law to practice as an attorney in this State.” M. Bar Admission
R. 8-10.
[¶25] If an applicant is denied a certification of good character and
fitness to practice law by the Board, the applicant may petition the Court for
admission pursuant to Rule 9(d)(6)(A). A single justice of this Court will then
conduct a de novo hearing during which the same reasonable person standard
of evidentiary admissibility applies. M. Bar Admission R. 9(d)(6)(C).
[¶26] Under the rules applicable to these proceedings, when a
suspended attorney petitioned for reinstatement to the bar, the process and the
petitioner’s burden were much the same as for an initial application, although
the applicable evidentiary standards were not explicitly addressed in the rules.5
Again, the petitioner was the moving party, not the Board of Overseers of the
5 As we noted, the Bar Rules provided standards of evidentiary admissibility only for disciplinary
proceedings. In disciplinary proceedings, the Bar Rules provided that hearings before the Commission were subject to the reasonable person standard of admissibility, whereas hearings before a single justice were subject to the Rules of Evidence, “[t]o the extent appropriate.” See M. Bar R. 7.1(e)(2)(C), 7.2(b)(2). 13
Bar. Because the procedural posture, allocation of burdens, and ultimate
consequences of reinstatement proceedings mirrored bar admission
proceedings, we conclude that the reasonable person standard of evidentiary
admissibility applied to reinstatement proceedings before the Commission and
the Board. See M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5) (providing that a petitioner seeking
reinstatement had the burden to show “the moral qualifications, competency,
and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this State”
(emphasis added)).
[¶27] In a single justice hearing on a reinstatement petition in which the
court, as anticipated by the Rule, did not provide the petitioner with the
opportunity for a full de novo factual presentation, the single justice’s
determination would be made based on a review of the record as it was
“developed before the Commission and the Board.”6 See In re Williams, 2010
ME 121, ¶ 8, 8 A.3d 666. Thus, the single justice’s determination could have
been based entirely on the record provided by the Board, and that record would
have been created, as we have just held, utilizing the reasonable person
admissibility standard rather than the Rules of Evidence.
6 Although we have previously held to the contrary, see, e.g., In re Application of Spurling, 595 A.2d
1062, 1065 (Me. 1991), the cases in which we did so involved bar admission rules that have been superseded. 14
[¶28] Because here the single justice took the additional step of
providing Jonas with a complete de novo factual hearing instead of engaging in
a “de novo” review of the record, we must determine what standard of
evidentiary admissibility applied during Jonas’s de novo reinstatement hearing.
We conclude that the fact that the single justice provided Jonas a fully de novo
reinstatement hearing does not alter the kind of evidence upon which the
reinstatement determination may be made. Thus, the admission of evidence in
that proceeding was governed by the same reasonable person standard that
applied before the Commission and the Board, and that applies to
administrative proceedings and to attorney admission proceedings before a
single justice. The Rules of Evidence did not apply.7
C. Review of Jonas’s Arguments
[¶29] Having clarified the nature of the reinstatement proceeding and
the standard for the admissibility of evidence, we turn to Jonas’s arguments on
appeal. Among his many arguments, Jonas challenges (1) the processes
7 The new Bar Rules explicitly subsume reinstatement from an administrative suspension longer
than five years within the same process as is used for reinstatement from a disciplinary suspension longer than six months. See M. Bar R. 4(i), 29 (Tower 2015). The new rules also provide different criteria for reinstatement that have a greater disciplinary focus and are less similar to the criteria applicable to attorney admissions. See id. 29(e). For example, to be reinstated, a petitioner no longer has the burden to show the “moral qualifications, competency, and learning in law required for admission.” Compare M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5) (Tower 2014) with M. Bar R. 29(e) (Tower 2015). As noted, we do not opine on the standard of evidentiary admissibility that applies pursuant to the new Bar Rules. 15
employed by the Commission, the Board, and the single justice in reviewing his
petition for reinstatement; (2) evidentiary rulings made during the de novo
hearing of his petition; and (3) the Board’s and single justice’s conclusion that
he failed to meet his burden to show that he was eligible for reinstatement to
the Maine Bar. We discuss each argument in turn.
1. Procedural Issues
a. Special Panel
[¶30] Jonas first challenges the Board’s establishment of a “Special
Panel” of the Board to review the Commission’s recommendation to reinstate
Jonas to the Maine Bar as a violation of the Bar Rules and his due process rights.
[¶31] After the Board receives the recommendations and findings of the
Commission on a petition for reinstatement, “the Board . . . retains the ultimate
responsibility for evaluating such recommendations and findings and making
its own findings and recommendations to the Court.” Me. Bd. of Overseers of
the Bar Reg. No. 50, 1 Maine Manual on Professional Responsibility R-30 (2004).
If the petitioner or Bar Counsel objects, “the Board will . . . decide . . . what, if
any, procedure to establish for hearing the objections to the findings and
recommendations of the Commission or Panel.” Id. at R-30 to R-31. Thus,
although the regulation does not explicitly mention the creation of a “Special 16
Panel,” it requires the Board to make independent recommendations and
findings and gives the Board broad discretion to adopt an appropriate
procedure to consider objections to the Commission’s report.
