People v. Stanley Jones

245 N.W.2d 91, 69 Mich. App. 459, 1976 Mich. App. LEXIS 772

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 14, 1976
• Docket: Docket 23535
• Status: Published

Opinions

McGregor, J.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree, MCLA 750.316; MSA 28.548, and subsequently sentenced to life in prison. He appeals as a matter of right.

Defendant raises four issues for our consideration. However, we need discuss only one as it necessitates the reversal of defendant’s conviction.

Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing adequately to present to the jury the defense theory that the killing was accidental. On the authority of People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 461 (1975), we are constrained to agree.

In Ora Jones, the Supreme Court stated:

"The defense theory was accidental shooting. The trial court’s instruction did not adequately present this to the jury. The only places in the instruction which touched directly upon the theory of accident were two: In defining homicide the court said:

" 'Members of the jury, the word homicide means the killing of one human being by another human being.

" 'Homicides in turn are divided into a number of classifications or degrees: felonious homicides, excusable homicides, justifiable homicides, or accidental homicides.

" 'It is only felonious homicides, members of the jury, that are punishable by statute in Michigan.’ ”

and in defining 'wilfully’ the court said:

" 'It means a wrongful criminal act done intentionally as opposed to an act done accidentally.’

'The court did not instruct the jury that if the jury found the shooting was accidental it should £nd the defendant not guilty. While a logician or one skilled in the law could have gleaned such a rule from the instructions given, we are not satisfied that the instructions fairly and fully presented the case to the jury in an understandable manner. Whether the shooting was intentional or accidental was the central issue in the case and read as a whole these instructions did not direct the jury’s attention to this issue.” (Emphasis added.) 395 Mich 379, 394.

The instructions in the instant case cannot be meaningfully distinguished from those given in Ora Jones. The instructions in the instant case touched directly upon the theory of accident only once but did not clearly direct the jury’s attention to this central issue. Furthermore, although the defendant in the instant case did not request such an instruction nor object to the instructions as given, the same situation was present in Ora Jones and not deemed controlling. See Ora Jones, dissenting opinion. Consequently, we hold that the trial court’s failure adequately to present the defendant’s theory to the jury was reversible error in spite of the fact that no request or objection was made.

Conviction reversed; remanded for a new trial.

N. J. Kaufman, J., concurred.