Peter Szanto - Adversary Proceeding

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Oregon
• Decided: March 10, 2020
• Docket: 16-03114
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

Waren TV, □□□□ Clerk, U.S. Bankruptcy Court

Below is an opinion of the court.

[ P — Pet __ U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON || In Re: ) ) Bankruptcy Case No. PETER SZANTO, ) 16-33185-pcem7 ) Debtor. ) a) ) PETER SZANTO, ) Adversary No. 16-3114-pcm ) Plaintiff, ) ) Vv. ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION? EVYE SZANTO, VICTOR SZANTO, NICOLE ) SZANTO, KIMBERLEY SZANTO, MARIETTE ) SZANTO, ANTHONY SZANTO, AUSTIN ) BELL, JOHN BARLOW, and BARBARA ) SZANTO ALEXANDER, ) ) Defendants. )

Defendants have filed two motions for attorney fees in this || adversary proceeding. First, on May 31, 2018, they filed an Application

1 This disposition is specific to this case and is not intended for publication or to have a controlling effect on other cases. It may, however, be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have.

Page 1 - MEMORANDUM OPINION

1 for Attorney’s Fees. Doc. 387. This followed the court’s entry of 2 judgment against plaintiff after defendants were granted summary judgment 3 on all of plaintiff’s claims. Second, on December 11, 2019, they filed 4 their Second Motion for Attorney’s Fees, seeking all fees incurred in 5 this adversary proceeding. Doc. 583. This followed the court’s entry of 6 judgment for defendants after the trial on their counterclaims. They 7 request a total of $267,663.50 in fees and $24,682.02 in costs, for a 8 total of $292,345.52. For the reasons explained below, I will exercise 9 the court’s inherent authority to award as a sanction attorney fees in 10 the amount of $134,166.50 and $13,242.47 for costs and expenses. 11 Plaintiff filed three responses to the initial Application for 12 Attorney’s Fees. Doc. 392, 393, 401, and one response to the Second 13 Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Doc. 604. The court has reviewed the 14 applications and responses, and concludes that the matter can be decided 15 without oral argument.2 16 Plaintiff raises a number of procedural arguments, which I will 17 address before addressing his substantive arguments. 18 First, plaintiff seeks denial of the fees because defendants failed 19 to include the conferral certification required by LBR 7007-1(a). Doc. 20 392. 21 Plaintiff is correct that defendants’ first application for attorney 22 fees – and the second application as well – fail to include a pre-filing 23 conferral certification. It is not entirely clear that the conferral 24 certification of LBR 7007-1(a) applies to applications for attorney fees 25 26 2 Neither party requested oral argument. 1 and expenses sought by a party as sanctions in an adversary proceeding. 2 Assuming that it does, LBR 7007-1(a)(2) allows the court to deny a motion 3 that fails to include the certification; it does not require denial on 4 that basis. I decline to exercise my discretion to deny defendants’ 5 applications on the basis of lack of a conferral certification. 6 Second, plaintiff argues that, because the underlying judgment in 7 this adversary proceeding is on appeal, this court lacks jurisdiction to 8 act on the fee request. Doc. 393. Plaintiff is wrong. Although a 9 notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject 10 matter of the appeal, it does not prevent the court from deciding 11 ancillary matters such as requests for attorney fees. Masalosalo v. 12 Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 956-57 (9th Cir. 1983). Therefore, 13 this court has jurisdiction to rule on the request for attorney fees, 14 even though the judgment is on appeal. 15 Next, plaintiff claims that this court’s “murderous rage” toward him 16 deprives the court of jurisdiction to consider the fee application. Doc. 17 604. Plaintiff’s assertion that this court has exhibited such conduct 18 toward plaintiff or any other party is belied by the record in this case. 19 The court has jurisdiction to decide whether to award attorney fees and 20 costs in this adversary proceeding. 21 Fourth, plaintiff argues that the application for fees must be 22 denied because defendants failed to give the notice of motion required by 23 LBR 9013-1(b). That rule by its terms applies only in contested matters. 24 This motion for fees and costs is a part of the adversary proceeding. 25 Therefore, the rule does not apply. Plaintiff received notice of the 26 motion through ECF, based on his request, which the court granted, to be 1 an electronic filer.3 2 Fifth, he argues that the application for fees and costs must be 3 denied because defendants waived their right to fees and costs requested 4 in the original application when they did not reply to his objection to 5 that request. He reasons that LBR 9021-1(d)(3)(A) allows a party to 6 reply to any objection to a cost bill within 14 days. LBR 9021- 7 1(d)(3)(B) provides that, if there is no objection filed, the costs 8 requested may be taxed. He also argues that the fees and costs must be 9 denied because the cost bill was not verified as required by LBR 9021- 10 1(d)(2). 11 Defendants seek their fees and expenses as a sanction for 12 plaintiff’s bad faith and vexatious behavior, not as fees and costs to be 13 allowed to a prevailing party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d), made 14 applicable through Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054(b). Thus, LBR 9021-1(d) 15 relating to objections to a cost bill and the verification of a bill of 16 costs does not apply. Nor does 28 U.S.C. § 1924, which relates to “the 17 taxing of conventional costs as defined in Section 1920 of Title 28, and 18 does not purport to limit the imposition of penalties beyond the ordinary 19 costs” as a sanction. Schauffler v. United Ass’n of Journeymen & 20 Apprentices, 246 F.2d 867, 870 (3d Cir. 1957). Defendants filed 21 22 3 Plaintiff complains that the court struck a document he filed 23 in the main case, Doc. 622 in Case No. 16-33185-pcm7, for failure to comply with LBR 9013-1(b). As I explained in the Order Granting Doc. 883 24 in plaintiff’s main bankruptcy case, the court vacated the order striking the offending document less than a week after it was stricken. Case No. 25 16-33185-pcm7, Doc. 885. At the time the clerk struck the document, the rule was new and there was initial confusion in the clerk’s office as to 26 whether to strike documents that failed to include the Notice of Motion. 