NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241527-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is March 13, 2025 not precedent except in the NO. 4-24-1527 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Fulton County JESSE POST, ) No. 23CF235 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Thomas B. Ewing, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE GRISCHOW delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant pretrial release, finding (1) no error when the trial court considered hearsay evidence during the detention hearing and (2) the State proved by clear and convincing evidence there was no less restrictive means of protecting the victims or the community from the threat posed by defendant; therefore, the decision to deny defendant pretrial release was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Defendant, Jesse Post, appeals the trial court’s order, entered November 26, 2024,
denying his pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)), hereinafter as amended by Public Act 101-652,
§ 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See Pub. Act
102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023
IL 129248, ¶ 52 (setting the Act’s effective date as September 18, 2023). In accordance with
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), defendant relies on his motion for relief filed in the trial court as his argument on appeal. In his motion for relief, defendant argues
the court erred in considering certain hearsay evidence regarding his dangerousness and the
court’s decision to deny him pretrial release was against the manifest weight of the evidence
because the State failed to prove there is no less restrictive means of protecting the community
from the threat he may pose. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On November 7, 2023, defendant was charged by information with three counts
of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2020)).
According to the information, from January 1, 2020, through May 28, 2020, defendant, who was
over 17 years of age, committed specific acts of sexual contact with C.W., F.W., and E.W., who
were all under 13 years of age at the time, for the purpose of his sexual gratification or arousal. A
warrant was issued on November 7, 2023, ordering defendant to be arrested and held for a
hearing without pretrial release. The warrant further ordered that he refrain from contact or
communication with the alleged victims. Defendant was arrested on May 24, 2024.
¶5 On May 28, 2024, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial
release, alleging he was charged with a sex offense enumerated in the Code and his pretrial
release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community
based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(5) (West 2022). A
hearing was held on the petition that same day, after which the trial court denied defendant
pretrial release. Defendant’s motion for relief pursuant to Rule 604(h)(2) was denied, and he
filed a timely appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).
¶6 On appeal, this court determined the trial court failed to make a record adequate
to allow a meaningful review of its decision to deny defendant pretrial release. Therefore, we
-2- vacated the order denying defendant’s pretrial release and remanded with directions for the trial
court to promptly set a new detention hearing, at which the State could present evidence and the
court could make express findings, based on defendant’s individual circumstances, as to whether
any condition or combination of conditions would allow for his pretrial release. People v. Post,
2024 IL App (4th) 241002-U, ¶ 29 (DeArmond, J., dissenting).
¶7 A. New Pretrial Detention Hearing on Remand
¶8 After the case was remanded, the trial court held a new detention hearing on
November 13, 2024. When discussing with the parties how to proceed, the court stated, “I think
it’s important to reconsider that evidence [from the original hearing], if there is additional
evidence also to present that, so that we can have a full understanding of the circumstances that
apply here.” Because the court expressly stated it had the transcripts of the original detention
hearing and was familiar with the proffers made at that time, we incorporate by reference our
summary of the facts in our prior decision in this case. Id. ¶¶ 4-11.
¶9 1. The State’s Evidence
¶ 10 a. Proffer of Sheriff Jonathon Webb’s Testimony
¶ 11 The State proffered Jonathon Webb, who was an investigator with the Fulton
County Sheriff’s Office (and is now the Fulton County sheriff), would testify to the following
facts about a prior, unrelated investigation regarding defendant. Sheriff Webb interviewed
defendant on September 22, 2017, regarding a complaint made by defendant’s four-year-old
daughter, L.G. (born October 2012). That same day, Sheriff Webb had been present during a
forensic interview of L.G. with the Children’s Advocacy Centers of Illinois (CAC). The
interview was conducted by Phyllis Todd of the Fulton-Mason Crisis Service. Sheriff Webb
would testify that L.G. said defendant “licked her butt on at least one occasion.” The State
-3- explained L.G. told Todd, “ ‘One time Daddy—who is the defendant in this case—took me in
the woods’ ” to retrieve a frisbee because “her father had thrown [it] too far.” L.G. said,
“ ‘[Defendant] peed with me’ ” and then “ ‘he licked my butt.’ ” L.G. identified body parts on a
diagram during the interview, identifying the “buttocks as the butt” and “referred to both the
vagina and penis as dooder.” Defendant denied these allegations during his interview with
Sheriff Webb.
