People v. Sardoma, Jr.
Opinion
FILED
1 9• E6
2
3
4 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM
5
6 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, Case Nos. CF 0402-11, CF 0601-11
7
8 VS.
DECISION AND ORDER ON
9 DEFENDANT SARDOMA'S MOTION MATEO BLANCO SARDOMA, JR., TO DISMISS [SPEEDY TRIAL 10 VIOLAT ION]
RUDY PAUL HERNANDEZ SABLAN, 11 and MARIA CRISTINA P. EDROSA,
12 Defendants. 13
14
15
16 INTRODUCTION
17 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena III on September 29, 2014 18 on Defendant Sardoma's Motion to Dismiss [Speedy Trial Violation]. Attorney Curtis C. Van 19 de veld represents Defendant Sardoma and Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins 20 represents the Government. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Defendant's 21 Motion. 22 BACKGROUND 23 On August 9, 2011, a Guam grand jury returned an Indictment (First Guam Indictment)
24 against Defendant in relation to alleged drug possession and importation. On November 4, 2011, a Guam grand jury returned an Indictment (Second Guam Indictment and, collectively, 25 Guam Indictments) against Defendants in relation to alleged drug possession, gun possession, 26 kidnapping, assault, and criminal enterprise. On February 15, 2012, a federal grand jury 27 returned an Indictment (Federal Indictment) against Defendants also in relation to an alleged 28 criminal enterprise.
0 R IG1'NAI -
Decision and Order CF 0601-11, CF 0402-11, People v. Sardoma, Sablan, Edrosa
On January 28, 2014, Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial and filed his Motion I to Dismiss Charges and Case with respect to the Guam Indictments; Defendant failed to file the 2 requisite notice of hearing. On January 30, 2014, a co-defendant joined Defendant's Motion to 3 Dismiss Charges and Case. On February 24, 2014, the Court received the requisite Notice from 4 Defendant. On February 25, 2014, the Government filed its Opposition to Defendant Mateo B.
5 Sardoma's Motion to Dismiss Charges and Case. On March 7, 2014, the matter was set for 6 hearing. On April 29, 2014, the Court heard oral argument and took the matter under 7 advisement. On July 28, 2014, the Court issued its Decision and Order denying the Motion to 8 Dismiss Charges and Case.
9 On September 3, 2014, Defendant filed his Motion as to the Guam Indictments. Pursuant
10 to 8 GCA § 80.60, Defendant contends that the Court "should dismiss the Indictment[s] in this matter for lapse of Defendant's Speedy Trial right." In particular, Defendant argues that his 11 prior Motion to Dismiss Charges and Case-in which he sought dismissal on double jeopardy 12 grounds-did not toll the speedy trial clock until after the Court set the matter for hearing. As a 13 result, Defendant concludes, he was not brought to trial within forty-five days of arraignment 14 per 8 GCA § 80.60(a)(2).
15 On September 12, 2014, the Government filed its Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 16 [Speedy Trial Violation]. The Government maintains that there is no violation of the statutory 17 forty-five day period because "[t]he period where a defense motion is `pending' generally runs 18 from when the motion is filed with the court" and Defendant "did not file a notice of motion 19 form along with his motion to dismiss on the basis of double jeopardy, nor did he take
20 advantage of any other device to accelerate the calendaring of his motion."
On September 29, 2014, the Court heard oral a r gument a nd took the matter under 21 advisement.