1 itemizations of their fees and costs, along with declarations signed 2 under penalty of perjury4 setting out the time spent by counsel working 3 on the case and the fees incurred in the matter. Therefore, LBR 9021- 4 1(d) does not support denial of defendants’ motion for fees and expenses. 5 I turn now to the merits of the motions. 6 The initial request for attorney fees cited two bases for an award: 7 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7037, which makes Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 applicable in 8 adversary proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The second request for fees 9 incorporated those two bases and added others: Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011, 11 10 U.S.C. § 105, and the court’s inherent authority. 11 Generally, under the American Rule, a prevailing party in federal 12 court is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. See Alyeska Pipeline 13 Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). A court may 14 award fees if a contract or specific statute provides for a shifting of 15 fees, or as a sanction for bad faith. See In re Macke Intern. Trade, 16 Inc., 370 B.R. 236, 249 n.11 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). Here, defendants seek 17 to shift their fees to plaintiff based on a discovery sanction rule and 18 as a sanction for plaintiff’s vexatious, bad faith conduct. 19 1. Discovery Sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 20 Defendants assert that they are entitled to attorney fees under Fed. 21 22 4 Plaintiff also argues that counsel’s declaration is insufficient to support the request for fees and costs, because 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1924 requires an affidavit. As I have explained, section 1924 does not apply to a request for fees and expenses as a sanction for bad faith 24 conduct. In any event, the use of a declaration instead of an affidavit is specifically allowed by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1746 provides that, 25 whenever a federal statute or rule requires that facts be supported by an affidavit, with limited exceptions, the support may be provided by a 26 declaration signed under penalty of perjury. 1 R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2), because plaintiff failed to admit certain facts in 2 defendants’ requests for admissions that were later proven to be true. 3 Rule 37(c)(2) provides: 4 If a party fails to admit what is requested under Rule 36 and if the requesting party later proves a document to be genuine or the matter 5 true, the requesting party may move that the party who failed to admit pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, 6 incurred in making that proof. 7 The court must order payment of expenses including fees, unless certain 8 facts exist. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2)(A)-(D). 9 Defendants served plaintiff with requests for admission on February 10 27, 2017. Plaintiff responded on March 29, 2017. After a hearing on 11 defendants’ motion to deem plaintiff’s responses as admissions, the court 12 entered an order deeming plaintiff’s responses as denials of the truth of 13 the facts set out in the requests for admission. Doc. 122. 14 The requests for admission on which defendants rely for this request 15 for sanctions are Requests No. 2 through 15, all of which were deemed 16 denied. These requests all sought admissions that plaintiff’s claims 17 were unfounded. Defendants argue that many of the requests were proven 18 true when the court entered summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s 19 claims. See Doc. 368, 370. Therefore, they argue, they are entitled to 20 their fees and costs in proving those matters true. 21 I will not award costs and attorney fees under Rule 37(c)(2). 22 First, some of the claims that were dismissed on summary judgment were 23 dismissed not because of lack of proof, but because they were barred by 24 the statute of limitations (conversion claim (Doc. 368 at p.9) and 25 emotional distress claim (id. at 26)), or for failure to state a claim 26 (conversion of real property claim (id. at 10), fraud claim (id. at 21), 1 and conspiracy claim (id. at 22 - there is no independent claim for 2 conspiracy)). Although plaintiff also failed to produce evidence in 3 support of these claims, lack of proof was not the basis for the ruling 4 on all of the claims for relief. Defendants are not entitled to their 5 attorney fees and costs for establishing facts that plaintiff denied, 6 where the lack of proof did not provide the basis for dismissal. 7 Second, even if plaintiff had admitted all of the facts for which 8 defendants sought admissions, it is not clear that defendants could have 9 avoided the costs of filing a motion for summary judgment. It is 10 doubtful at best that, had plaintiff admitted the facts in the request 11 for admissions, plaintiff would have voluntarily dismissed this 12 complaint. Defendants would have still needed to file a motion for 13 summary judgment, with all of the expense that entails, in order to 14 obtain dismissal of plaintiff’s claims. Therefore, the expenses they 15 seek in this request for attorney fees would have been incurred even if 16 plaintiff had made the admissions as requested. See Mane v. Tri-City 17 Healthcare Dist., 2007 WL 935624 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (no award of expenses 18 where party would have had to file motion for summary judgment even if 19 the requests had been admitted). 20 I conclude that defendants are not entitled to their attorney fees 21 and costs under Rule 37(c)(2). 22 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 23 Defendants assert that they are entitled to their fees in this 24 adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which provides: 25 Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the 26 proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required 1 by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. 2 3 They list a number of actions plaintiff took in connection with the case 4 that they say shows that plaintiff acted unreasonably and vexatiously. 