UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
CHANCE WILLIAM PERKINS,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-808
v. Honorable Phillip J. Green
CARSON CITY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al.,
Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in
litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That
is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty.
Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may
conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they
were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim
against Defendant Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s equal protection claims against Defendants Townsend and Leik. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Townsend and Leik remain in the case. Discussion I. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City, Montcalm County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the Carson City Correctional Facility in its official capacity. Plaintiff also sues Corrections Officer C. Townsend and Unit Counselor D. Leik in their official and personal capacities. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff alleges that on June 6, 2025, Defendant Townsend ordered another
inmate to assault Plaintiff because of a grievance Plaintiff had written on Defendant Townsend for failing to protect him and for violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Leik, stating that he was in danger and requesting protection “under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Act.” (Id.) On June 9, 2025, between seven and eight in the morning, Plaintiff was forced inside of Cell #75 and was assaulted multiple times in the head, neck, and ribs by the inmate that Defendant Townsend had ordered to assault Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff
states that this occurred because staff at DRF failed to place him in protective custody when he requested protection. (Id.) Plaintiff attaches copies of grievances regarding the attack as exhibits to his complaint. (ECF No. 1-1.) In his step I grievances, he asserts that Defendant Townsend paid an inmate to assault him and that when he requested protection, Defendant Leik told Plaintiff to “f**k off” and that he hoped Plaintiff would “get stabbed.” (Id., PageID.10–11.) In a step I grievance response dated June 29, 2025,
the respondent notes that staff observed prisoner Smallwood #276394 force open cell 75 and enter it. When officers arrived, they observed that prisoner Smallwood was striking Plaintiff in the head and neck area. Prisoner Smallwood did not comply with orders to cease, so a chemical agent was used to gain compliance. Prisoner Smallwood and Plaintiff were evaluated and both denied having injuries and refused to be seen by Healthcare. (Id., PageID.9.)
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff also expresses his desire to press charges against the prisoner who attacked him. II. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well- pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A. Charges Against the Attacking Inmate Plaintiff asks the Court to exercise its equitable powers to compel the criminal
prosecution of the prisoner who attacked Plaintiff. In Napier v. Baron, No. 98-4310, 1999 WL 1045169 (6th Cir. Nov. 9, 1999), Plaintiff Napier sought the criminal prosecution of an inmate who attack Napier. The Sixth Circuit explained that he requested relief was not available, stating that a plaintiff “does not have a constitutional right to have a particular person criminally charged and prosecuted[; w]hether to prosecute is a decision that lies within a prosecutor’s discretion.” 1999
WL 1045169, at *1 (citing United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 529–30 (6ht Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for that relief will be dismissed because he has not stated any claim on which that relief may be granted. B. Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) Plaintiff’s names DRF as a Defendant in this case. An express requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is that the defendant be a “person.” See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). DRF is an administrative unit of the Michigan
Department of Corrections. Neither a prison nor a state corrections department is a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). See also Anderson v. Morgan Cnty. Corr. Complex, No. 15-6344, 2016 WL 9402910, *1 (6th Cir. Sep. 21, 2016) (ruling that a state prison and its “medical staff” were not subject to suit under § 1983); Parker v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 65 F. App'x 922, 923 (6th Cir. 2003). Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint against DRF must be dismissed as frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. C. Official Capacity Claims Plaintiff sues the individual Defendants in their official capacities. (Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). And, regardless, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535
U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66). Here, other than the failed request for an order compelling a criminal prosecution, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages only. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) However, as noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See, e.g., Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617. Similarly, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state an official capacity claim against any
Defendant upon which relief the monetary relief he requests may be granted. Accordingly, his official capacity claims against Defendants will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. D. Equal Protection Although Plaintiff states that his “right to Equal Protection was denied,” he does not assert that he was treated differently than any other similarly situated person. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). A state practice generally will not require strict scrutiny unless it interferes with a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class of individuals. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). Plaintiff does not allege that a fundamental right is implicated in this case
or that he is a member of a suspect class; his claims therefore are not subjected to strict scrutiny. To prove an equal protection claim in a class-of-one case, Plaintiff must demonstrate “intentional and arbitrary discrimination” by the state; that is, he must demonstrate that he “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1992); United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 651 (6th Cir. 2011). “‘[T]he hallmark of [a “class-of-one”] claim is not the allegation that one individual was
