NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 241533-U This Order was filed under FILED February 25, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-1533 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County KAITLYNN R. RUSSELL, ) No. 22CF602 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Ryan M. Cadagin, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The evidence is insufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions for reckless conduct and child endangerment for defendant’s alleged failure to obtain appropriate medical treatment, as there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, this alleged failure was a cause or proximate cause of the child’s death.
(2) The indictment complies with section 111-3(a)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 2022)).
(3) The guilty verdicts on count I, child endangerment, and count III, reckless conduct, are legally inconsistent, as they are based on the same act and mutually exclusive mental states.
(4) As the remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel at trial is a new trial and a new trial is ordered due to the inconsistent verdicts reached on counts I and III, defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is moot.
¶2 Defendant, Kaitlynn R. Russell, appeals her convictions of two counts of child
endangerment (720 ILCS 5/12C-5(a)(2) (West 2022)) and two counts of reckless conduct (id. § 12-5(a)(1), (2)). On appeal, defendant argues (1) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt she knowingly or recklessly failed to obtain medical treatment after finding Paris face
down in water; (2) the trial court erred in not dismissing counts I and III, as the indictment set
forth only a negligent act but charged defendant with reckless conduct and child endangerment;
(3) the verdicts are legally inconsistent and require reversal and remand for a new trial, as the
verdicts rely on mutually exclusive mental states for the same conduct; and (4) defendant was
denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel did not seek the exclusion of
testimony after the State failed to produce a recording of a custodial interrogation. We agree with
defendant’s first and third arguments, reverse defendant’s convictions, and remand for a new
trial on counts I and III.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Indictment
¶5 On June 15, 2022, defendant was indicted on six offenses after the January 12,
2022, death of two-year-old Paris Green; only the first four counts went to trial. Count I alleged
defendant committed endangering the life or health of a child “in that said defendant, knowingly
caused or permitted [Paris], a child under the age of 18 years to be placed in circumstances that
endangered [Paris’s] life or health in that she failed to adequately supervise [Paris] and said
circumstances were the proximate cause of [Paris’s] death.” See id. § 12C-5(a)(2). Count II
alleged defendant committed the same offense in that she “knowingly caused or permitted [Paris]
*** to be placed in circumstances that endangered [Paris’s] life or health in that she failed to
obtain immediate medical treatment for [Paris] after locating [Paris] face-down in a bath tub and
said circumstances were the proximate cause of [Paris’s] death.” See id. Count III alleged
defendant committed reckless conduct in that she “recklessly caused great bodily harm to [Paris],
-2- [a] 2[-]year[-]old child, in that she failed to adequately supervise [Paris] thereby causing the
death of [Paris] when the act was committed.” See id. § 12-5(a)(2). Count IV alleged defendant
committed reckless conduct by failing “to obtain appropriate medical treatment for [Paris] after
locating [Paris] face-down in a bath tub thereby causing the death of [Paris].” See id. § 12-
5(a)(1).
¶6 B. Motion to Dismiss Indictment
¶7 On August 2, 2024, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending it
failed to state a cause of action on all counts. Defendant argued, “[T]he law requires there to be
an intentional act, and the State has alleged negligent or passive conduct in their charging
document.”
¶8 At the hearing on the motion, defendant argued the State did not charge in the
indictment knowing or reckless conduct to satisfy the mens rea of the charged offenses. Instead,
according to defendant, the State charged only an “omissive act,” as negligence is not an
intentional act. The State countered by arguing the indictment complied with the law and
defendant’s conduct “was a knowing act.” The State concluded, “[T]here was action here and
also willful inaction as well.”
¶9 The trial court denied defendant’s motion.
¶ 10 C. Trial
¶ 11 A jury trial was held in August 2024. At that trial, Keiona Smith, Paris’s mother,
testified defendant had watched her children in defendant’s home for approximately one year
before Paris’s death. Between 7 and 8:30 p.m. on January 11, 2022, Smith dropped Paris and her
younger sibling at defendant’s home. At 4:55 a.m. on the following day, Smith received a call
from defendant. She did not answer the call, nor did she pick up when defendant called again at
-3- 4:57 a.m. At 5 a.m., Smith answered defendant’s third call. Defendant told Smith Paris “was
breathing funny.” Defendant explained she had bathed Paris in the sink after Paris soiled herself.