5 Plaintiff argues that section 1927 does not apply to pro se 6 litigants. Although there is case law in other circuits holding that 28 7 U.S.C. § 1927 does not apply to pro se litigants because they are not 8 persons “admitted to conduct cases” in federal courts, see Meadowbriar 9 Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1996) (under 10 section 1927, fees may be awarded only against attorneys or those 11 admitted to practice before the court); Sassower v. Field, 973 F.2d 75 12 (2nd Cir. 1992) (section 1927 does not apply to non-attorney litigants), 13 the Ninth Circuit has held that section 1927 does authorize an award of 14 fees and costs against pro se litigants. See Wages v. I.R.S., 915 F.2d 15 1230, 1236-37 (9th Cir. 1990). Accord Sanai v. Sanai, 2005 WL 8172668 16 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (Wages is still good law); Harrell v. Hornbrook 17 Community Svcs. Dist., 778 Fed. Appx. 472 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Wages 18 in support of affirming award of sanctions under § 1927 against a pro se 19 litigant). I am bound to follow Ninth Circuit authority, and therefore 20 conclude that section 1927 applies to plaintiff as a pro se litigant.5 21 Nonetheless, defendants are not entitled to an award of their fees 22 and costs under this statute. Although there is not nationwide agreement 23 on the issue, in the Ninth Circuit, bankruptcy courts are not authorized 24 25 5 Because plaintiff is wrong that the statute does not apply to pro se litigants, he is wrong that defendants’ counsel violated the 26 ethics rules by arguing that the statute applies to pro se litigants. 1 to impose sanctions under section 1927. See In re Perroton, 958 F.2d 2 889, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1992). This is because the statutory definition of 3 “court of the United States” set out in 28 U.S.C. § 451, which applies to 4 United States Code title 28, refers to federal courts, “the judges of 5 which are entitled to hold office during good behavior.” In Perroton, 6 the court held that this language means Article III courts, not Article I 7 courts such as the bankruptcy court. Thus, the court held that 8 bankruptcy courts are not authorized to grant in forma pauperis status 9 under 28 U.S.C. 1915(a). 10 The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has recognized that 11 this interpretation of the definition of “court of the United States” in 12 section 451 applies equally to use of the same phrase in 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1927, and therefore bankruptcy courts are not authorized to sanction 14 under that statute. See, e.g., In re Sandoval, 186 B.R. 490, 495-96 (9th 15 Cir. BAP 1995) (recognizing that the court’s reasoning in Perroton 16 applies equally to sanctioning authority under section 1927); In re 17 Patmont Motor Werks, Inc., 2018 WL 4844777 at *8 n.8 (9th Cir. BAP 2018) 18 (unpublished) (recognizing that sanctions under section 1927 are not 19 available in bankruptcy courts). Although there are good arguments why 20 bankruptcy courts should be authorized to award sanctions under that 21 statute, see In re Loyd, 304 B.R. 372, 374-378 (9th Cir. BAP 2003) 22 (Klein, J., dissenting), we are bound by the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 23 Perroton. 24 Defendants argue that bankruptcy courts are authorized to award 25 attorney fees as sanctions under section 1927, citing In re Yochum, 89 26 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 1996). In that case, the court held that bankruptcy 1 courts are “courts of the United States” authorized to award attorney 2 fees in tax litigation pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7430. That statute 3 authorizes an award of litigation costs in a “court proceeding,” which is 4 defined as “any civil action brought in a court of the United States 5 (including the Tax Court and the United States Claims Court).” 26 U.S.C. 6 § 7340(c)(6). The court concluded that the definition did not exclude 7 bankruptcy courts. 89 F.3d at 670. However, the court specifically 8 distinguished Perroton, because the definition of “courts of the United 9 States” set out in 28 U.S.C. § 451, on which Perroton was based, does not 10 apply to the Internal Revenue Code, which was at issue in Yochum. 11 Therefore, this court may not award defendants their attorney fees 12 and expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 13 3. Bankruptcy Rule 9011 14 Defendants also ask that their fees and costs be awarded for 15 plaintiff’s violation of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(b), based on plaintiff’s 16 filing of a frivolous complaint to commence this adversary proceeding. 17 Rule 9011 allows a court to award sanctions against an attorney or 18 pro se litigant who files an unfounded or frivolous motion or pleading 19 with the court. “A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made 20 separately from other motions or requests[.]” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 21 9011(c)(1). Further, the rule contains a safe harbor; a motion for 22 sanctions under Rule 9011 may not be filed unless the moving party has 23 first served the motion on the offending party and that party has not, 24 within 21 days, withdrawn or corrected the challenged document. Fed. R. 25 Bankr. P. 9011(c)(1)(A). 26 Defendants did not file their Rule 9011 motion separately from other 1 motions; they simply included the rule as authority in support of their 2 motion for attorney fees. Further, there is nothing in the record that 3 would indicate that they served the motion on plaintiff at the outset of 4 the case, giving him 21 days to withdraw his adversary complaint. 5 Because defendants failed to comply with the separate motion and safe 6 harbor provisions of the rule, they are not entitled to receive their 7 fees and costs as sanctions under Rule 9011. See In re Deville, 280 B.R. 8 483 (9th Cir. BAP 2002), aff’d, 361 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 2004)(reversing 9 award of sanctions under Rule 9011 when applicant failed to comply with 10 procedural requirements of the rule). 11 4. Inherent Authority and 11 U.S.C. § 105 12 Defendants also rely on the court’s inherent authority and 11 U.S.C. 13 § 105 in support of their request for attorney fees and expenses. 14 Federal courts, including bankruptcy courts, have inherent authority 15 to impose sanctions for a litigant’s bad faith conduct. Chambers v. 16 NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (federal courts have inherent authority 17 to sanction); In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc., 77 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1996) 18 (bankruptcy courts have inherent authority to sanction bad faith 19 conduct). This authority includes assessing attorney fees against the 20 offending party. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45. The inherent power to 21 sanction “must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Id. at 44. 