People v. Tedtaotao

Opinion

, i 9 ?X Liz 11 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) qef 81 \ ! I , CRIMINAL CASE NO. CFOO50-09

4 VS. 1 DECISION AND ORDER RAYMUNDO TORRES TEDTAOTAO, (Speedy Trial)

8 11 On May 14, 2009 People filed an Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration of Dismissal Du el 1I1I to Violation of Speedy Trial Rights (hereinafter "Motion"). On May 18, 2009 the Honorabl

L.I4 10 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON heard People's Motion. The People were represented b 11 I/ Assistant Attorney General Stephen F. Leon Guerrero. Defendant was represented by James 12 11 Canto 11. After reading the briefs and upon hearing the arguments, the Court took the matte 1 13 II under advisement. The Court now issues its Decision and Order. I FACTUAL HISTORY I 15 II I(violation. A chronology of the history of h s case is crucial to the Court's determination of speedy tria 1 16 Therefore, the following dates apply herein: I l7 11 - February 6,2009 Defendant is indicted. I - - February llthDefendant is arraigned and asserted his speedy trial right. February 1 2 ' ~the Public Defender ("PD") filed a motion to withdraw due I to a conflict in representing co-defendant, Harry Mantanona. Alternative Public Defender ("APD") was appointed that same day.

- February isth APD submitted its motion to withdraw on the basis that it was also appointed to represent co-defendant, Harry Mantanona on other criminal cases. The motion was "received" by the Court, but not filed as no hearing date was scheduled.

February 24ththe matter was scheduled on calendar as Defendant's first Trial Setting. The Court heard and granted APD's motion to withdraw, un-opposed by the People, and appointed Attorney John Terlaje.

27 28 11 - - March 2ndAtty. Terlaje submitted an ex parte motion to withdraw.

March 3rdCourt heard and granted Atty. Terlaje's motion and appointed Atty. Jaime Canto. - March 1 2 ' ~Atty. Canto submits various motions. - March 1 3 ' ~the Court sets the motions and officially informs Defendant that speedy trial time is tolled while motions are under consideration.

April 2oththe Court renders its decision and order on all motions.

While Defendant's Motion to Suppress was not filed with the Court until March 16 2009, t h s Court recognized Defendant's Motion to Suppress that was received by the Court an confirmed with Defendant that his speedy trial right would be tolled until this Court issued decision on the Motion to Suppress on March 13, 2009. Based on 8 G.C.A $1.25(a) time tolle effective March 14'~. This Court issued its Decision and Order on the Motion to Suppress o April 20, 2009; tolling ended. On May 12, 2009, Defendant was arraigned on a supersedin indictment, and the Court informed both the People and Defendant of its concern of a possibl violation of Defendant's speedy trial right. Both parties agreed that 45 days had passed. Defendant moved to dismiss with prejudice on the grounds that his speedy trial rights had bee violated, and double jeopardy had attached. Trial was scheduled to start on May 13, 2009. Th Court dismissed the case against the Defendant with prejudice. DISCUSSION This Court finds that the People needed to commence a trial against the Defendant on May 12, 2009. The following dates are tolled: February llth;February 1 9 ' ~- February 24th; March 3rd; March 1 4 -~April ~ 2oth. The date Defendant asserted is excluded under 8 G.C.A. $1.25(a). Any of the days the Defendant was not represented by counsel "is excludable for good cause since it was clearly to [Defendmtl's benefit to have an attorney represent him." People v. Ibnnez, 1992 WL 9722 1 (D.Guarn.App.Div.1992). February 11'h was a concurrent and simultaneous withdrawal of PD and appointment of APD, therefore, this time is not tolled as there is no period of time within a 24 hour period that the Defendant was not represented by counsel. The Court excluded February 24th and March 3rd from the 45 day calculation on the basis that the Defendant was without counsel more than 24 hours prior to the Court's consideration of the withdrawal motions and new appointments. Finally, the 45 day limit established by 8.G.C.A. §80.60(a)(2) is further tolled for good cause while the Motion to Suppress was pending. Time tolled from March 1 4 ~the ~ ' day after the Court acted in setting the motion for hearing, through April 2oththe date the Court issued its decision and order, inclusive. Based on the Court's 45 day calculation, the People were required to bring the Defendant to trial on May 1 2 ~Trial ~ . was scheduled on May 13'~.The Court specifically rejects the People's attempt to calculate the speedy trial clock otherwise. This Court is not persuaded that 8 G.C.A. 5 80.60(b)(l) is applicable to this criminal action. A defendant can never implicitly waive a constitutional right. "Given the fundamental nature of the right to speedy trial, only the defendant, himself, and not his counsel, may waive this right. Such a waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." People v. Mendiola, 1999 Guam 8 at 7 31 (internal citations omitted). Failure of Defendant's counsel to object to the trial date prior to the expiration of the 45 days does not constitute a voluntary, knowing or intelligent waiver by the Defendant. To hold otherwise would allow the People to automatically have 55 days to commence criminal trials and shift the burden to all defendants to object or be deemed to have implicitly consented to the additional 10 days. The legislature is clear that criminal actions are to be dismissed if trials are not commenced within 45 days, unless a defendant has consented. There being no further basis in "good cause" to toll the Defendant's right to a speedy trial, the Court must dismiss this matter. Based on the above, People's Motion for Reconsideration of Dismissal Due to Violation of Speedy Trial Rights is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case be, and hereby is, DISMISSED with prejudice with regard to Defendant RAYMOND T. TEDTAOTAO. IT IS SO ORDERED this 1 9 ' ~day of May 2009.