NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________________
No. 24-3347 ________________
PETER J. LYNCH, Appellant
v.
KATHRYN ANNE DONNELLY, In her official capacity as Virgin Islands Special Designated Disciplinary Counsel, and in her Individual Capacity; TANISHA BAILEY- ROKA, in her Official Capacity as Virgin Islands Chief Disciplinary Counsel, and in her Individual Capacity _____________
On Appeal from the District Court for the Virgin Islands (D.C. Civil No. 3:24-cv-00043) District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney ________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on December 9, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 15, 2026)
_______________
OPINION* _______________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PORTER, Circuit Judge.
Peter Lynch, a lawyer licensed to practice in the Virgin Islands, is facing ongoing
attorney disciplinary proceedings. He filed a lawsuit alleging that those proceedings
violated his constitutional rights. The District Court dismissed Lynch’s claims, finding
that it must abstain under Younger and that defendants were entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity. For the reasons below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I
Peter Lynch is a citizen of Florida and an attorney barred in the Virgin Islands.
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) opened an investigation into Lynch for
improper solicitation of clients in violation of the Virgin Islands Rules of Professional
Conduct. Chief Disciplinary Counsel Tanisha Bailey-Roka initiated the investigation and
assigned it to Special Designated Disciplinary Counsel Kathryn Anne Donnelly. After a
great deal of back-and-forth correspondence and proceedings before the Virgin Islands
Supreme Court and the Professional Responsibility Board, Lynch sued Donnelly and
Bailey-Roka in the District Court of the Virgin Islands. The investigation remained
ongoing.
Lynch brought three claims against Bailey-Roka and Donnelly, seeking damages
and injunctive relief under (1) the All Writs Act, (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (3) 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985. Bailey-Roka and Donnelly moved to dismiss Lynch’s claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, insufficient process and service of process, and failure to state a
claim. The District Court denied the motion on the first two grounds before finding that it
must abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and that quasi-judicial
2 immunity attached to Bailey-Roka and Donnelly. Lynch v. Donnelly, 2024 WL 4819452,
at *6-14 (D.V.I. Nov. 18, 2024). Lynch timely appealed.
II 1
On appeal, Lynch argues that the District Court wrongly abstained under Younger,
mistakenly found Bailey-Roka and Donnelly entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, and
erred in denying his motion to amend the complaint. We address each issue in turn.
A
Younger requires federal courts to “abstain from deciding cases that would
interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings.” Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State,
938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 2019). Younger applies only to “three exceptional categories”
of cases: “(1) ongoing state criminal prosecutions; (2) certain civil enforcement
proceedings; and (3) pending civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Id. (quoting
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78–79 (2013)) (quotations omitted). The
Virgin Islands calls its attorney disciplinary proceedings sui generis, but sometimes treats
them as quasi-criminal. See In re Burns, 73 V.I. 600, 610 (2020). For a court to abstain
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a district court’s “determination of whether Younger abstention is proper.” Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 27 F.4th 886, 890 (3d Cir. 2022). We apply de novo review to a district court’s order granting immunity from suit, Trinh v. Fineman, 9 F.4th 235, 237 n.1 (3d Cir. 2021), and from an order denying leave to amend on the grounds of futility. U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014).
3 under Younger when an attorney disciplinary proceeding is at issue, the Court must also
find that three supplemental conditions are present, regardless of how it is categorized.
See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 433–34
(1982). Specifically, the proceedings must “[1] be ongoing and judicial in nature;
[2] implicate important state interests; and [3] afford an adequate opportunity to raise
federal claims.” Borowski v. Kean Univ., 68 F.4th 844, 849 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432). Even when all these conditions are satisfied, a court should
not abstain under Younger if it finds that “(1) the state proceedings are being undertaken
in bad faith or for purposes of harassment or (2) some other extraordinary circumstances
exist.” Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).
