2020 IL App (4th) 190252 FILED NO. 4-19-0252 June 22, 2020 Carla Bender IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Macon County MATTHEW Q. REDDING, ) No. 18DT38 Defendant-Appellee. ) ) Honorable ) Erick F. Hubbard, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In January 2018, defendant, Matthew Q. Redding, was charged with one count of
misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). On January 30, 2018, at approximately
10 p.m., officers stopped defendant’s truck near the area of Sliderz Bar and Grill (Sliderz) in
Decatur after being informed defendant was involved in an altercation inside the bar. Other officers
investigating the alleged battery at the bar quickly arrived to speak with defendant. After
demonstrating visible signs of intoxication and showing indicators of impairment on standard field
sobriety tests, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.
¶2 In September 2018, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence,
claiming sheriff’s deputies did not have probable cause to stop his vehicle. In November 2018, the
trial court heard and subsequently granted defendant’s motion. ¶3 On appeal, the State offers three arguments for our consideration: (1) the trial court
erred in finding the evidence was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop,
(2) defendant did not satisfy his burden by proving or making a preliminary showing that police
lacked reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, and (3) it was error for the trial court to exclude
evidence under the facts of this case, based on the good faith of the officers.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In January 2018, Deputy David Lewallen of the Macon County Sheriff’s
Department received a radio dispatch identifying defendant as a suspect involved in a bar fight at
Sliderz. In addition to identifying defendant’s involvement in the altercation, the caller provided
dispatch the color, make, and model of defendant’s truck and informed them he had left the scene.
Approximately six minutes after the call, Deputy Lewallen located the truck traveling near the area
of Sliderz, confirmed the truck was registered to defendant, and contacted Deputy Patrick Smith,
who was investigating the fight. Deputy Smith directed Deputy Lewallen to stop the truck so Smith
could speak to defendant about the bar fight. Within minutes of Deputy Lewallen effectuating a
traffic stop on defendant’s truck, Deputy Smith and Deputy Megan Burgener, a newly hired officer
under Deputy Smith’s supervision, arrived on scene. Upon interacting with defendant, Deputy
Burgener observed several indicators of alcohol intoxication, conducted field sobriety tests, and
arrested defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol as a result of her observations and the
test results.
¶6 In January 2018, the State charged defendant with one count of driving under the
influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2018)). In September 2018, defendant filed
a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing the police lacked probable cause to
effectuate the traffic stop and defendant’s statements should be suppressed because of the deputies’
-2- failure to read him Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In response,
the State argued probable cause was not the correct standard to determine whether the traffic stop
was permissible, contending the question was whether the deputies had a reasonable articulable
suspicion to conduct the stop. The State contended they did. Because the trial court found the
officers did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop, it did not reach
the merits of the suppression of defendant’s statements.
¶7 A. Motion to Suppress Hearing
¶8 In November 2018, defendant’s motion to suppress was heard. Before the
presentation of evidence, defense counsel conceded the proper standard for evaluating the legality
of the traffic stop was whether the deputies had a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct the
stop. The defense called Deputy Lewallen and Deputy Burgener to testify during the hearing. The
State recalled Deputy Lewallen in support of its response to the motion.
¶9 1. Deputy Lewallen
¶ 10 On direct examination, Deputy Lewallen testified he received information from
dispatch about an altercation at Sliderz, that defendant was a suspect, and defendant left the bar in
a black Chevrolet Silverado. While en route to Sliderz, since Lewallen had already been informed
the suspect left in his vehicle, he began looking in the area for a vehicle matching the description
given. Other officers were sent to Sliderz to investigate. He testified that, once he got behind
defendant’s truck (a black Chevrolet Silverado), he verified the license plate with dispatch and
confirmed it was registered to defendant. He then called Deputy Smith, who was investigating the
bar fight, and asked if Deputy Smith wanted him to make a traffic stop on defendant’s truck so
Smith could talk to defendant about the fight. When asked what Deputy Lewallen’s reasonable
suspicion was in making a traffic stop on defendant’s truck, he stated, “We were called to Sliderz
-3- for a battery they said, between the Redding brothers. That’s a possible domestic battery.” On
cross-examination, he stated the investigation of the battery was still ongoing and he pulled
defendant’s vehicle over pursuant to that ongoing investigation. When recalled by the State,
Lewallen testified he informed defendant why he was being stopped and may have asked if he had
been in a bar fight at Sliderz before Deputy Burgener arrived on the scene.
