NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2024 IL App (3d) 230196-U
Order filed December 5, 2024 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-23-0196 v. ) Circuit No. 18-CF-1855 ) DEANTHONY E. WILLIAMSON, ) Honorable ) Vincent F. Cornelius, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Peterson and Albrecht concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for driving while his license was revoked. (2) Defendant’s conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon did not violate the one-act, one-crime rule. (3) The unlawful use of a weapon by a felon statute is facially constitutional under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions. (4) Defendant forfeited his claim of error that the trial court considered an improper aggravating factor in sentencing. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
¶2 Defendant, Deanthony E. Williamson, appeals his convictions for aggravated discharge of
a firearm, unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF), and driving while his license was revoked (DWLR). Defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DWLR,
(2) his UUWF conviction violated the one-act, one-crime rule, (3) his UUWF conviction is facially
unconstitutional under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions, and (4) the trial court
improperly relied on his vacated convictions as a factor in aggravation in sentencing defendant.
For the following reasons, we reverse defendant’s DWLR conviction and otherwise affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In September 2018, defendant received traffic citations for disobeying a stop sign (625
ILCS 5/11-1204(b) (West 2018)), DWLR (id. § 6-303(a)), and operating a motor vehicle when his
registration was suspended for noninsurance (id. § 3-708). Thereafter, a grand jury returned an
indictment which included aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(1) (West
2018)), UUWF (id. § 24-1.1(a)), and possession of a firearm without a firearm owner’s
identification (FOID) card (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 2018)).
¶5 Defendant elected a bench trial, and he proceeded pro se. The following evidence was
adduced. At approximately 11 p.m. on September 23, 2018, a resident of Hobbs Avenue in Joliet,
Illinois, heard a vehicle with a loud muffler driving around her neighborhood for 20 minutes. Later
that night, her husband woke her up and told her he heard a gunshot. She went to her children’s
bedroom and noticed powder from the drywall on her children and a bullet hole in the wall. She
called the police who searched the home and found projectile holes in a shutter adjacent to the
children’s bedroom, the drywall in the children’s bedroom, and a bedroom closet. A neighbor
informed the officers he saw a man fire a shot in the direction of the home from a nearby alley and
that man was driving a silver sedan earlier that night. Shortly after, the officers observed a silver
sedan with a loud muffler drive around the scene. The driver’s side window was down, and an
2 object was extended out of the window, pointing at the officers. When the officers approached, the
sedan sped off.
¶6 The officers pursued the sedan. The sedan failed to stop at a stop sign and parked in a
nearby backyard. Defendant ran from the sedan while holding a rifle, which he threw into a
backyard during his flight. The officers apprehended defendant and found a bag on his person
containing 36 rounds of .30-caliber ammunition and gloves. The officers recovered the rifle and
discovered .30-caliber bullets inside its magazine, which had the same markings as the bullets
found on defendant’s person. The officers searched the sedan and found the same type of
ammunition on the floorboard. Near the scene, the officers recovered a lead-based projectile, a
portion of copper jacketing, and a .30-caliber shell casing. Expert testimony provided (1) a glove
found on defendant’s person was either in the environment of a discharged firearm or contacted a
gunshot residue related item, (2) the rifle discarded by defendant was operable, and (3) the shell
casing and portion of copper jacketing recovered at the scene were fired by the same rifle.
Defendant had a prior felony conviction and was on mandatory supervised release (MSR) when
these offenses occurred. The State admitted into evidence a one-page abstract from the Secretary
of State, stating defendant had “no supervisions on record.”
¶7 The court found defendant guilty of disobeying a stop sign, DWLR, aggravated discharge
of a firearm, UUWF, and possession of a firearm without a FOID card. The court found defendant
not guilty of operating a motor vehicle when his registration was suspended for noninsurance. The
court denied defendant’s posttrial motion.
¶8 At sentencing, the court merged defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm without
a FOID card into the UUWF conviction and sentenced defendant to 12 years’ imprisonment for
aggravated discharge of a firearm to be served concurrently with a 6-year term of imprisonment
3 for UUWF. The court entered judgment for costs on the disobeying a stop sign and DWLR
convictions. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, arguing his sentence was
excessive because it violated the one-act, one-crime rule and the court failed to consider factors in
mitigation. Defendant additionally asked the court to award him certain credit against his sentence.
