JUSTICE WRIGHT
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant Andres Roa appeals from his conviction for violation of section 401(a)(2)(A) of the Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/ 401(a)(2)(A) (West 2004)). On appeal, defendant raises the single issue of whether the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a consensual search of defendant’s vehicle. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Defendant was operating a vehicle he recently purchased when an Illinois state trooper stopped him for speeding at 71 miles per hour in a posted 65-mile-per-hour zone on Interstate 80 in Henry County, Illinois. The officer, Sergeant Floyd Blanks, is a certified drug interdiction instructor and the drug interdiction coordinator for his district. He has been employed by the State Police for 17 years.
According to the officer, after stopping defendant for speeding, he approached the car, advised defendant he was going to issue a written warning for speeding, and asked for defendant’s license and registration. Blanks stated that defendant fumbled for those documents, seemed “to exhibit more physical stress than most people do,” and mumbled while staring straight ahead. Blanks immediately advised defendant he was going to issue a written warning. At some point during the traffic stop, Blanks asked defendant where he was traveling from and where he was going. Defendant told Blanks that he was traveling from Colorado to New York.
Blanks said defendant seemed “to exhibit more physical stress than most people do, along with a couple of other factors.” Despite being informed that he was going to receive a warning, defendant remained nervous and, “in this case, that’s why I [Blanks] requested consent to search the vehicle.” Blanks also noticed a new air freshener and a strong odor of air freshener emanating from the car, which piqued Blanks’ suspicion.
According to Blanks, when he returned to his squad car to write a warning ticket, he knew, “with [defendant’s] nervousness, the odor of air freshener, *** [he] was going to try to obtain permission to search that vehicle.” Blanks testified, “I knew from my training and experience that something was amiss, something was wrong, so I asked— requested assistance from Trooper Clint Thulen.”
Blanks did issue a written warning for the speeding violation. Once he delivered the written warning citation, Blanks returned defendant’s license, registration and insurance card. According to defendant, as the officer started to return to his squad car, the officer said, “Wait a minute, Andres,” and then asked defendant for permission to conduct a search of defendant’s car. Defendant consented.
According to Blanks, the conversation with defendant before asking for consent was slightly longer. The officer recounted that, after issuing a written warning and returning defendant’s license and insurance card, he asked defendant if everything in the vehicle belonged to him and whether anyone had asked defendant to transport anything. Defendant responded that everything in the vehicle belonged to him and no one had asked him to transport anything. Blanks then asked if there was anything illegal in the vehicle, including any alcohol, weapons, or drags. The defendant replied, “no.” Blanks then asked if he could search the vehicle. Defendant’s response was, “yes.” According to Blanks, if defendant refused permission to search his car, Blanks would have allowed him to drive away.
After obtaining consent, Blanks asked defendant what was in the trunk. Defendant answered, “antiques,” and offered to show him an antique dealer’s card. At Blanks’ request, defendant opened the trunk and found it was empty. Blanks felt this was unusual since defendant had just told him there were antiques in the trunk.
As requested, Trooper Thulen arrived on the scene during the initial moments of the search, while Blanks was standing near the trunk of defendant’s car. Together, the officers then proceeded to the front of the vehicle. Blanks noticed that the air bag area appeared to have been tampered with or modified. After a 20-minute search, which included using a fiber-optic scope, the officers discovered a hidden compartment containing cocaine. Later, when the compartment was disassembled, the troopers found the compartment contained a total of 24.2 pounds of cocaine. The cocaine was packaged in 11 separate packages.
Initially, defendant faced three charges based on this evidence. Count I alleged defendant knowingly brought more than 900 grams of cocaine into the State of Illinois with the intent to deliver in violation of section 401.1(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (Act) (720 ILCS 570/401.1(a) (West 2004)). Count II alleged defendant knowingly possessed with the intent to deliver more than 15 but less than 100 grams of cocaine in violation of section 401(a)(2)(A) of the Act (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2004)). Finally, count III alleged that defendant possessed more than 900 grams of cocaine in violation of section 402(a)(2)(D) of the Act (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(D) (West 2004)).
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the cocaine, alleging the police expanded a traffic stop into a drug investigation without probable cause. During the hearing on the motion, the trial court heard testimony from Sergeant Blanks regarding factors he considers when looking for drug-related activities. According to Blanks, ongoing nervousness is only one of many factors indicating illegal activity. Blanks explained to the court:
“There are a number of things that we are trained to observe, such as third-party vehicles, vehicles rented by someone else, the odor of air freshener and masking agents in the vehicle, a vehicle that looks lived in, a vehicle with numerous energy drinks or coffee cups showing they’ve been driving all night, cigarettes and nervousness, and I could go on and on, sir.”