Defendant said Paris “was making bubbles” but did not explain what she meant by “making
bubbles.” After Smith asked defendant to show her Paris on the video call, defendant “kind of
hesitated” before bringing Paris to the phone. Smith observed Paris had a green shirt wrapped
around her neck. Paris did not answer when Smith called her name. Smith told defendant to take
Paris and meet her at the hospital. At the hospital, Smith asked defendant, “ ‘[W]hat
happened?’ ” Defendant replied, “ ‘I’m sorry, Sis, I tried. ”
¶ 12 Medical staff testified to the events that occurred after defendant brought Paris to
the hospital. Alana Downen, a registered nurse, testified, at approximately 5:15 a.m., she was
called to the lobby by the triage area at the hospital. There she found a woman holding a child
inside a coat. That woman asked Downen, “ ‘Can you check if they are okay?’ ” The child was
“very cold.” Downen took the child and had staff alerted “somebody critical [was] coming
back.” The child “was floppy, very, very cold, and was blue” and not breathing. Downen yelled
for a pediatric crash cart and a bed. Staff began cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)
immediately. Warming efforts were made, including using warm fluids, a warming light, and
warming blankets. After two hours of CPR, hospital staff could not register a core temperature,
as their “thermometers don’t go that low.” The child was declared deceased.
¶ 13 Jessica Henley, a travel nurse, testified Paris arrived in wet clothing and was very
cold. Paris’s diaper, other than having feces, was dry. Henley spoke to the female who brought
Paris in. Henley asked what happened and why Paris’s clothes were wet. The female responded
she placed Paris in the kitchen sink after Paris had diarrhea up her back. The female further
explained she left the room to check on Paris’s brother and returned to find Paris face down in
-4- the sink.
¶ 14 The treating emergency room physician, Robert Viaille, testified Paris’s heart was
not beating when she arrived at the hospital and stated, “[W]e began administering epinephrine,
which is a component of resuscitation in order to try to get her heart to start back up.” During the
approximately 90 minutes of resuscitation efforts, there were no spontaneous respirations by
Paris and no palpable pulse.
¶ 15 The State presented the expert testimony of Nathaniel Patterson, a forensic
pathologist, who conducted Paris’s autopsy on January 12, 2022. Dr. Patterson concluded Paris’s
cause of death was drowning.
¶ 16 Photographs and video evidence revealed the condition of defendant’s residence.
Defendant resided in a one-bedroom, one-bathroom apartment. A bookshelf with a television
partially separated the kitchen from the living-room area. A white or beige sofa was in the living
area. The door to the bedroom was off its hinges. Clothing, debris, and toys were scattered on the
apartment floor. The bathtub contained three inches of milky-white standing water. Floating in
the water were multiple dead cockroaches and a child’s diaper.
¶ 17 The State further introduced evidence of three police interactions with defendant.
The first, part of a recorded police interview from January 12, 2022, occurred hours after Paris’s
death. In that interview, defendant stated Paris and her sibling were dropped off at her apartment
at 2:30 a.m. Paris was asleep when she arrived but awoke approximately 5 to 10 minutes later
and played for a short time. After Paris soiled her diaper around 4 a.m., defendant washed Paris
her in the kitchen sink. Defendant left Paris in the sink, where she played with her toys for 5 to
10 minutes, while defendant watched television in the same room. Defendant could see Paris
from the living room. Defendant took Paris from the bathtub and attempted to dress her. Paris’s
-5- shirt was only partly on, with one arm in a sleeve, because Paris was fighting defendant with the
shirt. Paris lay on the couch. She then slid off the couch. Defendant noticed Paris was not
breathing. She telephoned Smith. When asked if she was certain Paris was alive when at
defendant’s house, defendant said she was because defendant heard her make a “raspy noise”
and, while on the phone with Smith, Paris’s eyes were open and she nodded at her mother.
Before heading to the hospital, defendant dressed Paris in a coat and shoes. At this time, Paris’s
eyes were closed, and she was not moving. Defendant could not wake her. When in the
emergency room, defendant wiped Paris’s nose because she had clear, “watery snot” running
down her nose.
