UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
CHANCE WILLIAM PERKINS,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-845
v. Honorable Jane M. Beckering
CARSON CITY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al.,
Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint as frivolous because it is duplicative of a pending action that Plaintiff previously filed in this Court. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City, Montcalm County, Michigan, which is where the events about which he complains occurred. Plaintiff sues DRF itself, as well as DRF Officers C. Townsend and D. Leik in their official and personal capacities. (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.2–3.) Plaintiff’s complaint is scant. Plaintiff alleges that on June 6, 2025, Defendant Townsend ordered that Plaintiff be assaulted by another inmate, and that Defendant Leik refused Plaintiff protection. (Id., PageID.5.) Plaintiff sets forth that the actual assault occurred on June 9, 2025. (Id.) He suggests that the refusal of protection amounted to an equal protection violation. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he received injuries to his face, head, stomach, and ribs, and did not receive medical attention. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that he is “now scared for [his] safety and life at the facility.” (Id.) Based upon the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to assert a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims as well as Eighth Amendment failure to protect/interference with personal safety claims. Plaintiff seeks damages and also requests that legal action be taken
against the appropriate parties. (Id.) The events of which Plaintiff complains in the present action are already the subject of another action that Plaintiff filed in this Court, which remains pending: Perkins v. Carson City Correctional Facility et al., No. 1:25-cv-808 (W.D. Mich. 2025), wherein Plaintiff sues DRF and DRF Officers Townsend and Leik, and presents claims regarding the incidents noted above. Duplicative Filing Plaintiffs generally have “no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendants.” Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). Accordingly, as part of its inherent power to administer its docket, a district court may dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another federal court suit. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); Missouri v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 259 F.3d 949, 953–54 (8th Cir. 2001); Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2000); Smith v. SEC, 129 F.3d 356, 361
(6th Cir. 1997). The power to dismiss a duplicative lawsuit is meant to foster judicial economy and the “comprehensive disposition of litigation,” Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952), and protect parties from “the vexation of concurrent litigation over the same subject matter.” Adam v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1991). In addition, courts have held that a complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims may be dismissed on PLRA screening as frivolous or malicious. See, e.g., McWilliams v. State of Colo., 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed as frivolous or malicious); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that an action may be dismissed as frivolous
when the complaint “merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims” (citations omitted)); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994–95 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that it is “malicious” to file a lawsuit that duplicates allegations of another pending federal lawsuit by the same plaintiff); Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that it was appropriate to dismiss a civil rights suit by a prison inmate where the suit was duplicative of facts and allegations made in a previously dismissed suit, and merely named a different defendant whose actions formed a partial basis for the previous suit); Hahn v. Tarnow, No. 06-cv-12814, 2006 WL 2160934, at *3–7 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2006). A complaint is duplicative and subject to dismissal if the claims, parties, and available relief do not significantly differ from an earlier-filed action. See Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993). Although complaints may not “significantly differ,” they need not be identical. Courts focus on the substance of the complaint. See, e.g., Bailey, 846 F.2d at 1021 (holding that a complaint was duplicative although different defendants were named because it
“repeat[ed] the same factual allegations” asserted in the earlier case). Here, Plaintiff’s claims against DRF and DRF Officers Townsend and Leik, as set forth in the complaint in this action, are also presented in Plaintiff’s previously filed action, Perkins v. Carson City Correctional Facility et al., No. 1:25-cv-808, which remains pending in this Court. Considering that the legal claims and factual allegations in the present action and prior action are identical, the Court concludes that the present complaint is duplicative of Plaintiff’s prior complaint with regard to all of Plaintiff’s present claims. Therefore, pursuant to the Court’s inherent power and the screening provisions of the PLRA, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed on the grounds that it is wholly duplicative and, therefore, frivolous.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
CHANCE WILLIAM PERKINS,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-845
v. Honorable Jane M. Beckering
CARSON CITY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al.,
Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint as frivolous because it is duplicative of a pending action that Plaintiff previously filed in this Court. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City, Montcalm County, Michigan, which is where the events about which he complains occurred. Plaintiff sues DRF itself, as well as DRF Officers C. Townsend and D. Leik in their official and personal capacities. (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.2–3.) Plaintiff’s complaint is scant. Plaintiff alleges that on June 6, 2025, Defendant Townsend ordered that Plaintiff be assaulted by another inmate, and that Defendant Leik refused Plaintiff protection. (Id., PageID.5.) Plaintiff sets forth that the actual assault occurred on June 9, 2025. (Id.) He suggests that the refusal of protection amounted to an equal protection violation. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he received injuries to his face, head, stomach, and ribs, and did not receive medical attention. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that he is “now scared for [his] safety and life at the facility.” (Id.) Based upon the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to assert a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims as well as Eighth Amendment failure to protect/interference with personal safety claims. Plaintiff seeks damages and also requests that legal action be taken
against the appropriate parties. (Id.) The events of which Plaintiff complains in the present action are already the subject of another action that Plaintiff filed in this Court, which remains pending: Perkins v. Carson City Correctional Facility et al., No. 1:25-cv-808 (W.D. Mich. 2025), wherein Plaintiff sues DRF and DRF Officers Townsend and Leik, and presents claims regarding the incidents noted above. Duplicative Filing Plaintiffs generally have “no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendants.” Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). Accordingly, as part of its inherent power to administer its docket, a district court may dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another federal court suit. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); Missouri v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 259 F.3d 949, 953–54 (8th Cir. 2001); Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2000); Smith v. SEC, 129 F.3d 356, 361
(6th Cir. 1997). The power to dismiss a duplicative lawsuit is meant to foster judicial economy and the “comprehensive disposition of litigation,” Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952), and protect parties from “the vexation of concurrent litigation over the same subject matter.” Adam v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1991). In addition, courts have held that a complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims may be dismissed on PLRA screening as frivolous or malicious. See, e.g., McWilliams v. State of Colo., 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed as frivolous or malicious); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that an action may be dismissed as frivolous
when the complaint “merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims” (citations omitted)); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994–95 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that it is “malicious” to file a lawsuit that duplicates allegations of another pending federal lawsuit by the same plaintiff); Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that it was appropriate to dismiss a civil rights suit by a prison inmate where the suit was duplicative of facts and allegations made in a previously dismissed suit, and merely named a different defendant whose actions formed a partial basis for the previous suit); Hahn v. Tarnow, No. 06-cv-12814, 2006 WL 2160934, at *3–7 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2006). A complaint is duplicative and subject to dismissal if the claims, parties, and available relief do not significantly differ from an earlier-filed action. See Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993). Although complaints may not “significantly differ,” they need not be identical. Courts focus on the substance of the complaint. See, e.g., Bailey, 846 F.2d at 1021 (holding that a complaint was duplicative although different defendants were named because it
“repeat[ed] the same factual allegations” asserted in the earlier case). Here, Plaintiff’s claims against DRF and DRF Officers Townsend and Leik, as set forth in the complaint in this action, are also presented in Plaintiff’s previously filed action, Perkins v. Carson City Correctional Facility et al., No. 1:25-cv-808, which remains pending in this Court. Considering that the legal claims and factual allegations in the present action and prior action are identical, the Court concludes that the present complaint is duplicative of Plaintiff’s prior complaint with regard to all of Plaintiff’s present claims. Therefore, pursuant to the Court’s inherent power and the screening provisions of the PLRA, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed on the grounds that it is wholly duplicative and, therefore, frivolous.
Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: August 29, 2025 /s/ Jane M. Beckering Jane M. Beckering United States District Judge