¶ 12 b. Proffer of Officer Ryan McCabe’s Testimony
¶ 13 The State proffered Officer Ryan McCabe of the Canton Police Department
would testify to the following facts regarding the allegations in this case.
¶ 14 Officer McCabe spoke with Breitanyia L., the mother of the three victims, about a
criminal sexual assault complaint made approximately three years ago. Officer McCabe would
testify Breitanyia reported that E.W., her seven-year-old son (born March 2016), made
“statements regarding a sexual assault that happened to him in Canton.” Breitanyia initially
reported the incident to the Peoria Police Department and was then told to contact the Canton
Police Department. Breitanyia told Officer McCabe the incident was investigated, but E.W. was
not interviewed because he was “too young at the time.” The other two victims, F.W. (born
February 2013) and C.W. (born June 2014), were interviewed in 2020. In the original proffer
regarding this initial investigation, the State explained the two older girls did not make any
disclosures of abuse against defendant at that time, but they later opened up about what had
happened to them in 2020. Breitanyia advised Officer McCabe that E.W. was now “being very
vocal” regarding defendant’s conduct from that time as well.
¶ 15 The State proffered further Officer McCabe observed the CAC interview of E.W.
conducted by Candi Buhl on October 17, 2023. Officer McCabe observed that E.W. told Buhl he
-4- knew he was being interviewed to talk about defendant, his father’s former friend. E.W. stated
“his father is no longer friends with [defendant] because [defendant] had done something really
bad” and “was really inappropriate with [them], in reference to him and his sisters.” At first,
during the interview, E.W. stated he “could not remember what [defendant] would do but stated
when [defendant] was done, he would give him Smarties, which is a form of candy.” After
reviewing male and female anatomy with the aid of a diagram, E.W. was asked again about what
defendant had done, and the State proffered Officer McCabe would explain:
“E.W. stated: He was licking my penis. E.W. stated [defendant] would lick his
penis every time he had been at [defendant’s] residence. E.W. stated it would
occur in [defendant’s] house in the kitchen, stated he believes he was only three
years old when this happened. He could only remember going there in the night
with his father and his sisters.”
E.W. described defendant lifting him onto the kitchen counter next to a blue bowl of Smarties,
pulling his pants and underwear down, and licking his penis. E.W. said he would get Smarties
every time defendant did this, and defendant told him not to tell his father. E.W. said this
happened more than one time, and no one else witnessed it happening. E.W.’s sisters told him
defendant “put his mouth on [their] vagina,” but he did not see it happen. E.W. said F.W. told
their father what had happened and defendant and their father got into a fight.
¶ 16 Officer McCabe spoke with Breitanyia on October 26, 2023, and arranged for
F.W. and C.W. to be interviewed by CAC on October 30, 2023. Officer McCabe observed
F.W.’s forensic interview, conducted by Buhl. F.W. acknowledged she knew she was being
interviewed because of the things her father’s former friend did to her and her siblings. When
asked what defendant had done to her, F.W. “went silent and did not respond.” Later, she said
-5- she could not remember what grade she was in when it happened but that it occurred at
defendant’s residence when they were visiting their father, who was living with defendant at the
time. F.W. told Buhl “the incidents occurred inside the house in the kitchen two or three times”
and she would be alone with defendant in the kitchen when it happened. F.W. said she could not
remember what happened but knew it occurred during the summertime when she was in
elementary school. Using a diagram, F.W. referred to the female genitalia as vagina and the male
genitalia as “the no-no square.” When asked where defendant had touched her, F.W. pointed to
the vagina on the diagram. F.W. said she could not remember what defendant touched her with,
but it happened two or three times. Defendant had pulled her pants down while she was standing
in the kitchen. She did not know if defendant had his clothes on or not. She said it made her feel
uncomfortable. F.W. said this was the second time she disclosed what defendant had done to her,
and she denied telling her siblings or mother about it. She explained she was alone with
defendant in the kitchen with “her family all being in the living room.” F.W. had also seen
defendant go into the kitchen alone with her siblings.