The court awarded defendant credit against his sentence but denied his motion in all other respects.
¶9 This appeal followed.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
DWLR; (2) his UUWF conviction violated the one-act, one-crime rule; (3) his UUWF conviction
is facially unconstitutional under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions; and (4) the court
improperly relied on his vacated convictions as a factor in aggravation in sentencing. We address
each contention in turn.
¶ 12 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 13 When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Cline, 2022
IL 126383, ¶ 25. In a bench trial, the judge is the trier of fact and assigns weight to the testimony,
resolves conflicts in the evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v.
Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 225 (2009). It is not our role to retry the defendant. People v. Gray,
2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35. We will reverse a criminal conviction only when the evidence is so
unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s
guilt. People v. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d 82, 98 (2008).
4 ¶ 14 Here, defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DWLR.
“It is well settled that the only elements necessary to prove the offense of [DWLR] are (1) the act
of driving a motor vehicle on the highways of this State, and (2) the fact of the revocation of the
driver’s license or privilege.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Jackson, 2013 IL
113986, ¶ 16; 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2018). Defendant concedes the first element but argues
no evidence was presented as to the second element—that his license was revoked at the time he
was driving.
¶ 15 We conclude the evidence failed to establish defendant’s license was revoked on the date
in question. The only evidence of record pertaining to his driver’s license status is a one-page
abstract from the Secretary of State, providing there were no supervisions on record. Thus, the
evidence failed to demonstrate his license was revoked, an essential element of the offense, and
we reverse defendant’s conviction outright.
¶ 16 In coming to this conclusion, we reject the State’s position the evidence of record
sufficiently demonstrated defendant’s license was revoked. First, the State relies on portions of the
aforementioned abstract providing that defendant’s continuous license date and issue date both
contain zeros to demonstrate defendant’s license was revoked. This argument is unconvincing as
the abstract likewise provides zeros for defendant’s weight and height, which certainly cannot be
true. Second, the State points to the PSI providing defendant was convicted in 2011 of DWLR to
seemingly suggest defendant’s license remained revoked in 2018. The State’s reliance on the PSI
as evidence of guilt is, at best, questionable. The PSI was created and made a part of the record
after the court found the defendant guilty. In any event, the PSI fails to demonstrate defendant’s
driver’s license was revoked on the date in question, even when viewed in the light most favorable
to the State.
5 ¶ 17 B. One-Act, One-Crime Rule
¶ 18 Defendant next argues his UUWF conviction violates the one-act, one-crime rule because
it was based on the same physical act as his conviction for aggravated discharge of a firearm.
¶ 19 The one-act, one-crime rule stands for the proposition a defendant may not be convicted of
multiple offenses when those offenses are based on precisely the same physical act. People v.
Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 11. We use a two-step analysis in our de novo review of this question.
People v. Smith, 2019 IL 123901, ¶ 15. First, we determine whether the defendant’s conduct
consisted of a single physical act or separate acts. Id. If the defendant’s convictions are based on
precisely the same physical act, multiple convictions are improper. Id. However, if the defendant’s
conduct is based on more than one physical act, we then determine whether any of the offenses are
lesser-included offenses. People v. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 79. If not, then multiple convictions
are proper. Id.
¶ 20 A defendant commits UUWF if he knowingly possesses a firearm or firearm ammunition
and has previously been convicted of a felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)), while, as
charged in this case, a defendant commits aggravated discharge of a firearm when he knowingly
or intentionally discharges a firearm at or into a building he knows or reasonably should know to
be occupied and does so from a place or position outside that building (id. § 24-1.2(a)(1)).