22 DISCUSSION
23 The instant motion concerns whether Defendant's speedy trial clock tolled during the 24 pendency of his previous motion to dismiss. The applicable statute, 8 GCA § 80.60(a)(2), 25 provides that the Court "shall dismiss a criminal action if the trial of a defendant, who is in 26 custody at the time of his arraignment, has not commenced within forty-five (45) days after his 27 arraignment." The statute further provides: 28
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Decision and Order CF 0601-11, CF 0402-11, People v. Sardoma, Sablan, Edrosa
(b) A criminal action shall not be dismissed pursuant to Subsection t (a) if:
2 (1) The action is set on a date beyond the prescribed period 3 upon motion of the defendant or with his consent, express or implied, and he is brought to trial on the date so set or 4 within ten (10) days thereafter;
5 (2) The defendant failed to appear for trial and he is brought to trial within thirty (30) days following his next 6 appearance in the trial court; or 7 (3) Good cause is shown for the failure to commence the trial within the prescribed period.
8 The Court issued its Decision and Order within the time standards set forth in 9 Administrative Rule No. 13-003 and, in any event, Defendant does not object to the period 10 during which the matter was under advisement. Defendant, rather, objects on the basis of the 11 period from when he filed the Motion to Dismiss Charges and Case until the matter was set for 12 hearing. Defendant offers no authority, however, from 8 GCA § 80.60 or case law to support his 13 contention that the speedy trial clock does not toll upon a defendant's filing of a motion. See 14 Data Mgmt. Res., LLC v. Office of Pub. Accountability, 2013 Guam 27, ¶ 17 (a statute's plain 15 meaning prevails absent legislative intent to the contrary); Sumitomo Const., Co. v. Guam, 2001
16 Guam 23, ¶ 17 (plain language must be followed unless "the result would lead to absurd or
17 impractical consequences, untenable distinctions, or unreasonable results"). Indeed, it would be an absurd result not to toll the speedy trial clock upon the Defendant's filing of the motion. For 18 example, the speedy trial clock would continue to run while the Government formulates an 19 opposition, without respect to the proximity of trial. Under such circumstances, the Government 20 would have a strong incentive for matters to be promptly set for hearing, notwithstanding the 21 fact that the Defendant-as-movant is the party required to submit a notice of hearing. The Court 22 declines to attach such significance to the date on which a matter is set for hearing.
23 Considering the plain language of the statute as well as the Court's duty "[t]o provide 24 for the orderly conduct of proceedings," 7 GCA § 7107, the Court concludes that the most 25 reasonable approach to tolling under 8 GCA § 80.60 is that the filing of a motion tolls the 26 statutory speedy trial clock. Although the Guam Supreme Court has yet to explicitly adopt this
27 approach, the Supreme Court has declined to divert from precedent in which the Appellate Division "excluded the period of time during which motions were pending" by relying on the 28
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Decision and Order CF 0601-11, CF 0402-11, People v. Sardoma, Sablan, Edrosa
Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 USC § 3161(h)(1)(F), which tolls the statutory speedy trial clock 1 for delay resulting from any pretrial motion. See People v. Nicholson, 2007 Guam 9, ¶ 14, n. 3 2 (citing People v. Ibanez, 1992 WL 97221 at *2-*3 (D. Guam App. Div. Apr. 16, 1992)).
3 Accordingly, the speedy trial clock tolled from January 28, 2014 to this Court's Decision and 4 Order of July 28, 2014. Less than forty-five days have elapsed from that Decision and Order to 5 the filing of the instant motion on September 3, 2014. 6 Although, as set forth above, forty-five days have yet to elapse with respect to 7 Defendant's statutory speedy trial clock, the Court nonetheless will address the "good cause" 8 exception set forth in 8 GCA § 80.60(b)(3) on the assumption that the Court failed to commence
9 the trial within the prescribed period. "[W]hether there is good cause for delay depends on the facts and the circumstances of each case, and there is no bright-line rule for how much time a 10 court may reasonably take to consider a motion." Quinata v. Superior Court of Guam , 2010 11 Guam 8, ¶ 36 (citing Nicholson , 2007 Guam 9, ¶ 13). "Generally, a defendant must accept some 12 reasonable delay as a consequence of filing a motion, but unreasonable delay does not toll [8 13 GCA § 80.60]." Nicholson , 2007 Guam 9, ¶ 26.
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