¶ 11 2. Deputy Burgener
¶ 12 At the time of the traffic stop, Deputy Burgener had been with the Macon County
Sheriff’s Department for approximately four months. She was still working under the supervision
of Deputy Smith, who was her field training officer. She testified she was called to back up Deputy
Lewallen regarding a traffic stop. She was aware the original call involved a bar fight at Sliderz
between the Redding brothers. Upon her arrival at the traffic stop, she approached defendant and
“immediately” noticed signs of impairment and began conducting a DUI investigation. On cross-
examination, she testified she began focusing on a possible DUI after observing defendant had
“slowed movements, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, indicators of being intoxicated.”
¶ 13 Defendant argued the deputies who stopped him did not have a “reasonable
suspicion” because “in order for a police officer to stop that person [(a suspect who has left the
scene),] they have to have something unfold in front of them that gives them reasonable suspicion
to believe that a crime has been committed.” Defendant argued because Deputy Lewallen did not
have reasonable suspicion that a crime was unfolding in front of him, Deputy Lewallen should
have “s[a]t back and watch[ed] [to] see if he could observe a traffic violation” and, without more,
there was no basis to stop defendant’s vehicle.
¶ 14 The State argued Deputy Lewallen received a call from dispatch that defendant and
his brother were in an altercation at Sliderz and the reason Deputy Lewallen made a traffic stop on
-4- defendant’s truck was to help investigate that report. The stop was based on an ongoing
investigation. The State disagreed with counsel’s argument that the criminal activity had to reveal
itself or unfold in front of the officer in order to have a reasonable suspicion. Regardless of whether
Lewallen had probable cause to believe defendant had committed a battery, “he had reasonable
suspicion to investigate.” The State noted the officers were entitled to rely on the information they
were given, even if it proved to be incorrect. “Someone called and complained about a domestic
dispute that occurred at Sliderz. Someone had given someone at dispatch or another officer
information to lead them to believe that it was the defendant who was involved in the fight, and
that’s clearly enough for reasonable suspicion.” After arguments, the trial court took the matter
under advisement.
¶ 15 In March 2019, the trial court issued its written order finding “defendant made a
prima facie showing that Deputy Lewallen lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to temporarily
detain defendant.” The court explained Deputy Lewallen did not see defendant violate any traffic
laws and the only reason for the stop was due to defendant’s alleged involvement in a bar fight
with his brother. Furthermore, the court noted that neither of the deputies called to testify identified
the complainant of the alleged battery or articulated any facts involving the alleged battery, and
neither witness went to investigate the alleged battery. The court found the sole basis for the stop
was a dispatch indicating defendant was involved in a bar fight and that neither witness “offered
testimony or facts sufficient to establish reasonable and articulable suspicion to make a Terry stop
of defendant.” See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). As a result, the court found the State failed
to meet its burden. The court further opined that, if the State had called Deputy Smith, who was
detailed to investigate defendant’s alleged involvement in a bar fight, or the dispatcher who relayed
the information concerning the bar fight to Deputy Lewallen, then the State may have provided
-5- facts and testimony sufficient to establish a reasonable articulable suspicion to make the stop.
Finally, the court stated the complainant was not identified and therefore was “effectively
anonymous” and an anonymous tip, without more, could not provide reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. See People v. Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶ 2, 125 N.E.3d 1268.
¶ 16 This appeal followed.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 A. Motions to Suppress
¶ 19 The defendant bears the burden of proof at a hearing on a motion to suppress.