¶ 21 Although both convictions inherently require a common act, possession of a firearm, the
offenses are not based on precisely the same physical act. See People v. Lobdell, 121 Ill. App. 3d
248, 252 (1983) (“A person can be guilty of two offenses when a common act is part of both
offenses or part of one offense and the only act of the other offense.”); People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d
551, 566 (1977) (defining “act” as “any overt or outward manifestation which will support a
different offense”). For instance, the record establishes defendant possessed a firearm and
6 intentionally discharged the firearm into a building. To commit aggravated discharge of a firearm,
defendant needed to commit the additional act of discharging the firearm. See Coats, 2018 IL
121926, ¶ 16 (collecting cases). Stated another way, if defendant had not discharged the firearm,
he could only have been convicted of UUWF and not aggravated discharge of a firearm. See
People v. Tolentino, 409 Ill. App. 3d 598, 610 (2011) (explaining aggravated discharge of a firearm
requires proof of a separate and distinct act in addition to possessing the firearm). Therefore,
because possession and discharge are distinct acts, we conclude defendant committed multiple
physical acts. See People v. Myers, 85 Ill. 2d 281, 288-89 (1981) (holding the defendant’s acts
were not one physical act despite occurring close in time).
¶ 22 Given this conclusion, we would ordinarily determine whether either of these offenses is a
lesser-included offense. However, defendant does not make this argument. Thus, our analysis ends
here. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall not
be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”).
¶ 23 Accordingly, we find it necessary to reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Glenn, 363
Ill. App. 3d 170, 176 (2006), which held that the defendant could not be convicted of both unlawful
possession and unlawful delivery of cocaine where both convictions were based on the same
cocaine. Glenn has little applicability after the supreme court’s holding in Coats where the supreme
court rejected the argument that where the “crux” or “essence” of the crime are the same, multiple
convictions cannot stand. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶¶ 18-20.
¶ 24 C. Constitutionality of UUWF Statute
¶ 25 Next, defendant contends the UUWF statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)) is facially
unconstitutional as it improperly burdens the right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the
second amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II) and article I, section
7 22, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 22). While defendant did not assert this
claim before the trial court, in criminal cases, a facial constitutional challenge to a statute may be
raised for the first time on appeal. People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 123 (2006).
¶ 26 Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and must be construed to uphold their
constitutionality whenever reasonably possible. People v. Wells, 2023 IL App (3d) 210292, ¶ 19.
Therefore, the challenging party has the burden of establishing a statute is unconstitutional. People
v. McKown, 2022 IL 127683, ¶ 29. The party must establish “no set of circumstances exists under
which [the statute] would be valid.” Caulkins v. Pritzker, 2023 IL 129453, ¶ 29. Constitutional
challenges present a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. ¶ 28.
¶ 27 1. United States Constitution
¶ 28 Defendant argues the UUWF statute is facially unconstitutional because a lifetime
prohibition of possession of a weapon as a felon is inconsistent with the historical traditions of
firearm regulation. We apply a two-part analysis when determining whether a firearm regulation
violates the second amendment. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1,
26-27 (2022). We first determine whether the conduct at issue is protected under the second
amendment’s text and, if so, we consider whether the regulation justifiably comports with history
and tradition. Id.
¶ 29 Applying this framework, we recently upheld the constitutionality of the UUWF statute
(720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)). People v. Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶¶ 25, 33. First,
we concluded the conduct to be regulated by the UUWF statute—possession of a firearm—falls
within the second amendment’s text. Id. ¶ 25. The amendment’s plain language guaranteeing the
“right of the people to keep and bear Arms” covers the possession of firearms and does not exclude
felons from “the people” to whom it applies. U.S. Const., amend. II; Travis, 2024 IL App (3d)
8 230113, ¶ 25. Second, our historical analysis concluded the UUWF statute is consistent with this
country’s history and tradition of disarming individuals who violate the law or are deemed
dangerous. Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶¶ 27-33. Although laws specifically prohibiting
felons from possessing firearms did not emerge until the twentieth century, these regulations
evolved from comparable status-based restrictions dating back to the founding era. Id. ¶¶ 28-31.
¶ 30 Defendant nonetheless contends these historical predecessors are not a proper analogue for
the permanent disarmament of felons under the UUWF statute because precursory dispossession
regulations were traditionally temporary and easily removable. However, the UUWF statute is not
an indissoluble ban on firearm possession. A felon can avoid the UUWF statute’s application by
obtaining relief under section 10 of the FOID Card Act (430 ILCS 65/10 (West 2018)). See 720
ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018). Moreover, Bruen’s historical inquiry only requires the challenged
regulation have “a well-established and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin.”
