People v. Tedtaotao

Opinion

r-r, r- . ?I , 'r, -- -- [ , !TI ,r-T 4 > , . ,I i l IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM ..r- !v".-. .f , , , , *&a n: u7 PEOPLE OF GUAM, CRIMINAL CASE NO. CF0050-09 ) Plaintiff, ) VS. 1 r: DECIS~ONAND ORDER RAYMUNDO TORRES TEDTAOTO, (Motion to Suppress) (aka Raymond Torres Tedtaotao)

II Defendant. ) I

I1 This matter came before the Honorable Elizabeth Barrett-Anderson on April 13, 2009 for

II hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Assistant Attorney General Suzanne K.

Ilrepresented the People. Appearing on behalf of Defendant was Attorney James L. Canto a. Afte

reading the briefs and upon hearing the arguments, the Court took the matter under advisement. Th 1 Court now issues its Decision and Order.

II FACTUAL EUSTORY

II// On January 29,2009, at approximately 12:OO p.m., Officer John Aguon pulled over and stopped a( I( vehicle in which the Defendant was a passenger. The stopped vehicle had been reported stolen, however i 11 it is this Court's understanding that the police never suspected the Defendant of stealing the vehicle. A 9 I I Subsequently,Officer Lizama verbally informed the Defendant of his Miranda rights and then transportedI approximately 12:06 p.m. Officer Frank Lizama told Mr. Tedtaotao to step out of the vehicle

II the Defendant in a police vehicle to the Dededo Precinct Police Station (hereinafter "Precinct")

According to Officer Lizarna's report, at approximately 12:35 p.m. he informed Mr. Tedtaotao of hi

Miranda rights again via the Custodial Interrogation Form and Mr. Tedtaotao declined to provide

)I statement. The timeline of events after that point are not clear as there are numerous inconsistencied

I1 I found in the police reports related to the Defendant on that day. After reading the conflicting polic (reports, it is clear that the Defendant was detained, and transported beyond the immediate vicinity of th

I e( (original detention, for anywhere between 32 minutes to 1.5 hours prior to his formal arrest in violation o

8 G.C.A. $30.30. ! DISCUSSION

Just like the factual circumstances in People v. CundifJ;

[tlhe facts of this case are similar to the facts in Dunaway v. New York, I 442 U.S. 2000 (1979), where police, without probably cause, took the defendant into custody, transported him to the police station and detained him for interrogation. Id. at 2 16. The Court held that the police officers' actions were unconstitutional, and held that 'detention for custodial interrogation -regardless of its label - intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.. .[that such] trigger[s] the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.' Id.

2006 Guam 12, 7 22 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2006). Here Mr. Tedtaotao could not have reasonably believed h el was free to leave, hence seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, when the Officer Lizama instructed Mr i Tedtaotao out of the vehicle, transported him in a GPD Patrol Vehcle to the Precinct, as well as durin the time he was being investigated at the Precinct prior to his arrest. A "seizure made without a warrant per se unreasonable unless it falls within the specifically established and well delineated exceptions".

at 7 26. Those exceptions are not found in the facts of this case. Unlike People v. Cundif, the Defendant argues that "any and all evidence obtained by the police

officers must be deemed inadmissible in any criminal proceedings against Mr. Tedtaotao" because of the violation of 8 G.C.A. § 30.30. Def.'s Mot. to Suppress (Mar. 12, 2009) at p. 5. This Court does not believe based on the evidence that the People have satisfied their burden to prove that the officers had probable cause to seize, or in effect, arrest Mr. Tedtaotao at the scene of the investigatory stop. Pursuan to 8 G.C.A. § 30.40, if there was not probable cause to arrest, then after the permitted fifteen minut detention, Mr. Tedtaotao should have been released or asked to voluntarily submit to further 4 but in no event should have been seized and transported to the Precinct for questioning. The search of hi

person was unlawful because there was no lawful arrest', no probable cause for the search, and no consen

given. Furthermore, the People have failed to present independent evidence and the Court has found non 9 that would "break the causal connection" between Mr. Tedtaotao's unlawful detention and arrest and th

evidence obtained from his person at the time of the arrest. 2006 Guam 12 at 7 4 1.

I Additionally, while not argued extensively by the Defendant and not necessary for the current Motion to Suppress, this Cou questions whether the eventual official arrest based on an identification by a "witness observ[ing] Mr. Tedtaotao by himself in holding cell and asked if he is the one she observed 2 weeks ago" is a lawful arrest that could withstand the scrutiny of a to suppress under 8 G.C.A. 8 20.35. Def.'s Mot. to Suppress (Mar. 12, 2009) at p. 2. The search of the vehicle was separate and independent of Defendant's illegal detention an

eventual arrest. Rakas v. Illinois is clear that a passenger in a vehicle who asserts neither a propriety nor

possessory interest in the vehicle has no legitimate right of privacy insofar as any search of the vehicl

and therefore cannot vicariously assert Fourth Amendment rights. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Since the searc

of the vehicle is not a direct violation of Defendant's rights, as he does not have standing to allege

Fourth Amendment violation, Defendant has no valid legal argument to suppress the evidence foun

inside the vehicle. This Court need not address whether or not the search of the vehicle was permissible.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED in part and the People ar

ORDERED to suppress all evidence obtained by the police fiom Mr. Tedtaotao's person at any time o January 29, 2009 related to this case. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED in part regarding a1 evidence obtained by Officer Flores during the vehicle check.

This matter is ASSERTED. Defendant asserted on February 11, 2009. On February 24ththe Co

granted withdrawal of the Alternative Public Defender due to a conflict; time tolled. On March 6"

Attorney Jaime Canto appeared as appointed counsel for Defendant; time resumed. On March 13" hearing the Court was informed that a Motion to Compel Discovery and a Motion to Suppress Evidenc were filed; time tolled. Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery was GRANTED at hearing on 13'". Effective issuance of this Decision speed trial time resumes.

.JURY SELECTION and TRIAL is scheduled for May 13, 2009, at 1:30 p.m. A Trial Schedulin Order is issued concurrent with this Decision.

II IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of April 2009.