¶ 18 In this interview, during further questioning, defendant stated she and her
boyfriend, Lawrence, were awake during this time. After getting out of the sink, Paris stood and
watched television. Defendant observed “nothing unusual” until Paris slid from the couch onto
the floor. Paris did not respond to defendant’s attempts to wake her. At this time, defendant
called Smith and rushed Paris to the hospital. Defendant reported, before being bathed in the
sink, Paris was pushing a crate around the apartment. Paris used the crate to climb onto things.
At one point, Paris fell from the crate to the floor onto her stomach as the crate slid from beneath
her. Paris continued playing. Defendant stated she permitted Paris and her older sibling to run
around the house, doing whatever they wanted, until they wore themselves out.
¶ 19 In revisiting the time period after Paris’s bath in the sink, defendant reported Paris
ate some Cheetos after the bath and walked around before falling asleep on the couch. Paris
made a “raspy breathing noise.” Defendant checked Paris’s mouth and found nothing. Defendant
then called Smith. Between attempts to get in touch with Smith, defendant was getting dressed to
take Paris to the hospital, which was 5 to 10 minutes from defendant’s apartment.
-6- ¶ 20 The State’s video of the second police interaction shows an interview beginning
around 5:45 p.m. on the same day. Defendant reported Paris only went to the kitchen when at her
apartment and did not go into other parts of the home. After a detective asked if Paris could have
gotten her face into the water somehow, defendant mentioned Paris would grab cups from the
kitchen counter and sometimes drink the bathwater. When asked if Paris could have drowned,
defendant reported Paris would, at times, fall asleep while in the sink. Defendant stated she “did
leave her in the sink maybe more than 15 minutes, and I probably wasn’t—I was on my phone.”
Defendant could not tell if Paris went under, but she did have the faucet on and the water was
cold. Upon hearing the water running, defendant removed Paris from the sink. Water overflowed
onto the counter and the floor. At this time, Paris was standing and appeared fine. Paris ate some
Cheetos. Defendant assumed Paris had fallen asleep. This occurred about 15 to 20 minutes after
being taken from the sink.
¶ 21 A detective asked about the condition of the bathroom and the standing water in
the bathtub. Defendant acknowledged the water had been in the bathtub for a while. She noted
the toilet would not flush with toilet paper. Defendant had been talking to her landlord about the
conditions. When asked if it was possible Paris entered the bathroom and got into the bathtub,
defendant acknowledged that was possible because she did play in the bathtub. After being
informed police found objects in the bathtub that made it appear Paris had been in the bathtub
and being asked if Paris had been in the bathtub, defendant said Paris fell into the bathtub.
Defendant had heard a “boom” and rushed to pull Paris out immediately. Paris was lying face
down, and the diaper “fell off.” Paris “wasn’t responsive.” She was gurgling. Defendant stuck
her finger in Paris’s throat and tried to perform CPR for approximately five minutes. Water came
out of Paris’s nose. Defendant then called Smith and took Paris to the emergency room.
-7- ¶ 22 Defendant explained she and her boyfriend left water in the bathtub because of
the roaches and the fact roaches were attracted to the water. Defendant forgot to drain the
bathtub when the children arrived. Defendant drained the bathtub using a trash can. She said she
usually kept the bathroom door closed. Defendant stated when Paris fell into the bathtub, both
she and Lawrence were on their phones. Lawrence had on a headset while playing a game. The
television was on.
¶ 23 Defendant’s third conversation was described by Charles Redpath, a detective
with the Springfield Police Department. Detective Redpath testified he and Detective Jennifer
Howard were assigned to investigate Paris’s death. Detective Redpath participated in the two
videotaped interviews of defendant that occurred on January 12, 2022. After the interviews, the
detective remained concerned about the length of time Paris was in the bathtub. On June 21,
2022, Detective Redpath asked defendant how much time passed between when she heard a
thump and when she found Paris in the bathtub. Defendant stated the time was approximately
one hour. Detective Redpath recorded the conversation on his department-issued cell phone. The
department-issued cell phone would automatically erase the phone’s data after more than five
unsuccessful attempts were made to unlock the phone. In the days after the June 21, 2022,
conversation, the detective had training with the SWAT team while in his “full kit.” In that
training, the phone was in Detective Redpath’s pocket, and the contents were erased. Efforts
were made to recover the recording, but those efforts failed.
