People v. Roldan

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Roldan

111 A.D.3d 909, 975 N.Y.S.2d 681

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 27, 2013

StatusPublished

This text of 111 A.D.3d 909 (People v. Roldan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Roldan, 111 A.D.3d 909, 975 N.Y.S.2d 681 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2013).

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Opinion

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Foley J.), dated April 17, 2012, which, after a hearing, designated him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

One of the defendant’s contentions on appeal is that he was entitled to a downward departure from the presumptive risk level because he allegedly had an “exceptional response” to [910]*910treatment while incarcerated. A defendant seeking a downward departure has the initial burden of “(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is not otherwise adequately taken into account by the Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence” (.People v Wyatt, 89 AD3d 112, 128 [2011]). The Sex Offender Registration Act Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary recognize that “[a]n offender’s response to treatment, if exceptional, can be the basis for a downward departure” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 17 [2006]; see People v Washington, 84 AD3d 910, 911 [2011]). Here, however, the defendant’s evidence did not prove that he had an exceptional response to treatment (see People v Perez, 104 AD3d 746, 747 [2013]; People v Hays, 99 AD3d 1212, 1213 [2012]; People v Peeples, 98 AD3d 491, 492 [2012]; People v Watson, 95 AD3d 978, 979 [2012]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions regarding his request for a downward departure are without merit. Accordingly, he was not entitled to a downward departure from the presumptive risk level (see People v Peeples, 98 AD3d at 492; People v Watson, 95 AD3d at 979; People v Wyatt, 89 AD3d at 131). Mastro, J.E, Leventhal, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Foley J.), dated April 17, 2012, which, after a hearing, designated him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

One of the defendant’s contentions on appeal is that he was entitled to a downward departure from the presumptive risk level because he allegedly had an “exceptional response” to [910]*910treatment while incarcerated. A defendant seeking a downward departure has the initial burden of “(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is not otherwise adequately taken into account by the Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence” (.People v Wyatt, 89 AD3d 112, 128 [2011]). The Sex Offender Registration Act Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary recognize that “[a]n offender’s response to treatment, if exceptional, can be the basis for a downward departure” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 17 [2006]; see People v Washington, 84 AD3d 910, 911 [2011]). Here, however, the defendant’s evidence did not prove that he had an exceptional response to treatment (see People v Perez, 104 AD3d 746, 747 [2013]; People v Hays, 99 AD3d 1212, 1213 [2012]; People v Peeples, 98 AD3d 491, 492 [2012]; People v Watson, 95 AD3d 978, 979 [2012]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions regarding his request for a downward departure are without merit. Accordingly, he was not entitled to a downward departure from the presumptive risk level (see People v Peeples, 98 AD3d at 492; People v Watson, 95 AD3d at 979; People v Wyatt, 89 AD3d at 131). Mastro, J.E, Leventhal, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

111 A.D.3d 909, 975 N.Y.S.2d 681, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-roldan-nyappdiv-2013.

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