Trooper Clint Thulen also testified at the suppression hearing. Thulen testified that he has been employed by the State Police for 14 years as a patrol officer and currently as a canine handler. When Thulen arrived on the scene of the stop, Blanks was searching defendant’s trunk. According to Thulen, defendant appeared unusually nervous and exhibited signs of stress. Defendant seemed unusually uncomfortable, “out of sorts,” and avoided eye contact.
Following the testimony of defendant, Sergeant Blanks, and Trooper Thulen, and arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding Sergeant Blanks’ search was properly based on three grounds. First, the court noted Sergeant Blanks had probable cause for the initial traffic stop based on speeding. Second, the court found the duration of the traffic stop was reasonable because Sergeant Blanks did not delay asking for consent to search. Finally, the judge concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant Blanks had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal conduct.
Applying a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, the court considered the officer’s description of the circumstances the officer encountered. Relevant factors included defendant’s extreme nervousness, mumbling, fumbling, straightforward gaze, and abnormal physical stress, and a new air freshener that piqued the officer’s curiosity and suspicion. The court heavily weighed Sergeant Blanks’ vast experience in drug interdiction, finding Sergeant Blanks’ training would give a person in his position a reasonable, articulable suspicion that there was some kind of criminal activity afoot. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
Defendant’s first jury trial resulted in a deadlocked jury. Subsequently, the State dismissed counts I and III of the information and, following a stipulated bench trial on count II only, the trial judge found defendant guilty of unlawful possession with intent to deliver more than 15 grams but not more than 100 grams of a controlled substance, in violation of section 401(a)(2)(A) (720 ILCS 570/ 401(a)(2)(A) (West 2004)). The court sentenced defendant to 15 years’ imprisonment. Following the denial of his posttrial motions, defendant timely appealed on the ground that his motion to suppress should have been granted.
ANALYSIS
Defendant contends Sergeant Blanks’ request for consent to search, and the resulting search of his vehicle, exceeded the scope of the circumstances justifying the traffic stop, negating defendant’s consent. Defendant claims the officer illegally expanded the traffic stop into a drug investigation.
The State argues the consensual nature of the search alone justifies the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. The State asserts the request for consent was well within the strictures of the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, based on the totality of the circumstances in this case.
The fourth amendment guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV Similarly, article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 guarantees that “people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, [and] seizures.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. The Illinois Supreme Court has construed the search and seizure language found in section 6 of our state constitution in a manner consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s fourth amendment jurisprudence. People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 314 (2006).
Both the United States Supreme Court and our Illinois Supreme Court have provided some limited guidance for drug interdiction vehicle stops. However, the status of this area of the law is quickly evolving. Based on a review of existing precedent, we hold that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
The law of search and seizure is based upon the strongest foundational requirements of our constitutional footings. The forefathers of our federal constitution could not have foreseen the possibility of interstate highways becoming an efficient passageway for illegal drug trade. Sadly, those who transport the drugs are often recruits or “mules,” far removed from the drug dealers who profit from a commodity they refuse to transport. Drug interdiction operations remove contraband from the chain of commerce. Nevertheless, courts have a duty to ensure drug interdiction efforts do not overshadow the protections afforded by our federal and state constitutions.
Generally, the review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law and fact (People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 175 (2003)), and a two-part standard of review is applicable (People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 542 (2006)). The reviewing court first examines whether the trial court’s factual findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 542. Second, the court must determine de novo whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts.
As to the first prong, defendant states in his brief that he is not challenging the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations concerning Sergeant Blanks’ justification for the traffic stop. Additionally, defendant does not challenge the voluntariness of his consent to search. The State concedes the traffic stop had ended prior to the request to search. Consequently, this case presents only a question of law, not fact. Accordingly, we review de novo the trial court’s ultimate legal determination that the request for consent to search the vehicle after the traffic stop ended was constitutionally justified.
Under the law, the United States Supreme Court has recognized “[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 846, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837 (2005). There are three tiers of lawful police-civilian encounters: (1) arrests supported by probable cause; (2) brief investigatory detentions, justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)); and (3) consensual encounters involving no coercion or detentions that do not implicate fourth amendment interests. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 544.
The parties here agree the initial traffic stop fell squarely within the first level of lawful intrusions because this traffic stop was based upon probable cause to believe defendant was speeding. However, defendant relies on our supreme court’s decision in People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003), to challenge the officer’s request for consent to search, as beyond the scope of the stop and without a reasonable, articulable basis. Defendant argues the request for consent went far beyond the scope of the circumstances justifying the traffic stop under either Terry or Gonzalez.
The State asserts that, according to another recent decision by our supreme court in People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501 (1999), both the defendant’s detention and the officer’s request for consent to search were permissible. Alternatively, the State argues that Gonzalez is no longer good law. Since the parties do not agree whether Gonzalez or Brownlee applies to the facts of this case, a brief review of the Illinois Supreme Court’s holdings in those cases may be helpful.