¶ 24 The jury found defendant guilty on all counts. At sentencing, the trial court agreed
with the State’s assertion the reckless-conduct charges would merge into the child-endangerment
charges under the one-act, one-crime doctrine. The court sentenced defendant to concurrent
terms of 30 months’ probation and 180 days’ incarceration, with credit for the 652 days
-8- defendant served while awaiting trial.
¶ 25 This appeal followed.
¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 27 A. The Sufficiency of the State’s Evidence on Counts II and IV
¶ 28 As to counts II and IV, which charged defendant with child endangerment and
reckless conduct based on defendant’s alleged failure to seek immediate and appropriate medical
treatment, defendant argues the State failed to prove those counts beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant argues there is no evidence she acted knowingly or recklessly in her attempts to aid
Paris and no evidence any alleged delay in seeking care caused harm. Defendant emphasizes no
witness testified Paris’s death would have been prevented had defendant sought medical
attention sooner.
¶ 29 The State disagrees and maintains the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, sufficiently proves defendant acted knowingly and recklessly in not
seeking medical help for Paris. The State highlights defendant’s delay in getting Paris to the
hospital upon finding her in the bathtub and then waiting in line in the emergency room. As to
the issue of cause or proximate cause, the State asserts the jury could reasonably infer
defendant’s failure “proximately contributed to the victim’s death.”
¶ 30 When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court views
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and considers, in that light, whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Ivanchuk, 2025 IL App (4th) 241230, ¶ 78.
¶ 31 Both offenses, endangering the life or health of a child and reckless conduct,
require proof defendant’s alleged criminal act, failing to seek immediate or appropriate medical
-9- attention, caused or proximately caused Paris’s death. As charged against defendant in count II,
endangering the life or health of a child requires proof defendant “knowingly *** cause[d] or
permit[ed] the life or health of a child under the age of 18 to be endangered” and that action was
“a proximate cause of the death of a child.” (Emphases added.) 720 ILCS 5/12C-5(a), (d) (West
2022). Reckless conduct, as charged in count IV, requires proof defendant “recklessly
perform[ed] an act or acts that *** cause[d] great bodily harm *** to another person.”
(Emphasis added.) Id. § 12-5(a)(2).
¶ 32 In general, “when a crime requires both an act by defendant and a specified result
of that act, the defendant’s act must be both the ‘cause in fact’ of the result and the ‘proximate’
or ‘legal’ cause of the result.” People v. Nere, 2018 IL 122566, ¶ 31 (quoting 1 Wayne R.
LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4, at 628 (3d ed. 2018)). To satisfy the first requirement,
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt defendant’s act was a contributing cause of
Paris’s death. See id. ¶ 32. As to the second requirement, proximate cause, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt defendant’s act of not seeking immediate medical care, “ ‘in natural
or probable sequence, produced the injury complained of[;] *** [i]t is sufficient if it concurs with
some other cause acting at the same time, which in combination with it, causes the injury.’ ”
People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392, 401 (2006) (quoting Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil,
No. 15.01 (2005)); see People v. Cook, 2011 IL App (4th) 090875, ¶ 30.
¶ 33 Here, given the evidence at trial, no rational trier of fact could have found the
State proved the elements of “proximate cause” or “cause” beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is no reasonable inference
defendant’s alleged delay in seeking medical treatment caused or proximately caused Paris’s
death. In response to defendant’s argument on appeal, the State points to no medical testimony or
- 10 - expert testimony Paris would have survived, or even probably would have survived, had
defendant’s efforts to secure medical treatment occurred quicker. In light of the absence of such
testimony, the jury could only speculate as to the effect, if any, defendant’s alleged delay had on
Paris’s death. To find the delay caused or proximately caused Paris’s death based on the
evidence at trial, any rational trier of fact would have to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, had
Paris arrived at the hospital approximately 15 to 20 minutes earlier, she would have survived.
