Opinion
ANDERSON, P. J.
Gary Lee Shepeard (appellant) appeals from the Contra Costa County Superior Court order refusing to recall and resentence him after a hearing conducted pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (f)-1
On March 27, 1981, after negotiations with the prosecutor, appellant pled guilty in one information to count I, possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and count II, possession of a concealable firearm by an ex-felon (Pen. Code, § 12021), and in another information to two counts of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon.
In open court the prosecutor announced the terms of the plea agreement as follows: Appellant would plead guilty to the above four counts and two pending related felony charges (§ 246—discharging a firearm in an inhabited dwelling and § 12021—possession of a firearm by an ex-felon), and several pending unrelated misdemeanor charges would all be dismissed. Appellant agreed to accept a maximum sentence of four years and four months (fifty-two months).2
[583]*583Pursuant to the plea and sentence negotiations, appellant was sentenced on the first information (case No. 24925) to the upper term of three years on count I and to a consecutive term of eight months on count II. In case No. 25273, he was sentenced to an additional term of eight months on count I, to run consecutive to the sentence imposed on the first information and to a term of two years on count II, to run concurrently. As agreed, his sentence term totaled fifty-two months.
Two months later the Board of Prison Terms (the Board) notified the superior court that the sentence imposed on appellant was disparately long— by eight months (due to the imposition of one of the consecutive terms). The Board recommended that appellant’s sentence be recalled and that he be resentenced to a total term not to exceed 44 months.
After reviewing and giving great weight to the Board’s report and hearing testimony, the sentencing court found that appellant’s sentence was not disparate and accordingly refused to recall and resentence appellant. This appeal followed.
I
Section 1170, subdivision (f), requires the Board to review sentences imposed under the determinate sentencing law (DSL).3
The disparate [584]*584sentence review process assumes that the sentence under scrutiny is legally correct; its exclusive concern is with the statistical uniformity of DSL sentences imposed on those convicted of similar crimes under similar circumstances. (People v. Herrera (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 590, 597 [179 Cal.Rptr. 694].)
Apparently the Board compiles data on all DSL prisoners for use in a three-step process designed to identify disparate sentences. (See People v. Herrera, supra, at pp. 597-598.)
Chairman Ray Brown’s communication to the sentencing court herein described the process: First, an “automated sentence review”4 indicated that the sentence imposed on appellant warranted further scrutiny by the Board; next, the case was referred to the sentence review unit (the Unit) for further review as a “variant” case, i.e., one whose sentence differs from that of other comparable cases. Appellant’s case was then compared with 31 other offenders sharing the following common factors: drug possession; on supervised release/probation at time of the offense; no prior violent juvenile convictions; no prior adult state/federal prison terms; no injured victims; and no weapon use by accomplices. The Unit concluded that a substantial difference existed between the sentence imposed on appellant and those in the “comparison group.” In the final phase, the Unit submitted a detailed report to a panel of the Board. The panel concluded that appellant’s sentence was in fact disparate. The Board then recommended recall and resentencing. (See fn. 2, ante, at p. 582.)
Within the prescribed statutory period the sentencing court held a hearing to determine whether appellant’s sentence was disparate and presumably if so found, whether it should be recalled. At the disparate sentencing hearing, the Board’s report was received into evidence and the court noted that the [585]*585report was entitled to great weight. The district attorney called two witnesses: the Board’s sentence review analyst and the assistant counsel for the Board. Both witnesses testified that when reviewing appellant’s sentence for disparity, the Board was aware that some charges were dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations between appellant and the prosecutor. However, the Board was not aware of the nature of those dismissed charges. The fact that a sentence is the result of a plea agreement is noted in the DSL prisoner’s file, but it is the Board’s policy not to use the negotiated plea as a factor “to establish comparability between the case that is being reviewed and other cases.” The witnesses testified that in appellant’s case, had the Board known that firearm use, a dismissed charge, was involved, that factor might have altered the relevant comparison group and potentially the Board’s ultimate finding of disparity.
In the present case, it is clear that the trial court has met the obligations imposed upon it by statute and by People v. Herrera, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d 590. Herrera established a two-part analysis: (1) the trial court must determine whether a sentence is in fact disparate; and (2) if the sentence is found to be disparate, the judge must then decide whether to recall the sentence using the “ ‘observed sentencing pattern’ ” as a guideline. (At pp. 601-602.)