People v. Brooks, 2017 IL 121413, ¶ 22, 104 N.E.3d 417. It is the responsibility of the defendant
to make a prima facie showing the evidence was obtained by an illegal search or seizure. People
v. Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d 298, 306-07, 786 N.E.2d 540, 545 (2003). The Illinois Supreme Court
discussed what constitutes a prima facie case—albeit in the context of a defendant seeking
rescission of a statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license—in People v. Relwani, 2019
IL 123385, 129 N.E.3d 1222. Our supreme court first noted, “in rescission cases we apply the same
standard of review used in appeals of suppression motion rulings.” Relwani, 2019 IL 123385, ¶ 18.
The court further explained how, in making a prima facie case, the defendant “has the primary
responsibility for establishing the factual and legal bases for the requested action.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Relwani, 2019 IL 123385, ¶ 17. It went on to define a prima facie case
as one where the party having the burden produces “enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer
the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Relwani, 2019
IL 123385, ¶ 18. Within the context of a suppression hearing, once the defendant does so, the
burden of proceeding, or going forward with the evidence, shifts to the State to present evidence
to counter defendant’s prima facie case. Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d at 307. The ultimate burden of proof
-6- remains, however, with the defendant. People v. Brooks, 2017 IL 121413, ¶ 22, 104 N.E.3d 417.
Applying a two-part analysis when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence, we review the trial court’s factual findings under the manifest weight of the evidence
standard and then apply the de novo standard of review to the court’s ultimate legal ruling on
whether the evidence should be suppressed. Brooks, 2017 IL 121413, ¶ 21.
¶ 20 B. Vehicle Stops
¶ 21 The ultimate touchstone of the fourth amendment is “reasonableness,” and vehicle
stops are subject to that same reasonableness requirement. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
810 (1996). Since “the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry investigative stop than to a
formal arrest,” “courts generally analyze fourth amendment challenges to the reasonableness of
traffic stops under Terry principles.” People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 270, 830 N.E.2d 541, 549
(2005); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). When applying Terry principles, our supreme
court has said: “For a traffic stop to comport with the reasonableness requirement of the
constitutional guarantees, the police officer must have at least reasonable, articulable suspicion
that a violation of the law has occurred.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Gaytan,
2015 IL 116223, ¶ 20, 32 N.E.3d 641. Discussing Gaytan, this court explained how a “reasonable,
articulable suspicion” means the officer effectuating the stop “must have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped was violating the law.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) People v. Hill, 2019 IL App (4th) 180041, ¶ 17, 123 N.E.3d 1236 (citing
Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 20), aff’d on other grounds, 2020 IL 124595). This is a less exacting
standard than probable cause, and such stops are evaluated objectively. We are to consider the
facts available to the officer at the moment of the stop and whether they would “warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate,” considering the totality of
-7- the circumstances. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9,
50 N.E.3d 1092. In other words, “when evaluating the validity of the stop, [the reviewing courts]
consider the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9.
¶ 22 The Supreme Court of the United States recently reaffirmed this reasonable
suspicion standard necessary for vehicle stops. Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. ___, ___, 140 S. Ct.
1183, 1187 (2020) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative
traffic stop when he has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity.’ ” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981))).
We find the Court’s instruction illuminating here. In Glover, 589 U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1186-
87, a deputy sheriff ran a license plate check on a vehicle, found the owner to have a revoked
license, and stopped the vehicle. The Court held the vehicle stop reasonable. Considering the
totality of the circumstances—namely the computer database information coupled with the
deputy’s reasonable, commonsense inference that the vehicle owner was driving his car with a
revoked license—the Court found the deputy possessed reasonable suspicion Glover was engaged
in criminal activity. Discussing the “reasonable suspicion” standard, the Court reiterated: “The
standard depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks
omitted.) Glover, 589 U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1188 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 695 (1996)). The Court echoed the long-standing principle that the reasonable suspicion
standard sets a lower bar than either the probable cause or preponderance of the evidence standards,
instructing, “[t]he reasonable suspicion inquiry ‘falls considerably short’ of 51% accuracy
-8- [citation] for, as we have explained, ‘to be reasonable is not to be perfect.’ [Citation.]” Glover, 589
U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1188.
