2025 IL App (1st) 240351-U
FOURTH DIVISION Order filed: May 15, 2025
No. 1-24-0351
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 06 CR 10291 ) LARRY WILLIAMSON, ) Honorable ) Charles P. Burns, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s denial of the defendant’s successive petition for postconviction relief raising a claim of actual innocence was manifestly erroneous when newly discovered evidence contradicted the State’s evidence of guilt at trial and identified someone other than the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense for which the defendant was convicted.
¶2 Following a third-stage evidentiary hearing, the defendant, Larry Williamson, appeals the
denial of his successive petition for postconviction relief filed under the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). In the petition, the defendant raised a claim of No. 1-24-0351
actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence from a previously unidentified witness who
averred that he would testify that someone other than the defendant committed the murder for
which the defendant was convicted. After the third-stage hearing, the circuit court found that the
defendant had failed to demonstrate that the new evidence was material, noncumulative, and
conclusive. Because the circuit court’s rulings on those issues conflict with determinations that
this court made in a prior appeal involving the defendant’s petition, as well as supreme court
precedent, we reverse the denial of the defendant’s petition, vacate his conviction, and remand the
cause to the circuit court for a new trial.
¶3 The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting death of Dimitri
Wilson. The evidence adduced at trial generally established that, at approximately 8:30 p.m. on
June 6, 2005, Wilson was shot and killed near the corner of 75th Street and Colfax Avenue after
engaging in an argument with an individual. The evidence specifically implicating the defendant
consisted entirely of prior statements and grand jury testimony from three witnesses who each
recanted their respective pre-trial accounts at the defendant’s trial. No physical evidence linked
the defendant to the murder.
¶4 At trial, Herman Fordman testified that he rode his bicycle to a liquor store at 75th Street
and Colfax Avenue on the evening of the shooting. According to Fordman, many people were out
that night, and there was a lot of traffic on 75th Street. He was leaving the store at approximately
8:30 p.m. when he observed a verbal altercation between two people. As he was riding westbound
on 75th Street, he heard three gunshots coming from behind him. Fordman testified that he did not
know the people who were involved in the altercation, and he did not see from where the shots had
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been fired. After hearing the gunshots, Fordman continued riding his bicycle to his grandmother’s
house.
¶5 The following day, Fordman was arrested on a drug charge. While at the police station, the
detectives asked him about the shooting and showed him an array of six photographs, which
included pictures of the defendant and Wilson. From those photos, Fordman identified the
defendant and Wilson as the individuals involved in the altercation, but he did not know either of
them at the time. Fordman further testified that, after identifying the defendant, he was released
without being charged with the drug offense. Fordman stated that he never saw the defendant with
a gun and never saw him shoot Wilson.
¶6 Fordman acknowledged that in January 2006, he was brought back to the police station and
signed a written statement taken by Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) James Murphy. In that
statement, Fordman indicated that he knew both Wilson and the defendant from the neighborhood,
but he did not know their names. According to Fordman’s statement, at about 8:30 p.m. on June
6, 2005, he left the liquor store located at 75th Street and Colfax Avenue and then saw Wilson
arguing with the defendant. Fordman’s statement further indicated that he looked back as he was
riding away because he thought the men might fight. He saw Wilson put his hands up in front of
his face and heard gunshots. According to his statement, Fordman did not see a gun, but he did see
flashes come from where the defendant was standing. Fordman’s written statement also
acknowledged that he was giving the statement freely and voluntarily and that no threats or
promises were made to him in exchange for his statement.
¶7 When questioned about his written statement at trial, Fordman admitted that he signed the
bottom of each page of the statement, initialed certain corrections, and signed the photographs of
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Wilson and the defendant, which were attached to the statement as exhibits. He testified, however,
that he did not read the statement before signing it. He also denied that he told the ASA the
information that was contained in the statement and denied that no threats or promises were made
in return for his statement. Fordman admitted that he was subsequently convicted of a narcotics
offense and that, at the time of trial, he was serving a four-year sentence for that conviction.
