2015 IL App (3d) 130489
Opinion filed October 16, 2015 _____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2015
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-13-0489 v. ) Circuit No. 06-CF-536 ) CORRIE WALLACE, ) ) Honorable Daniel J. Rozak, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices O'Brien and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In October 2008, a Will County jury convicted defendant, Corrie Wallace, of first-degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2006)) and aggravated battery with a firearm (720
ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 2006)). The court sentenced defendant to 70 years for first-degree
murder and 18 years for aggravated battery to be served consecutively. Defendant subsequently
raised nine issues on direct appeal; this court affirmed his conviction and sentences. People v.
Wallace, 2011 IL App (3d) 090500-U. In May 2013, defendant filed a postconviction petition,
which the trial court dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit. Defendant appeals the
dismissal of his postconviction petition arguing: (1) he set forth an arguable claim of actual innocence; and (2) he stated the gist of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We disagree
and affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 We provide a summary of the evidence presented at trial here. For a more detailed
account of the evidence, reference our previous decision. Id. ¶¶ 6-31.
¶4 The evidence at defendant’s trial showed that the victim in this case, Hallie Parish, was in
a vehicle with three other people when he was shot and killed by the defendant in March 2006.
Most notably, among those present in the vehicle with the victim were Joe Williams and Charles
McAfee. Neither Williams nor McAfee could identify the shooter. Williams was also shot
during the incident, but survived. Williams later claimed he received an apology from a person
claiming to be the shooter, though Williams refused to identify that person other than to say it
was not the defendant. The trial court would not allow Williams to testify about this alleged
conversation at trial. We note this issue was raised by defendant on direct appeal, but deemed a
forfeited issue by this court. Id. ¶¶ 54-56.
¶5 Tonya Dandridge’s and Zatella Bridge’s testimony at trial established that defendant shot
the victim while wearing a mask, immediately ran away from the scene, walked back up to the
victim shortly thereafter without the mask or gun, and taunted him before walking away again.
Their testimony also established that defendant ran away from the scene using the same path he
used to approach before the shooting, and returned by way of the same path once again when he
taunted the victim. Police later discovered that this path led to the home of Tarnisha Davenport.
¶6 Officer Stubler, the first responding officer, testified that he overheard people identifying
defendant as the shooter while he was protecting the crime scene in the immediate aftermath of
the shooting. Stubler located defendant and detained him shortly thereafter behind Davenport’s
2 residence. Defendant matched the description of the shooter (in build as well as clothing) as
provided by witnesses on the scene that could not identify defendant. Defendant was told he was
under arrest and transported from the crime scene to the police department approximately 45
minutes after being detained by Officer Stubler.
¶7 When arrested, defendant possessed a key to Davenport’s home. In Davenport’s home,
police located a mask (described by witnesses as being worn by the shooter) and ammunition
later determined to have previously been chambered in the same gun used in the shooting.
Defendant’s hands later tested positive for gunshot residue and his DNA was on the mask
recovered from Davenport’s home.
¶8 In May 2013, defendant filed pro se a 207-page petition for relief under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-8 (West 2012)). The trial court summarily
dismissed defendant’s petition as frivolous and patently without merit under section 122-
2.1(a)(2) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2012)).
Defendant’s petition asserted many claims, only two of which he appeals now: a claim of actual
innocence and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
¶9 Defendant’s actual innocence claim is supported by affidavits from Darius Foster and
Adrian Ellis. Foster claims he saw Conley Ratcliffe—who testified at defendant’s trial—running
away from the area of the shooting with a gun in his hand shortly after he heard the gunshots.
Foster also claims he walked up to the vehicle shortly after the victim had been shot, along with
the defendant and other unidentified individuals. Ellis, on the other hand, avers in his affidavit
that while he was incarcerated with Ratcliffe sometime in 2008, Ratcliffe confessed to him that
he was the shooter. Ellis also claims Ratcliffe stated he previously apologized to Williams for
3 shooting him on accident. Defendant asserts these affidavits constitute newly discovered
evidence that support his claim of actual innocence.
¶ 10 Defendant argues in his ineffective assistance of counsel claim that his trial counsel
should have filed a motion to suppress his arrest at the crime scene, as it was not based on
probable cause. Defendant further asserts appellate counsel was equally ineffective for not
arguing the same issue on appeal. Defendant alleges his actual innocence and ineffective
assistance of counsel claims should be allowed to proceed to the second stage of postconviction
proceedings.
¶ 11 ANALYSIS
¶ 12 At the first stage, a postconviction petition may be summarily dismissed only if it is
“frivolous” or “patently without merit.” Id. Appellate review of a first-stage postconviction
petition’s summary dismissal is de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).
Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2009); People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 25. At the first stage of a
postconviction proceeding, we must determine whether the petition sets forth the “gist” of a
constitutional claim. People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 99-100 (2002). If we determine
defendant’s pleadings meet the minimum requirements, the petition proceeds to the second stage.
725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2012). The defendant, however, has the burden of establishing he
has suffered a substantial deprivation of a constitutional right. People v. Waldrop, 353 Ill. App.
3d 244, 249 (2004).
¶ 13 I. Defendant’s Actual Innocence Claim
¶ 14 A postconviction actual innocence claim is limited to arguments based on newly
discovered evidence. People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (2009). Courts should grant relief on
this basis only when the petitioner’s argument is supported by evidence that is new, material,
4 noncumulative, and of such a conclusive character that it would likely change the result on
retrial. People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 84. Courts rarely grant postconviction petitions
based on claims of actual innocence as the standard is “extraordinarily difficult to meet.” Id.
¶ 94.
¶ 15 Defendant argues that the Foster and Ellis affidavits each set forth a colorable claim of
actual innocence. Specifically, defendant asserts it is “at least arguable” both affidavits contain
evidence that is newly discovered. In so doing, defense counsel asserts there is no proof that
defendant knew Foster was on the scene in the aftermath of the shooting, or that defendant could
have known about Ratcliffe’s confession to Ellis prior to trial. These arguments are unavailing
as they are based on indisputably meritless legal theories.
¶ 16 A. Foster’s Affidavit
¶ 17 Newly discovered evidence is evidence which was not available at defendant’s trial and
which defendant could not have discovered sooner through the exercise of due diligence. Id.
¶ 96. Furthermore, a claim of actual innocence does not merely question the defendant’s guilt,
but is so conclusive as to be capable of completely exonerating the defendant. People v. Savory,
309 Ill. App. 3d 408, 414-15 (1999); People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96. Defendant’s
failure to state a free-standing claim of actual innocence can fail as a matter of law. People v.
Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 31, 36-37.
¶ 18 Here, defendant’s claim of actual innocence buttressed by Foster’s affidavit fails as a
matter of law. Defendant’s argument ignores the due diligence requirement of newly discovered
evidence and relies heavily on the premise that if there is no proof defendant knew of the
evidence prior to trial, his discovery of that information afterward renders the information newly
discovered. Defense counsel cites no case law for this proposition, in violation of supreme court
5 Rule 341(h)(7), and therefore forfeits the argument. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013);
see People v. Clinton, 397 Ill. App. 3d 215, 223-24 (2009).
¶ 19 Moreover, defendant’s claim is explicitly contradicted by the record. By defendant’s
own admission, he provided his trial counsel with Foster’s name and contact information as a
potential witness in preparation for trial. This is prima facie evidence that defendant did know
Foster was in the area and a potential witness to the incident. That defendant did not know the
content of Foster’s alleged observations does not render its recent revelation newly discovered.
People v. Montes, 2015 IL App (2d) 140485, ¶ 24.
¶ 20 Even if Foster’s affidavit were considered newly discovered evidence, it does not
conclusively support defendant’s claim of actual innocence. Accepting the contents of Foster’s
affidavit as true, Foster cannot conclusively prove defendant was not the shooter. As the State
highlights, Ratcliffe could have been running away from the scene with the gun used by
defendant. Thus, we find the Foster affidavit is insufficient as a matter of law to support a claim
of actual innocence.
¶ 21 B. Ellis’s Affidavit
¶ 22 Generally, evidence is not considered “newly discovered” such that it can support a
postconviction petition for relief based on actual innocence, when it presents facts already known
to the defendant at or prior to trial, though the source of those facts may have been unknown,
unavailable, or uncooperative. Id.
¶ 23 The record establishes that Williams, the other victim of the shooting, testified at trial and
was prohibited from asserting that a person he refused to identify was the shooter. McAfee
testified at trial as well. Prior to his testimony, the State argued several motions in limine to
block specific portions of McAfee’s testimony. On the record, the State argued that McAfee
6 should not be allowed to testify that Williams revealed to him that Ratcliffe was the one who
apologized to Williams for shooting him in the arm. The defense ultimately conceded such
testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and McAfee did not aver such statements during his
testimony.
¶ 24 Shortly after McAfee testified, Ratcliffe took the stand and the defense chose not to ask
him about his alleged statements to Williams. Therefore, the defense theory that Ratcliffe was
the shooter—and not defendant—was available to defendant at trial. The defense cross-
examined Ratcliffe, while the record demonstrates they were aware Ratcliffe had allegedly
admitted to Williams he was the shooter. Thus, defendant’s actual innocence claim, as supported
by the Ellis affidavit, is not based on newly discovered evidence.