¶ 17 Officer McCabe observed the CAC interview of C.W. later that same day. C.W.
stated her father had lived with defendant. Her father would be sleeping on the couch in the
living room while she and her siblings watched television. Defendant “called each child into the
kitchen one by one, starting with her sister, then her brother.” After going into the kitchen,
defendant would give them a “handful of Smarties” from a bag on top of the refrigerator. When
her father asked where they got the candy, the children would tell him defendant gave it to them.
C.W. stated this had only happened to her once, and she did not know now many times defendant
took her siblings into the kitchen alone. When asked what defendant had done to her, C.W. “said
at first she did not feel comfortable vocalizing what had happened.” After reviewing the diagram
-6- of male and female anatomy, C.W. was asked again what happened. C.W. said “defendant would
put her onto the counter and then touch her as she pointed to the female vagina on the diagram.”
C.W. said defendant also touched her butt. C.W. said she thought the same thing happened to her
siblings because they had all talked about it. When asked how defendant touched her, C.W. said
she was on her hands and knees on the counter and defendant “licked inside of it [referring to her
butt]” and she was “standing when he had licked her vagina.” Defendant told C.W. not to tell
anyone and would give her candy after touching her. C.W. said defendant had shown her his
penis more than once by unzipping his pants, and she described him as “shaking it around.” She
denied that defendant touched her with his penis.
¶ 18 The State proffered Officer McCabe would testify that he conducted a phone
interview with Glen W., the victims’ father, on November 2, 2023. Glen told Officer McCabe
that when he lived with defendant, he would sometimes sleep on the couch or go to bed early and
leave defendant supervising the children. Williams saw Smarties candy in a purse belonging to
one of his daughters. Williams confronted defendant about the allegations with Breitanyia
present. Williams said defendant denied the allegations but then “remained silent and did not
speak.” Williams moved, and after leaving Canton, he had no further contact with defendant.
¶ 19 Officer McCabe conducted an Internet investigation of defendant on November 2,
2023. When viewing defendant’s Facebook page, Officer McCabe saw “several images in his
photographs that depicted [defendant] having sexually deviant behaviors, including statements in
the images such as ‘eat ass.’ ” On May 28, 2024, defendant met with Canton police but declined
to speak with officers, so he was taken into custody.
¶ 20 c. Testimony of Breitanyia L.
¶ 21 The State called Breitanyia to testify at the hearing. She stated Williams lived
-7- with defendant in Canton for approximately three months in 2020. During that time, Breitanyia
also lived in Canton, but she moved to her current apartment in Peoria in July 2020. She
explained that she moved the children out of Canton after these incidents to “get a fresh start.”
Breitanyia believed defendant moved at that time to live with his mother in St. David, but in June
2021, he moved to Peoria. In March 2022, defendant was living at an address “two minutes or
three minutes” from her home. Referring to a Google map printout, Breitanyia noted the driving
distance between her home and defendant’s home was half a mile, a trip estimated to take two
minutes.
¶ 22 Breitanyia testified she has told other people about her children being victims of
defendant, and “several” people responded that they had been victimized by defendant as well.
Defendant’s objection to this line of questioning was overruled, and the trial court concluded it
was permissible evidence of defendant’s social conduct. Breitanyia stated S.R. told her she was
close to defendant when she was in seventh grade and “[t]hey lived right down the street from
each other, and some inappropriate acts followed.” Breitanyia stated B.H. told her that when she
was 16 years old and defendant was 20 years old, defendant “was manipulating and trying to
force himself on her and ultimately did force himself on her. And she felt coerced, manipulated,
and violated at the end of that.” Breitanyia stated when M.M. was 16 years old, she lived next
door to Breitanyia and Glen (who were married at that time). M.M. would help Glen care for
Breitanyia’s children while she worked. Breitanyia said she “would come home, and [she] would
observe [defendant] being extremely inappropriate with [M.M.]” Breitanyia stated she had to ask
defendant to leave her home several times when M.M. was at her house. Breitanyia also stated,
after this case was filed against defendant, M.M. “reached out to [her] and informed [her] that
[defendant] had exposed himself to her not only in person but also in photographs, and he had
-8- sent her several photographs of his genitals.” Defendant would have been 26 or 27 years old at
the time.
