T. G. Kavanagh, C. J.
Defendant’s initial conviction of first-degree murder was reversed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. Upon retrial, defendant was charged with second degree murder and convicted by a jury of that offense. That conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. People v Jones, 45 Mich App 373; 206 NW2d 453 (1973). We granted leave to consider the failure to instruct on lesser included offenses.
Testimony indicated that defendant was sitting in the living room of an apartment he shared with the decedent, Phyllis Grace. A female friend of the decedent came to visit her and, on the decedent’s invitation, the two women left the living room and entered the kitchen where they carried on a conversation. After a few minutes, while they were standing in the kitchen, defendant rose from the couch, went to a closet, and removed a shotgun he had stored there. He then proceeded to the kitchen [385]*385door where he aimed the weapon at the decedent and the gun discharged, fatally wounding the decedent.
Two police officers called to the scene testified that upon their entering the apartment the defendant made a statement to the effect that 'T [have] just done something I should have done a long time ago”. This statement was ruled admissible by the trial judge subsequent to a Walker-type hearing held during the course of the trial. The defendant denied making such a statement.
The defendant testified that he took the shotgun from a closet and approached the kitchen with the intention of frightening the female companion from the apartment.
He testified that he did not aim the weapon intentionally, that he did not know the weapon was loaded, and that the weapon accidentally discharged when he was bumped by the fleeing female companion.
During both his opening statement and closing argument, defense counsel asserted the shooting was accidental. During his closing argument he also alluded to the fact that the jury might find the defendant guilty of manslaughter rather than murder in the second degree.
The court instructed the jury on murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter. Defendant did not object to these instructions.
Subsequent to the giving of these instructions and before the jury retired to consider its verdict, defense counsel requested the trial judge to instruct the jury on the statutory offense of killing or injuring a person by careless, reckless or negligent discharge of a firearm,1 claiming this was a lesser included offense of second-degree murder. [386]*386The trial judge ruled defendant was not entitled to such a charge and refused the request.
Our disposition of this appeal requires only consideration of the claimed errors in instructing the jury.
We conclude that the trial court erred in the following respects:
1. In refusing to give the requested instruction on the statutory offense of careless discharge of a firearm. MCLA 752.861; MSA 28.436(21).
2. In giving a misleading instruction on manslaughter.
3. In failing to instruct adequately that an accidental homicide is not murder or manslaughter.
We conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to instruct on a statutory manslaughter offense, MCLA 750.329; MSA 28.561, not requested by defendant.
I
In People v Henry, 395 Mich 367; 236 NW2d 489 (1975), we held that a trial court is not ordinarily required to instruct on lesser included offenses unless request for those instructions is properly made.
In the case at bar, defense counsel requested instructions on the offense of reckless use of firearms causing death. The trial judge refused the request, stating that reckless use of firearms was not a lesser included offense of second degree murder.
The law of lesser included offenses in Michigan has not been clear or consistent:
"The case law is not in agreement as to either the elements of the various crimes or the lesser offenses, [387]*387and there tends to be a stratification of law along the lines of individual crimes, so that in one instance, instructions on lesser offenses are routinely given sua sponte, whereas in other crimes they are rarely if ever given sua sponte, although both crimes are equally susceptible to lesser offenses.” Koenig, The Many-Headed Hydra Of Lesser Included Offenses: A Herculean Task for the Michigan Courts, 1 DCL Rev 41, 42 fns 3, 4 (1975).
The common-law definition of lesser included offenses is that the lesser must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without, first having committed the lesser. 4 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, § 1799. This definition includes only necessarily included lesser offenses. This definition, however, is generally conceded to be unduly restrictive, and thus most jurisdictions, including Michigan, have statutes that are broadly construed to permit conviction of "cognate” or allied offenses of the same nature, under a sufficient charge.2 These lesser offenses are related and hence "cognate” in the sense that they share several elements, and are of the same class or category, but may contain some elements not found in the higher offense.
"The practical differences become evident when one considers an indictment containing allegations of facts which are extraneous to the basic offense on which defendant is to be tried, but which are essential elements of some lesser 'cognate’ offense.” Comment, Jury [388]*388Instructions On Lesser Included Offenses, 57 Nw U L Rev 62, 63 (1962).
