NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 260336-U NOTICE Decision filed 07/01/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-26-0336 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County. ) v. ) No. 26-CF-106 ) GAIGE A. RUSSELL, ) Honorable ) Jerry E. Crisel, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McHaney and Clarke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s orders granting the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release and denying the defendant’s motion for relief are affirmed.
¶2 Defendant, Gaige A. Russell, appeals from the Jefferson County trial court’s March 31,
2026, order granting the State’s petition to deny pretrial release, along with the court’s April 8,
2026, denial of his motion for relief and immediate release. 1 For the following reasons, we affirm.
1 We note that the record before us, consisting of a common law record, report of proceedings, and an impounded common law record, does not contain a written order denying defendant’s motion for relief. Rather, the report of proceedings reveals that at the April 8, 2026, hearing on defendant’s motion for relief, the trial court made an oral ruling denying the motion with reasons given on the record. 1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On March 28, 2026, defendant was arrested and subsequently charged with aggravated
domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1), 12-3.3(a-5) (West 2024)), a Class 2 felony, as well as
domestic battery (id. § 12-3.2(a)(2)), a Class 4 felony, which was enhanced due to a prior violation
of an order of protection (Jefferson County case No. 22-CM-23) (see id. § 12-3.2(b)). Two days
later, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release, alleging that defendant
was charged with detainable offenses, being aggravated domestic battery and domestic battery,
that his pretrial release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the
community, and that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that threat. 725
ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(4), (e)(1)-(3) (West 2024).
¶5 A timely pretrial detention hearing followed on March 31, 2026, where the State presented
its evidence by proffer. Officer Devin Jackson of the Mount Vernon Police Department would
testify that on March 28, 2026, he responded to a domestic disturbance call at defendant’s
residence. When Officer Jackson arrived outside the residence, a man identified himself as the
father of the alleged victim, Karmella Aguilar, and advised Officer Jackson that his daughter was
the subject of an ongoing domestic disturbance. Aguilar’s father further advised Officer Jackson
that his daughter was inside the home and that defendant would not let her out.
¶6 Thereafter, Officer Jackson made contact with defendant at the front door and asked to
speak to Aguilar. According to Officer Jackson, defendant stated he would not cooperate with
police and he would not let them enter the home. Defendant indicated that Aguilar was in the
shower and not available to speak with police. Moments later, however, Aguilar “appeared fully
clothed and appeared to be dry.” She had “bruising around her left eye” that looked “black.” She
2 also “had bruising around her right eye and a cut above her eye, as well as a busted lip.” Aguilar
complained of severe pain, claiming she could not bend over.
¶7 Aguilar would testify that at 4 a.m. that morning, she was arguing with defendant wherein
he accused her of cheating on him. Defendant then punched Aguilar “repeatedly in the face with a
closed fist and knock[ed] her on the ground and then kick[ed] her in the side.” He then dragged
her “to the bathroom by her hair.”
¶8 Aguilar eventually was taken to the hospital. Emergency medical service (EMS) and
hospital staff would testify that, due to her injuries, Aguilar suffered three broken ribs, a bruised
lung, various bruises to her face, and a busted lip.
¶9 Defense counsel proffered that defendant was 23 years old and resided with Aguilar at the
address where he was arrested in Mount Vernon. Defendant completed his junior year in high
school and was a lifelong resident of Jefferson County. Further, defendant had “significant” family
ties to Jefferson County, including his eight-month-old daughter with Aguilar, his mother, father,
grandfather, grandmother, a brother, and two sisters, all of whom resided in Jefferson County. He
had been employed at Linus Rapp Construction for a couple months, and, before that, he had
worked at Antolin in Nashville, Illinois. Defendant claimed he could return to work at Linus.
¶ 10 At the time of his arrest, defendant was not on bond or pretrial release, nor was he on parole
or work release. He was, however, on felony probation for a prior obstruction of justice conviction
(Jefferson County case No. 24-CF-290), and he was on court supervision for a misdemeanor
driving under the influence (DUI) conviction (Jackson County case No. 23-DT-23). Defendant
had never been sentenced to the Department of Corrections, and he did not use a weapon in the
commission of the alleged offense. Additionally, he was the sole financial provider for his family.