¶ 23 Breitanyia testified “[defendant] moved in 2022 to get closer to me.” Breitanyia
stated it “was absolutely terrifying” when she learned he was living so close to her and that “until
he was detained, [her] children were no longer allowed to play outside.” She explained it was
“extremely terrifying” because they had both grown up in the same area and she had moved “to
get away from this darkness, and [she] felt that [she] was being followed.”
¶ 24 On cross-exanimation, Breitanyia confirmed from 2020 to 2024, defendant had
not contacted her or come to her home.
¶ 25 2. Defendant’s Evidence
¶ 26 Defendant testified that prior to being taken into custody, he lived in Peoria, but
upon his release, he would reside in St. David with his mother. Defendant testified he would
have no reason to visit Peoria and would stay out of Peoria if the trial court ordered him to do so.
Defendant stated that prior to his arrest, he was not employed, but he was looking for a job. He
testified that before that, he was a “stay-at-home father.” He stated he would seek employment if
released because he has four children to support “[f]inancially, physically, [and] emotionally.”
Defendant stated he was willing to abide by any conditions of release, including checking in with
a probation officer, wearing an ankle monitor, submitting to a psychological examination, having
no contact with the victims or other minors, and abiding by any restrictions on his movement.
¶ 27 On cross-examination, defendant testified that he has two daughters (ages 12 and
4) and two sons (ages 8 and 2). Defendant initially testified that all four children have different
mothers and live separately. Defendant later clarified two of his children have the same mother.
Defendant acknowledged he had no contact with three of his children (including his oldest
-9- daughter, L.G.) since 2020 and did not know where they resided. Defendant testified his
youngest son, whom he had been staying home to take care of, and his son’s mother live at the
Peoria address where he was also living before he was arrested. He acknowledged the mother of
that child was in the courtroom.
¶ 28 3. Argument of the Parties and the Trial Court’s Ruling on the State’s Motion
¶ 29 The State argued the proof was evident and presumption great that defendant
committed the offenses in this case, he presented a danger to the victims and the community, and
there exists no condition or combination of conditions that could ensure the safety of the victims
or community. At the time of his arrest, defendant resided near the victims. The State suggested
it was not a “coincidence” that defendant decided to move to that location. The State argued,
even if defendant intended to live in St. David upon his release, any conditions would be
insufficient to ensure the safety of the children in that community. The State contended
defendant is a predator who has had multiple alleged victims in multiple locations.
¶ 30 In response, defense counsel argued defendant intended to go to trial and prove
his innocence. He argued the evidence relied upon by the State that defendant offended against
other victims was uncorroborated hearsay and resulted in no other criminal charges against
defendant. The allegations he offended against the three victims in this case stemmed from four
years ago, and there were no allegations that anything has occurred since. Defendant stated he
was willing to abide by any conditions imposed on him, including staying out of Peoria and
away from the alleged victims or other minors.
¶ 31 In reply, the State acknowledged its argument that defendant intentionally moved
near the victims was a “just a gut feeling that it’s very troubling.” The State also reminded the
trial court of the 2017 complaint made by defendant’s own child during a CAC interview of
- 10 - similar inappropriate conduct. The State referred to Breitanyia’s testimony regarding other
purported victims, including witnessing defendant’s inappropriate conduct against another
minor, as evidence of “a pattern of [defendant] victimizing people in the community in general.”
Although there had been no new allegations since 2020, the State argued this did not mean
nothing else had occurred.