22 The award must be compensatory, not punitive, in nature. Goodyear Tire & 23 Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S.Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017). 24 To impose sanctions under the court’s inherent authority, I must 25 find that plaintiff acted “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 26 oppressive reasons,” Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-46, or has delayed or 1 disrupted litigation or “taken actions in the litigation for an improper 2 purpose.” Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 3 must explicitly find that the conduct was in bad faith. Primus Auto. 4 Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997). “A 5 finding of bad faith is warranted where [the party] ‘knowingly or 6 recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for 7 the purpose of harassing an opponent.’” Id. at 649. When the court 8 shifts fees, it may “shift only those attorney’s fees incurred because of 9 the misconduct at issue.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 137 S.Ct. at 1186. 10 Where a party’s conduct is sufficiently egregious, the court may order 11 payment of all reasonable attorney fees and expenses incurred by the 12 party’s adversary. Id. at 1187-88; DeVille, 280 B.R. at 496. 13 The first question is whether defendants’ motions for fees and costs 14 provided adequate notice that the fees were being sought as a sanction 15 under the court’s inherent authority. To comport with due process, 16 plaintiff must have received 17 notice that was reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise [him] of the pendency of the action and afford [him] an 18 opportunity to present [his] objections. . . . Generally, the notice regarding sanctions must specify the authority for the 19 sanction, as well as the sanctionable conduct. 20 DeVille, 280 B.R. at 496 (internal citation omitted). 21 Here, defendants asserted a right to attorney fees in their 22 counterclaims, which were filed nearly three years ago, in March 2017. 23 Doc. 66. In addition, defendants’ first Application for Attorney’s Fees 24 and Costs, Doc. 387, sought their fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 25 as a sanction for plaintiff’s “unreasonable and vexatious conduct,” 26 setting out eleven categories of actions they claim support the sanction. 1 Their Second Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs, Doc. 583, states that 2 they are seeking their attorney fees and costs as sanctions for 3 plaintiff’s bad faith conduct under a number of sources of authority, 4 including section 1927 and the court’s inherent authority. Although 5 defendants do not separately articulate plaintiff’s specific conduct that 6 is sanctionable under this court’s inherent authority, they do so in 7 their discussion of why sanctions should be imposed under 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1927. 9 The standards for awarding sanctions under section 1927 and the 10 court’s inherent authority are functionally the same. “Sanctions 11 pursuant to section 1927 must be supported by a finding of subjective bad 12 faith.” New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th 13 Cir. 1989). The conduct that constitutes bad faith for purposes of 14 section 1927 – knowingly or recklessly raising frivolous arguments, 15 arguing a meritorious claim for purpose of harassment, using tactics with 16 the intent of increasing expenses – is essentially the same type of 17 conduct that supports invoking the court’s inherent authority to impose 18 sanctions. See id. (setting out conduct that constitutes bad faith under 19 section 1927); Baker v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 431 F.Supp.2d 351, 361 20 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (bad faith finding for sanction under inherent power is 21 similar to that under section 1927). 22 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s conduct in this adversary 23 proceeding was unreasonable and vexatious, and that plaintiff filed a 24 frivolous case, warranting sanctions under the court’s inherent 25 authority. Because that argument was more fully articulated in their 26 discussion of section 1927, and the same bad faith finding is required to 1 support an imposition of sanctions under both section 1927 and inherent 2 power, defendants’ motions and counterclaim provided adequate notice that 3 they were seeking their attorney fees and costs under the court’s 4 inherent authority. Plaintiff was on notice that defendants were seeking 5 sanctions for his bad faith conduct under section 1927 and the court’s 6 inherent authority. Defendants adequately described the conduct that 7 warrants sanctions under section 1927. Because that same conduct 8 supports an award of sanctions under the court’s inherent authority, it 9 provides adequate notice. 10 Plaintiff had the opportunity to be heard; he filed responses to 11 each request for fees and costs, Doc. 401, 604, arguing that an award of 12 fees and costs should not be made for various reasons, including that he 13 did not engage in the conduct defendants listed in their motions. 14 Thus, I conclude that defendants’ counterclaim and motions provided 15 adequate notice that they were seeking sanctions under the court’s 16 inherent authority based on plaintiff’s bad faith conduct, including the 17 filing of a frivolous complaint. Plaintiff had the opportunity to 18 respond to the specific allegations made by defendants before sanctions 19 were imposed, and in fact he did so respond. 20 The second issue is whether plaintiff’s conduct warrants an award of 21 sanctions. Plaintiff argues that defendants’ list of instances of bad 22 faith conduct is not specific enough to apprise him of what conduct is at 23 issue. He complains that defendants say in their brief that they will 24 provide specific citations to each instance of misconduct on request. He 25 then argues that he did not do any of the things defendants list as bad 26 faith conduct, and that he needs discovery and an evidentiary hearing on 1 the specific accusations. 2 Although it is true that defendants’ lists of instances of 3 unreasonable and vexatious conduct are somewhat general and listed by 4 category, plaintiff is well aware of the many instances and facts that 5 demonstrate that this litigation was abusive and his conduct was 6 vexatious. This court has observed and been called upon to act on many 7 instances of misconduct that fit within those categories, as plaintiff 8 well knows. The filing of this frivolous adversary proceeding and 9 plaintiff’s conduct of the litigation were among the factors that caused 10 this court to enter a pre-filing vexatious litigant order against 11 plaintiff. See Memorandum Opinion/Report and Recommendation, Doc. 571. 