3 He paid “all the bills, and he [was] the main caregiver for his eight-month-old daughter, as well as
being her main support.”
¶ 11 The State proceeded to argument, asserting it presented sufficient evidence showing that
defendant committed aggravated domestic battery and domestic battery against Aguilar, both of
which are detainable offenses (see id. 110-6.1(a)(4)), that resulted in extensive injuries and great
bodily harm to Aguilar. The State also highlighted defendant’s criminal history, which included
two felony convictions for obstruction of justice and mob action, as well as misdemeanor
convictions for a DUI and violation of an order of protection. Further, defendant had charges
pending for an aggravated DUI and fleeing or attempting to elude peace officers. The State asserted
that defendant was already subject to court probation and supervision orders that required him to
follow the law, yet he had not done so. Instead, he “continue[d] to thumb his nose at the law” and
“rack up criminal offenses.” The State argued that defendant posed a danger to Aguilar and the
community and that no condition or combination of conditions “would protect [Aguilar] or the
public.” The State thus asked the court to deny pretrial release.
¶ 12 In response, defense counsel argued that defendant was not a danger to any person or
persons or the community, emphasizing that no weapon was used in this offense. Defense counsel
further argued that less restrictive conditions were appropriate in this case so that defendant could
“get out and keep supporting his child.” Specifically, defense counsel requested that defendant be
placed on home confinement at his prior residence with work-release so that he could financially
support his daughter. Defense counsel also noted that defendant did not oppose electronic
monitoring or a no-contact order with Aguilar.
¶ 13 The trial court stated that it considered the proffered evidence from both parties,
defendant’s age, his employment and financial responsibilities, and the fact that no weapon was
4 involved in the alleged offense. The court also considered defendant’s criminal history, which
included other crimes of violence and two felony convictions, as well as the nature of the offense
in this case. The court stated that the proffered evidence indicated the State would have “a strong
case and likelihood of conviction” for aggravated battery given that Aguilar sustained great bodily
harm, including three broken ribs and a bruised lung, among other injuries. Finally, the court
considered that defendant was on probation and court supervision when the alleged offense
occurred, noting that he had “not abided by either one of those by getting into this scrape.” The
court also noted that defendant had a couple failures to appear.
¶ 14 The trial court subsequently granted the State’s petition to detain defendant, finding he
posed a threat to Aguilar and the community due to his record, and that no conditions would either
ensure Aguilar and the public’s safety or that defendant would “abide by Pretrial Service’s order.”
The court entered a written order for detention the same day, finding that, by clear and convincing
evidence, the proof was evident or presumption great that defendant committed a qualifying
offense; he posed a real and present threat to any person, persons, or the community, based on the
specific articulable facts of the case; and no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate
that threat. Regarding conditions, the trial court specifically found that no less restrictive
conditions would be sufficient based on defendant’s criminal history and previous violations of
court orders.
¶ 15 On April 2, 2026, defendant filed a motion for relief and immediate pretrial release. 2 The
motion generally alleged that the trial court erroneously granted the State’s petition to deny pretrial
release because the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
2 At the hearing on defendant’s motion, defense counsel moved, successfully, to amend the motion for relief by interlineation to correct a few errors concerning defendant’s arrest date, charges, and date of the pretrial release hearing. 5 that the proof was evident or presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense,
posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community, and that no
condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that threat. More specifically, defendant
alleged that the trial court failed to fully consider his ties to the community, his employment
opportunities and financial responsibilities to his family, his willingness to abide by any terms of
pretrial release, and that no weapon was used in the commission of the alleged offense.
¶ 16 The trial court held a hearing on the motion on April 8, 2026. Defense counsel provided
the same factual proffer regarding defendant’s age, familial ties to the community, employment
history, and financial responsibilities. Defense counsel again emphasized that no weapon was used
in the alleged offense, that defendant was not on bond, pretrial release, parole, or work release,
and that he had never been sentenced to the Department of Corrections. Defense counsel then
asked that defendant be released on electronic monitoring and home confinement to his previous
residence with work release. Defense counsel indicated that defendant would also accept a no-
contact order as to Aguilar.