¶8 ASA Murphy testified that, on January 26, 2006, he interviewed Fordman, who gave an
oral statement describing the events he witnessed on the night of the shooting. Fordman later
agreed to have his statement memorialized in writing. Murphy testified that he asked Fordman
questions about the shooting and wrote a summary of Fordman’s answers. At trial, Murphy
recounted the substance of the written statement and testified that Fordman reviewed the
completed document before signing each page, including the photographs of Wilson and the
defendant. Murphy further testified that Fordman expressly agreed that no threats or promises were
made in exchange for the statement and that it was made freely and voluntarily.
¶9 Donald Epps testified that he had known both Wilson and the defendant for more than 10
years. According to Epps, he was standing in the doorway of the liquor store at 75th Street and
Colfax Avenue when he saw Wilson pull up in his Cadillac and say something as he approached a
group of people that included the defendant. Epps stated that he then heard gunshots and saw
Wilson on the ground. He did not see anything else because, when the shots were fired, he ran
away with everyone else who was on the street. In addition, Epps stated that he had been drinking
alcohol and smoking marijuana that night and that he was standing across the street from where
the shooting occurred. Epps also acknowledged that he has no vision in his left eye.
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¶ 10 Epps further testified that he was arrested on a drug charge on December 18, 2005, and
was interviewed by ASA Kim Ward at the police station. Epps acknowledged that, following the
interview, Ward asked him a series of questions and wrote down his answers. Epps further
admitted that he signed the written statement prepared by Ward and subsequently testified before
the grand jury. Epps’ written statement and his grand jury testimony indicated that he saw Wilson
pull up in his Cadillac, approach the defendant, and ask the defendant if he wanted to “box,” which
meant to fist fight. Wilson, who was standing approximately five feet from the defendant, started
to back away and turn around when the defendant shot at him about six times. Wilson began to
run but then fell and tried to crawl back to his car. The defendant ran to a van and drove off with
his girlfriend. In his written statement, Epps acknowledged that he had been arrested for a drug
offense, and he stated that no threats or promises had been made regarding that case to induce him
to make the statement, which was given freely and voluntarily. In addition, Epps testified before
the grand jury that he had not been threatened or promised anything in exchange for his testimony.
¶ 11 At trial, Epps identified the written statement he gave to ASA Ward and admitted that his
signature appeared on each page. He also admitted that he had identified a photograph of the
defendant as the person who shot Wilson and that he signed that photograph, which was attached
as an exhibit to his written statement. Yet, when questioned about the substance of his written
statement and his grand jury testimony, Epps denied that the information contained in his prior
statements was true. According to Epps, ASA Ward told him that she would “drop” the drug charge
if he signed a statement inculpating the defendant, but she later reneged on her promise, and the
drug charge was not dismissed. Epps stated that he was convicted of that drug offense and
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sentenced to a term of probation. In addition, he was simultaneously convicted on a separate
narcotics charge and sentenced to a prison term of four years.
¶ 12 Jennifer Jackson testified that the defendant was her former boyfriend and the father of her
four-year-old daughter. Though the two had broken off their relationship in early May 2005 and
were no longer dating at the time of the shooting, they continued to see each other when the
defendant visited with their daughter. Jennifer testified that, at about 4:30 p.m. on June 6, 2005,
she was at a store located at 75th Street and Colfax Avenue. She was accompanied by her two
daughters, her sister, her brother, and two of her cousins. Jennifer stated that, as they were leaving
the store, she heard several gunshots. Upon hearing the gunfire, she immediately ran home along
with her daughters. Jennifer denied seeing the defendant in the vicinity of the shooting when she
heard the gunshots, and she stated that she did not know who fired the shots. She also denied that
the shooting had occurred during the evening hours and stated that she was at home at 8:30 p.m.
that night.