In its determination under part I of the Herrera analysis, a trial court must accord “great weight” to the Board’s finding of disparity. If the record shows that the trial court seriously considered the information provided by the Board, then the trial court has met its burden under part I of the analysis. If the court finds that the sentence is not disparate, no further inquiry is necessary, and the trial court may then refuse to resentence the defendant. (People v. Herrera, supra, at p. 601.)
Herein the trial court properly found that appellant’s sentence was not disparate. The court was required to do no more.5 Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s finding that appellant’s sentence is not disparate and its refusal to resentence him.
II
The instant case presents an issue not raised in Herrera or Mitchell: Whether a sentence that was negotiated by the parties and approved by the [586]*586court is subject to disparate sentencing review at all. The answer is not clear.
The negotiated disposition has long been an important factor in the administration of criminal law and it has been judicially sanctioned as an appropriate method of disposing of criminal prosecutions. (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 604 [91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409]; In re Hawley (1967) 67 Cal.2d 824, 828 [63 Cal.Rptr. 831, 433 P.2d 919].) This long established practice of plea negotiation was recently codified in 1970 and as codified specifically provides for binding sentence agreements between the court and the parties.
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Opinion
ANDERSON, P. J.
Gary Lee Shepeard (appellant) appeals from the Contra Costa County Superior Court order refusing to recall and resentence him after a hearing conducted pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (f)-1
On March 27, 1981, after negotiations with the prosecutor, appellant pled guilty in one information to count I, possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and count II, possession of a concealable firearm by an ex-felon (Pen. Code, § 12021), and in another information to two counts of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon.
In open court the prosecutor announced the terms of the plea agreement as follows: Appellant would plead guilty to the above four counts and two pending related felony charges (§ 246—discharging a firearm in an inhabited dwelling and § 12021—possession of a firearm by an ex-felon), and several pending unrelated misdemeanor charges would all be dismissed. Appellant agreed to accept a maximum sentence of four years and four months (fifty-two months).2
[583]*583Pursuant to the plea and sentence negotiations, appellant was sentenced on the first information (case No. 24925) to the upper term of three years on count I and to a consecutive term of eight months on count II. In case No. 25273, he was sentenced to an additional term of eight months on count I, to run consecutive to the sentence imposed on the first information and to a term of two years on count II, to run concurrently. As agreed, his sentence term totaled fifty-two months.
Two months later the Board of Prison Terms (the Board) notified the superior court that the sentence imposed on appellant was disparately long— by eight months (due to the imposition of one of the consecutive terms). The Board recommended that appellant’s sentence be recalled and that he be resentenced to a total term not to exceed 44 months.
After reviewing and giving great weight to the Board’s report and hearing testimony, the sentencing court found that appellant’s sentence was not disparate and accordingly refused to recall and resentence appellant. This appeal followed.
I
Section 1170, subdivision (f), requires the Board to review sentences imposed under the determinate sentencing law (DSL).3
The disparate [584]*584sentence review process assumes that the sentence under scrutiny is legally correct; its exclusive concern is with the statistical uniformity of DSL sentences imposed on those convicted of similar crimes under similar circumstances. (People v. Herrera (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 590, 597 [179 Cal.Rptr. 694].)
Apparently the Board compiles data on all DSL prisoners for use in a three-step process designed to identify disparate sentences. (See People v. Herrera, supra, at pp. 597-598.)
Chairman Ray Brown’s communication to the sentencing court herein described the process: First, an “automated sentence review”4 indicated that the sentence imposed on appellant warranted further scrutiny by the Board; next, the case was referred to the sentence review unit (the Unit) for further review as a “variant” case, i.e., one whose sentence differs from that of other comparable cases. Appellant’s case was then compared with 31 other offenders sharing the following common factors: drug possession; on supervised release/probation at time of the offense; no prior violent juvenile convictions; no prior adult state/federal prison terms; no injured victims; and no weapon use by accomplices. The Unit concluded that a substantial difference existed between the sentence imposed on appellant and those in the “comparison group.” In the final phase, the Unit submitted a detailed report to a panel of the Board. The panel concluded that appellant’s sentence was in fact disparate. The Board then recommended recall and resentencing. (See fn. 2, ante, at p. 582.)