It is elementary that a defendant may not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged. DeJonge v Oregon, 299 US 353; 57 S Ct 255; 81 L Ed 278 (1937). The reason is apparent: The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments give a defendant the right to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him.3
Thus, while there is comparatively little difficulty with the necessarily included lesser offenses, the cognate lesser included offenses are somewhat more difficult to ascertain, conceptually as well as practically. One guide to the minimal due process notice requirements in this area was set out in Paterno v Lyons, 334 US 314; 68 S Ct 1044; 92 L Ed 1409 (1948), wherein the Court said that due process notice requirements are met if the greater charged crime and the lesser included offense are of the same or of an overlapping nature.4
While the distinction between cognate and necessarily included lesser offenses is helpful in analyzing the subject of lesser included offenses, the distinction has largely disappeared.
If the lesser offense is of the same class or category, or closely related to the originally charged offense, so as to provide fair notice to the defendant that he will be required to defend against it, the lesser offense is or may be included within the greater.
The failure to advert to the nature of the "cognate” lesser included offense has caused confusion. The fact that a lesser offense, within the same [389]*389category as the greater charged offense, has an element not included within the greater does not
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T. G. Kavanagh, C. J.
Defendant’s initial conviction of first-degree murder was reversed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. Upon retrial, defendant was charged with second degree murder and convicted by a jury of that offense. That conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. People v Jones, 45 Mich App 373; 206 NW2d 453 (1973). We granted leave to consider the failure to instruct on lesser included offenses.
Testimony indicated that defendant was sitting in the living room of an apartment he shared with the decedent, Phyllis Grace. A female friend of the decedent came to visit her and, on the decedent’s invitation, the two women left the living room and entered the kitchen where they carried on a conversation. After a few minutes, while they were standing in the kitchen, defendant rose from the couch, went to a closet, and removed a shotgun he had stored there. He then proceeded to the kitchen [385]*385door where he aimed the weapon at the decedent and the gun discharged, fatally wounding the decedent.
Two police officers called to the scene testified that upon their entering the apartment the defendant made a statement to the effect that 'T [have] just done something I should have done a long time ago”. This statement was ruled admissible by the trial judge subsequent to a Walker-type hearing held during the course of the trial. The defendant denied making such a statement.
The defendant testified that he took the shotgun from a closet and approached the kitchen with the intention of frightening the female companion from the apartment.
He testified that he did not aim the weapon intentionally, that he did not know the weapon was loaded, and that the weapon accidentally discharged when he was bumped by the fleeing female companion.
During both his opening statement and closing argument, defense counsel asserted the shooting was accidental. During his closing argument he also alluded to the fact that the jury might find the defendant guilty of manslaughter rather than murder in the second degree.
The court instructed the jury on murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter. Defendant did not object to these instructions.
Subsequent to the giving of these instructions and before the jury retired to consider its verdict, defense counsel requested the trial judge to instruct the jury on the statutory offense of killing or injuring a person by careless, reckless or negligent discharge of a firearm,1 claiming this was a lesser included offense of second-degree murder. [386]*386The trial judge ruled defendant was not entitled to such a charge and refused the request.
Our disposition of this appeal requires only consideration of the claimed errors in instructing the jury.
We conclude that the trial court erred in the following respects:
1. In refusing to give the requested instruction on the statutory offense of careless discharge of a firearm. MCLA 752.861; MSA 28.436(21).
2. In giving a misleading instruction on manslaughter.
3. In failing to instruct adequately that an accidental homicide is not murder or manslaughter.
We conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to instruct on a statutory manslaughter offense, MCLA 750.329; MSA 28.561, not requested by defendant.
I
In People v Henry, 395 Mich 367; 236 NW2d 489 (1975), we held that a trial court is not ordinarily required to instruct on lesser included offenses unless request for those instructions is properly made.
In the case at bar, defense counsel requested instructions on the offense of reckless use of firearms causing death. The trial judge refused the request, stating that reckless use of firearms was not a lesser included offense of second degree murder.
The law of lesser included offenses in Michigan has not been clear or consistent:
"The case law is not in agreement as to either the elements of the various crimes or the lesser offenses, [387]*387and there tends to be a stratification of law along the lines of individual crimes, so that in one instance, instructions on lesser offenses are routinely given sua sponte, whereas in other crimes they are rarely if ever given sua sponte, although both crimes are equally susceptible to lesser offenses.” Koenig, The Many-Headed Hydra Of Lesser Included Offenses: A Herculean Task for the Michigan Courts, 1 DCL Rev 41, 42 fns 3, 4 (1975).
The common-law definition of lesser included offenses is that the lesser must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without, first having committed the lesser. 4 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, § 1799. This definition includes only necessarily included lesser offenses. This definition, however, is generally conceded to be unduly restrictive, and thus most jurisdictions, including Michigan, have statutes that are broadly construed to permit conviction of "cognate” or allied offenses of the same nature, under a sufficient charge.2 These lesser offenses are related and hence "cognate” in the sense that they share several elements, and are of the same class or category, but may contain some elements not found in the higher offense.