¶ 13 Jennifer further testified that in April 2006, she was 21 years old and was six months
pregnant with the child of a former boyfriend, not the defendant. According to Jennifer, the police
came to her house on April 1, 2006, and left a card with her brother. When she called the telephone
number on the card later that night, a police officer asked whether she would come to the station
and pick up some of the defendant’s things because he had been arrested the previous day. She
agreed, and an officer picked her up at about 11 p.m. Jennifer stated that she was at the police
station for approximately five hours and was periodically questioned about the shooting. Jennifer
testified that she did not know Wilson and learned his identity from the detectives who showed
her his picture while they were questioning her. In addition, Jennifer repeatedly testified that she
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initially told the detectives that she had not witnessed the shooting. She acknowledged, however,
that she later signed a written statement and gave testimony before the grand jury, both of which
implicated the defendant in the shooting.
¶ 14 Jennifer’s written statement was taken by ASA Michael Clarke and indicated that, on June
6, 2005, she was at 75th Street and Colfax Avenue, where she saw the defendant standing outside
of the post office. She also saw a man, whom she later learned was Wilson, walking on 75th Street.
According to Jennifer’s written statement, she saw Wilson walk to his car and make a motion like
he was getting something, but she could not see what it was. She did not see Wilson holding
anything, but one of his hands was at his waist when he and the defendant greeted each other by
saying “[w]hat’s up.” Jennifer’s statement further indicated that she began to walk away and then
heard five or six gunshots coming from where Wilson and the defendant were standing. According
to her statement, Jennifer did not see who fired the shots, but she looked back briefly and saw
Wilson on the ground. She did not see anything in Wilson’s hand when he was lying on the ground.
Jennifer’s written statement also indicated that, after the shooting, she had a conversation with the
defendant in which he said that he wished it had never happened and he wished that Wilson was
never out there that day. According to Jennifer’s statement, the defendant told her that he knew he
would have to face Wilson someday, but he wished it wasn’t a situation in which Wilson’s life
was taken. Jennifer’s statement also indicated that, during this conversation, the defendant was
upset and crying and said that his life was pretty much over because of what he had done to Wilson.
Attached to Jennifer’s statement was a photograph of Wilson as well as a photograph of herself
that was taken when she signed her statement.
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¶ 15 Jennifer’s grand jury testimony relayed substantially the same facts as those set forth in her
written statement, but also indicated that she was in the vicinity of the shooting during the evening
hours of June 6, 2005, when she saw Wilson, whom she described as “the one who [the defendant]
had gotten into it,” get something from his car and then walk toward the defendant. Jennifer also
testified before the grand jury that “there was some type of fight going on between [the defendant]
and [Wilson].” Jennifer testified that, after the shooting, she continued walking home because, by
that time, detectives had already pulled up. During her grand jury testimony, Jennifer recognized
and identified the handwritten statement that she had given to ASA Clarke, including the
photograph of Wilson, which was attached as an exhibit to the statement. Jennifer testified that she
had reviewed and signed each page of the statement and was given an opportunity to make any
necessary corrections. Jennifer specifically denied that she was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol when she made the statement. She also stated that no threats or promises were made to
induce her to give the written statement, and she stated that ASA Clarke had treated her “[l]ike a
regular person.” Jennifer further stated that she was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol
at the time of her grand jury testimony and that no one had made any threats or promises to her
that day.
¶ 16 When questioned at trial about the content of her written statement, Jennifer testified that
she made up a story implicating the defendant in the shooting and signed the statement so that she
would be able to leave the police station. Jennifer admitted telling Clarke that she was not under
the influence of alcohol or drugs when she gave the statement and that it was given freely and
voluntarily. Jennifer acknowledged that a photograph of Wilson was attached to her statement and
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that she had identified him as the man who was shot on June 6, 2005. However, she denied ever
seeing or affixing her signature to the photograph of herself that was attached to the statement.
¶ 17 Jennifer was also questioned about the substance of her testimony before the grand jury.
Jennifer acknowledged that she was under oath when she appeared before the grand jury and
answered questions posed by ASA Diana Garcia-Camilo. Jennifer further stated that Garcia-
Camilo interviewed her before they went into the grand jury room and that she told Garcia-Camilo
that she had been threatened by the police detectives prior to giving her written statement. With
few exceptions, Jennifer stated that she could not remember what she had said during the grand
jury proceedings.