12 I found that plaintiff had no objective good faith expectation that he 13 would prevail in this and previous actions against his family members, 14 that plaintiff has been untruthful, that he filed litigation for the 15 purpose of harassing his family members, that he has filed motion after 16 motion, failed to follow rules of discovery, and falsified documents. 17 Id. It can be no surprise to plaintiff that his conduct forms the basis 18 for a request for sanctions. 19 The list all of plaintiff’s frivolous and unwarranted actions that 20 have both caused defendants to incur costs of responding and required 21 wasted effort by the court are too numerous to list in their entirety. 22 The court has had to rule on several of plaintiff’s arguments and motions 23 that were based more on personal attacks on the parties, lawyers, and the 24 court than on any cogent legal theory. I have found that the filing of 25 the complaint in this adversary proceeding was frivolous. Plaintiff was 26 sanctioned for discovery violations. Doc. 163. Plaintiff filed many 1 motions to extend time for filing documents or to set over hearings, most 2 of which were denied. E.g., Doc. 114 (denied Doc. 116); Doc. 137 (denied 3 Doc. 143); Doc. 294 (denied Doc. 295). He sought reconsideration of 4 rulings of the court, which were denied. E.g., Doc. 18 (denied Doc. 19); 5 Doc. 174 (denied Doc. 194). He raised frivolous objections to forms of 6 order submitted by defendants’ counsel. E.g., Doc. 79 (overruled Doc. 7 83); Doc. 177 (order entered Doc. 179); Doc. 178 (order entered Doc. 8 183); Doc. 204 (order entered Doc. 208). He sought Rule 9011 sanctions 9 against defendants’ counsel based on the form of order submitted to the 10 court, Doc. 130, which the court denied. Doc. 132. He sought to file 11 counterclaims against defendants’ counterclaims, Doc. 97, causing the 12 court to strike the document as an improper pleading. Doc. 136. He 13 sought to vacate defendants’ litigation privileges, Doc. 336, which was 14 denied. Doc. 411. He moved to correct clerical mistakes, Doc. 355, 15 which the court denied as frivolous. Doc. 359. He moved to supplement 16 his complaint, Doc. 352, which the court denied, finding that the motion 17 was an attempted end run around the court’s ruling on a previous motion, 18 and filed only to delay the proceedings. Doc. 360. 19 These are just a few of the frivolous, unfounded documents and 20 arguments plaintiff filed in this adversary proceeding. Plaintiff’s 21 conduct in this adversary proceeding is the most egregious, abusive 22 conduct this court has observed, both on the bench and as an attorney. 23 Plaintiff’s filings are often abusive and vitriolic, and without basis in 24 law or fact. Plaintiff has multiplied the proceedings by filing numerous 25 unfounded motions and sought to delay the proceedings and increase costs. 26 Based on the fact that the complaint itself was frivolous and without any 1 objective basis as well as plaintiff’s conduct during the course of the 2 adversary proceeding in filing motions and documents that lacked merit 3 and were filed only to create delay or confusion, all of which caused 4 defendants substantial attorney fees and expenses that should never have 5 been necessary, I conclude that this is an exceptional case and that 6 defendants are entitled to an award of all of their reasonable attorney 7 fees and expenses in defending against plaintiff’s complaint.6 Plaintiff 8 initiated this “case in complete bad faith, so that every cost of defense 9 is attributable only to sanctioned behavior[.]” Goodyear Tire & Rubber 10 Co., 137 S.Ct. at 1188. 11 The court has considered plaintiff’s other arguments and rejects 12 them without discussion. 13 The final issue is the amount of fees and costs the court should 14 award. Defendants seek all of the fees and expenses incurred in this 15 adversary proceeding, as well as fees and expenses incurred in related 16 matters. It is reasonable to award the fees and expenses incurred in 17 defending against plaintiff’s complaint. However, there are categories 18 of fees and costs that I will disallow. What follows is an explanation 19 of the disallowed fees and expenses, as well as the code for that reason 20 that is used in the attached exhibits to indicate the reason for 21 disallowance. 22 23 6 Although it is doubtful that this sanctions award will deter plaintiff from further abusive and frivolous litigation tactics, see 24 Memorandum Opinion/Report and Recommendation (Doc. 571) at pp. 44-45 (finding that monetary sanctions would be inadequate to cause plaintiff 25 to stop his litigation efforts against his family members), plaintiff’s conduct must have consequences. If ever there was a case that called for 26 sanctions for frivolous and abusive litigation conduct, this is it. 1 A. Fees and costs incurred in pursuing the counterclaims in this 2 adversary proceeding (CC): 3 I find that defendants are not entitled to their attorney fees and 4 costs in pursuing their counterclaims (for wrongful use of civil 5 proceedings and vexatious litigant designation) against plaintiff. 6 Although the counterclaims may have never been filed if plaintiff had not 7 filed the complaint in this adversary proceeding, it was defendants’ 8 choice to file and pursue their counterclaims. The misconduct on which 9 they rely for their request for fees and costs in the second application, 10 which covers the prosecution of the counterclaims, is the same as the 11 conduct relied on in their first application, which related to defending 12 against plaintiff’s claims (before summary judgment), with the addition 13 of a twelfth category relating to frivolous appeals and motions to 14 withdraw reference. As I explain below, I will not award fees and costs 15 related to the appeals. To the extent the motion to withdraw reference 16 was litigated in district court, it was done after this court had 17 disposed of plaintiff’s claims and affected only the counterclaims. 18 Defendants do not identify any other conduct by plaintiff in his defense 19 of their counterclaims in support of their request for sanctions. 20 Therefore plaintiff will not be required to pay for defendants’ fees and 21 costs incurred in prosecuting the counterclaims. 