There is no basis in the record to support that conclusion. The bulk of the evidence suggests the
more likely conclusion, as the State argued in its closing argument, was Paris died in defendant’s
home. Defendant admitted approximately one hour passed after she heard a thump and found
Paris in the bathtub, with her diaper floating in the water. When Smith asked defendant to show
Paris to her during the video call, defendant hesitated to bring Paris to the phone, and Paris was
not responsive to Smith. Upon arrival to the hospital, Paris was very cold, not breathing, and
blue, and she had no pulse. At no point did Paris register a pulse. While it is possible, had
defendant gotten Paris to the hospital earlier, she would not have died, given the absence of any
medical testimony or expert testimony to support that conclusion and the weight of evidence
showing Paris had already drowned when defendant found her sans diaper and face down in the
bathtub, such a conclusion cannot reach the standard of being beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 34 Because the State did not prove all the elements of counts II and IV beyond a
reasonable doubt, we reverse defendant’s convictions on counts II and IV.
¶ 35 B. The Sufficiency of the Indictment
¶ 36 Defendant argues her convictions on counts I and III must be reversed because the
State, in its indictment, only alleged the failure to adequately supervise, which is an omission and
not an act that can be knowingly or recklessly committed. Defendant argues, in effect, an
- 11 - omission amounts only to negligence. As the State did not charge defendant with a knowing or
reckless act, defendant argues, the indictment does not comply with the requirement of section
111-3(a)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 2022))
that charges of an offense “[s]et[ ] forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.”
¶ 37 Criminal defendants have the fundamental right to be informed of the nature and
cause of criminal charges against them. See People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 448 (1991). To
ensure this right, section 111-3 mandates a written criminal charge state the offense’s name, the
statutory provision allegedly violated, the date and county of the offense, the accused’s name,
and “the nature and elements of the offense charged.” 725 ILCS 5/111-3(a) (West 2022). When
facing a challenge to the sufficiency of a charging instrument in a pretrial motion, the trial court
must dismiss the information or indictment if that charging instrument fails to satisfy section
111-3, including if that instrument fails to provide all of the offense’s elements. People v. Kidd,
2022 IL 127904, ¶ 26. Our question, on appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss an
allegedly insufficient charging instrument, is whether that instrument strictly complies with
section 111-3. People v. DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 2d 318, 321-22 (1996). If the charging instrument
does not comply, the appropriate remedy is to reverse the trial court and remand with directions
to dismiss the indictment. See Kidd, 2022 IL 127904, ¶ 31. Because the question of whether the
trial court properly denied defendant’s pretrial motion is a question of law, our review is de novo.
People v. Espinoza, 2015 IL 118218, ¶ 15.
¶ 38 We are not convinced by defendant’s argument the failure to adequately supervise
cannot be a knowing or reckless act. Defendant provides no case law showing an omission, like
inadequate supervision of a child, cannot be committed recklessly or knowingly, but only
negligently. Two of defendant’s cases, People v. Gibbs, 119 Ill. App. 2d 222 (1970), and People
- 12 - v. Gosse, 119 Ill. App. 3d 733 (1983), simply provide instances where the conduct of the
defendants did not rise to the level of recklessness but did not foreclose charges of recklessness
or knowing child endangerment for the failure to supervise. See Gibbs, 119 Ill. App. 2d at 224-
28; Gosse, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 735, 739. In Gibbs, a child died after his foster mother failed to
close a door to the basement and the child fell down the stairs. Gibbs, 119 Ill. App. 2d at 226-27.
The facts showed the defendant removed the child from his playpen to allow him to play on the
floor. Id. at 226. The defendant then went to the basement to put a load of clothes into the
washing machine, leaving the door to the basement open. Id. at 226-27. The defendant was
convicted of reckless conduct. Id. at 222. On appeal, the Second District concluded the facts at
trial did not rise to the level of reckless conduct and concluded reversal without remand was
necessary, as
“[t]o hold otherwise would be to interpret the statute to mean that
if any person were to leave a child in a room, briefly unattended,
and omitted to close a basement door, whether the child was
injured or not, such individual would be guilty, not of negligence,
but of the offense of reckless conduct.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at
231.
In Gosse, the court reversed a conviction for reckless conduct upon finding the defendant had not
acted recklessly when he attempted a right-hand turn on land used to excavate gravel. Gosse, 119
Ill. App. 3d at 735, 739.