¶ 18 Jennifer testified that her prior written statement and grand jury testimony were not true.
She claimed that, when she told the police that she had not seen the shooting, they accused her of
lying and threatened to take her children away, to charge her as an accessory to murder, and to
force her to have her baby in jail if she did not change her story and sign a statement inculpating
the defendant. Jennifer testified that she made up the story that was contained in her written
statement to avoid being charged in connection with the shooting, and she told the same story
during the grand jury proceedings. She further stated that, during the three days between her
written statement and her grand jury testimony, the police repeatedly came to her house and
threatened to cut off her public aid and to call the Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) if she did not testify.
¶ 19 Jennifer stated that she told ASA Clarke and ASA Garcia-Camilo that she had been
threatened by the police detectives, but both responded that the detectives’ comments were not
threats. Jennifer also testified that she told the grand jury that the police had threatened her. The
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defendant attempted to introduce a prior statement by Jennifer to defense counsel, which related
to her grand jury testimony, but the trial court sustained the prosecution’s objection to its
admission.
¶ 20 ASA Clarke testified that, on April 2, 2006, he spoke with Jennifer for approximately 30
minutes. According to Clarke, Jennifer was calm and cooperative during the interview, and she
gave an oral statement describing the events she witnessed on the night of the shooting. Jennifer
later agreed to have her statement documented in writing. Jennifer then repeated what she had told
him during the oral statement, and he wrote it down as she spoke. Clarke testified as to the
substance of Jennifer’s written statement. When it was complete, he read the entire statement to
Jennifer and asked her whether she wanted to make any changes. Jennifer responded that the
statement was accurate, and she signed the bottom of each page, as well as the photograph taken
of her at the time the statement was given.
¶ 21 Clarke further testified that, while he was alone with Jennifer and before he recorded her
written statement, he asked her how she had been treated by the police and whether she had been
threatened or promised anything in exchange for her statement. Jennifer answered that she had
been treated “fine” and that no one had threatened her or told her what to say to him. Clarke
specifically denied that Jennifer told him the detectives had threatened to take her children away
from her and had threatened to arrest her as an accessory to the murder, thereby forcing her to have
her baby in jail.
¶ 22 ASA Garcia-Camilo testified that, on April 6, 2006, she interviewed Jennifer for about 40
minutes and later presented her as a witness before the grand jury. According to Garcia-Camilo,
Jennifer was cooperative, and she never said that she had been threatened by police detectives.
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Garcia-Camilo particularly denied that Jennifer told her the detectives had threatened to contact
DCFS, take her child away from her, or charge her with a crime. Garcia-Camilo recounted the
substance of Jennifer’s testimony before the grand jury. In addition, Garcia-Camilo testified that,
during the grand jury proceedings, she showed Jennifer a photocopy of her prior handwritten
statement, and Jennifer recognized the document as the statement she had given to ASA Clarke.
Garcia-Camilo identified the transcript of Jennifer’s appearance before the grand jury and stated
that it contained Jennifer’s full testimony during those proceedings. Garcia-Camilo further stated
that, when Jennifer testified before the grand jury, she never mentioned that she had been
threatened by the police.
¶ 23 The written statements by Jennifer, Epps, and Fordman and a transcript of Jennifer’s grand
jury testimony were admitted as substantive evidence pursuant to section 115-10.1 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 2004)). The defendant did not raise any
objection to the admission of this evidence.
¶ 24 The defendant testified on his own behalf, stating that, at the time of the shooting, he was
talking with a group of people on the comer of 75th Street and Colfax Avenue. Just before the
shooting, he saw a man approach a nearby group of about five other men. The man and one member
of the group got into argument and “squared off’ like they were going to “box.” The defendant
then heard gunshots and ran from the scene along with everyone else. He did not see the shooting
and did not see who got shot. The defendant admitted that he knew Epps and that he owned a van
in June 2005. However, he denied knowing Wilson and also denied seeing either Epps or Jennifer
in the vicinity of the shooting. Finally, the defendant admitted that he continued to talk to Jennifer,
and he stated that she was someone whom he trusted and in whom he confided.