¶ 25 Furthermore, testimony by Ellis regarding Ratcliffe’s alleged confession is hearsay,
which cannot be the basis of a defendant’s postconviction petition. People v. Coleman, 2012 IL
App (4th) 110463, ¶ 55. Generally, hearsay is insufficient to support a postconviction petition,
particularly when there is no explanation why an affidavit from the declarant is unavailable. 725
ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2012); People v. Coleman, 2012 IL App (4th) 110463, ¶ 55. In this case,
defendant does not explain why Ratcliffe (the declarant) is unavailable and ignores the fact that
Ratcliffe already testified at defendant’s trial and therefore actually was available.
¶ 26 Defendant counters that the Illinois Supreme Court recently rejected the argument that
evidence needs to be admissible during the first stage of postconviction proceedings in People v.
Allen, 2015 IL 113135. The majority in Allen, however, stated it is sufficient for a
postconviction petitioner to provide “substantive evidentiary content” in support of a claim
supported by “ ‘other evidence,’ ” not an affidavit. Id. ¶ 37.
7 ¶ 27 We find that Allen speaks to the procedural requirements or defects of a defendant’s
postconviction petition. In Allen, at issue was the legal creation of defendant’s supporting
affidavit, which was procedurally insufficient. Id. ¶ 2. That is not at issue in the case sub judice.
The substantive requirements of affidavits in postconviction petitions (in this case the status of
the averred content as newly discovered evidence or admissible evidence) remains unchanged in
the wake of Allen.
¶ 28 Inadmissible hearsay cannot constitute substantive evidence by any definition. We
cannot believe the supreme court in Allen meant for any petitioner’s claim to survive the
relatively abbreviated review of first-stage postconviction proceedings without regard for the
substance of the supporting evidence. In fact, the majority explicitly rejected an overly broad
interpretation of its ruling in response to direct criticism from the dissent. Id. ¶ 38.
¶ 29 The trial court would not let Williams testify that he was given an apology by an
anonymous person claiming to be the real shooter. Nor would it let McAffe testify that Williams
told him that that person was Ratcliffe. We now have another declarant offering the same
information. The information is still inadmissible hearsay, as already ruled upon by the trial
court, and substantively cannot support a postconviction petition—even in the first stage. Thus,
we find the Ellis affidavit is insufficient as a matter of law to support a claim of actual
innocence.
¶ 30 II. Defendant’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
¶ 31 Lastly, defendant argues the trial court erred by dismissing his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Defendant asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant also contends his appellate counsel
was ineffective for failing to argue trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for this same reason on direct
8 appeal. The State contends that probable cause existed at the time of arrest and any motion filed
by the defense to quash defendant’s arrest would have been futile.
¶ 32 Again, to survive first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition, a pro se petitioner
need only present the “gist” of a constitutional claim. People v. English, 353 Ill. App. 3d 337,
339 (2004). Postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must allege facts
sufficient to prove both prongs under Strickland in order to succeed: (1) that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that the defendant was
substantially prejudiced as a result. People v. Gale, 376 Ill. App. 3d 344, 351 (2007); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
¶ 33 Trial counsel and appellate counsel are held to the same standard in a Strickland analysis.
People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997); People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (2000).
On appeal, substantial prejudice is not demonstrated by enumerating the issues appellate counsel
did not brief, as appellate counsel is not required to brief every possible issue. People v.
Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 523 (1995). Consequently, if defendant’s claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel fails the deficiency prong of Strickland, appellate counsel cannot be
found deficient for failing to address the same issue on appeal. Id.
¶ 34 Defendant alleges the police did not have probable cause to arrest him when Officer
Stubler placed him in handcuffs. From our review of the record, this is likely true. The
continuation of defendant’s argument, however—that defendant was therefore unconstitutionally
arrested without probable cause, in violation of the fourth amendment—is patently false. In
making this argument, defendant makes two assumptions that are legally inaccurate and factually
contradicted by the record: (1) that defendant was under arrest when Officer Stubler placed him
in handcuffs; and (2) that Officer Stubler’s knowledge needed to be the sole basis for the
9 probable cause supporting the decision to arrest the defendant. Absent these assumptions,
defendant’s argument falls apart.
