Perozeni v. Perozeni

2026 Ohio 185

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 22, 2026
• Docket: 114960
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Perozeni v. Perozeni, 2026-Ohio-185.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

ALICIA PEROZENI, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114960 v. :

RENE PEROZENI, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 22, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Case No. DR-20-383044

Appearances:

The Law Offices of LeeDaun C. Williams, LLC, and LeeDaun C. Williams, for appellee.

Kenneth R. Hurley, for appellant.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant Rene Perozeni (“Husband”) appeals the

Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Domestic Relations Division’s (the “trial

court”) judgment in this divorce action. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court and remand for the trial court to correct a clerical error in

the final divorce decree.

Procedural and Factual History

Husband and Alicia Perozeni (“Wife”) were married on September

22, 2007. Wife filed a complaint for divorce in October 2020, and Husband filed an

answer in November 2020. The couple had two minor children at the time of the

divorce.

In December 2021, Husband filed a notice of bankruptcy and a

motion to stay the proceedings, which the trial court granted. In the interim, the

parties participated in mediation and the trial court issued a temporary order for

child support and medical expenses not covered by insurance to be paid by Husband

to Wife. In May 2022, Husband filed a notice of discharge of bankruptcy.

In June 2022, Wife filed a motion to sell the marital residence and a

motion for attorney fees and litigation expenses. Husband filed a brief in opposition

to Wife’s motion to sell the marital residence. The trial court granted Wife’s motion.

Husband moved to vacate the order, which the trial court denied. Husband

appealed that decision. This court affirmed the trial court’s order in Perozeni v.

Perozeni, 2023-Ohio-1140 (8th Dist.). In June 2022, the trial court ordered both

parties to provide an accounting of any funds received from the couples’ home equity

line of credit (“HELOC”) attached to the marital residence.

In August 2022, Wife filed a motion to show cause for nonpayment of

temporary support. Wife filed a subsequent motion to show cause for nonpayment of support and a motion to modify temporary support in March 2023. Also, in

March 2023, Wife filed a motion to show cause for Husband’s failure to provide an

accounting of funds withdrawn from the HELOC.

In December 2023, a magistrate conducted a trial in this matter. At

the beginning of the proceeding, the parties presented stipulations to the magistrate.

Relevant to this appeal, the trial addressed the complaint and answer, Wife’s motion

for attorney fees, the two motions to show cause for nonpayment of temporary

support, the motion to modify temporary support, and the motion to show cause for

failure to comply with the court’s order regarding the HELOC. During the course of

the trial, Husband sought to introduce evidence that Wife had originally stipulated

that the marital property was separate property, but later withdrew the stipulation.

The magistrate refused to allow Husband to address the withdrawn stipulation.

After hearing the testimony at trial, the magistrate issued a ruling.

The magistrate found that the marital residence was wholly marital property,

renewed the order to sell the marital property, and found that each party was

entitled to half of the proceeds after payment of the mortgage. Additionally, the

magistrate determined that $40,000 that Husband withdrew from the HELOC was

wholly his responsibility and Wife was entitled to an additional $40,000 from the

sale of the marital residence. The magistrate further found that Husband was solely

responsible for a tax lien on the property incurred after Wife left the marital

residence. The magistrate partially granted Wife’s motion for attorney fees,

awarding $20,000 instead of the requested $40,000; granted Wife’s motion to show cause for nonpayment of temporary support, which Husband could purge by paying

Wife $2,543.90; and granted her motion to modify the temporary child support

order effective March 15, 2023.

Both parties filed objections to the magistrate’s decision and provided

a transcript for the trial court. Husband argued that the magistrate erred by: (1)

declaring the marital home wholly marital property; (2) increasing the amount of

temporary support and making it retroactive from March 2023; (3) holding him in

contempt of court for failure to pay temporary support; (4) declaring Husband solely

responsible for the past due real estate taxes; (5) ordering Husband to pay to Wife

an additional $40,000 from the proceeds of the sale of the marital home; (6)

imposing attorney fees; and (7) making Husband the obligor for the children’s

health care. Wife’s objections raised 18 issues, including the failure to divide taxes

owed during the marriage that were assessed solely in Wife’s name.

The trial court issued a journal entry overruling all but one of

Husband’s objections. The trial court found that the evidence did not establish

whether Husband had health insurance available to him but did establish that Wife

had private health insurance at a reasonable cost. Because of this, the trial court

ordered Wife to be designated as the health insurance obligor for the parties’ minor

children rather than Husband. Additionally, the trial court overruled all but one of

Wife’s objections, finding that the magistrate failed to address an error in the

couple’s 2021 tax returns that led to Wife owing federal taxes. The trial court found

that the debt should be split between the parties and determined that Husband’s share was $2,512.17. Aside from these findings, the trial court adopted the

magistrate’s decision in its entirety.

As it relates to Wife’s designation as the health insurance obligor, the

decision states, in pertinent part:

Plaintiff [Wife] is hereby designated as the health insurance obligor, and shall secure and maintain private health insurance for the children and shall hereafter be referred to as the health insurance obligor until further order of Court for the following reasons: the child support obligor already has health insurance coverage available for the children that is reasonable in cost.

(Emphasis added.)

However, the trial court designated Husband as the child support

obligor and found no evidence that addressed Husband having a health insurance

policy.

Husband appeals from this decision, assigning the following errors

for our review.

Assignment of Error No. 1

The trial court erred in its conclusion that the marital home was entirely marital property when the evidence showed that the land upon which it was built was owned by [Husband] prior to the marriage. That finding and order was an error of law and an abuse of discretion.

Assignment of Error No. 2

The trial court erred in awarding [Wife] an increase in temporary support effective as of March 15, 2023. That award was an error of law and an abuse of discretion. Assignment of Error No. 3

The trial court erred in finding [Husband] in contempt for failure to pay funds in accordance with the temporary support order. That finding and resultant orders were an error of law and abuse of discretion.

Assignment of Error No. 4

The trial court erred in ordering [Husband] to pay all of the parties’ past due real estate taxes on the marital home in the approximate amount of $27,475.96. Said order was an error of law and an abuse of discretion.

Assignment of Error No. 5

The trial court’s finding that [Husband] failed to account for $40,000 based upon an allegation that he took said sum from the parties’ credit line is an error of law and an abuse of discretion. The resulting order that he repay said sum to [Wife] from his share of anticipated sales proceeds is an abuse of discretion and an error of law.

Assignment of Error No. 6

The trial court’s finding and order that [Husband] should pay $20,000 of [Wife’s] attorney fees is an error of law and an abuse of discretion.

Assignment of Error No. 7

The Magistrate’s finding and order that [Husband] should pay 100 percent of the children’s health insurance costs is an abuse of discretion and an error of law.

Law and Analysis

Briefing Requirements

Preliminarily, we note that Wife argues that this court should

disregard Husband’s assignments of error because he failed to cite relevant case law

in support of his arguments. Wife’s argument has merit. Husband’s brief does not comport with the appellate rules in that he

did not include a list of issues presented for review with reference to the assignments

of error they address, did not include a statement of facts with citations to the record,

and, with the exception of one citation, did not support his arguments in any of the

assignments of error with citations to relevant case law. App.R. 12(A)(2); 16(A)(4),

(6), and (7). “An appellant is required to support its assignment of error with

citation to legal authority.”1 Jabr v. Burger King, 2022-Ohio-773, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.),

citing State v. Hubbard, 2013-Ohio-2735, ¶ 34 (10th Dist.), citing App.R. 16(A)(7)

and 12(A)(2).

“It is the duty of the appellant, not this [C]ourt, to demonstrate his assigned error through an argument that is supported by citations to legal authority and facts in the record. It is not the function of this [C]ourt to construct a foundation for [an appellant’s] claims; failure to comply with the rules governing practice in the appellate courts is a tactic which is ordinarily fatal.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted).

(Brackets in original.) First Communications, LLC v. Helms, 2016-Ohio-7586, ¶ 9

(9th Dist.), quoting Ohio Edison Co. v. Williams, 2007-Ohio-5028, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.).

Furthermore, a court of appeals may disregard any assigned error

that fails to comply with the appellate rules. App.R. 12(A)(2). Nevertheless, we are

mindful that to the extent possible it is better for appeals to be decided on the merits.

State v. Harris, 2020-Ohio-4138, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

1 Husband cites to one case in the third assignment of error, but only in a conclusory fashion to support his argument that inability to pay is a defense to a finding of contempt. Based on the foregoing, we decline to address Husband’s second

through sixth assignments of error because they each include conclusory statements

that the trial court erred and abused its discretion without citation to any case law

to establish the relevant standard of review, the applicable law, or how the trial

court’s decision contravened the law. While this is also true for the first and seventh

assignments of error, Husband’s brief is adequate enough for this court to address

his claims. Accordingly, we confine our review to Husband’s first and seventh

assignments of error.

Designation of Marital versus Separate Property

In the first assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court

erred when it found that the marital residence was wholly marital property, rejecting

Husband’s argument that he held a separate property interest in the marital

residence.

Standard of Review for Trial Court’s Adoption of Magistrate’s Decision

When a trial court reviews a magistrate’s decision, it does so de novo,

and thus ‘“must conduct an independent review of the facts and conclusions made

by the magistrate.”’ Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 2020-Ohio-5080, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.),

quoting Haupt v. Haupt, 2017-Ohio-2719, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.), citing Phillips v. Phillips,

2014-Ohio-5439, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.). In contrast, an appellate court generally reviews

a trial court’s ruling on the magistrate’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Glendell-

Grant v. Grant, 2018-Ohio-1094, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing Butcher v. Butcher, 2011-

Ohio-2550, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). Accordingly, we will only reverse the trial court’s decision if it is “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Id., citing Blakemore v.

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

Division of Property

There are several considerations in reviewing a trial court’s division

of property. Preliminarily, the trial court must determine what constitutes marital

property and what constitutes separate property before distributing property in a

divorce proceeding. Herrera v. Phil Wha Chung, 2021-Ohio-1728, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.),

citing Comella v. Comella, 2008-Ohio-6673, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.), citing

R.C. 3105.171(B). The determination of whether property is marital or separate is a

mixed question of law and fact and is reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-the-

evidence standard. Kobal v. Kobal, 2018-Ohio-1755, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.).

A court examining the manifest weight of the evidence “weighs the

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment]

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

387 (1997).

R.C. 3105.171 governs the division of property. Lichtenstein, 2020-

Ohio-5080, at ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). “Marital property” means, generally, property owned

by the parties together or separately that was acquired by either or both spouses

during the marriage. R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a). “Marital property” does not include

“separate property.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(b). “‘Property that is acquired during the marriage is presumed to be marital property unless it can be shown to be separate.’”

Lichtenstein at ¶ 21, quoting Ockunzzi v. Ockunzzi, 2006-Ohio-5741, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.).

Furthermore, “‘[t]he party seeking to have a particular asset classified as separate

property has the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to trace the

asset to separate property.’” Parker v. Parker, 2017-Ohio-78, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.), quoting

Fetzer v. Fetzer, 2014-Ohio-747, ¶ 24 (9th Dist.), quoting Eikenberry v. Eikenberry,

2010-Ohio-2944, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.).

The standard is different, however, when the property is a gift. Combs

v. Combs, 2019-Ohio-3685, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.). “Separate property” includes “[a]ny gift

of any real or personal property or of an interest in real or personal property that is

made after the date of the marriage and that is proven by clear and convincing

evidence to have been given to only one spouse.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vii). “‘Clear

and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof, which is more than a

mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is

required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in

the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

established.’” Lichtenstein at ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St.

469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. In order to establish that a gift is

separate property, the party claiming it must show that the property was “‘given with

the intent to provide a benefit to only one of the spouses.’” Chahdi v. Elhassan,

2019-Ohio-4472, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.), quoting Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2016-Ohio-4642,

¶ 15 (10th Dist.). Once the trial court determines what constitutes marital versus

separate property, the court must equally divide the property; however, “‘if an equal

division of property is inequitable, the court must divide the marital property

equitably.’” Herrera, 2021-Ohio-1728, at ¶ 36 (8th Dist.), quoting Neville v. Neville,

2003-Ohio-3624, ¶ 5, citing R.C. 3105.171(C)(1). We review the trial court’s division

of marital property for an abuse of discretion. Id., citing Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio

St.3d 142, 144 (1989).

In the instant case, Husband’s family business acquired the land

where the parties built the marital residence prior to the marriage. In 1995, the

property was transferred to Husband. The deed established that the transfer was

made for “valuable consideration shown.” Husband testified that he did not

remember purchasing the property, but that he did pay something for the property

at some point, though he was unsure when. Husband transferred the property to

his brother in 2002. Three months after the wedding in 2007, his brother

transferred the property back to Husband.

Husband claims that the transfer from his brother was a gift and

therefore, he has a separate property interest in the marital residence. Thus, he

argues that the trial court erred when it found the marital residence was wholly

marital property.

The only evidence presented at trial that the transfer was a gift was

Husband’s testimony. Wife did not know the nature of the transfer. She testified

that she only agreed to stipulate that the land was separate property because she did not know when the transfer took place. Once she learned that it occurred after the

wedding, she withdrew the stipulation. Furthermore, Husband testified that he paid

consideration for the property at some point. Even if Husband had been permitted

to cross-examine Wife regarding the stipulation or proffer the withdrawn

stipulation, it would not have established the property was a gift by clear and

convincing evidence. Furthermore, the fact that Husband paid some consideration

for the property conflicts with his testimony that his brother’s transfer was a gift.

Based on the foregoing, Husband failed to present clear and convincing evidence

that he received the land as a gift and it was solely for his benefit. Accordingly, the

trial court’s finding that the marital home was marital property was supported by

the greater weight of the evidence and the court did not abuse its discretion.

Designation of the Health Insurance Obligor

In the seventh assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial

court erred when it designated him the health insurance obligor for the children.

Wife concedes that the trial court erred in this regard.

The record reflects that the magistrate found that Husband should be

the health insurance obligor. Husband then objected to that finding. The trial court,

during its independent review of the magistrate’s decision, sustained Husband’s

objection, finding that Wife had private health care insurance and should be the

health insurance obligor. In its separate opinion establishing the divorce decree, the

trial court explicitly designated Wife as the health insurance obligor, but included

language that placed responsibility on the child support obligor, i.e., Husband. A trial court may correct clerical errors in its journal entry at any time.

State v. Wilson, 2016-Ohio-379, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Steinke, 2003-Ohio-

3527, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.). “The trial courts retain continuing jurisdiction to correct these

clerical errors in judgments with a nunc pro tunc entry to reflect what the court

actually decided.” Id., citing State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 2006-Ohio-5795, ¶ 18-

19. The trial court clearly intended to designate Wife as the health insurance obligor,

in both of its orders. However, by including the term “child support obligor” the

entry is inconsistent with that finding. Accordingly, we sustain Husband’s seventh

assignment of error.

Judgment affirmed, and case remanded for the trial court to issue a

nunc pro tunc entry reflecting the fact that the trial court sustained Husband’s

objection to his designation as the health insurance obligor and to reflect that Wife

is the health insurance obligor.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into

execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

__________________________________ EMANUELLA D. GROVES, PRESIDING JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and WILLIAM A. KLATT, J.,* CONCUR

(*Sitting by assignment: William A. Klatt, J., retired, of the Tenth District Court of Appeals.)