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¶ 25 The jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder and also found that he had
personally discharged the firearm that proximately caused Wilson’s death. Upon consideration of
the evidence and arguments in aggravation and mitigation, the court sentenced the defendant to a
term of 48 years in prison.
¶ 26 On direct appeal, we affirmed the defendant’s conviction and remanded for a correction to
the mittimus. See People v. Williamson, No. 1-08-0238 (2009) (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23) (Williamson I). We also affirmed the second-stage dismissal of the defendant’s
initial petition for postconviction relief, in which the defendant claimed that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by not calling a man named Vincent Davidson to testify at his trial.
See People v. Williamson, 2015 IL App (1st) 130932-U (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23) (Williamson II).
¶ 27 In May 2016, the defendant requested leave to file a successive petition for postconviction
relief alleging actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence from two witnesses, Michael
Berry and Jeffrey Fields, who each alleged that the defendant was not the shooter. While that
request was pending, the defendant filed a second request to file a successive postconviction
petition in June 2017. In that proposed petition, the defendant again raised a claim of actual
innocence based on newly discovered evidence, this time from a witness named Spencer Jackson,
who does not appear to bear any relation to Jennifer Jackson. In an affidavit, Spencer alleged that
he had witnessed the shooting of Wilson and that the shooter was not the defendant but instead a
“light skin, slim black guy” with a tattoo under his eye. According to Spencer’s affidavit, the man
approached Spencer, asked Spencer if he was selling weed, and then told Spencer that he was
looking for Wilson because Wilson had sold him some weed earlier that day that was laced with
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PCP and he wanted his money back. While the unknown man and Spencer were talking, Wilson
pulled up in his Cadillac and walked toward a crowd of people. The man saw Wilson and started
to approach him. The man and Wilson began arguing, and the man then pulled out a gun and shot
Wilson. Spencer averred that he first learned that the defendant had been convicted of the murder
when the two met in prison, at which point he told the defendant that he would be willing to prepare
an affidavit and testify on his behalf. Spencer stated that he had not come forward previously
because the shooter had seen his face and he did not want to get involved.
¶ 28 The circuit court denied the defendant leave to file both postconviction petitions. In a
consolidated appeal, we reversed the denial of leave to file as to Fields’ and Spencer’s affidavits,
concluding that both affidavits were newly discovered, material and noncumulative, and of a
conclusive character. See People v. Williamson, 2019 IL App (1st) 162511-U, ¶¶ 37-42
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Williamson III). Notably, we observed that
“[b]oth the Fields and Spencer affidavits constitute material evidence because their potential
testimony goes to the central issue of the identity of Wilson's shooter and each provided a first-
person account of the shooting that directly contradicted the prior statements of Fordman, Epps,
and [Jennifer].” Id. ¶ 39. Further, Fields’ and Spencer’s “description of the shooter as someone
other than defendant and Spencer's account of the shooter's alleged motive are details that were
not presented to the jury, and therefore were not cumulative.” Id.
¶ 29 We also found that the affidavits “are of such a conclusive character that, if presented,
would probably change the result on retrial.” Id. ¶ 40. We based that conclusion on the fact that
the affidavits “contradict the prior statements of all three of the State's eyewitnesses to the
shooting” and “comport with the theory of the defense at trial, which was that defendant was
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present on the scene in the crowd of people, but was not the shooter.” Id. We further observed that
“this evidence of defendant's innocence would be stronger when weighed against Fordman's,
Epps', and [Jennifer’s] prior statements, *** especially so where, as here, Fordman and [Jennifer]
did not see who shot the gun.” Id.
¶ 30 On remand, the defendant’s petitions were consolidated and the State filed an answer,
following which the circuit court advanced the petition to a third-stage evidentiary hearing. Prior
to the hearing, the defendant’s counsel advised the court that, despite using an investigator and
conducting internet searches, she was unable to locate Jeffrey Fields and requested a continuance.