¶ 39 Defendant’s third case, People v. Brown, 2021 IL App (2d) 190181-U, also falls
short. In Brown, the court affirmed a reckless-conduct conviction for a defendant who injured her
daughter while forcing the infant to perform “bicycle kicks.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 11. In so doing, the Brown
- 13 - court distinguished Gibbs, finding “defendant’s choice to modify the performance of bicycle
kicks was inherently more deliberate than the kind of negligence at issue in Gibbs.” Id. ¶ 43. No
language in Brown supports the conclusion a lapse in supervision may not be knowing or
reckless. In fact, its language distinguishing Gibbs indicates insufficient watchfulness is not
limited to negligent conduct: “it was thus not ordinary in the same way as insufficient
watchfulness may be.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
¶ 40 As the facts elicited at defendant’s trial indicated, a failure to supervise may be
knowingly or recklessly committed. The decision to allow Paris and her older sibling to roam
around the apartment and to do as they pleased until they wore themselves out when in
defendant’s home may certainly be a knowing or reckless decision. The decision to be on one’s
phone with the television on as the children had access to other rooms in the house and the
ability to climb using a crate may be a knowing or reckless decision that endangered Paris’s life
or recklessly caused her death.
¶ 41 We find the State’s indictment, which alleged the act of failing to adequately
supervise Paris, sets forth the elements of the charges made against defendant and, therefore,
complies with the mandate of section 111-3(a)(3). Defendant is not entitled to a reversal of her
convictions for counts I and III on this ground.
¶ 42 C. Inconsistent Verdicts
¶ 43 Defendant argues the guilty verdicts for knowingly failing to supervise Paris
(child endangerment) and recklessly failing to supervise Paris (reckless conduct) are legally
inconsistent and must be reversed, as knowledge and recklessness are “mutually inconsistent
culpable mental states.” Defendant, citing People v. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d 396, 410 (1986),
contends simultaneous guilty findings on the mental states of knowledge and recklessness for the
- 14 - same act against the same victim are legally inconsistent, necessitating a remand for a new trial.
¶ 44 The State counters by first arguing this court should find defendant forfeited this
claim. The State maintains defendant did not object to the instructions during the jury-instruction
conference and “waited until the arguably inconsistent verdicts were returned” before raising the
issue in a posttrial motion. Defendant responds by stating she raised the issue in her motion for a
new trial and supported it with the above-cited authority.
¶ 45 Case law establishes forfeiture is not a bar to inconsistent-verdict claims. In
People v. Carter, 193 Ill. App. 3d 529, 533 (1990), this court rejected a similar claim the
defendant’s failure to seek “an instruction on inconsistent verdicts at trial” or object “when the
verdicts were returned” barred that defendant from seeking relief on appeal. Quoting Spears and
finding “ ‘[w]hen the jury returned with inconsistent guilty verdicts, the trial judge had a duty to
send the jury back for further deliberations consistent with new instructions to resolve the
inconsistency,’ ” we considered the merits of the defendant’s claim. Id. at 533-34 (quoting
Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 410). Other courts have rejected claims of forfeiture upon finding legally
inconsistent verdicts are plain error. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1058
(1992) (“Legally inconsistent verdicts present plain error, which is an exception to the general
rule that issues not raised in defendant’s motion for a new trial are waived.”); People v. Randle,
213 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1085 (1991). We thus turn to the merits of defendant’s claim.
¶ 46 In support of her argument, defendant relies heavily on Spears to prove the
verdicts are legally inconsistent. In Spears, a jury found the defendant guilty of three charges
against his wife based on the same gunshots but with differing levels of intent: attempted murder,
armed violence, and reckless conduct. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 399. The Illinois Supreme Court
found the jury improperly concluded defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly
- 15 - but unintentionally at the same time. Id. at 403-04. In deciding whether multiple gunshots could
support different verdicts, the Spears court focused on prosecutorial intent, such as “[t]he manner
by which a defendant is charged, and the jury is instructed,” as “the essential framework for
analyzing the consistency of jury verdicts in the troublesome context of multiple shots or
victims” Id. 405.
¶ 47 The State, citing People v. Stroud, 2023 IL App (2d) 220306, ¶ 24, maintains its
theory of the case at trial is germane to whether alleged legally inconsistent verdicts are based on
separable acts. The State points to the charges and contends they are based on different acts.