¶ 32 The trial court found the proof was evident and presumption great defendant
committed the offenses alleged in the information and that he posed a threat. When addressing
whether any condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat, the court noted the
importance of additional evidence of the allegations of similar conduct made by defendant’s
child in 2017. The court found further corroboration and testimony “regarding statements made
by, it would appear, other victims, means that the community is at risk.” The court found
defendant lacked credibility based on his hesitation in answering questions, particularly when he
claimed that he would provide support for his children when, in fact, he admitted he did not
know where three of the four children currently resided. The court explained, “[W]hat is of
concern here is *** the victims of this case and the community at large, and I don’t believe there
is any set of circumstances at the present time that supports a release of [defendant] with what is
in front of this Court.” The court’s findings were detailed in a written decision filed on
November 13, 2024.
¶ 33 B. Defendant’s Motion for Relief
¶ 34 On November 14, 2024, defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule
604(h)(2). Defendant argued the trial court erred in allowing hearsay evidence regarding his
danger to the community, the court should not have considered evidence of a 2017 CAC
interview of his child because those allegations did not result in any arrest or criminal charge
- 11 - against him, the State failed to prove there existed no less restrictive means of protecting the
community from the threat he may pose, and the court’s decision to deny his pretrial release was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. A hearing was held on the motion on November 26,
2024. The court denied the motion, reaffirming its original decision and finding there was no less
restrictive means of protecting the community.
¶ 35 This appeal followed.
¶ 36 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 37 Defendant did not file a memorandum in support of his appeal. Instead, he relies
on his motion for relief filed in the trial court as his argument on appeal in accordance with Rule
604(h)(7). In his motion for relief, defendant raised the following issues: (1) the court erred in
considering certain hearsay evidence regarding his dangerousness, including testimony regarding
other alleged victims and testimony regarding the 2017 CAC interview of his child and (2) the
court’s decision to deny him pretrial release was against the manifest weight of the evidence
because the State failed to prove there was no less restrictive means of protecting the community
from any threat he may pose.
¶ 38 Under the Code, it is presumed that all criminal defendants are entitled to pretrial
release on personal recognizance, subject to certain conditions. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West
2022). The State may petition for the pretrial detention of a defendant if the defendant is charged
with a detainable offense as enumerated in the Code and, after a hearing, the trial court finds the
defendant’s release would pose “a real and present threat to the safety of any person or person or
the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case,” or the defendant “has a high
likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution.” Id. § 110-6.1(a)(1), (8). The State has the
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that any condition of pretrial release is
- 12 - necessary. Id. § 110-2(b).
¶ 39 When live testimony is presented at a pretrial detention hearing, the trial court’s
underlying factual findings and ultimate decision regarding detention will not be disturbed unless
they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626,
¶ 54. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence when “the opposite conclusion is
clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence
presented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted). Id. ¶ 21.
¶ 40 A. Hearsay Evidence
¶ 41 Defendant’s first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in considering
certain hearsay evidence regarding his purported dangerousness to the community. Defendant
did not support this contention with argument or citation to authority in his motion for relief in
the trial court, which is the sole source of his argument on appeal. A reviewing court “is entitled
to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and coherent arguments presented;
any arguments inadequately presented are forfeited.” People v. Hui, 2022 Ill App (2d) 190846,
¶ 52; see People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545-46 (2010) (finding a defendant forfeits plain-
error review when he fails to argue plain error on appeal). Forfeiture aside, we find no error
occurred in the admission of this evidence at the detention hearing. People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d
125, 139 (2005) (“[T]here can be no plain error if there is no error.”).
¶ 42 A hearing on a petition to deny a defendant pretrial release is an evidentiary
hearing at which the State has the burden of showing clear and convincing evidence of the
applicable statutory requirements. People v. Whitaker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232009, ¶ 54. In
determining dangerousness, the trial court will consider the factors enumerated in section 110-
6.1(g) of the Code, which include, inter alia, evidence and testimony of a defendant’s prior
- 13 - criminal history, his “social history which tends to indicate a violent, abusive, or assaultive
nature, or lack of such history,” and any other factors “deemed by the court to have a reasonable
bearing upon the defendant’s propensity or reputation for violent, abusive, or assaultive
behavior, or lack of such behavior.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(2)(A), (2)(B), (9) (West 2022).