22 B. Fees awarded against Susan Szanto in the California subpoena 23 litigation (SS): 24 Defendants’ fee itemization includes some entries that were included 25 in their request for fees in their contempt action against Susan Szanto 26 in the California subpoena litigation. The California court awarded some 1 but not all of the fees requested. However, I am unable to tell from the 2 California court’s order which fees were allowed and which were not. 3 Therefore, I will disallow all fees included in both the fee itemization 4 filed in this adversary proceeding and in the request for fees in 5 California, because I cannot tell whether those fees have already been 6 allowed. 7 C. Fees and expenses incurred in pursuing Susan Szanto in the 8 California district court (CDC): 9 Some of the fees and expenses were incurred in pursuing Susan Szanto 10 for contempt, responding to her motions and arguments in the California 11 district court, and attempting to collect the fee award from her. 12 Susan’s actions are not directly attributable to plaintiff. Further, the 13 pursuit of Susan’s deposition, which led to the contempt matter, related 14 to the counterclaims, not to plaintiff’s claims against defendants. 15 Therefore, I will disallow fees and expenses that I can tell relate to 16 the Susan Szanto California district court matter. 17 D. Fees for attorney conferences that were charged by both 18 attorneys (AC): 19 The itemization shows charges by one attorney for conferring with 20 another attorney. Where both attorneys involved in the conference 21 charged for the same conference, I will allow the higher billing rate 22 entry and disallow the lower billing rate entry. 23 E. Fees incurred related to Peter Szanto’s main bankruptcy case 24 (MC): 25 There were several entries in the fee itemization that related to 26 counsel’s tracking of or involvement in matters related to the main 1 bankruptcy case. Those charges are not directly related to plaintiff’s 2 bad faith conduct in this adversary proceeding, and they will be 3 disallowed. 4 F. Fees and costs incurred in plaintiff’s appeals of matters in 5 the adversary proceeding (AP): 6 Counsel charged for some work that was done on plaintiff’s appeals 7 of decisions in this adversary proceeding, and defendants request 8 expenses relating to appeals. Those charges are not directly related to 9 plaintiff’s bad faith conduct in this adversary proceeding and will be 10 disallowed. 11 G. Incomplete entries (IC): 12 Some entries in the fee itemization were incomplete, making it 13 impossible for the court to determine what work was done that supported 14 the charges. As a consequence, I cannot tell whether the charge is 15 reasonable, and the charge will be disallowed. 16 H. Fees incurred in the California domestic violence case (DV): 17 Fees incurred in the California domestic violence case are not 18 directly related to plaintiff’s bad faith conduct in this adversary 19 proceeding, and will be disallowed. 20 I. Fees incurred in working on a motion to withdraw reference 21 (WD): 22 The itemization includes fees incurred in drafting a motion to 23 withdraw reference which was not, as far as I can tell, ever filed. It 24 is not reasonable to award fees for that unfiled motion. 25 J. Fees charged that were previously awarded as discovery sanction 26 (DS): 1 The fee itemization contains charges that were awarded as a 2 discovery sanction in 2017. Those fees are duplicative and will be 3 disallowed. 4 K. Fees incurred in Nevada case (NV): 5 The itemization contains fees related to a Nevada hearing and 6 restraining order. That case is not directly related to plaintiff’s bad 7 faith conduct in this adversary proceeding. The fees will be disallowed. 8 L. Other (OT): 9 There are a few other fees that will be disallowed for other 10 reasons. These include excessive fees for preparing these fee 11 applications, fees related to monitoring a different adversary proceeding 12 (brought by the United States Trustee to deny plaintiff a discharge), 13 fees in the second application that duplicate fees charged in the first 14 application, as well as other miscellaneous items. Those will be 15 disallowed. 16 M. Block billing (BB): 17 Defendants did not segregate their fees to assure that they are 18 requesting only fees that are reasonably related to this adversary 19 proceeding and have not already been awarded in other contexts. Their 20 failure to segregate their fees has made it more difficult for the court 21 to determine which fees are allowable and which are not. Further, many 22 entries include a variety of tasks billed in a block, without breaking 23 down the amount of time spent for each task. To the extent fees are 24 block billed and include some tasks that are allowable and some tasks 25 that are not, the fees for that entire block of time will be excluded. 26 Attached to this Memorandum is Exhibit A, which sets out attorney 1 fees that are disallowed from defendants’ fee itemization from the first 2 application for fees and costs. Only disallowed fees are listed. If 3 only a portion of the itemization entry is disallowed, a description is 4 included. If the entire charge is disallowed, no explanation is provided 5 other than the code showing the reason for disallowance. Attached to 6 this Memorandum is Exhibit B, which sets out attorney fees that are 7 disallowed from defendants’ fee itemization from the second application 8 for fees and costs. This exhibit uses the same process for explanation 9 as Exhibit A. Fees not listed in Exhibit A or Exhibit B will be allowed 10 as reasonable fees to be imposed as a sanction for plaintiff’s bad faith 11 conduct in this adversary proceeding. The total amount of attorney fees 12 to be awarded on defendants’ first and second application for fees is 13 $134,166.50 ($267,663.50 minus $133,497.00). The remainder of the fees, 14 $133,497.00, are disallowed. 15 Attached to this Memorandum is Exhibit C, which sets out the costs 16 and expenses that are disallowed from defendants’ itemization included 17 with their first application for fees and costs. Disallowed costs are 18 designated using the codes set out above. All costs listed in the costs 19 itemization attached to the second application for fees and costs are 20 disallowed, as they all relate to expenses incurred in prosecuting the 21 counterclaims or other matters, not in defending against plaintiff’s bad 22 faith conduct in bringing and prosecuting his claims against them. The 23 amount disallowed from the second application is $1,599.01. 24 The total amount of expenses that will be awarded as a sanction for 25 plaintiff’s bad faith conduct is $13,242.47 ($24,682.02 minus 26 $11,439.55). The remainder, $11,439.55, are disallowed. 1 Counsel for defendants should submit an order allowing the fees and 2 costs as set forth above. 