¶ 35 We note again that the record makes clear the defendant was detained at the crime scene
for approximately 45 minutes before he was placed under arrest and transported to the police
station. Shortly before transport, defendant was informed that he was under arrest at that time,
rather than detained. The legal distinction between detention and arrest is significant. An arrest
requires probable cause, while temporary detention need only be supported by reasonable
suspicion. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 544 (2006). Detention based on reasonable
suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances, which factors in the seriousness of the
crime; in this case a murder. People v. Easley, 288 Ill. App. 3d 487, 491-92 (1997).
¶ 36 After reviewing the record, we find that Office Stubler had reasonable suspicion to detain
the defendant on scene and his subsequent arrest was supported by probable cause. Contrary to
defense counsel’s assertions on appeal, the defendant was not placed under arrest by Officer
Stubler solely because he overheard anonymous people make the accusation that defendant was
the shooter. Officer Stubler’s testimony at trial belies this assertion. In relevant part, Officer
Stubler stated:
“I made my way to where Mr. Wallace was in the back, took
control of him and advised him he was being detained in reference
to [sic] a suspect of that shooting.”
Nowhere in Officer Stubler’s testimony does he say that he arrested the defendant at that time.
Police reports from other responding officers all clearly state that defendant was detained at the
scene before he was arrested.
10 ¶ 37 Defendant was detained at the scene initially because yet-to-be-identified people were
stating that he was the shooter. This was the appropriate action under the circumstances
supported by reasonable suspicion. No reasonably prudent officer would ignore this information.
Rather, the appropriate course of action was to detain defendant to investigate further.
¶ 38 Probable cause for arrest exists when facts known to an officer would lead a reasonably
cautious person to believe the arrestee committed a crime. People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d 545, 563-
64 (2008). Probable cause can be based on information provided by a third party, anonymous or
identified, as long as it bears some indicia of reliability. People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 397
(1989). “Where officers are working together in investigating a crime, the knowledge of each
constitutes the knowledge of all, and probable cause can be established from all the information
collectively received by the officers.” People v. Ortiz, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1065 (2005).
¶ 39 Defendant’s subsequent arrest after a relatively brief detention was the result of a
budding investigation that pointed to him as the culprit. Dandridge’s testimony contains the
following relevant inquiry by the State:
“MR. KNICK [assistant State’s Attorney]: That day did you
talk to the police at both the scene, at the Fairmont housing unit,
and also at the Joliet police station?
MS. DANDRIDGE [witness]: Yes.
MR. KNICK: And when you talked – – were talking to the
police there at the scene, what was going on?
MS. DANDRIDGE: Everybody was outside just looking at
everything that was going on.”
11 Dandridge went on to say that she told the officer she was not comfortable speaking with the
police at her home, and that the officer she spoke with suggested she speak to police later, at the
station. Defense counsel on appeal emphasizes the latter portion of Dandridge’s testimony,
implying she said nothing of substance to officers on scene. This assumption, however, is
contradicted by the record.
¶ 40 Detective Jackson responded promptly to the scene and immediately began interviewing
witnesses. In describing his second interview with a witness, Detective Jackson documented the
following in a report:
“I traveled to 1514 Fairmount where Tonya Dandridge ***
stated that shooter in the above mentioned matter was a subject
known to her as ‘Choke’. It should be known that I have prior
knowledge of ‘Choke’ being Corrie Wallace. At the time I
obtained this information from Tonya Dandridge there were
several onlookers in the Fairmount Housing Projects. Ms.
Dandridge stated that she would feel more comfortable coming to
the Joliet Police Department giving this statement without so many
onlookers and people observing the statement of her speaking with
the police. I furnished Ms. Dandridge with my business card and
stated when her children arrived home from school that it would be
okay to [sic] the Joliet Police Department.”
Hence, the police had probable cause to arrest defendant after they spoke with Dandridge, an
eyewitness to the shooting, on scene.
12 ¶ 41 Given the record before this court, it is apparent that defense counsel’s efforts at trial to
quash defendant’s arrest would have been futile. The testimony of the witnesses at trial,
supplemented by police reports from investigating officers, establish that the police had probable
cause to arrest defendant before transporting him to the station. Had defense counsel filed a
motion to quash defendant’s arrest, it would have been denied. Defendant’s detention on scene
in the aftermath of a shooting for approximately 45 minutes was reasonable. His eventual arrest
was supported by probable cause. Trial counsel’s subsequent decision not to file a motion to
quash defendant’s arrest was objectively reasonable as well. Likewise, appellant counsel was
not deficient for failing to raise the same issue on direct appeal. As a result, defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail the first prong of the Strickland analysis.
¶ 42 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction
petition.
¶ 43 CONCLUSION
¶ 44 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 45 Affirmed.