(Emphases in original.) Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30. Properly analogous modern and historical
regulations are determined by their relative similarities, which include, inter alia, “ ‘how and why
the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.’ ” Travis, 2024 IL App
(3d) 230113, ¶ 24 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29). The disarmament of felons under the UUWF
statute based on their criminal convictions is consistent with a longstanding history and tradition
of similar firearm prohibitions disarming individuals who engaged in criminal conduct or posed a
danger to society. Id. ¶¶ 29-31. Like its historical antecedents, the UUWF statute imposes
practically no burden on the second amendment rights of law-abiding citizens. Id. ¶ 33. Therefore,
the UUWF statute is facially constitutional under the second amendment of the United States
Constitution.
¶ 31 2. Illinois Constitution
9 ¶ 32 Defendant further claims the UUWF statute violates article I, section 22, of the Illinois
Constitution. Article I, section 22, provides: “Subject only to the police power, the right of the
individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 22. In
Travis, we held the UUWF statute is “a proper exercise of the state’s police power, which allows
the state to exert, through legislation, control over the dangers posed by firearms and the people
who might use them to do harm.” Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶ 43. Thus, the UUWF statute
is facially constitutional under article I, section 22, of the Illinois Constitution.
¶ 33 As discussed in Travis, we find it necessary to again reject the assertion that, by extending
the right to bear arms to “the individual citizen,” the Illinois Constitution provides greater
protection than the right granted to “the people” under the second amendment. Id. ¶ 42. Indeed,
the use of “individual citizen” broadens the scope of the type of arms covered by expanding it
beyond weapons only traditionally used by a regulated militia. Id. ¶ 40. However, article I, section
22 also provides the state with an immense degree of control over firearms by explicitly limiting
the right to bear arms subject to the police power. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 22. The disarmament
of felons under the UUWF statute is a proper exercise of this power, which contemplates
legislation intended to prohibit or restrict anything that presents a danger to the welfare of the
people. Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶¶ 41, 43.
¶ 34 Accordingly, we adhere to Travis for these reasons and find the UUWF statute is facially
constitutional under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions.1
¶ 35 D. Sentence
1 During the pendency of this appeal, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024), in which it upheld a federal statute that prohibited individuals subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm. We have reviewed Rahimi and conclude it does not change the above analysis. 10 ¶ 36 Last, defendant argues the court improperly considered his vacated convictions as factors
in aggravation when determining his sentence. Specifically, he asserts the court improperly
considered (1) his 2007 and 2008 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) convictions,
which were void under People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, and (2) the fact his probation sentence
on the first AUUW conviction was revoked. Defendant contends he preserved this issue for our
review by including it in his motion to reconsider the sentence. Although not raised by the State,
we conclude defendant forfeited this claim because he did not raise it in his motion to reconsider
sentence.
¶ 37 “[A] defendant forfeits appellate review of any sentencing issue not raised in the trial court
in a written postsentencing motion.” People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 42 (2009). The purpose of
this rule is two-fold. First, it allows the trial court an opportunity to review the defendant’s claimed
sentencing error and save the delay and expense of an appeal if the claim is meritorious. People v.
Heider, 231 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (2008). Second, it prevents the defendant from raising on appeal a different
objection than the one asserted below. Id.
¶ 38 Defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence did not argue the court improperly
considered his vacated convictions in aggravation. Admittedly, the motion states the AUUW
statute under which defendant was previously convicted had been found unconstitutional.
However, that assertion is made as part of an argument that the State misled the grand jury and not
in an argument attacking his sentence. Indeed, even if we liberally construe the motion, none of its
contents gave the court the opportunity to review the claim defendant has now raised on appeal.
Accordingly, defendant has forfeited this claim.
¶ 39 When a defendant forfeits appellate review of a claim, we may consider the claim if the
defendant establishes a plain error occurred. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). Defendant
11 does not argue for plain-error review or otherwise provide any reason why this court should excuse
his forfeiture. See People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545-46, 550 (2010) (holding the appellate
court erred by considering the merits of an unpreserved issue when the defendant did not argue
plain error). Thus, we must honor defendant’s procedural default.
¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 41 For the reasons stated, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the circuit court
of Will County.
¶ 42 Affirmed in part and reversed in part.