The court expressed displeasure at the delay and noted that three years had passed since the case
had been remanded back to the circuit court, but the court granted a final continuance.
¶ 31 At the ensuing evidentiary hearing, only Spencer testified, and the defendant did not
present any testimony or evidence relating to Fields. Spencer testified that he knew both the
defendant and Wilson from the neighborhood, where he had lived for all of his life, but he was not
friends with either of them. According to Spencer, immediately before the shooting he had gone
to the liquor store near the scene of the shooting. After he exited the store, a light-skinned man
with a tattoo whom he had never seen before approached and “asked me something about someone
sold him some PCP weed, and kept going from there.” Spencer then saw the man shoot Wilson.
Spencer did not know whether the defendant was there that night, but he was certain that the
defendant was not the shooter.
¶ 32 Spencer explained that he had not come forward with this information earlier because he
did not want to get involved, specifically stating, “You don't get involved in that type of stuff. You
mind your business and keep it moving. That is how you stay safe.” That changed when he
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encountered the defendant in prison and learned that the defendant had been convicted of the
murder. At that point, he told the defendant, “I know a little bit more than what you think,” and he
offered to testify for the defendant because he knew that the defendant did not commit the murder.
Spencer acknowledged that he had been convicted of second-degree murder and attempted murder,
and the State entered certified copies of his convictions into evidence.
¶ 33 Following the hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying the defendant’s petition.
The court began by noting that it was not considering Fields’ affidavit in its analysis of the
defendant’s actual innocence claim because the defendant had not offered it as evidence at the
hearing. The court then found that the defendant had failed to show that Spencer’s testimony was
material, noncumulative, and conclusive. Specifically, the court first explained that Spencer’s
testimony “that he saw another man shoot the victim is cumulative of [the defendant’s] trial
testimony that he was not the shooter and another man was responsible.” The court then continued
that Spencer’s testimony was not conclusive and would not probably change the result on retrial
because Fordman, Epps, and Jennifer had each implicated the defendant as the actual or apparent
shooter in their pre-trial statements: “Juxtaposed with the testimony provided by the State’s
occurrence witnesses, who identified Petitioner either as the person who shot the victim or stood
next to the victim as shots were fired, the testimony provided by Spencer Jackson does not place
the original trial evidence in a different light or undermine this Court’s confidence in the judgment
of guilt.” This appeal follows.
¶ 34 On appeal, the defendant raises two primary issues, contending first that the circuit court
erred in several ways in denying his petition and then arguing that his postconviction counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence regarding Fields and by unreasonably
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delaying the proceedings. We agree with the defendant that the circuit court erred in finding that
Spencer’s testimony did not warrant relief on his claim of actual innocence. That determination
moots our consideration of the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction
counsel.
¶ 35 In challenging the circuit court’s denial of his petition, the defendant makes several
different arguments, but we only need to address one of them, which is his contention that the court
erred by finding that Spencer’s evidentiary hearing testimony was not material, noncumulative, or
conclusive, despite our prior ruling that Spencer’s account, if testified to, would satisfy those
requirements. We agree with the defendant, as the court’s ruling contradicted our prior decision in
Williamson III and is also at odds with analogous caselaw.
¶ 36 The Act provides a three-stage review process for a defendant’s postconviction claim of a
constitutional violation, only the third of which is at issue in the present appeal. At a third-stage
evidentiary hearing, the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a
substantial violation of a constitutional right during his trial proceedings. People v. Coleman, 2013
IL 113307, ¶ 92 (citing People v. Stovall, 47 Ill. 2d 42, 47 (1970)). “At the third stage, unlike the
first and second stages, the allegations are not taken as true; instead, ‘the trial court acts as a
factfinder, making credibility determinations and weighing the evidence.’ ” People v. House, 2023
IL App (4th) 220891, ¶ 78 (quoting People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 51)). “A reviewing court
will not reverse a trial court's findings regarding credibility determinations or fact finding after a
third-stage evidentiary hearing unless the findings are manifestly erroneous.” Id. (citing Reed,
2020 IL 124940, ¶ 51). The court’s ultimate decision to deny relief following an evidentiary
hearing is likewise reviewed for manifest error. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 98 (citing People v.
