Petersen v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company

CourtDistrict Court, D. Idaho
DecidedFebruary 3, 2025
Docket1:23-cv-00408
StatusUnknown

This text of Petersen v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (Petersen v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Petersen v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, (D. Idaho 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

SPENCER PETERSEN, as trustee of The Spencer and Lesley Petersen Family Case No. 1:23-cv-00408-DCN Living Trust, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND Plaintiff, ORDER

vs.

PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a business entity of unknown form or residence; AMERICAN STRATEGIC INSURANCE COMPANY, a business entity of unknown form or residence; and DOES I through X,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendants Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and American Strategic Insurance Company’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (“Fee Motion”).1 Dkt. 24. Plaintiff Spencer Petersen (“Plaintiff”) did not respond to the Fee Motion and the deadline for doing so has passed. Having reviewed the record and Fee Motion, the Court finds the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay,

1 In their Fee Motion, Defendants seek only an award of attorney fees and do not request reimbursement for costs. See generally Dkt. 24; Dkt. 24-2, at ¶ 13. and because the Court conclusively finds the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Court decides the Fee Motion without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, the Fee Motion is

GRANTED. II. BACKGROUND The factual background of this case is set forth in the Court’s July 11, 2024 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Granting Defendants’ Motion to Compel (Dkt. 23) and is incorporated by

reference. In short, after Plaintiff repeatedly failed to respond to Defendants’ interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission, the Court ultimately granted Defendants’ Motion to Compel. Dkt. 23, at 8–10. After holding Defendants were entitled to compensation for their reasonable expenses and fees incurred in bringing the Motion to Compel, the Court ordered Defendants to file a short motion detailing their

relevant fees and costs. Id. at 9. Defendants thereafter filed the instant Fee Motion, requesting $2,364.00 in attorney fees. Dkt. 24. When Plaintiff failed to respond to the Fee Motion, Defendants filed a Reply reiterating their request for $2,364.00 in fees. Dkt. 25. III. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)

A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling responses. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37(a)(1). “If the motion is granted . . . the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion . . . to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.”2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). The purpose of Rule 37(a) is “to protect courts and opposing parties from delaying or harassing tactics during the discovery process.” Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 208 (1999).

An award of attorney’s fees is mandatory unless: (1) “the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action”; (2) “the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified”; or (3) “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id. at (a)(5)(A)(i)–(iii); W. Mortg. & Realty Co. v. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n, 2016 WL 11643651, at *1 (D. Idaho Jan. 4,

2016) (noting an award under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) is not discretionary). The burden of establishing substantial justification or special circumstances which would make a fee award unjust “rests on the party being sanctioned.” Infanzon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 335 F.R.D. 305, 311 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1994)).

B. Calculation of Fees Courts within the Ninth Circuit apply the “lodestar” approach to determine appropriate fee awards. Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Ctr., LLC, 893 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2018). The lodestar amount is calculated by multiplying “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.”3 Id. at 1160 (emphasis in original)

2 Although Plaintiff failed to respond to the Fee Motion, he was given the chance to do so and thus had, but ignored, his opportunity to be heard.

3 A court has discretion to adjust the lodestar figure based on a number of additional factors not subsumed within the initial lodestar calculation. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds by City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). Because Defendants do (quoting Costa v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012)). “The party seeking fees bears the burden of documenting the hours expended in litigation and must submit evidence supporting those hours and the rates claimed.” Welch v. Metro. Life

Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). “The party opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hensley 461 U.S. at 437).

While the “calculation of the amount of a ‘reasonable attorney’s fee’ is not a precise science,” Green v. Baca, 225 F.R.D. 612, 614 (C.D. Cal. 2005), there is a “strong presumption” the lodestar figure “represents a reasonable” fee. Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987). IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has neither established—nor even suggested—that a fee award would be unjust due to special circumstances or because Plaintiff’s discovery conduct was somehow justified. Defendants are accordingly entitled to a fee award under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A). Having reviewed defense counsel’s Declaration (Dkt. 24-2) and billing records (Dkts. 24-3 and 24-4), the Court finds Defendants’ request for $2,364.00 in

fees is reasonable under the lodestar calculation.

not seek an adjustment to the lodestar calculation and Plaintiff failed to respond to the Fee Motion, the Court does not further address the factors outlined in Kerr. A. Hours Expended A fee applicant must submit detailed time records to support its claim of fees. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). Claimed hours may

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Related

Hensley v. Eckerhart
461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983)
City of Burlington v. Dague
505 U.S. 557 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Cunningham v. Hamilton County
527 U.S. 198 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Ingram v. Oroudjian
647 F.3d 925 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
480 F.3d 942 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Martin Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Center, LLC
893 F.3d 1152 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Hyde & Drath v. Baker
24 F.3d 1162 (Ninth Circuit, 1994)
W.E. Green v. Baca
225 F.R.D. 612 (C.D. California, 2005)
Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.
526 F.2d 67 (Ninth Circuit, 1975)
Liew v. Breen
640 F.2d 1046 (Ninth Circuit, 1981)
Gates v. Deukmejian
987 F.2d 1392 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)

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