Within the prescribed statutory period the sentencing court held a hearing to determine whether appellant’s sentence was disparate and presumably if so found, whether it should be recalled. At the disparate sentencing hearing, the Board’s report was received into evidence and the court noted that the [585]*585report was entitled to great weight. The district attorney called two witnesses: the Board’s sentence review analyst and the assistant counsel for the Board. Both witnesses testified that when reviewing appellant’s sentence for disparity, the Board was aware that some charges were dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations between appellant and the prosecutor. However, the Board was not aware of the nature of those dismissed charges. The fact that a sentence is the result of a plea agreement is noted in the DSL prisoner’s file, but it is the Board’s policy not to use the negotiated plea as a factor “to establish comparability between the case that is being reviewed and other cases.” The witnesses testified that in appellant’s case, had the Board known that firearm use, a dismissed charge, was involved, that factor might have altered the relevant comparison group and potentially the Board’s ultimate finding of disparity.
In the present case, it is clear that the trial court has met the obligations imposed upon it by statute and by People v. Herrera, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d 590. Herrera established a two-part analysis: (1) the trial court must determine whether a sentence is in fact disparate; and (2) if the sentence is found to be disparate, the judge must then decide whether to recall the sentence using the “ ‘observed sentencing pattern’ ” as a guideline. (At pp. 601-602.)
In its determination under part I of the Herrera analysis, a trial court must accord “great weight” to the Board’s finding of disparity. If the record shows that the trial court seriously considered the information provided by the Board, then the trial court has met its burden under part I of the analysis. If the court finds that the sentence is not disparate, no further inquiry is necessary, and the trial court may then refuse to resentence the defendant. (People v. Herrera, supra, at p. 601.)
Herein the trial court properly found that appellant’s sentence was not disparate. The court was required to do no more.5 Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s finding that appellant’s sentence is not disparate and its refusal to resentence him.
II
The instant case presents an issue not raised in Herrera or Mitchell: Whether a sentence that was negotiated by the parties and approved by the [586]*586court is subject to disparate sentencing review at all. The answer is not clear.
The negotiated disposition has long been an important factor in the administration of criminal law and it has been judicially sanctioned as an appropriate method of disposing of criminal prosecutions. (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 604 [91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409]; In re Hawley (1967) 67 Cal.2d 824, 828 [63 Cal.Rptr. 831, 433 P.2d 919].) This long established practice of plea negotiation was recently codified in 1970 and as codified specifically provides for binding sentence agreements between the court and the parties.6
A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound. In exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea, the prosecutor typically may agree to dismiss certain charges then pending against the defendant or the defendant may be permitted to plead guilty to a lesser offense than that originally charged. The agreement may also fix the sentence to be imposed. (§ 1192.5, fn. 6, ante; Scoggins v. Superior Court (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 873, 876-877 [135 Cal.Rptr. 619].) Both parties gain certain benefits from the agreement: the People receive the benefit of defendant’s vulnerability to a term of punishment and the prosecutor is relieved of the time and expense of trial;7 the defendant escapes the possibility of a much graver sentence if he is successfully prosecuted for all possible charges. (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 287 [193 Cal.Rptr. 538, 666 P.2d 980]; People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 604-605; People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 215 [145 Cal.Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026].)
It is now well established that both the People and the accused will be strictly held to the terms of a plea agreement. (People v. Caron (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 236, 246 [171 Cal.Rptr. 203]; In re Troglin (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 434, 438 [124 Cal.Rptr. 234].) Where the sentence imposed [587]*587upon a defendant, and each of its components, is based upon the defendant’s express acceptance of it as part of an overall plea agreement, and the sentence is otherwise lawful, the defendant is to be held to that agreement. (People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1024 [184 Cal.Rptr. 483].)
The record herein clearly shows that prior to the entry of the plea, appellant, who was represented by counsel at all times, voluntarily waived his rights and was fully aware of the consequences of his plea. Appellant neither moved to have his plea set aside, nor did he appeal the judgment. Instead, he accepted the benefits of the plea agreement. The question is whether the Legislature intended to allow him to avoid his responsibility pursuant to that agreement by requiring the court to hold a hearing, requiring the court to give great weight to the Board’s recommendation, and authorizing the court to recall and reduce the sentence contrary to the plain terms of the agreement.
Appellant asserts that a court which has approved a plea pursuant to section 1192.5 is not bound by the terms of the agreement and may reduce the length of a defendant’s sentence if it finds the sentence to be disparate within the meaning of section 1170, subdivision (f). In essence, appellant contends that section 1170, subdivision (f), mandates review of all DSL sentences, including those imposed pursuant to a sentence agreement.