¶ 23 Heeding the Court’s guidance, we turn to the case before us. The State argues
defendant did not make a prima facie showing the traffic stop was unlawful and, by contrast, the
testimony produced at the suppression hearing was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for
the traffic stop. We agree.
¶ 24 C. Anonymous Tip
¶ 25 Although much has been made by defendant regarding an “anonymous tip,” in
reality, other than the suggestion by defendant’s counsel at the suppression hearing, there is no
evidence in this record the call to dispatch was anonymous. Deputy Lewallen said he received his
information from dispatch and did not know who gave the information to them. Deputy Burgener
said she did not know who called the sheriff’s office and suggested there may be a record of who
called dispatch. It was only after counsel suggested, “[c]ould it have been an anonymous caller?”
the deputy said it “could have been.” Regardless, the legality of the stop is not necessarily based
on the original source of the information but instead on the objective reasonableness of the officer’s
actions based on the facts available to him at the time of the stop. See People v. Dunmire, 2019 IL
App (4th) 190316, ¶ 40. Deputy Lewallen knew the following at the time of the stop: (1) a caller
who was familiar with the “Redding brothers” and a local bar named Sliderz called the sheriff’s
department to report a fight; (2) the caller knew enough about the situation to describe the fight as
being between the brothers themselves at the bar; (3) dispatch considered the information
sufficiently reliable to warrant contacting the deputies on duty to advise them of the call and direct
them to investigate; (4) the caller was in a position to tell dispatch that one of the brothers had left
the scene; and (5) the caller provided a description of the vehicle the brother was driving, including
-9- color, make and model. Coupled with that, Deputy Lewallen, searching in the vicinity of the bar
within six minutes of the call, came across a vehicle matching the description (color, make, and
model) given, which he learned after contacting dispatch was registered to a Redding brother. He
then contacted the deputy investigating the fight and learned the deputy wanted the driver detained
in order to speak to him about the fight. It is based upon this body of information we are to evaluate
the reasonableness of the stop.
¶ 26 1. Practical Pitfalls in Applying Holmes
¶ 27 Even if we accepted defendant’s (and the trial court’s) premise the call was
anonymous, the outcome would be no different. The trial court concluded, “It is well established
that an anonymous tip, without more cannot provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,”
citing the argument made by the defendant in Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987. The court then
erroneously said it was the State’s responsibility to provide testimony from either Deputy Smith,
who was charged with investigating the bar fight, or the dispatcher, in order to test the reliability
of the information. First and foremost, the court accepted defense counsel’s suggestion the
information was anonymous, although that fact is not contained in the record. Regardless, it also
ignored the information known to Deputy Lewallen at the time of the stop, which formed the basis
for his reasonable suspicion. More importantly, the court shifted the burden to the State
prematurely. Had defendant presented testimony the original call was not as represented, or had
information that any reasonable police officer would have found suspect, or was never even made,
then the State would have been obligated to present evidence to justify the deputy’s reliance on
the information given. But the defendant did not present such testimony. As noted above, “The
officer’s conduct is judged by an objective standard, which analyzes whether the facts available to
the officer at the moment of the stop justify the action taken.” (Emphasis in original and internal
- 10 - quotation marks omitted.) Dunmire, 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶ 40 (citing Hill, 2019 IL App
(4th) 180041, ¶ 17).
¶ 28 2. Holmes’s Legal Deficiencies
¶ 29 Besides the trial court’s practical mistakes, we find its reliance on Holmes
misplaced, both legally and factually. In Holmes, the First District, much like defendant’s trial
counsel and the trial court here, characterized the information known to officers conducting a Terry
stop and frisk on a suspected gunman at a large Chicago park gathering as, “effectively,” an
anonymous tip. Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶ 2. In reality, the tip had come from a Chicago
Park District security guard who told a Chicago police sergeant a man, “described as black, about
five-and-a-half feet tall, wearing a purple shirt and black jeans” was in the park with a gun in his
pocket. Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶ 1. The sergeant conveyed the same information to
two Chicago police officers, who within two to three minutes found someone matching that
description. Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶ 1. The Holmes court ultimately found this
“effectively anonymous” tip “did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion” and “reverse[d]
the trial court’s denial of [defendant’s] motion to suppress.” Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987,
¶ 18.