3 ### 4 cc: Peter Szanto Nicholas Henderson 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 1 2 EXHIBIT A - FIRST APPLICATION FOR FEES - AMOUNTS DISALLOWED 3 Date and Charge Description Code Biller 4 3/22/17 NJH 150.00 MC 5 3/29/17 NJH 187.50 “P. Szanto regarding same (0.3)”; IC 6 0.2 unaccounted for 7 4/10/17 NJH 75.00 CC 4/12/17 NJH 150.00 “email to D. Olsen regarding BB; 8 evidence for vexatious litigation CC claim” (CC) 9 4/26/17 NJH 75.00 “review email from client re AP 10 appeal (0.2)” 11 5/19/17 NJH 450.00 “Motions to Compel (0.5)”; “email 1.2 IC upload link to P. Szanto” 12 6/6/17 NJH 1125.00 “Draft Motion for Sanctions (3.0)” DS 13 6/9/17 NJH 562.50 “multiple telephone calls to/from DV 14 V. Szanto and D. Olsen regarding Orange County Domestic Violence 15 paperwork (1.5)” 6/12/17 NJH 187.50 “telephone call to McClurg BB; 16 regarding main case; email to B. MC Kukso regarding same” (MC) 17 6/15/17 NJH 150.00 “regarding update (0.2)”; no entry IC (.4 18 for 0.2 hr hr) 19 7/14/17 NJH 412.50 “emails from/to M. Fell and V. SS; Szanto regarding process server” IC 20 included in Calif Contempt sanction 21 7/25/17 NJH 600.00 “communications from P. Szanto SS; 22 regarding same” - incomplete. IC Remainder included in Calif 23 Contempt sanction 7/26/17 NJH 450.00 “prepare outline for S. Szanto SS (1.2 24 deposition; email to P. Szanto hr) regarding deposition” - 1.2 25 included in SS Calif contempt sanction 26 1 7/27/17 NJH 262.50 “M. Fell regarding same; draft SS (.7 update email to clients” .7 hr) 2 included in SS Calif contempt sanction 3 7/31/17 NJH 525.00 “Draft petition for enforcement of SS (1.4 4 subpoena; draft related hr) declarations;” “review and revise 5 Motion for Limited Extension of Discovery Cutoff Deadline;” - 1.4 6 included in SS Calif contempt sanction 7 8/8/17 NJH 150.00 “email to C. Mona regarding SS (.4 8 revised dubpoena and service on S. hr) Szanto.” - .4 included in SS Calif 9 contempt sanction 10 8/15/17 NJH 187.50 MC 8/17/17 NJH 562.50 “Emails from/to client regarding NV; 11 NV hearing and restraining order; BB emails from/to L. Ramos regarding 12 service of order;” - relates to Nevada case 13 8/26/17 NJH 187.50 SS 14 8/29/17 NJH 1425.00 SS 15 8/30/17 NJH 1162.50 SS 16 9/4/17 NJH 262.50 “draft Petition to Enforce SS (.7 17 Subpoenato Susan Szanto (0.2); hr) draft declarations of court 18 reporter and videographer (0.5).” 9/6/17 NJH 750.00 SS 19 9/7/17 NJH 75.00 SS 20 9/8/17 NJH 375.00 “continue drafting motion for SS (1.0 21 contempt regarding deposition of hr) Susan Szanto (1.0);” 22 9/11/17 NJH 562.50 SS 23 9/25/17 NJH 1650.00 CDC 24 10/17/17 NJH 375.00 CDC 25 26 1 10/18/17 NJH 2062.50 “Attend preliminary hearing on MC; Motion to Convert;” “attend BB 2 Special Meeting of Creditors.” (MC) 3 10/18/17 NJH 1687.50 (This entry may also be duplicate MC 4 of previous 10/18/17 entry) 5 10/26/17 NJH 150.00 CDC 6 10/28/17 NJH 112.50 SS 11/1/17 NJH 187.50 “conference with C. Sturgeon SS (.5 7 regarding order compelling S. hr) Szanto deposition, regarding 8 deposition subpoena, and regarding notice of deposition.” 9 11/3/17 NJH 150.00 “review Motion to Vacate CA order SS (.4 10 filed by Plaintiff.” hr) 11 11/8/17 NJH 675.00 SS 12 11/9/17 NJH 1312.50 “Prepare for and attend 3rd SS; deposition of Susan Szanto;” MC 13 “review Motion to Quash; draft motion to extend discovery 14 deadling and related declaration.” - 1.3 (SS) 15 “reveiw transcript from Special Meeting of Creditors; draft 16 objection to confirmation;” - 2.2 (MC) 17 11/13/17 NJH 1050.00 “review case law regarding plan MC; 18 confirmation standards and bases BB for objection to confirmation.” - 19 (MC) 11/14/17 NJH 675.00 “draft declaration regarding SS (.9 20 motion to extend discovery cutoff; hr); continue drafting declaration for MC; 21 motion for contempt;” - .9 (SS) BB “continue drafting objection to 22 confirmation.” - (MC) 23 11/15/17 NJH 562.50 “Continue drafting” “contempt SS; paperwork.” - .5 SS MC 24 “objection to confirmation, supplemental briefs” - 1.0 (MC) 25 26 1 11/16/17 NJH 750.00 “Emails from/to V. Szanto SS (2.0 regarding update and Susan Szanto hr) 2 deposition;” “continue drafting motion for contempt and related 3 declaration; continue drafting motion to extend or eliminate 4 deadline for Susan Szanto deposition; continue drafting 5 response to Motion to Quash.” - 2.0 (SS) 6 11/20/17 NJH 187.50 MC 7 11/21/17 NJH 1312.50 SS 8 11/22/17 NJH 1050.00 SS 9 11/27/17 NJH 937.50 “email from D. Olsen regarding NV NV; order and removal.” - (NV) BB 10 11/28/17 NJH 375.00 SS 11 11/29/17 NJH 2625.00 “continue drafting response to CA SS; 12 motions;” - 1.0 SS MC “Prepare for and attend hearing on 13 confirmation and motion to convert;” - 6.0 (MC) 14 12/4/17 NJH 1312.50 MC 15 12/5/17 NJH 937.50 “attend hearing regarding MC; 16 conversion; email to clients BB regarding same;” - (MC) 17 12/6/17 NJH 187.50 “telephone call to C. McClurg MC; regarding follow-up.” - (MC) BB 18 12/7/17 NJH 300.00 “Emails and telephone call to T. SS; 19 Bell regarding Safeway documents;” MC “email to P. Szanto regarding 20 motion conferral.” - .5 (SS) “telephone call to S. Arnot 21 regarding case information;” - .3 (MC) 22 12/8/17 NJH 150.00 SS 23 12/11/17 NJH 525.00 SS 24 12/12/17 NJH 375.00 SS 25 12/13/17 NJH 150.00 SS 26 12/26/17 NJH 450.00 SS 1 12/27/17 NJH 750.00 SS 2 12/28/17 NJH 300.00 “Conference with J. Tolchin SS (.8 regarding strategy for Susan hr) 3 Szanto; review Response to OSC filed by Susan Szanto;” - .8 (SS) 4 1/18/18 NJH 2812.50 CDC; CC 5 1/31/18 NJH 112.50 “emails to/from J. Bell regarding CDC (.3 6 Susan Szanto deposition transcript hr) (0.3);” - (CDC) 7 2/1/18 NJH 750.00 “conference call with clients MC; regarding strategy and claim BB 8 preparation;” - (MC) 9 2/2/18 NJH 1687.50 “Continue review of case law and MC; supporting documents for clients’ BB 10 proofs of claim; draft proofs of clam;” - (MC) 11 2/6/18 NJH 562.50 “conference with J. Tolchin CDC; 12 regarding Susan Szanto voicemail;” BB - (CDC) 13 2/6/18 NJH 1312.50 “continue reviewing documents and MC; 14 drafting POCs for clients; email BB to clients regarding review of 15 POC.” - (MC) 16 2/7/18 NJH 600.00 MC 2/8/18 NJH 562.50 MC 17 2/9/18 NJH 375.00 “revise and finalize Victor Proof MC; 18 of Claim.” - (MC) BB 19 2/13/18 NJH 937.50 “Continue drafting claims for MC; clients;” - (MC) BB 20 2/23/18 NJH 937.50 “draft Response to MC; 21 Dismissal/Conversion;” - (MC) BB 3/1/18 NJH 187.50 “Email from S. Arnot regarding MC; 22 requested information;” - (MC) BB 23 3/5/18 NJH 525.00 “Review response and motion for CDC; testimony filed by Plaintiff/Susan MC; 24 Szanto;” - (CDC) BB “Compile documents for S. Arnot; 25 email to S. Arnot regarding same;” - (MC) 26 1 3/6/18 NJH 525.00 “Review UST complaint” - (OT) OT; “continue review and revise CDC; 2 Response to Susan Szanto Motion;” BB - (CDC) 3 4/19/18 NJH 112.50 AP 4 5 2/23/17 TGS 63.00 “conference with N. Henderson AC (.2 6 regarding strategy and discovery hr) issues (0.2).” 