"The practical differences become evident when one considers an indictment containing allegations of facts which are extraneous to the basic offense on which defendant is to be tried, but which are essential elements of some lesser 'cognate’ offense.” Comment, Jury [388]*388Instructions On Lesser Included Offenses, 57 Nw U L Rev 62, 63 (1962).
It is elementary that a defendant may not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged. DeJonge v Oregon, 299 US 353; 57 S Ct 255; 81 L Ed 278 (1937). The reason is apparent: The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments give a defendant the right to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him.3
Thus, while there is comparatively little difficulty with the necessarily included lesser offenses, the cognate lesser included offenses are somewhat more difficult to ascertain, conceptually as well as practically. One guide to the minimal due process notice requirements in this area was set out in Paterno v Lyons, 334 US 314; 68 S Ct 1044; 92 L Ed 1409 (1948), wherein the Court said that due process notice requirements are met if the greater charged crime and the lesser included offense are of the same or of an overlapping nature.4
While the distinction between cognate and necessarily included lesser offenses is helpful in analyzing the subject of lesser included offenses, the distinction has largely disappeared.
If the lesser offense is of the same class or category, or closely related to the originally charged offense, so as to provide fair notice to the defendant that he will be required to defend against it, the lesser offense is or may be included within the greater.
The failure to advert to the nature of the "cognate” lesser included offense has caused confusion. The fact that a lesser offense, within the same [389]*389category as the greater charged offense, has an element not included within the greater does not preclude the lesser from being included within the greater. This rule was enunciated in Michigan in 1861 in People v McDonald, 9 Mich 150 (1861), where the Court stated that a defendant indicted for assault with intent to commit murder could be convicted of "an assault, or assault and battery only. Upon a charge for felonious assault, the lesser offense of an assault, or an assault and battery is, under our statutes, included”. 9 Mich at 153.5 Of course under a strict "necessarily included” test, an assault and battery offense would not be included, as battery is an element not required for the higher assault with intent to murder offense. Thus, although we recognized the broader definition in 1861, we have not followed it with consistency, with the result that different theoretical definitions have been followed which have led to different results.
While it is true that reckless discharge of a firearm causing death is not always a lesser included offense of second-degree murder, e.g., if the killing were done by stabbing, it may be such a lesser included offense, as it was in the case at bar.
Analysis of the offense charged (second-degree murder), and the lesser offense on which instruction was requested (careless, reckless, or negligent discharge of a firearm causing death), demonstrates the overlapping of certain elements and common statutory purpose. The common purpose is the protection against killing or injury to the person. The overlapping elements relate first to a "reckless” state of mind concerning damage to [390]*390human life and secondly to an activity or intended activity to kill or injure a person. Both of these overlapping elements relate to the common purpose of the statutes, i.e., to protect against killing or injury to the person. The offenses are cognate; the elements shared by the two offenses coincide in the harm to the societal interest to be protected.
The duty of the trial judge to instruct on lesser included offenses is determined by the evidence. People v Phillips, 385 Mich 30; 187 NW2d 211 (1971). If evidence has been presented which would support a conviction of a lesser included offense, refusal to give a requested instruction is reversible error. Id. at 36. People v Hamilton, 76 Mich 212; 42 NW 1131 (1889).
If the lesser offense is one that is necessarily included within the greater, the evidence will always support the lesser if it supports the greater.
In the area of "cognate” lesser offenses, the evidence in each case adduced at the particular trial must be examined to determine whether that evidence would support a conviction of the lesser offense. In the case at bar, the evidence was undisputed that the killing resulted from a shotgun blast. The defendant claimed that the blast was accidental.
Because the evidence adduced at trial would have supported a guilty verdict on the offense of careless, reckless or negligent discharge of firearms causing death, the trial court was required to accede to defendant’s request to instruct the jury that such offense was a lesser included offense of the charge of second-degree murder.
II
There were no requests by counsel for instruc[391]*391tions on manslaughter. The court, nevertheless, instructed the jury that they could find defendant guilty of manslaughter, though the language used covered only voluntary manslaughter. The judge instructed as follows:
"Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful, intentional killing of another without malice, but where the killing is done under some great provocation before the passions have had time to subside, and the blood to cool.
"Whether or not there is a legally sufficient provocation in this case is a question of fact for you to determine from a consideration of all the testimony and the evidence in this case.