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Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 (2004)). “[A] decision is manifestly erroneous when the opposite
conclusion is clearly evident.” Id. (citing Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d at 155, and In re Cutright, 233 Ill.
2d 474, 488 (2009)).
¶ 37 To succeed on a claim of actual innocence, a defendant must present evidence that is (1)
newly discovered, (2) material and noncumulative, and (3) of such a conclusive character that it
would probably change the result on retrial. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96 (citing People v.
Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996)). Only the second and third elements are at issue in this
appeal. Material evidence is “relevant and probative of the petitioner's innocence” (id. ¶ 96 (citing
People v. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, 82-83 (1997)), and “[n]oncumulative means the evidence adds to
what the jury heard” (id. (citing People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 135 (1984)).
¶ 38 If the defendant’s evidence qualifies as new, material, and noncumulative, the court must
then determine whether it is of conclusive character, meaning that, “when considered along with
the trial evidence, [it] would probably lead to a different result.” Id. (citing People v. Ortiz, 235
Ill. 2d 319, 336-37 (2009)). Conclusive evidence “places the evidence presented at trial in a
different light and undercuts the court's confidence in the factual correctness of the guilty verdict.”
Id. ¶ 97. In conducting this analysis, a court should not redecide the defendant’s guilt, and
“[p]robability, not certainty, is the key as the trial court in effect predicts what another jury would
likely do, considering all the evidence, both new and old, together.” Id.
¶ 39 Looking first at whether Spencer’s testimony was material and noncumulative, we agree
with the defendant that the circuit court committed manifest error in determining that it was neither.
The circuit court provided no explanation for why it believed that Spencer’s account was not
material, while it stated that Spencer’s testimony “that he saw another man shoot the victim is
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cumulative of [the defendant’s] trial testimony that he was not the shooter and another man was
responsible.” In Williamson III, we specifically addressed these issues and held that Spencer’s
account is material because it “goes to the central issue of the identity of Wilson's shooter and ***
provided a first-person account of the shooting that directly contradicted the prior statements of
Fordman, Epps, and [Jennifer].” Williamson III, 2019 IL App (1st) 162511-U, ¶ 39. We also found
that Spencer’s description of the shooter as someone other than the defendant and his information
regarding the shooter’s alleged motive “are details that were not presented to the jury, and therefore
were not cumulative.” Id. Nothing in Spencer’s evidentiary hearing testimony, which was
consistent with his affidavit, has altered these conclusions, and the circuit court manifestly erred
in finding that testimony not material and merely cumulative.
¶ 40 We reach the same conclusion regarding the final element of conclusiveness. The circuit
court determined that Spencer’s testimony was not of conclusive character by reviewing the old
evidence presented at the defendant’s trial and considering the potential effect of Spencer’s new
testimony, with the court ultimately stating, “[j]uxtaposed with the testimony provided by the
State’s occurrence witnesses, who identified [the defendant] either as the person who shot the
victim or stood next to the victim as shots were fired, the testimony provided by Spencer Jackson
does not place the original trial evidence in a different light or undermine this Court’s confidence
in the judgment of guilt.” While the court’s methodology was proper, we agree with the defendant
that an opposite conclusion from that analysis is clearly evident.
¶ 41 To begin, we already explained in Williamson III that Spencer’s potential testimony
identifying someone other than the defendant as the shooter was sufficient to qualify as conclusive
evidence because it “contradict[s] the prior statements of all three of the State's eyewitnesses to
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the shooting” and “comport[s] with the theory of the defense at trial, which was that defendant was
present on the scene in the crowd of people, but was not the shooter.” Williamson III, 2019 IL App
(1st) 162511-U, ¶ 40. The State contends that our holding on this point was reliant on the defendant
presenting a second similar account from Fields, which he ultimately did not do during third-stage
proceedings, and was also limited to the context of first-stage proceedings, in which the defendant
only needed to demonstrate a colorable claim of actual innocence. See People v. Edwards, 2012
IL 111711, ¶ 24. However, nothing in our order imposed any such constraints on our holding that
Spencer’s account of the shooting qualified as conclusive evidence. Indeed, a materially
indistinguishable decision from the supreme court supports the conclusion that, even within the
context of third-stage proceedings, a single witness contradicting the State’s trial witnesses and
identifying someone other than the defendant as the perpetrator is sufficient to establish a claim of
actual innocence and to warrant a new trial.