Regarding count I, the State maintains it argued defendant knowingly caused or permitted Paris
to be placed in circumstances endangering her life, as she knew the condition of her apartment,
the child’s presence, and the child’s “roaming free.” The State argues, in contrast, for count III, it
argued “defendant committed reckless conduct by consciously disregarding the risk created by
the dangerous circumstances.”
¶ 48 Upon our review of the record, we find the verdicts on counts I and III are legally
inconsistent. “Recklessness and knowledge are mutually inconsistent mental states” (id. ¶ 21),
but the jury found defendant acted with both mental states when she failed to adequately
supervise Paris. As shown in the indictment and in the State’s closing argument, the State
pursued and secured guilty verdicts for both child endangerment and reckless conduct based on
the same act. Both charges identified defendant’s failure to supervise as the act defendant
committed and the act that caused Paris’s death. Count I alleged defendant committed
endangering the life or health of a child “in that said defendant, knowingly caused or permitted
[Paris], a child under the age of 18 years to be placed in circumstances that endangered [Paris’s]
life or health in that she failed to adequately supervise [Paris] and said circumstances were the
- 16 - proximate cause of [Paris’s] death.” (Emphasis added). Count III alleged defendant committed
reckless conduct in that she “recklessly caused great bodily harm to [Paris], [a] 2[-]year[-]old
child, in that she failed to adequately supervise [Paris], thereby causing the death of [Paris] when
the act was committed.” (Emphasis added).
¶ 49 Moreover, in its closing argument, the State argued the same act, allowing Paris to
roam without supervision, supported convictions on both charges. As to count I, the State
maintained the following:
“[Defendant] knew the condition of her apartment. She knew that
Paris Green was there. As she told the police, she knew that she
was letting her roam around. She knew that Paris had already
gotten hurt earlier in the evening when she fell on the crate, and so
she let her roam free. She knew. You can’t live in an apartment
like that and now know what it is like. She knew.”
¶ 50 As to count III, the reckless-conduct count:
“There’s no such thing as letting a two-year-old roam wherever
they want. There is no such thing as letting a two-year-old roam
wherever they want in an apartment that is in a condition around
standing water. It’s beyond belief. There’s no taking that back.
And, as has already been indicated, the Defendant had been taking
care of Paris Green for quite some time off and on. She knew what
Paris Green was like. She knew that she liked to roam around like
any two-year-old would. They get into stuff, and still she let her
roam. Paris had already gotten hurt earlier that day, and she still let
- 17 - her roam. So, the very definition of Reckless.”
¶ 51 The verdicts of child endangerment and reckless conduct based on the same act of
a lack of adequate supervision but with differing mental states cannot stand.
¶ 52 We find double jeopardy does not preclude retrial; an argument otherwise is not
asserted by defendant. The evidence at defendant’s initial trial is sufficient to sustain a verdict on
either the reckless-conduct or child-endangerment charges. See People v. Drake, 2019 IL
123734, ¶ 20 (“The double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial when a conviction has been
overturned because of an error in the trial proceedings, but retrial is barred if the evidence
introduced at the initial trial was insufficient to sustain the conviction.”). Accordingly, we
reverse defendant’s convictions on counts I and III and remand for retrial on those counts.
¶ 53 D. Effectiveness of Counsel
¶ 54 Defendant last argues she was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial
when her counsel failed to seek the exclusion of testimony by Detective Redpath regarding the
alleged third pretrial custodial interrogation. According to defendant, Detective Redpath
recorded the conversation but then failed to produce a copy of the recording in discovery after
the only copy of said recording was deleted.
¶ 55 The proper remedy for the denial of the effective assistance of counsel is reversal
and remand for a new trial. See, e.g., People v. Parks, 2025 IL App (4th) 230597, ¶¶ 56, 71. As
we have granted this remedy on defendant’s surviving claims due to the legally inconsistent
verdicts, no further remedy may be given here, and the issue is moot. Commonwealth Edison Co.
v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 10 (“An appeal is moot *** when events have
occurred that make it impossible for the reviewing court to render effectual relief.”). We will not
consider it. See id. (“ ‘As a general rule, courts of review in Illinois do not decide moot
- 18 - questions.’ ” (quoting In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998))).
¶ 56 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 57 We reverse defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial on counts I and
III.
¶ 58 Reversed and remanded.
- 19 -