Given the unique circumstances of pretrial detention hearings, the legislature has instructed that
“[t]he rules concerning the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not apply to the
presentation and consideration of information at the hearing.” Id. § 110-6.1(f)(2), (5). This
includes “specifically permitting acceptable evidence to include hearsay, and proffers based on
reliable information.” Whitaker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232009, ¶ 55.
¶ 43 In this case, it was not error for the trial court to consider Breitanyia’s hearsay
testimony regarding defendant’s alleged abusive behavior toward other victims. This testimony
was relevant as an indicator of defendant’s social history and propensity or reputation for abusive
behavior. Similarly, the court properly considered the proffered evidence regarding the 2017
CAC interview of L.G. wherein the State proffered Sheriff Webb would testify he observed the
interview and L.G.’s assertions that defendant abused her in a manner similar to the alleged
offenses in this case. This proffer was based upon reliable information from Sheriff Webb’s own
observations of L.G.’s forensic interview. This evidence also had a reasonable bearing upon
defendant’s propensity for committing abusive behavior against children. As such, no error
occurred because the evidence was properly submitted and considered, in accordance with the
Code, at defendant’s detention hearing.
¶ 44 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 45 Defendant argues the trial court’s decision to deny him pretrial release was
against the manifest weight of the evidence because the State failed to prove there existed no less
- 14 - restrictive means of protecting the community from the threat he may pose. We disagree.
¶ 46 Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that he was charged with
a detainable offense and posed a threat to the safety of any person or the community. Instead,
defendant challenges the court’s determination there were no “less restrictive means besides
detention” to protect the alleged victims or the community from his threat. A finding of
dangerousness alone does not automatically warrant pretrial detention. People v. Atterberry,
2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 18 (finding pretrial detention requires more than a detainable
offense and a threat to public safety). “Instead, the trial court must determine, based on the
specific facts of the case and the defendant’s individual background and characteristics, whether
any combination of conditions can mitigate the threat and allow the defendant’s release.” Id. “In
each case, a court must conduct an ‘individualized’ assessment of the propriety of detaining the
defendant versus releasing him or her with conditions.” Id. ¶ 15.
¶ 47 We determine the trial court’s decision that there existed no condition or
combination of conditions that would mitigate the threat defendant posed to any individual or the
community was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record reveals defendant
had demonstrated a pattern of sexually abusive behavior. Breitanyia testified three other
individuals had informed her they were victimized by defendant. Breitanyia witnessed
defendant’s abusive conduct toward one of those victims firsthand. In 2017, defendant’s own
daughter, L.G., accused him of sexually abusing her in a manner similar to that alleged by the
victims in this case. It is notable that defendant has no contact with that daughter or two of his
other children, to the point of testifying he does not even know where they reside. It is troubling,
to say the least, given L.G.’s allegations and those made by the victims in this case, that
defendant identified himself as a stay-at-home father for his youngest child.
- 15 - ¶ 48 Furthermore, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that defendant’s
testimony lacked credibility. Defendant testified he had four children whom he would be
supporting “financially, physically, [and] emotionally” if he were released, but he later
acknowledged he had not been in contact with three of those children since 2020 and, it bears
repeating, he did not even know where they currently live. Further concern regarding defendant’s
credibility was revealed as the court doubted whether it was, in fact, a coincidence that he moved
to live in such close proximity to the alleged victims in this case. Breitanyia testified she
believed defendant moved to that location to get closer to her, and she was terrified because she
moved to Peoria “to get away from this darkness” and felt as though defendant was following
her. Defendant’s past behavior and credibility issues call into question his stated intentions to
move to St. David and stay away from Peoria. This is particularly true given defendant testified
his youngest child and that child’s mother still reside a mere half mile from the victims’
residence in Peoria.
¶ 49 After a careful review of the record, we conclude the State proved an absence of
any less restrictive means of protecting the victims and the community from the threat posed by
defendant. The trial court’s decision to deny defendant pretrial release was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we affirm.
¶ 50 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 51 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 52 Affirmed.
- 16 -