¶ 42 In Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 322-24, the defendant was convicted of murder based solely on the
pre-trial statements of two witnesses who had recanted those statements at trial. A decade later,
the defendant filed a postconviction petition raising an actual innocence claim based on newly
discovered evidence from a new witness, a fellow gang member, who ultimately testified at a third-
stage evidentiary hearing that he witnessed the murder and saw someone other than the defendant
shoot the victim. Id. at 326-27. The circuit court denied the defendant’s petition on grounds that
the new testimony was cumulative (id. at 327), while not making any finding that the new witness’
account was not credible (id. at 334). On appeal, both the appellate court and the supreme court
concluded that the circuit court had committed manifest error in denying the defendant’s petition.
Id. at 327-28, 337.
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¶ 43 Although the circuit court had denied the petition as cumulative, the supreme court also
examined the conclusiveness of the new evidence and determined that the newly discovered
evidence directly contradicting the recanted pre-trial statements of the trial witnesses was of a
conclusive character. Id. at 336-37. The court noted that the State had been unable to discredit the
new evidence and that no physical evidence linked the defendant to the crime. Id. at 337. As a
result, “at retrial, the evidence of defendant's innocence would be stronger when weighed against
the recanted statements of the State's eyewitnesses.” Id. The court continued:
“The fact finder will be charged with determining the credibility of the witnesses in light
of the newly discovered evidence and with balancing the conflicting eyewitness accounts.
As we said in Molstad, ‘this does not mean that [defendant] is innocent, merely that all of
the facts and surrounding circumstances, including the testimony of [defendant's
witnesses], should be scrutinized more closely to determine the guilt or innocence of
[defendant].’ ” (Alterations in original.) Id. (quoting Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d at 136).
¶ 44 We do not see any basis on which to distinguish Ortiz from the present case. Like the
defendant in Ortiz, the defendant in this case was convicted solely on the prior statements of
witnesses who recanted those statements at trial, and there was no physical evidence linking him
to the murder. Also like Ortiz, the defendant has presented new evidence from an alleged
eyewitness to the crime who testified that someone other than the defendant committed the offense.
Further, although the new witnesses in the two cases each had or have character issues, with the
witness in Ortiz being a gang member and Spencer being a convicted murderer, in both cases the
circuit courts did not make any findings that the new accounts were not credible, and the State did
not otherwise discredit the new testimony. In this case, the circuit court merely found that, when
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compared to the trial evidence, Spencer’s testimony would not probably change the result on
retrial. The supreme court’s decision in Ortiz, however, demonstrates that the court’s conclusion
on that point was manifestly erroneous.
¶ 45 Ultimately, Spencer’s new testimony identifying someone other than the defendant as the
shooter, an account that was not materially inconsistent with the defendant’s trial testimony or the
trial testimony of Fordman, Epps, or Jessica, “places the evidence presented at trial in a different
light and undercuts the court's confidence in the factual correctness of the guilty verdict.” Coleman,
2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97. Therefore, the defendant is entitled to a new trial, which is not barred by
double jeopardy because the evidence presented at his first trial was legally sufficient to sustain
his conviction. See People v. Wells, 2023 IL 127169, ¶ 38 (“The remedy for a successful claim of
actual innocence is a new trial.”); People v. Jiles, 364 Ill. App. 3d 320, 331 (2006) (explaining that
double jeopardy does not preclude retrial of a defendant whose conviction was supported by
sufficient evidence).
¶ 46 Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the defendant’s petition for postconviction relief,
vacate the defendant’s conviction, and remand the cause to the circuit court for a new trial.
¶ 47 Reversed and remanded.
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