"Before you can find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, you must find that the people have established each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
"First, that the defendant unlawfully, intentionally killed Phyllis Grace.
"Second, that this was a killing without malice either express or implied, but the defendant was acting under a great provocation, as the court has defined that term.
"Third, that the defendant committed the crime on July 24, of 1969.
"And fourth, that the crime was committed by the defendant in the City of Detroit, Wayne County, State of Michigan.
"If you find that the people have established each and every one of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of manslaughter.
"On the other hand, if the people have failed to establish all of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt as I have defined that term, you must find the defendant not guilty of manslaughter.”
Defendant alleges that the above quoted instruction was erroneous and prevented the jury from considering either involuntary manslaughter or the statutory offense of manslaughter resulting [392]*392from a firearm pointed intentionally but without malice.6
In People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 590-591; 218 NW2d 136 (1974), this Court discussed the necessary elements of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter:
"A defendant properly convicted of voluntary manslaughter is a person who has acted out of a temporary excitement induced by an adequate provocation and not from the deliberation and reflection that marks the crime of murder. People v Younger, [380 Mich 678; 158 NW2d 493 (1968)] supra, 681-682; People v Droste, 160 Mich 66, 79; 125 NW 87 (1910); People v Bucsko, 241 Mich 1, 3; 216 NW 372(1927).
"The elements of involuntary manslaughter, although not completely exclusive of those found in voluntary manslaughter are distinguishable in several respects. They define a crime that originates out of circumstances often quite different from those found in voluntary manslaughter and apply to a defendant who did not proceed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury. In the leading case of People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923), the Court approved the following definition of involuntary manslaughter:
"' "Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.” ’
"The usual situations in which involuntary manslaughter arise are either when death results from a direct act not intended to produce serious bodily harm, People v Carter, 387 Mich 397, 419; 197 NW2d 57 (1972), People v Austin, 221 Mich 635, 643-645; 192 NW 590 (1923), or when death results from criminal negligence. People v Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329; 28 NW 883 (1886); People v Townsend, 214 Mich 267; 183 NW 177; 16 ALR 902 (1921).”
[393]*393Appellant contends that confronted with a manslaughter instruction expressly limited to only the voluntary type the jury was precluded from finding manslaughter based on defendant’s theory of the facts.
We agree.
The prosecutor claimed intentional shooting, the defendant maintained it was accidental. The jury was not obliged to accept either theory but could have concluded that the killing was the result of criminal negligence, e.g., involuntary manslaughter. Had the judge not instructed at all on manslaughter, there would be no reversible error, because no request for instruction on manslaughter was made. See People v Henry, 395 Mich 367; 236 NW2d 489 (1975).
Having undertaken to do so, however, it was reversible error to give a misleading instruction which recognized only the prosecution’s theory but not the defendant’s.
Michigan has a statutory definition of manslaughter which defendant alleges fits the facts of this case and on which an instruction should have been given. MCLA 750.329; MSA 28.561 provides:
"Any person who shall wound, maim or injure any other person by the discharge of any firearm, pointed or aimed, intentionally but without malice, at any such person, shall, if death ensue from such wounding, maiming or injury, be deemed guilty of the crime of manslaughter.”
We agree that on the evidence presented in this case the trial court would have been required if requested to instruct on this offense.
Since no such instruction was requested, there was no reversible error in failing to give it. People v Henry, 395 Mich 367; 236 NW2d 489 (1975).
[394]*394III
The defense theory was accidental shooting. The trial court’s instruction did not adequately present this to the jury. The only places in the instruction which touched directly upon the theory of accident were two: In defining homicide the court said:
"Members of the jury, the word homicide means the killing of one human being by another human being.
"Homicides in turn are divided into a number of classifications or degrees: felonious homicides, excusable homicides, justifiable homicides, or accidental homicides.
"It is only felonious homicides, members of the jury, that are punishable by statute in Michigan.”
and in defining "wilfully” the court said:
"It means a wrongful criminal act done intentionally as opposed to an act done accidentally.”
The court did not instruct the jury that if the jury found the shooting was accidental it should find the defendant not guilty. While a logician or one skilled in the law could have gleaned such a rule from the instructions given, we are not satisfied that the instructions fairly and fully presented the case to the jury in an understandable manner. Whether the shooting was intentional or accidental was the central issue in the case and read as a whole these instructions did not direct the jury’s attention to this issue.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Williams, Levin, and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with T. G. Kavanagh, C. J.
[395]*395Lindemer and Ryan, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.