Lynch does not dispute that the three Middlesex conditions are satisfied, but
argues that Younger abstention nonetheless does not apply because Donnelly and Bailey-
Roka’s disciplinary investigation was driven by bad faith. It is Lynch’s burden to provide
evidence that bad faith existed, Schall, 885 F.2d at 111, but he fails to meet that burden.
While Lynch alleges many grievances with the attorney disciplinary system writ large in
the Virgin Islands, they are not sufficient to establish bad faith. He argues that the
charges against him were brought “without any reasonable expectation of a valid
conviction.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. But his arguments amount only to bare allegations of
bias and animus against him by Donnelly and Bailey-Roka. And his own personal view
that his actions did not violate Virgin Islands Supreme Court Rule 211.7.3 is unsupported
by any authority. This is far from sufficient to meet the demanding requirements of the
bad faith exception to Younger, which is limited to cases “of proven harassment or
4 prosecutions undertaken by state officials . . . without hope” of success. Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971).
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________________
No. 24-3347 ________________
PETER J. LYNCH, Appellant
v.
KATHRYN ANNE DONNELLY, In her official capacity as Virgin Islands Special Designated Disciplinary Counsel, and in her Individual Capacity; TANISHA BAILEY- ROKA, in her Official Capacity as Virgin Islands Chief Disciplinary Counsel, and in her Individual Capacity _____________
On Appeal from the District Court for the Virgin Islands (D.C. Civil No. 3:24-cv-00043) District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney ________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on December 9, 2025
Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 15, 2026)
_______________
OPINION* _______________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PORTER, Circuit Judge.
Peter Lynch, a lawyer licensed to practice in the Virgin Islands, is facing ongoing
attorney disciplinary proceedings. He filed a lawsuit alleging that those proceedings
violated his constitutional rights. The District Court dismissed Lynch’s claims, finding
that it must abstain under Younger and that defendants were entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity. For the reasons below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I
Peter Lynch is a citizen of Florida and an attorney barred in the Virgin Islands.
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) opened an investigation into Lynch for
improper solicitation of clients in violation of the Virgin Islands Rules of Professional
Conduct. Chief Disciplinary Counsel Tanisha Bailey-Roka initiated the investigation and
assigned it to Special Designated Disciplinary Counsel Kathryn Anne Donnelly. After a
great deal of back-and-forth correspondence and proceedings before the Virgin Islands
Supreme Court and the Professional Responsibility Board, Lynch sued Donnelly and
Bailey-Roka in the District Court of the Virgin Islands. The investigation remained
ongoing.
Lynch brought three claims against Bailey-Roka and Donnelly, seeking damages
and injunctive relief under (1) the All Writs Act, (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (3) 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985. Bailey-Roka and Donnelly moved to dismiss Lynch’s claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, insufficient process and service of process, and failure to state a
claim. The District Court denied the motion on the first two grounds before finding that it
must abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and that quasi-judicial
2 immunity attached to Bailey-Roka and Donnelly. Lynch v. Donnelly, 2024 WL 4819452,
at *6-14 (D.V.I. Nov. 18, 2024). Lynch timely appealed.
II 1
On appeal, Lynch argues that the District Court wrongly abstained under Younger,
mistakenly found Bailey-Roka and Donnelly entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, and
erred in denying his motion to amend the complaint. We address each issue in turn.
A
Younger requires federal courts to “abstain from deciding cases that would
interfere with certain ongoing state proceedings.” Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State,
938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 2019). Younger applies only to “three exceptional categories”
of cases: “(1) ongoing state criminal prosecutions; (2) certain civil enforcement
proceedings; and (3) pending civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Id. (quoting
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78–79 (2013)) (quotations omitted). The
Virgin Islands calls its attorney disciplinary proceedings sui generis, but sometimes treats
them as quasi-criminal. See In re Burns, 73 V.I. 600, 610 (2020). For a court to abstain
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a district court’s “determination of whether Younger abstention is proper.” Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of N.J., 27 F.4th 886, 890 (3d Cir. 2022). We apply de novo review to a district court’s order granting immunity from suit, Trinh v. Fineman, 9 F.4th 235, 237 n.1 (3d Cir. 2021), and from an order denying leave to amend on the grounds of futility. U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014).
