Perseptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc.

12 F. Supp. 2d 69, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2263, 1998 WL 206040
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJanuary 28, 1998
DocketCIV. A. 93-12237-PBS
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 12 F. Supp. 2d 69 (Perseptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perseptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 69, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2263, 1998 WL 206040 (D. Mass. 1998).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SARIS, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. and Purdue Research Foundation (collectively “PerSeptive”) have filed motions (1) to vacate the March 31, 1997 order on correction of patents; (2) to enter a judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); and (3) to withdraw the motion to correct inventorship. This flurry of motions was precipitated by a new standard articulated in a recent decision, Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 119 F.3d 1551, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed.Cir. July 11, 1997) (“Stark ”), which fundamentally alters the legal landscape of proceedings pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 256. After hearing, this Court must re-examine its March 31, 1997 decision under the new standard.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As background, on January 9, 1996 this Court allowed defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. Based on the undisputed facts in the record, the Court concluded as a matter of law that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 116, Frank Warner and/or Linda Lloyd were joint inventors of three patents concerning “perfusive chromatography”. See Memorandum and Order, Jan. 9, 1996 (“Per-Septive I”) (Attachment A to this opinion.) The Court directed PerSeptive to move to correct inventorship of the patents pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 256 or the patents would be held invalid. Although objecting to that ruling and requesting the right to seek an interlocutory appeal on the inventorship issue, plaintiff moved to correct the inventorship. The Court held ten days of hearings on that motion. On March 31, 1997, the Court ruled that PerSeptive had not met its burden of *71 proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the nonjoinder was made without deceptive intent on the part of the named inventors: See Memorandum and Order, Mar. 31, 1997, at 131 (“PerSeptive II ”) (Attachment B to this opinion.)

Because the Federal Circuit had not decided the proper burden of proof for the element of deceptive intent in a correction motion pursuant to § 256, that issue was starkly contested by the parties. Defendants urged the Court to put on the plaintiffs, i.e. the named inventors, the burden of proving the absence of deceptive intent on the part of the named inventors by clear and convincing evidence. The named inventors argued that the defendants were required to prove their intent by clear and convincing evidence, or, as a fallback, that if the named inventors bore the burden, they were required to prove the absence of deceptive intent only by a preponderance of the evidence. I adopted the fallback position of the plaintiffs. Id. at 123-25.

DISCUSSION

1. Stark

Stark holds, contrary to what the parties and the Court had assumed, that the proper focus of a Section 256 hearing is not on the intent of the named inventors. Instead, correction of inventorship under Section 256 “only requires an inquiry into the intent of the nonjoined inventor.” Stark, 119 F.3d at 1552 emphasis added. Section 256 “allows complete substitution of inventors as long as the true inventors are without deceptive intent.” Id. at 1556.

To the extent, the defendants allege deceptive conduct on the part of the named inventors, the Court is called upon to examine that claim under the “inequitable conduct” doctrine. Id. at 1555-1556. Under this doctrine, defendants bear the burden of proving deceptive intent by the named inventors by clear and convincing evidence. See Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550, 1556-57 (Fed.Cir.1995) (“The factual premises of materiality and intent must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”). As Stark points out, a patent may be held unenforceable under the inequitable conduct doctrine where any co-inventors have been omitted with evidence of deceptive intent on the part of the named inventors. See 119 F.3d at 1555-56 (citing Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1226 (Fed.Cir.1994)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 115 (requiring that an applicant for a parent “shall make oath that he believes himself to be the original and first inventor”).

With respect to Warner and Lloyd, the nonjoined and unnamed true co-inventors, exhaustive discovery has unearthed no hint of deceptive intent. The named inventors proffer none. Still, the straightforward, straightjacket task mandated in Stark — the inquiry into the intent of the nonjoined inventor(s) — is complicated by the fact that both Warner and Lloyd are probably es-topped from asserting an inventorship interest, as they have received notice of these proceedings, but declined to intervene. 1 See PerSeptive II at 88. Accordingly, I decline to order the patents to be corrected and instead simply hold, as suggested by PerSeptive, that they are correctable — subject to the claim of estoppel — because there is no evidence of deceptive intent on the part of the nonjoined inventors.

2. Inequitable Conduct

In light of Stark, the Court must reexamine the legal effect of its factual findings in PerSeptive II that defendants have proven by clear and convincing evidence that the named inventors made a series of misrepresentations to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). First, in the 117-page opinion, I concluded that the named inventors intentionally misrepresented their role in developing the perfusive particle and intentionally underplayed the role of Polymer Laboratories. Second, I concluded that defendants had demonstrated that the named inventors made four affirmative misrepresentations to the Parent Examiner regarding the timing of the invention. I *72 fully re-adopt all factual findings in PerSep-tive II. See id. at 88-122 & 125-131.

Even before Stark was decided, defendants had filed a motion for determination of inequitable conduct based on these factual findings. (Docket No.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

LaCourse v. Ocwen Loan Servicing
2015 DNH 077 (D. New Hampshire, 2015)
Cargill, Inc. v. Sears Petroleum & Transport Corp.
334 F. Supp. 2d 197 (N.D. New York, 2004)
PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc.
225 F.3d 1315 (Federal Circuit, 2000)
Perseptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech
225 F.3d 1315 (Federal Circuit, 2000)
Brasseler U.S.A., I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp.
93 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (S.D. Georgia, 1999)
J & J Manufacturing, Inc. v. Logan
24 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Texas, 1998)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
12 F. Supp. 2d 69, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2263, 1998 WL 206040, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perseptive-biosystems-inc-v-pharmacia-biotech-inc-mad-1998.