¶ 17 The State proceeded by proffer, reiterating the information provided at the initial detention
hearing. Furthermore, the State asserted that on the day of the alleged offense, Aguilar’s father
saw his daughter “waiving from a window believed to be the bathroom appearing to beg for help.”
Likewise, Aguilar’s sister, Helena, indicated that Aguilar had called her whispering, “ ‘Please call
the cops, please call the cops, he beat me up really bad.’ ” According to Helena, defendant then
began yelling in the background and the call disconnected. The State repeated Aguilar’s version
of events from the initial detention hearing, adding that after defendant punched Aguilar and she
fell to the floor, he dragged “her by her hair from the doorway to the bathroom to rinse the blood
from her face in the shower.”
6 ¶ 18 The State further proffered that “[h]ospital staff, [and] Karmella Aguilar herself, advised
that she had three fractured ribs and a potential[ly] bruised and possibly bleeding lung relating to
the incident.” Finally, the State revisited defendant’s criminal history and prior court orders for
probation and supervision, none of which were sufficient “to deter him from the actions of March
28.” The State argued that nothing short of detention would adequately deter defendant from
committing additional crimes and guarantee Aguilar and the community’s safety.
¶ 19 The trial court stated it considered several factors in defendant’s favor, including his age,
ties to the community, and employment history. The court, however, also considered the nature of
the charge, “which is a very serious charge,” and defendant’s criminal history, which, as stated,
included two felony convictions for obstruction of justice and mob action, as well as misdemeanor
convictions for a DUI and violation of an order of protection. Further, defendant was already on
probation and court supervision at the time of the alleged offense. The trial court consequently
found that no condition or combination of conditions would ensure he adhered to court orders and
that he posed a danger to Aguilar and the public. The court denied defendant’s motion for relief,
and he appealed.
¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 Pretrial release—including the conditions related thereto—is governed by Public Act 101-
652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending
various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting
effective date as September 18, 2023). A defendant’s pretrial release may be denied only in certain
statutorily limited situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024). Upon filing a timely verified
petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has
7 committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat
to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, and that less restrictive conditions
would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or
prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. Id. §§ 110-6.1(e), (f). The State or the
defendant may present evidence to the trial court by way of proffer based upon reliable
information. Id. § 110-6.1(f)(2). The trial court may order a defendant detained pending trial if the
defendant is charged with a qualifying offense, and the trial court concludes the defendant poses a
real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1)-(7)) or
there is a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(a)(8)).
¶ 22 In determining whether a defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any
individual(s) or the community, courts may consider
“(1) The nature and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the
offense is a crime of violence, involving a weapon, or a sex offense.
(2) The history and characteristics of the defendant including:
(A) Any evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal history indicative of
violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior. Such evidence
may include testimony or documents received in juvenile proceedings, criminal,
quasi-criminal, civil commitment, domestic relations, or other proceedings.
(B) Any evidence of the defendant’s psychological, psychiatric or other
similar social history which tends to indicate a violent, abusive, or assaultive nature,
or lack of any such history.
(3) The identity of any person or persons to whose safety the defendant is believed
to pose a threat, and the nature of the threat.
8 (4) Any statements made by, or attributed to the defendant, together with the
circumstances surrounding them.
(5) The age and physical condition of the defendant.
(6) The age and physical condition of any victim or complaining witness.
(7) Whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any weapon or
weapons.
(8) Whether, at the time of the current offense or any other offense or arrest, the
defendant was on probation, parole, aftercare release, mandatory supervised release, or
other release from custody pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for
an offense under federal or State law.
(9) Any other factors, including those listed in Section 110-5 of this Article deemed
by the court to have a reasonable bearing upon the defendant’s propensity or reputation for
violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior.” Id. § 110-6.1(g)(1)-(9).
No one factor is determinative, and the court must base its decision on an individualized
assessment. People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 15 (citing 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(7)
(West 2022)).