3 under Younger when an attorney disciplinary proceeding is at issue, the Court must also
find that three supplemental conditions are present, regardless of how it is categorized.
See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 433–34
(1982). Specifically, the proceedings must “[1] be ongoing and judicial in nature;
[2] implicate important state interests; and [3] afford an adequate opportunity to raise
federal claims.” Borowski v. Kean Univ., 68 F.4th 844, 849 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing
Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432). Even when all these conditions are satisfied, a court should
not abstain under Younger if it finds that “(1) the state proceedings are being undertaken
in bad faith or for purposes of harassment or (2) some other extraordinary circumstances
exist.” Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989).
Lynch does not dispute that the three Middlesex conditions are satisfied, but
argues that Younger abstention nonetheless does not apply because Donnelly and Bailey-
Roka’s disciplinary investigation was driven by bad faith. It is Lynch’s burden to provide
evidence that bad faith existed, Schall, 885 F.2d at 111, but he fails to meet that burden.
While Lynch alleges many grievances with the attorney disciplinary system writ large in
the Virgin Islands, they are not sufficient to establish bad faith. He argues that the
charges against him were brought “without any reasonable expectation of a valid
conviction.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. But his arguments amount only to bare allegations of
bias and animus against him by Donnelly and Bailey-Roka. And his own personal view
that his actions did not violate Virgin Islands Supreme Court Rule 211.7.3 is unsupported
by any authority. This is far from sufficient to meet the demanding requirements of the
bad faith exception to Younger, which is limited to cases “of proven harassment or
4 prosecutions undertaken by state officials . . . without hope” of success. Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971). As such, the District Court did not err in abstaining
under Younger.
B
Quasi-judicial immunity derives from judicial immunity, the principle that judges
ought to be able to administer justice without fear of personal consequences. Russell v.
Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 347 (1871)). These protections extend, through quasi-judicial immunity, to
“certain others who perform functions closely associated with the judicial process.”
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985). Quasi-judicial immunity encompasses a
host of actors, including those who serve as “arms of the court” and “fulfill[ ] a quasi-
judicial role at the court’s request.” Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2001).
For quasi-judicial immunity to attach, an individual must be exposed to liability through
the exercise of his judicial functions, not his nonjudicial acts. Russell, 905 F.3d at 247–
48.
As the District Court noted, Donnelly and Bailey-Roka are members of the ODC,
an arm of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, which has “exclusive jurisdiction to . . .
discipline [ ] persons admitted to the practice of law.” V.I. Code tit. 4, § 32(e). Officers
like Bailey-Roka and Lynch help the Virgin Islands Supreme Court to investigate and
prosecute misconduct, and if they risk personal liability every time an attorney contests
the charges against him, the attorney disciplinary process is imperiled. See Capogrosso v.
Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that members of New Jersey’s
5 Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct, who investigate claims of judicial misconduct,
were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity). Lynch’s assertions of bias on the part of
Donnelly and Bailey-Roka or their misconduct during this process are simply irrelevant,
because “specifics” like “motive or the correctness of [their] decision” are not a factor in
whether immunity attaches. Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 769 (3d Cir. 2000).
The District Court recognized this principle, and correctly held that Donnelly and Bailey-
Roka are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
C
Under these circumstances, the District Court properly dismissed Lynch’s claims
with prejudice. Because both Donnelly and Bailey-Roka are immune from suit, any
amendment of the complaint by Lynch would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (recognizing the principle that courts
should not permit amendment of the complaint when doing so would be futile).
* * *
We will affirm the District Court’s orders dismissing the case and denying leave to
amend.