¶ 30 In our view, the Holmes court unnecessarily provided a novel analysis for
“effectively anonymous” informant tips that we find flawed and inapplicable to these facts. First,
despite basing its analysis on its conclusion that police acted on an “effectively anonymous tip,”
the Holmes majority routinely noted how the tip was not actually anonymous but came from the
security guard. See Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶ 3 (acknowledging that knowing the
security guard provided the tip “arguably dissipated the cloud of anonymity”); Holmes, 2019 IL
App (1st) 160987, ¶ 18 (identifying the tip police acted upon as “the security guard’s tip”); Holmes,
- 11 - 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶ 21 (stating the tip started with the security guard); Holmes, 2019 IL
App (1st) 160987, ¶ 41 (noting defendant’s acknowledgment that “the tip from the security guard
*** [was] not anonymous in a literal sense”); Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶ 42 (noting
again how defendant’s “counsel acknowledged that the tip was not literally anonymous”). Besides
teetering on a faulty factual foundation, the Holmes court built its legal analysis upon a
misunderstanding of relevant precedent, namely Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990). Citing
White, the Holmes court announced, “An anonymous tip, without more, generally provides
‘virtually nothing’ by which one could conclude that the tipster is honest, that his or her
information is reliable, or that he or she has a basis by which to predict a suspect’s criminal
activity.” Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶ 22 (citing White, 496 U.S. at 329). But, as we see
it, this broad statement misunderstands and misapplies White—a case the Holmes majority found
instructive. See Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶¶ 22, 55. Because we see Holmes’s
misstatement of White as the first domino falling in its flawed analysis, we pause to closely
examine White.
¶ 31 In White, police received an anonymous telephone tip “stating that Vanessa White
would be leaving 235-C Lynwood Terrace Apartments at a particular time in a brown Plymouth
station wagon with the right taillight lens broken, that she would be going to Dobey’s Motel, and
that she would be in possession of about an ounce of cocaine inside a brown attaché case.” White,
496 U.S. at 327. Police corroborated the tip by finding the brown Plymouth station wagon at the
given address, observing the broken taillight, and following the wagon toward Dobey’s Motel
before conducting a Terry stop. White, 496 U.S. at 327. After receiving consent from White (the
driver), police searched her vehicle and purse and found marijuana and cocaine. White, 496 U.S.
- 12 - at 327. In upholding the Terry stop as reasonable and therefore constitutional, the Supreme Court
of the United States discussed informants’ tips and reasonable suspicion.
¶ 32 Unlike Holmes, White did not announce a general rule that anonymous tips alone
provide “virtually nothing” to determine if the tipster is reliable or if the bases for the tip prove
reliable. Instead, White quoted the “ ‘virtually nothing’ ” language when describing the specific tip
that included the brown Plymouth, the attaché case with cocaine, and Dobey’s Motel. White, 496
U.S. at 329 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983)). White merely acknowledged
tips—anonymous or otherwise—need more. In other words, informants’ tips must be corroborated
by police in order to establish reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop. See White, 496 U.S.
at 329-32. And in building on that principle, White instructed that the amount of police
corroboration necessary to find the tip reliable varies based on whether the police need reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to act. See White, 496 U.S. at 330 (“Reasonable suspicion is a less
demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish
probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is
less reliable than that required to show probable cause.”). Once police corroborate the significant
information in the tip, the less demanding reasonable suspicion standard is satisfied, and police
may make the investigative stop. White, 496 U.S. at 332 (“When significant aspects of the caller’s
predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also
that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the stop.”).
¶ 33 White made no generalizations that anonymous tips provide us “virtually nothing”
to test their reliability. White simply instructs that courts must look at the totality of the
circumstances, including the quantity and quality of information in the anonymous tip when
- 13 - deciding if police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. More importantly, White did
not dive into the deep rabbit hole of what it did not know, like precisely how the tipster learned
the information or precisely what an officer said to other officers in relaying the tip. Rather, White
considered the totality of the circumstances—the telephone tip and independent police
corroboration—and found those circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion—and found the
police action constitutional. See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014) (looking at the whole
picture, particularly what police corroborated or could infer from an anonymous tip and whether
that knowledge established reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances).