¶ 23 We review the trial court’s pretrial release determination in this case de novo. See People
v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54 (stating, where, as here, the “parties to a pretrial detention hearing
proceed solely by proffer, the reviewing court is not bound by the circuit court’s factual findings
and may therefore conduct its own independent de novo review of the proffered evidence and
evidence otherwise documentary in nature”).
¶ 24 On appeal, defendant filed a notice in lieu of memorandum. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7)
(eff. Apr. 15, 2024) (stating, an “appellant may file, but is not required to file, a memorandum” on
9 appeal). Accordingly, defendant’s motion for relief in this case serves as his argument on appeal.
See id. (“Issues raised in the motion for relief are before the appellate court regardless of whether
the optional memorandum is filed.”). Defendant’s motion for relief states the following:
“7. The Court erred in granting the State’s Petition to Deny Pre-Trial Release at said
hearing, in that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence any of the above in that:
a. The Court failed to fully consider Defendant’s ties to the community.
b. The Court failed to fully consider Defendant’s employment opportunities and
financial responsibilities to his family.
c. The Court failed to fully consider Defendant’s willingness to abide by any terms
of pre-trial release.
d. No weapon was used in the commission of the allege[d] offense.”
As stated, defendant did not file a memorandum in this appeal. Therefore, this represents his
arguments before this court. See id.
¶ 25 Defendant, however, has not specified how each factor applies to each element of
detention, nor has he developed any legal argument with respect to these contentions. “Whether
made in the motion for relief alone or as supplemented by the memorandum, the form of the
appellant’s arguments must contain sufficient detail to enable meaningful appellate review,
including the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefore and citations of the record and
any relevant authorities.” Id. A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined and
supported by relevant authority and cohesive arguments; it is not merely a repository into which
parties may foist the burden of argument and research, nor is it the obligation of this court to act
10 as an advocate for the parties. See Atlas v. Mayer Hoffman McCann, P.C., 2019 IL App (1st)
180939, ¶ 33.
¶ 26 While defendants may rely on their Rule 604(h)(2) motion for their arguments on appeal,
they must, nevertheless, adhere to the requirements of the rule or risk facing the consequences of
noncompliance. People v. Post, 2025 IL App (4th) 250598, ¶ 23. Indeed, reviewing courts are
“being pushed to engage in an ever-increasing amount of advocacy for criminal defendants—a
position that is not acceptable.” Id. Defendants, therefore, “must endeavor to present a more
complete analysis of the issues in their motions for relief or, as the rule allows, file a supplemental
memorandum in support of the appeal rather than relying on the appellate court to do the work for
them.” Id. Defendant did neither here.
¶ 27 Rather, defendant’s motion for relief asserts that the trial court erroneously granted the
State’s petition to deny pretrial release because the State did not meet its burden of proof for “any
of the above,” which refers to the elements of the statute set forth above (see supra ¶ 21).
Defendant then included a list of factors he claimed the trial court “failed to fully consider” as to
all elements of the statute, such as his ties to the community, employment history, financial
obligations, willingness to adhere to any pretrial terms, and that no weapon was involved. Yet, the
broad language employed in his motion does not address how the State failed to prove each
element of the statute. Nor does it provide this court with sufficient detail to enable meaningful
appellate review, in violation of Rule 604(h)(7). Such noncompliance with the rule’s requirements
effectively waives the issue on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2), (7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).
¶ 28 Regarding whether the proof is evident or presumption great that defendant committed a
detainable offense, none of the factors contained in the motion apply. The State has correctly
observed that defendant’s motion did not adequately challenge the trial court’s finding that he
11 committed a detainable offense, thereby waiving the issue on appeal. See. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2)
(eff. Apr. 15, 2024) (“Upon appeal, any issue not raised in the motion for relief, other than errors
occurring for the first time at the hearing on the motion for relief, shall be deemed waived.”).
¶ 29 With respect to whether defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person
or the community, the only applicable factor is that no weapon was used in the alleged offense.
See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1) (West 2024) (noting, courts may consider the “nature and
circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence,
involving a weapon.”). Accordingly, we must evaluate whether defendant posed a real and present
threat.