7 2/28/17 TGS 220.50 CC 8 3/3/17 TGS 252.00 CDC 9 4/7/17 TGS 94.50 “telephone call to Bank of America MC (.3 attorney regarding disclosure hr) 10 statement hearing (0.3).” 11 4/10/17 TGS 126.00 MC 12 5/15/17 TGS 63.00 “conference with N. Henderson AC (.2 regarding same (0.5).” - .2 AC hr) 13 (Henderson charged .2 hr) 7/19/17 TGS 330.00 SS 14 10/19/17 TGS 126.00 OT 15 11/20/17 TGS 94.50 MC 16 11/21/17 TGS 189.00 MC 17 11/29/17 TGS 567.00 MC 18 11/30/17 TGS 126.00 CDC 19 1/9/18 TGS 94.50 CDC 20 1/16/18 TGS 661.50 MC 1/18/18 TGS 346.50 CDC 21 1/31/18 TGS 126.00 MC 22 TOTAL 49755.00 23 24 25 26 1 EXHIBIT B - SECOND APPLICATION FOR FEES - AMOUNTS DISALLOWED 2 Date and Charge Description Code 3 Biller 4 4/30/18 NJH 150.00 Included in First Application for OT Fees 5 5/2/18 NJH 712.50 Included in First Application for OT 6 Fees 7 5/18/18 JGT 162.50 CDC 5/21/18 JGT 455.00 CDC 8 5/22/18 JGT 130.00 CDC 9 5/31/18 NJH 562.50 2.5 hours to draft fee OT (1.5 10 application, declaration and hr) exhibits excessive; allow 1.0 hr 11 6/1/18 JGT 97.50 CDC 12 6/5/18 JGT 585.00 CDC 13 6/6/18 JGT 617.50 CDC 14 6/11/18 JGT 1462.50 CDC 15 6/11/18 NJH 75.00 CDC 16 6/12/18 JGT 227.50 CDC 6/13/18 JGT 195.00 CDC 17 6/25/18 JGT 97.50 CDC 18 6/29/18 NJH 75.00 CC 19 7/7/18 NJH 112.50 MC 20 7/9/18 JGT 422.50 CDC 21 7/9/18 NJH 75.00 CDC 22 7/12/18 NJH 187.50 CC 23 7/18/18 NJH 375.00 CC 7/25/18 NJH 750.00 AP 24 7/30/18 JGT 65.00 CDC 25 8/1/18 JGT 260.00 CDC 26 1 8/1/18 NJH 187.50 CDC 2 8/4/18 NJH 112.50 MC 3 8/9/18 NJH 562.50 AP 4 8/9/18 NJH 375.00 AP 8/14/18 NJH 187.50 CC 5 8/27/18 JGT 487.50 CDC 6 8/30/18 JGT 422.50 CDC 7 8/30/18 TGS 94.50 CDC 8 9/4/18 JGT 260.00 CDC 9 9/5/18 JGT 585.00 CDC 10 9/5/18 NJH 75.00 CDC 11 9/14/18 NJH 225.00 CC 12 9/17/18 JGT 195.00 CDC 9/21/18 NJH 375.00 CC 13 9/28/18 JGT 780.00 CDC 14 10/1/18 JGT 130.00 CDC 15 10/4/18 NJH 75.00 Relates to main case and separate MC; 16 adversary proceeding OT 10/8/18 JGT 97.50 CTC 17 10/11/18 NJH 75.00 CC 18 10/12/18 JGT 357.50 CDC 19 10/15/18 JGT 195.00 CDC 20 11/5/18 JGT 65.00 AP 21 11/15/18 NJH 187.50 “telephone call to A. Arnot MC; regarding funds on hand;” - (MC) BB 22 11/21/18 SCG 162.50 WD 23 11/29/18 SCG 2047.50 Drafted motion to withdraw WD 24 reference never filed 25 11/30/18 SCG 162.50 WD 26 1 12/7/18 NJH 3000.00 Appears to relate to motion to WD withdraw reference that was never 2 filed 3 1/2/19 NJH 120.00 CC 4 1/8/19 NJH 400.00 CC 5 2/5/19 NJH 200.00 CC 2/12/19 NJH 160.00 CC 6 2/26/19 NJH 160.00 “review most recent Interim MC; 7 Report; email to client regarding BB analysis.” - (MC) 8 3/18/19 NJH 200.00 AP 9 5/22/19 NJH 200.00 CC 10 6/10/19 NJH 200.00 CC 11 6/18/19 TGS 357.50 CC 12 6/19/19 TGS 97.50 CC 13 6/20/19 TGS 65.00 CC 14 6/25/19 NJH 480.00 CC 6/28/19 TGS 162.50 CC 15 7/1/19 NJH 200.00 CC 16 7/2/19 TGS 292.50 CC 17 7/5/19 NJH 160.00 CC 18 7/6/19 NJH 120.00 CC 19 7/10/19 NJH 80.00 CC 20 7/15/19 NJH 80.00 CC 21 7/19/19 NJH 120.00 CC 7/24/19 NJH 2400.00 CC 22 7/25/19 NJH 1920.00 No description of work done IC 23 7/26/19 NJH 2400.00 CC 24 7/26/19 TGS 487.50 CC 25 7/29/19 TGS 97.50 CC 26 7/30/19 TGS 260.00 CC 1 7/31/19 TGS 1007.50 CC 2 8/1/19 TGS 585.00 CC 3 8/7/19 NJH 2000.00 CC 4 8/7/19 TGS 130.00 CC 8/9/19 NJH 880.00 CC 5 8/12/19 NJH 1840.00 CC 6 8/14/19 JGT 260.00 CDC 7 8/14/19 NJH 2200.00 CC 8 8/16/19 NJH 2480.00 CC 9 8/19/19 JGT 487.50 CDC 10 8/19/19 NJH 1680.00 CC 11 8/20/19 JGT 130.00 CDC 12 8/20/19 NJH 2400.00 CC 8/21/19 NJH 2600.00 CC 13 8/22/19 NJH 3600.00 CC 14 8/23/19 NJH 3720.00 CC 15 8/23/19 TGS 1170.00 CC 16 8/24/19 NJH 2200.00 CC 17 8/25/19 NJH 3000.00 CC 18 8/26/19 NJH 4840.00 CC 19 8/26/19 TGS 1072.50 CC 8/27/19 NJH 4200.00 CC 20 8/28//19 JGT 130.00 CDC 21 8/28/19 NJH 4600.00 CC 22 8/28/19 TGS 1852.50 CC 23 8/29/19 NJH 1480.00 CC 24 9/3/19 JGT 65.00 CDC 25 9/4/19 JGT 325.00 CDC 26 9/9/19 JGT 130.00 CDC 1 9/12/19 NJH 400.00 MC 2 9/17/19 JGT 32.50 CDC 3 9/18/19 NJH 80.00 Unclear what this relates to OT 4 9/23/19 JGT 65.00 CDC 10/14/19 JGT 227.50 CDC 5 11/5/19 NJH 400.00 MC 6 11/18/19 NJH 120.00 CC 7 12/4/19 NJH 600.00 CC; 8 MC 9 TOTAL 83742.00 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 1 EXHIBIT C - COSTS DISALLOWED 2 Date Amount Description Code 3 7/18/17 40.00 Florida Dept of Hwy Safety & Motor OT 4 Vehicles; subpoena witness fee 5 7/25/17 31.00 United States Court of Appeals; AP audio hearing copy fee 6 8/9/17 1103.55 Advanced Depositions; Susan Szanto CDC 7 video deposition and transcript 8/25/17 1050.00 CMI Resources; Process Service: CDC 8 Susan Szanto 9 9/1/17 136.10 DDS Legal Support Systems; Process CDC Service: Susan Szanto 10 9/1/17 52.00 Douglas County Courts; hearing CC 11 transcript 12 9/22/17 47.00 United States District Court; AP filing fee 13 10/7/17 20.00 Oregon State Bar; certificate of CDC 14 good standing 10/18/17 115.00 Szanto OT 15 11/2/17 95.00 Szanto OT 16 11/7/17 500.00 Advanced Depositions; Susan Szanto CDC 17 deposition 18 11/8/17 600.00 CMI Resources; Process Service: CDC Susan Szanto and support services 19 11/13/17 34.34 Washington State Bar; Pro Hac Vice CDC; Certificate of Good Standing OT 20 11/15/17 377.15 Advanced Depositions; Invoice No. CDC 21 28851: Susan Szanto Certificate of Non-Appearance 22 11/17/17 21.00 Oregon State Bar; Pro Hac Vice CDC; 23 certificate of good standing OT 24 11/29/17 39.95 On Legal LLC Invoice No. 11543367; CDC Process Service: Susan Szanto 25 11/30/17 215.00 Advanced Depositions Invoice No. CDC 29201; Susan Szanto video services 26 1 12/27/17 7.50 San Diego Superior Court; filing OT fee 2 1/9/18 532.60 Airfare regarding Susan Szanto CDC 3 deposition 4 1/9/18 532.60 Airfare regarding Susan Szanto CDC deposition 5 1/18/18 27.00 J. Tolchin; airport parking CDC 6 1/18/18 1776.50 Advanced Depositions; Invoice No. CDC 29900; Susan Szanto deposition and 7 certified transcript 8 1/19/18 27.00 Airport parking CDC 9 1/22/18 1275.00 CMI Resources; Process Service: CDC Susan Szanto 10 2/23/18 995.00 Advanced Depositions; 01/18/2018 CDC 11 Susan Szanto video services 12 2/28/18 189.90 Janice Russell Transcripts; MC 11/09/2017 Invoice No. 17-245-1: 13 10/17/2017 & 10/18/2017 Creditors Meeting Transcripts 14 Second 1599.01 Application 15 TOTAL 11439.20 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26