[¶32] Turning to the purpose of the rules, we have previously noted that,
although the Court itself retains ultimate authority to regulate attorneys and
the practice of law in Maine, it has delegated some of that authority to the Board
of Overseers “to develop a record and issue recommendations in reinstatement
proceedings.” In re Williams, 2010 ME 121, ¶ 5, 8 A.3d 666. The creation of a
Special Panel of the Board to review the Grievance Commission’s findings and
seek additional input from the parties is consistent with this purpose.
[¶33] Based on the language of the applicable Bar Rules and Board
Regulations and the purpose and role of the Board, it was neither inappropriate
nor a violation of Jonas’s due process rights for the Board to appoint a “Special
Panel” of the Board to review the Grievance Commission’s recommendation
and make its own recommendation to the full Board.8
8 Moreover, Jonas’s objections to the Board’s processes have been rendered moot by the single
justice’s decision to conduct a hearing during which Jonas and the Board were given the opportunity to present their evidence anew. 17
b. Reinstatement Factors
[¶34] Jonas next argues that because he was seeking reinstatement after
an administrative suspension, M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(4), the factors listed in M. Bar
R. 7.3(j)(5) did not apply to his petition. That argument is simply incorrect.
[¶35] The procedure set out in 7.3(j)(5) applied to all types of petitions
for reinstatement mentioned in section 7.3(j). See Bailey, 2014 ME 58,
¶¶ 16-17, 90 A.3d 1137; In re Williams, 2010 ME 121, ¶ 6, 8 A.3d 666. This does
not mean that each factor would have similar weight in every case; rather, the
factors would be considered to the extent that they applied to the petitioner.
The Board and single justice appropriately applied the factors to determine
whether Jonas had met his burden to demonstrate eligibility for reinstatement.
c. Due Process
[¶36] In addition to his argument that the procedures violated the Bar
rules, Jonas argues that the procedures collectively violated his due process
rights. We review alleged procedural due process violations de novo. See State
v. Jones, 2012 ME 126, ¶ 35, 55 A.3d 432.
[¶37] We have previously held that due process in the context of bar
proceedings “consists of notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be 18
heard, including the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.” See In re
Williams, 2010 ME 121, ¶ 5, 8 A.3d 666.
[¶38] Jonas had both notice and the opportunity to be heard at every
stage of the proceedings. First, he had notice and the opportunity to present
his petition to the Grievance Commission. After the Grievance Commission—
and then the Board—issued recommendations, the single justice invited the
parties to address the process employed by the Grievance Commission and the
Board, where Jonas had the opportunity to brief and argue the procedural
issues. Jonas was then provided a full de novo hearing before the single justice.9
Before holding a hearing, the single justice allowed Jonas to file motions in
limine and heard his evidentiary arguments. At the hearing, Jonas was again
given the opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence, and to
address the evidence offered by the Board. At each stage of the proceedings,
Jonas was represented by capable counsel. Jonas was not deprived of due
process at any stage of the proceedings. See In re Williams, 2010 ME 121,
¶¶ 5-9, 8 A.3d 666.
9 Neither party contests the propriety of the single justice holding a de novo hearing in this matter. 19
2. Evidentiary Issues
[¶39] Jonas next argues that the single justice erroneously took judicial
notice of the facts found in judgments from other jurisdictions in which Jonas’s
conduct was assessed. See M.R. Evid. 201. We review evidentiary rulings for
clear error or abuse of discretion. State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 24, 58 A.3d
1032.
[¶40] As we have concluded, the Rules of Evidence did not apply in these
proceedings. Bar reinstatement proceedings required the single justice to
determine, inter alia, that the petitioner was of good moral character, and that
reinstatement would not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar.
See M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5). In such a proceeding, the single justice was bound to
consider the petitioner’s conduct as an attorney and litigant in determining
whether the petitioner was eligible for reinstatement. Judgments and orders
relating to prior litigation involving that attorney are uniquely relevant to that
determination. Thus, pursuant to the reasonable person standard of
admissibility, the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in
considering the extensive history of judgments and orders against Jonas. Cf. M.
Bar R. 7.3(h)(4) (“A final adjudication in another jurisdiction that an attorney
had been guilty of misconduct may be treated as establishing the misconduct 20
for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this State.”). Furthermore, as a
litigant in family matters and as an attorney facing potential discipline, Jonas
had the motivation and formal opportunity to offer evidence and argument.
Because of the process afforded in the prior proceedings and the nature of the
proceedings before the single justice, the facts found in the judgments that were
relied on by the single justice constituted the kind of information upon which a
reasonable person would rely. The single justice did not err or abuse her
discretion in considering the judgments involving Jonas, including the factual
findings contained in those judgments.10
10 Because the parties spent considerable energy addressing the use of judicial notice in this
matter, we briefly address the issue, despite its inapplicability to the proceedings before the single justice. During a trial in which the Rules of Evidence apply, courts may “judicially notice,” and thereby conclusively establish, facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute because [they] . . . [c]an be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” M.R. Evid. 201(b), (f). When a court takes judicial notice of a final judgment, from a Maine court or another court of competent jurisdiction, however, that “notice” is limited to the existence of the judgment, and the action of the court. “[A] court may take notice of another court’s order only for the limited purpose of recognizing the ‘judicial act’ that the order represents or the subject matter of the litigation.” United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1993); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Logistics Control Group Int’l, 762 F.2d 454, 459 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 201.3 at 57 (6th ed. 2007) (“A court will take judicial notice [pursuant to M.R. Evid. 201(b)(2)] of pleadings, dockets, and other records of that court in the same or in other lawsuits.”).