singled out, but rather, the allegation of arbitrary or malicious treatment not based on membership in a disfavored class.’” Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis removed) (quoting Aldridge v. City of Memphis, 404 F. App’x 29, 42 (6th Cir. 2010)); see also Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The ‘class of one’ theory . . . is unusual because the plaintiff in a ‘class of one’ case does not allege that the defendants discriminate against a group with whom she shares characteristics, but rather that the defendants simply harbor
animus against her in particular and therefore treated her arbitrarily.”) (emphasis in original). A plaintiff “must overcome a ‘heavy burden’ to prevail based on the class- of-one theory.” Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 462 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, Hamilton Cnty., 430 F.3d 783, 791 (6th Cir. 2005)). “Unless carefully circumscribed, the concept of a class-of-one equal protection claim could effectively provide a federal cause of action for review of almost every
executive and administrative decision made by state actors.” Loesel, 692 F.3d at 462 (quoting Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1210–11 (10th Cir. 2004)). The threshold element of an equal protection claim is disparate treatment. Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006). “‘Similarly situated’ is a term of art—a comparator . . . must be similar in ‘all relevant respects.’” Paterek v. Vill. of Armada, 801 F.3d 630, 650 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 651 (6th Cir. 2011)); see also Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10; Tree of Life Christian Sch. v. City of Upper Arlington, 905 F.3d 357, 368 (6th Cir. 2018) (“A plaintiff bringing an equal protection claim must be ‘similarly
situated’ to a comparator in ‘all relevant respects.’”). In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that he was treated differently than another similarly situated individual but merely makes a conclusory assertion that his equal protection rights were violated. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protection claims.
E. Eighth Amendment The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The
deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. “Routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)
(quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). Plaintiff contends that Defendant Leik violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him from anticipated prisoner assaults. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Townsend violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by deploying excessive force against Plaintiff through the attack by Prisoner Smallwood. 1. Failure to Protect Among the protections of the Eighth Amendment, inmates have a
constitutionally protected right to personal safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Prison staff are obliged “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in their care. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). Nevertheless, “[a]lthough ‘prison officials have a duty [under the Eighth Amendment] to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners,’ it is equally clear that not ‘every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials.’” Reedy v. West, 988 F.3d 907, 912 (6th
Cir. 2021) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833–34 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). In order to state a failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he “objectively” was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, and (2) that the official acted with “deliberate indifference” to inmate safety, “meaning the official was ‘subjectively aware of the risk’ and ‘fail[ed] to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” Reedy, 2021 WL 710909, at *3 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 834, 847; see also Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 293–94 (6th Cir. 2004) (addressing whether knowing placement of a small, transgender female in a unit with a known predatory inmate
amounted to deliberate indifference). In establishing the objective prong, although a prisoner does not need to prove that he has been the victim of an actual attack to bring a personal-safety claim, he must at least establish that he reasonably fears such an attack. Thompson v. Cty. of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 242–43 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff has the minimal burden of “showing a sufficient inferential connection” between the alleged violation and inmate violence to “justify a reasonable fear for personal safety.”)
Plaintiff’s factual allegations, accepted as true, permit the inferences that Plaintiff was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that Defendant Leik was aware of that risk but took no action to abate it. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendant Leik. 2. Excessive Force As noted above, the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the
Eighth Amendment. Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are “totally without penological justification.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “On occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under common law.’” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)). There is an objective component and a subjective component to this type of
Eighth Amendment claim. Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison officials.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). “The objective component requires a “contextual” investigation that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Although the extent of a prisoner’s injury may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official, it is not dispositive of whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically
use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, as is required at this stage, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim excessive force claim against Defendant Townsend on screening. Conclusion The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Defendant Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) will be dismissed
for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s request for equitable relief and Plaintiff official capacity claims and equal protection claims against Defendants Townsend and Leik. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Townsend and Leik remain in the case. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: August 18, 2025 /s/ Phillip J. Green PHILLIP J. GREEN United States Magistrate Judge