¶ 30 Initially, the State again asserts that defendant did not sufficiently argue this issue in his
motion for relief in order to preserve it on appeal. While we agree that defendant did not develop
a legal argument with respect to the real and present threat element of the statute, he did aver that
no weapon was used in the alleged offense. Thus, we cannot say that he entirely waived the issue
on appeal. We find that defendant posed a real and present threat to Aguilar specifically, as well
as the community.
¶ 31 The nature and circumstances of the offense charged against defendant in this case involved
crimes of violence against Aguilar. Id. Additionally, the history and characteristics of defendant
include two felony convictions for obstruction of justice and mob action, as well as misdemeanor
convictions for a DUI and violation of an order of protection. The pretrial investigation report
revealed that defendant had two other cases pending with multiple charges. In case No. 26-CF-82,
he was charged with an aggravated DUI on a suspended or revoked license (count I), obstructing
justice/destroying evidence (count II), driving under the influence of alcohol (count III), and
driving on a suspended license (count IV). In case No. 25-MT-256, defendant was charged with
12 fleeing/attempting to elude a peace officer (count I) and reckless driving (count II). Defendant’s
apparent disregard for the law poses a threat to the public.
¶ 32 Likewise, defendant poses a threat to Aguilar based on his alleged domestic violence
against her that resulted in significant injuries. Id. § 110-6.1(g)(3). As set forth above, Aguilar
claimed that defendant accused her of cheating on him, then punched her repeatedly in the face
with a closed fist, knocked her to the ground, kicked her in the side, and dragged her by her hair
to the bathroom where he washed blood from her face. Aguilar’s father claimed he saw his
daughter “waiving from a window believed to be the bathroom appearing to beg for help.”
Similarly, Aguilar’s sister, Helena, indicated that Aguilar had called her whispering, “ ‘Please call
the cops, please call the cops, he beat me up really bad.’ ” Aguilar’s injuries included three broken
ribs, a bruised and possibly bleeding lung, multiple bruises to her face, and a busted lip.
¶ 33 We acknowledge that defendant was not on bond, pretrial release, parole, or work release
at the time of the alleged offense. He was, however, on felony probation for a prior obstruction of
justice conviction and on court supervision for a misdemeanor DUI conviction. Id. § 110-6.1(g)(8).
Still, he decided to violate the law. Given all these factors, we cannot say the trial court erred in
finding the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant posed a real and present
threat to the safety of Aguilar and the community.
¶ 34 Defendant’s motion for relief argued that the trial court failed to fully consider his ties to
the community, employment opportunities, financial responsibilities, and his willingness to abide
by any terms of pretrial release. These factors apply to whether the State met its burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence what pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure
the appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and
the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” Id. § 110-
13 5(a). We proceed in our review of whether any conditions would mitigate defendant’s real and
present threat.
¶ 35 After reviewing the record before us, we find the following factors support the conclusion
that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat posed by
defendant. First, the nature and circumstances of the offense in this case. Defendant was charged
with aggravated domestic battery and domestic battery. Both crimes involved violence, and the
latter charge was enhanced due to defendant’s criminal history. Id. § 110-5(a)(1). Second, the
proffered evidence against defendant included observation of Aguilar’s injuries by Officer
Jackson, which was consistent with the injuries observed and treated by EMS and hospital staff.
Aguilar’s own account of what happened was consistent with her injuries, specifically, that
defendant punched her repeatedly in the face with a closed fist, knocked her to the ground, kicked
her in the side, then dragged her to the bathroom by her hair where he washed blood from her face.
¶ 36 Furthermore, defendant’s criminal history was not insignificant, especially for his young
age. He had two felony convictions, along with two misdemeanor convictions including an order
of protection violation. At the time of his arrest, defendant had two other cases pending with
multiple charges, and he was already on probation and court supervision. As defendant clearly has
a propensity to violate the law, we are not convinced that he would abide by any terms of pretrial
release, like electronic monitoring or a no-contact order with Aguilar. Accordingly, we agree with
the trial court that no condition or combination of conditions would mitigate the threat posed by
defendant.
14 ¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s orders of March 31, 2026, and April
8, 2026.
¶ 39 Affirmed.