Interestingly, Holmes never mentions, let alone applies, a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
¶ 34 We cannot cosign the Holmes majority’s—and by extension this trial court’s—
novel “effectively anonymous” informant tip analysis when it proceeds from a misunderstanding
and misapplication of precedent. Instead, we find the Holmes dissent persuasive. Justice Mason’s
dissent, in our assessment, correctly focused on the reasonableness of the articulable suspicions
held by the officers to whom the information was conveyed by their sergeant when, within a matter
of minutes, still in the park, they found a person who matched the rather specific description. When
coupled with the observations and information known to the officer by the time of the stop, the
dissent in Holmes correctly found there was sufficient evidence upon which to conclude the
officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to warrant the stop of Holmes. “ ‘We do not view
these facts with analytical hindsight but instead consider them from the perspective of a reasonable
officer at the time the situation confronted him.’ ” Holmes, 2019 IL App (1st) 160987, ¶ 70
(Mason, P.J., dissenting) (quoting In re J.J., 183 Ill. App. 3d 381, 388, 539 N.E.2d 764, 768
(1989)). Justice Mason’s dissent also provided an excellent discussion of burden shifting in
suppression hearings, noting, as we have here, defendant had the burden of proof, both at the outset
- 14 - of the suppression motion and throughout. The State had only the burden of production if defendant
was able to establish the unreasonableness of the officer’s actions in stopping him.
¶ 35 3. Eyler
¶ 36 Rather than shoehorn the instant facts into the Holmes model, we opt to follow our
recent opinion in People v. Eyler, 2019 IL App (4th) 170064, because we find it on point and
useful. This court listed several factors to consider when evaluating the reliability of an anonymous
tip in Eyler, including “(1) whether the tip provides a sufficient quantity of information so that the
officer may be certain that the stopped individual is the one the tipster identified; (2) the time
interval between the officer receiving the tip and locating the suspect; (3) whether the tip is based
upon contemporaneous eyewitness observations; (4) whether the tip is sufficiently detailed to
permit the reasonable inference that the tipster has actually witnessed a crime; and (5) whether the
tip was made to a police emergency number.” Eyler, 2019 IL App (4th) 170064, ¶ 30 (citing People
v. Shafer, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1050, 868 N.E.2d 359, 363 (2007)). There is no question the caller
knew the individuals involved; he named them. Further, considering how the deputies testified
about “the Redding brothers,” it is reasonable to conclude they were already known to police. The
caller did not give a physical description but identified them as “the Redding brothers,” and that
was enough information for the deputies to know for whom they were looking. The caller’s
description of the vehicle proved correct as to make, model, and color since Deputy Lewallen saw
it and confirmed through dispatch it did, in fact, belong to a Redding. The caller’s information was
such that it was reasonable to believe he or she was present at the bar; he or she knew it was the
Redding brothers, knew they were fighting between themselves as opposed to fighting with
someone else, knew when one of them left the scene, and described the vehicle in which he left.
The call must have been either during or immediately after the fight because they informed
- 15 - dispatch one had left, and Deputy Lewallen, who received the call at 10 p.m., responded to the
area and found defendant and his vehicle at 10:06 p.m. The only factor from Eyler not contained
in the record is whether the call was placed to a police emergency number; although under the
circumstances, it is reasonable to believe it was. Furthermore, the fact the information contained
“predictive information” (defendant Redding had left the scene) and “readily observable details”
(the description of the vehicle registered to defendant found in the area) the deputies corroborated
or confirmed adds reliability. As a result, the information would be deemed even more reliable.
See Eyler, 2019 IL App (4th) 170064, ¶ 30.
¶ 37 Here, even if we consider this an anonymous tip case, when considering the totality
of the circumstances, the information provided by the caller demonstrated “sufficient indicia of
reliability” to justify a temporary Terry stop for investigative purposes. White, 496 U.S. at 327.