Contrary to the Board’s argument here, the factual findings contained within a judgment are not appropriate subjects for judicial notice. As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “If it were permissible for a court to take judicial notice of a fact merely because it has been found to be true in some other action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would be superfluous.” Jones, 29 F.3d at 1553. The collateral estoppel doctrine, also known as issue preclusion, “prevents a party from relitigating factual issues already decided if the identical issue necessarily was determined by a prior final judgment, and the party estopped had a fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.” Kurtz & Perry, P.A. v. Emerson, 2010 ME 107, ¶ 16, 8 A.3d 677 (quotation marks omitted). In the matter before us, however, the Board did not assert the applicability of collateral 21
3. Jonas’s Burden
[¶41] To be reinstated, Jonas was required to demonstrate, by clear and
convincing evidence, that he possessed the moral qualifications, competency,
and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this State, as well
as to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was likely that
reinstatement would not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar,
the administration of justice, or the public interest. M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5). We
review a single justice’s factual findings for clear error. Bailey, 2014 ME 58,
¶ 16, 90 A.3d 1137. Because Jonas had the burden of proof, he can prevail only
if he can establish that the single justice was “compelled to find in his favor.”
See In re Williams, 2010 ME 121, ¶ 10, 8 A.3d 666.
[¶42] Jonas argued that any misconduct that he committed leading to his
New Jersey suspension was part of his personal life and should not be
dispositive as to his moral character as an attorney. He continued to deny
responsibility for many of his actions. For example, he asserted that his
decision to abscond with his children in direct violation of the court’s order was
estoppel. See Conary v. Perkins, 464 A.2d 972, 975-76 (Me. 1983); Reed v. Tracy, 435 A.2d 745, 746 (Me. 1981).
Because the court, here, could rely on findings in other jurisdictions’ judgments pursuant to the reasonable person standard of evidentiary admissibility, we need not determine whether collateral estoppel would have applied in this case had the Board argued its applicability. 22
not premeditated, and that the New Jersey courts, his former wife, and her
attorney were biased and had formed a conspiracy against him. The single
justice found that these explanations were not credible.
[¶43] Furthermore, the Board offered ample evidence, upon which the
single justice could rely, to rebut Jonas’s contention that he has behaved
ethically since his suspension from the New Jersey bar in 2005. Specifically, the
evidence showed that Jonas has demonstrated a pattern of disrespect and
contempt for every level of the court system over many years, and in so doing
he has abused the very litigation skills that he now seeks to use in Maine.
[¶44] Based on the above evidence, the single justice did not err in
finding that Jonas failed to meet his burden of proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, that he recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of his
misconduct, M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5)(C), or that he has the requisite honesty and
integrity to practice law, M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5)(E). The single justice was not
compelled to find that Jonas possesses the moral qualifications, competency,
and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this State, and that
it is likely that reinstatement will not be detrimental to the integrity and
standing of the bar, the administration of justice, or the public interest. See
M. Bar R. 7.3(j)(5); Bailey, 2014 ME 58, ¶ 57, 90 A.3d 1137. Jonas’s proven 23
willingness to abuse his law license and legal skills, disrespecting multiple
tribunals and the truth, left the single justice little choice in this matter.
III. CONCLUSION
[¶45] The procedures employed at each stage of the proceedings in this
case complied with the Bar Rules and provided Jonas with extensive due
process. Jonas was provided ample notice and opportunity to present his case
at each level of the proceedings. There was no error in the single justice’s
consideration of the multitude of judgments and orders against Jonas. Over
more than two decades, Jonas incessantly abused his legal skills by initiating a
litany of frivolous, vexatious, and harassing litigation, and has shown
unremitting contempt for the legal system by continually and repeatedly
ignoring court orders.
[¶46] As the single justice found at the conclusion of the forty-four page
judgment,
When an attorney is admitted to the Maine bar, he swears that he “will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false, groundless or unlawful suit nor give aid or consent to the same” and that he “will delay no man for lucre or malice.” 4 M.R.S. § 806 (2014). Jonas has demonstrated just the opposite.
[¶47] The single justice was not compelled to find that Jonas had
demonstrated his eligibility for readmission to the Maine Bar. 24
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
James M. Bowie, Esq. (orally), Thompson & Bowie, LLP, Portland, for appellant Edwin R. Jonas III
Aria Eee, Esq. (orally), Board of Overseers of the Bar, Augusta, for appellee Board of Overseers of the Bar
Maine Supreme Judicial Court docket number Bar-13-16 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY