Perma Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co.

402 F. Supp. 881, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12899
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 11, 1975
Docket66 Civ. 665 KTD
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 402 F. Supp. 881 (Perma Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perma Research & Development Co. v. Singer Co., 402 F. Supp. 881, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12899 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

Opinion

OPINION

KEVIN THOMAS DUFFY, District Judge.

This case has had a long and tortured history. It was instituted on March 9, 1966, and the operative facts go back several years prior to that time. The trial spanned eight months and included many thousands of pages of exhibits.

Basically, it is a breach of contract action, plaintiff and defendant having entered into two contracts, one on June 18, 1964, the other on December 21, 1964. By judicial curtailment of the issues, only the breach of the December 21, 1964 contract was the subject of the trial but in order to put into perspective all of the claims, counterclaims and defenses of the parties it is necessary to review the negotiations leading to the June 18, 1964 contract, the relationship of the parties while operating thereunder, and particularly the knowledge gained by the defendant during the period starting with the negotiations leading to the June 18, 1964 contract and ending with the December 21, 1964 contract; and also the performance by the defendant under the December 21, 1964 contract.

Both contracts 1 involve an anti-skid device for automobiles invented by the president of the plaintiff, Frank Perrino (hereinafter “Perrino”); patented by him and the patents assigned first to the plaintiff corporation and thereafter pursuant to the December 21, 1964 contract to the defendant. It should be remembered that anti-skid devices for automobiles were not generally marketed prior to 1964, and that there is no attack whatsoever on the patents which underlie this suit.

This action started as one to set aside the December 21, 1964 contract and to enforce certain provisions of the June 18, 1964, contract. That complaint was dismissed by Judge Frederick vanPelt Bryan of this Court except that Judge Bryan found that a cause of action lay in the “Wherefore” clause of the complaint that the defendant may have not used its “best efforts to market and manufacture” the invention assigned to it under the December 21, 1964 contract. Civil No. 66-665 (S.D.N.Y., filed March 29, 1968), aff’d 410 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1969).

Thereafter, Judge MacMahon of this Court, in denying another motion for summary judgment, further delineated the issue of “best efforts” as follows:

“. . . we think that ‘best efforts’ here means that Singer was required to continue collaborating with Perma for a reasonable length of time in a good faith effort to solve the problems then preventing marketing of the product.”
“For example: (1) Did Singer use its best efforts for a reasonable time . to perfect the product under all the circumstances? (2) In view of the fact that the device was not ‘fail-safe,’ was Singer justified in abandoning the contract either because it was impossible to make the device ‘fail-safe’ or because it could not be made ‘fail-safe’ without unreasonable, unwarranted or impractical efforts and expenditures of time and money out of all proportion to engineering and economic realities?” 308 F.Supp. 743, 748-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)

While I defined the issues at the start of trial in a somewhat similar manner to that of Judge MacMahon, I permitted extraordinary latitude to the defense to prove all that it could and to make any arguments it wished as to its defenses and its counterclaim. Since the case was tried without a jury I permitted *885 certain evidence to be received which is of questionable probative value. All of this was done with a view that this trial would mark an end to this litigation.

In summary, I find for the plaintiff on the claim that was tried. I also find that the counterclaim advanced by defendant was totally sham as a matter of fact.

This opinion is to be considered findings and conclusions as required by Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I.

BACKGROUND OF THE PARTIES

Frank Perrino, although a person without formal engineering training, has been a “tinkerer” all his adult life. After being discharged from the Air Force, where he received training as a airplane mechanic, he returned to his native New England where he invented an accelerator brake and filed for a patent in 1959. An anti-skid control was part of this accelerator brake patent application. In 1962, a separate patent application was filed for the anti-skid invention. Thereafter, the anti-skid was separated into five patent applications representing different aspects of the device. These applications matured into five separate patents between 1966 and 1969 after the assignment of them to the defendant.

Perrino founded the plaintiff corporation, Perma Research & Development Company (hereinafter “Perma”) under Delaware law and has been its president at all relevant times. Perma has its principal place of business in North Attleboro, Mass.

The Singer Company (hereinafter “Singer”) is a New Jersey corporation with its headquarters in Rockefeller Center, New York, N. Y. While originally started as a manufacturer of sewing machines, it has become a widely diversified manufacturing concern. The 1965 annual report for the Singer Corporation shows sales of $980 million from manufacturing and sale of heating and air conditioning equipment, technical products, business machines and computers, and a variety of other devices, of course including sewing machines. During 1965 alone, Singer spent $18 million on its various research and development activities.

Both parties acknowledge that this Court has jurisdiction over this action based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U. S.C. § 1332.

II.

BACKGROUND TO THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE JUNE 18, 1964 CONTRACT

After the invention of the accelerator brake and the recognition that the anti-skid control could be separated from it, Perrino tried to interest various people in the automotive industry in the devices. Of particular note is the fact that he took the anti-skid device to the Bendix Corporation in 1960, where it was considered by Stanley I. MacDuff, who tested it once by driving it home and who recommended that Bendix decline any interest in the device. (As we will see later, this was the same Stanley I. MacDuff whom the defendant Singer employed as an expert when it became apparent that this case would go to trial and who was permitted to give “expert” testimony at trial). Perrino, on behalf of Perma, was apparently unable to interest anyone in the anti-skid device but continued working on it at North Attleboro, Mass.

Perma also arranged to have tests made of its anti-skid device by certain automotive companies and by the Motor Vehicle Research of New Hampshire (hereinafter “M.V.R.N.H.”), apparently a private organization owned by one Andrew White. M.V.R.N.H. agreed to do the testing for a portion of the capital stock of Perma and White became a member of the Board of Directors of Perma. M.V.R.N.H., thereafter, issued a glowing report on the Perma anti-skid device.

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Bluebook (online)
402 F. Supp. 881, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12899, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perma-research-development-co-v-singer-co-nysd-1975.