¶ 38 D. Radio Bulletin
¶ 39 In reality, this case hinges on the content of the radio dispatch received by the
deputies and not its source. The trial court cited People v. Lawson, 298 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1001, 700
N.E.2d 125, 129 (1998), for the proposition that, “when the State attempts to justify a warrantless
arrest on the basis of a radio bulletin, it must establish that the officer who issued the bulletin had
reasonable articulable suspicion to make the stop.” The trial court conflated two different
standards: reasonable articulable suspicion and probable cause. The correct standard, espoused by
Lawson when discussing a warrantless arrest, says the State “must establish that the officer who
issued the bulletin had probable cause to effect an arrest.” (Emphasis added.) Lawson, 298 Ill.
App. 3d at 1001 (citing People v. Bascom, 286 Ill. App. 3d 124, 127-28, 675 N.E.2d 1359, 1362
(1997)). The court in Lawson went on to say, “[I]f a flyer or [radio] bulletin has been issued on the
basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed
- 16 - an offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop.” (Emphasis in original and internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lawson, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1004. The United States Supreme Court
said so in United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985). There, the Court held an officer could
reasonably rely on a radio bulletin issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable
suspicion in order to justify a Terry stop, despite having no personal knowledge of the information
that formed the basis of a reasonable suspicion. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232. Illinois courts also permit
officers to rely on police radio transmissions to make Terry stops even if they are unaware of the
specific facts that established reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. See People v. Green, 2014
IL App (3d) 120522, ¶ 30, 19 N.E.3d 13; People v. Wallace, 2015 IL App (3d) 130489, ¶ 38, 42
N.E.3d 945; People v. Maxey, 2011 IL App (1st) 100011, ¶ 54, 949 N.E.2d 755 (and the cases
cited therein). While the information known to Deputy Lewallen may not have been sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest of defendant for the crime of battery, when coupled with the fact that
the officer assigned to the bar fight was requesting defendant be detained for questioning about a
possible criminal offense, it was sufficient to justify a traffic stop on the vehicle to investigate his
involvement in the bar fight at Sliderz. See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232-33 (holding that if a police
bulletin was issued from articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that the individual
committed an offense, the temporary stop based on the bulletin is justified to obtain further
information or check identification). “An officer may act on information provided by a third party
in making a Terry stop, but only if the information provided is reliable and allows an officer to
reasonably infer that a person was involved in criminal activity.” People v. Jackson, 348 Ill. App.
3d 719, 729, 810 N.E.2d 542, 553 (2004) (citing People v. Lockhart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 358, 362,
724 N.E.2d 540, 543 (2000)).
- 17 - ¶ 40 A police officer has authority to briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes
if the officer reasonably believes that person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry,
392 U.S. at 21-22. This is exactly what Deputy Lewallen did. He is the officer who made the
investigatory stop, not a warrantless arrest for the crime of battery. He was conducting a stop
pursuant to an ongoing investigation concerning defendant’s involvement in a bar fight that
occurred less than 10 minutes before. Deputy Lewallen acted based upon the information from
dispatch and at the behest of the investigating officer, who wanted to speak with defendant about
the fight. In our view, Terry allowed this investigative stop because the information relayed from
dispatch led officers to reasonably suspect defendant may have committed a crime. People v.
Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 505, 939 N.E.2d 463, 467 (2010) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22). As a result,
based on the testimony presented by defendant himself, there was no evidence the information
provided to the deputies by dispatch was unreliable or otherwise suspect. Looking at that
information objectively, the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing the stop was unlawful.
Having failed to do so, the trial court erred in granting the suppression motion.
¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 43 Reversed and remanded.
- 18 - No. 4-19-0252
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County, No. 18-DT-38; the Hon. Erick F. Hubbard, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Jay Scott, State’s Attorney, of Decatur (Patrick Delfino, David for J. Robinson, and James Ryan Williams, of State’s Attorneys Appellant: Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Catherine K. Hart, and Jessica L. Harris, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellee. Appellee:
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