It has long been the rule that courts will not construe statutes in a manner leading to absurdity or manifest injustice: “The rule by which we are to be guided in construing acts of Parliament is to look at the precise words, and to construe them in their ordinary sense, unless it would lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice; and if it should, so to vary and modify them as to avoid that which it certainly could not have been the intention of the legislature should be done.” (Parke, B., in Perry v. Skinner (1837) 2 M. & W. 471, 476.)
To apply the disparate sentence review process to a negotiated plea would be meaningless. By its own admission the Board does not have adequate information from which to make a relevant comparison in order to determine whether a negotiated sentence is disparate. The Board does not know the nature of any dismissed charges, a factor that a sentencing judge may, in many instances, consider in determining the proper sentence.8 The sen[588]*588tencing judge is uniquely best able to make the proper sentencing determination, for the court has available to it the independent agency of probation to conduct a thorough and unbiased investigation. And following that, it has the benefit of both counsels’ analyses and conclusions and their ability to develop further evidence if warranted. Suffice it to conclude that the judge, and not an agency of the executive branch of government, is best able to fashion the appropriate sentence.9
Moreover, rule 440, California Rules of Court (one of a series of rules promulgated by the Judicial Council pursuant to § 1170.3 in order to promote uniformity in sentencing under § 1170), expressly provides that the plea agreement itself constitutes an adequate reason for the imposition of the specified punishment.10 Thus it can be argued, that at a disparate sentence review the trial court need only justify its imposition of the original sentence on the grounds that it was one of the terms of the plea agreement.
But does the disparate sentence review statute itself exclude review of sentences imposed pursuant to agreement? Section 1170, subdivision (f) provides first as follows: “(1) . . . the Board of Prison Terms shall review the sentence to determine whether the sentence is disparate in comparison with the sentences imposed in similar cases.” (§ 1170, subd. (f), fn. 3, italics added.) Appellant suggests that the Legislature intended “the sentence” to mean “all determinate sentences” including those sentences imposed pursuant to a different statute according to a plea and sentence agreement.11
But in construing its scope appellant neglects to consider the second paragraph of that very subdivision—a subdivision which limits the scope of disparate sentence review to the following specifically enumerated decisions of a sentencing court: (1) the decision to deny probation; (2) the sentencing decision to impose the upper or lower prison term; (3) the sentencing decision to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences; (4) the sentencing [589]*589decision to consider an additional sentence for prior prison terms; and (5) the sentencing decision to impose an additional sentence for being armed with a deadly weapon, using a firearm, an excessive taking or damage, or the infliction of great bodily harm.12 Paragraph (2) does not include the trial court’s decision to approve a negotiated plea and sentence pursuant to section 1192.5. Query whether the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” (the enumeration of specific items in a statute necessarily excludes those not enumerated) compels us to conclude that had the Legislature intended to subject the decision to approve negotiated sentences to disparate sentence review, it would have included that subject along with those sentencing decisions it did enumerate. (Henderson v. Mann Theatres Corp. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 397, 403 [135 Cal.Rptr. 266].)
We next question whether the very section pursuant to which the appellant herein was sentenced prohibits the court from proceeding in any manner inconsistent with that plea: “Where such plea is accepted by the prosecuting attorney in open court and is approved by the court, the defendant, except as otherwise provided in this section, cannot be sentenced on such plea to a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea and the court may not proceed as to such plea other than as specified in the plea. ” (§ 1192.5, italics added.) Does section 1192.5 render the sentencing court powerless to act upon the sentence in any manner other than as expressly provided for in the plea? Certainly the plea did not provide for disparate review; nor did it authorize the court to reduce the sentence by eight months.
It must also be recognized that at the time the Legislature enacted section 1170, subdivision (f), section 1192.5 was already the law and it then also provided that “the court may not proceed to such plea other than as specified in the plea.” We must also assume that in passing a new statute, the Legislature acted with full knowledge of the state of the law at the time. (In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 552 [213 Cal.Rptr. 569, 698 P.2d 635].)
While we decide it unnecessary to answer whether disparate sentence review applies to negotiated sentences at all in order to determine the issue here presented, we invite the Legislature to address the question.
The judgment is affirmed.
[590]*590Channel!, J., concurred.