In Brownlee, two officers stopped a vehicle for a minor traffic violation. The officers approached the car from each side and obtained the identities of the four young occupants. After returning the driver’s license and insurance card, one of the officers explained that no citations would be issued. The officer then “paused, a couple [of] minutes,” and asked the driver if he could search the vehicle. The driver reluctantly consented. The officers not only searched the car, but also searched the occupants of the vehicle. The officers discovered the defendant, a young female passenger, possessed a controlled substance. On appeal, our supreme court acknowledged that an officer is always free to request permission to search. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 515, citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996). The court stated:
“The problem in this case was not that the officers requested permission to search the car. It was that the officers unconstitutionally detained the car and its occupants before requesting permission to search the car, and after the conclusion of the traffic stop.” (Emphasis in original.) Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 515.
The court agreed with the circuit court below, finding that the pausing for “a couple [of] minutes” by the police constituted a sufficient show of authority leading the defendant, a reasonable person, to conclude that she was not free to leave. The court concluded the driver and the passengers were, therefore, subjected to a second seizure. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 520.
The court then applied a Terry analysis and held the second seizure was illegal since the State made no showing that the officers’ second detention of the car was reasonable or sufficiently limited in scope and duration. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 521. Consequently, our supreme court held that the illegal detention tainted the driver’s subsequent consent to search the vehicle, as well as the passenger-defendant’s subsequent arrest. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 521.
In Gonzalez, the officer asked the defendant, a passenger, for identification. The ensuing encounter between the officer and the passenger resulted in a search which revealed a packet of cocaine on his person. Both the trial court and the appellate court concluded the officer’s request for Gonzalez’s identification was unreasonable, warranting suppression of the evidence.
On review, the supreme court held that, “even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose,” a traffic stop is a “seizure.” Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 225. The court stated that, “[b]ecause a vehicle stop constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants, a vehicle stop is subject to the fourth amendment’s requirement of reasonableness.” Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 226, citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). The court determined that the vehicle stop was “justified at its inception” because it was supported by probable cause. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228-29. The court then set forth the test to determine whether police questioning during a traffic stop satisfies the “scope” requirement. The court stated, “[W]e must consider whether, in light of all the circumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop.” Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235. The court reasoned:
“A simple request for identification is facially innocuous. It does not suggest official interrogation and is not the type of question or request that would increase the confrontational nature of the encounter. We note, too, that defendant was under no obligation to answer or comply.” Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236.
Consequently, the court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, which had affirmed the trial court’s decision granting the defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 237.
In this case, the State concedes that the traffic stop for speeding ended with the delivery of the written warning citation. Therefore, since the police questioning occurred after the lawful traffic stop ended, the officer’s conduct must be examined under the mandates of Brown-lee to determine whether Officer Blanks’ questions and request for consent to search constituted an additional seizure. Unfortunately, here, the trial court overlooked Brownlee, finding that since the officer did not delay before asking the questions, “it isn’t a Brownlee situation.” The trial court should have first examined the facts under Brownlee to determine whether the additional questioning constituted a second seizure.
The United States Supreme Court has provided guidance for determining whether a detention constitutes a seizure in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980). In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court held that “[a] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 545, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 497, 100 S. Ct. at 1870. Mendenhall listed four examples of circumstances that may indicate a seizure: (1) a threatening presence of several officers, (2) the display of an officer’s weapon, (3) physical touching of the civilian by the officer; and (4) the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 390 (1990), citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
Recently, in Luedemann, our supreme court discussed and refined these considerations in the context of a situation involving a parked vehicle, which had not been pulled over by police. In Luedemann, the court applies a “free to ignore” test to support the conclusion that the nature of the encounter between the occupant of the stationary vehicle and officer was also consensual. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 564-65. The “free to ignore” test is similar to the Gonzalez “under no obligation to answer or comply” test.
Examining the facts of this case with all these considerations in mind, Justice McDade and I agree the conversation between defendant and Sergeant Blanks following the issuance of the written warning constituted a second seizure based on the facts of this case. We agree that defendant, a man of foreign-born descent, confronted with the progressive nature of each question, would not have felt free to leave before the officer ended the conversation.
Here, the officer continued the exchange, following each response by defendant with further, albeit abbreviated, conversation, requiring defendant to reply or be judged for his failure to respond. Defendant was not free to ignore the questions. Although there was no threatening presence of officers, display of weapons, or use of physical force, a reasonable motorist would not believe he or she was free to depart, or decline the officer’s inquiries, until given clear communication from the officer that the encounter was over.
This determination is supported by other appellate court decisions concluding that a reasonable motorist would not believe he or she was free to disregard an officer’s questioning following the conclusion of a legal traffic stop and depart. See, e.g., People v. Goeking, 335 Ill. App. 3d 321, 324 (2002) (observing that “[i]t is difficult to imagine many cases when a motorist would voluntarily remain at the scene of a traffic stop to engage the officer in casual conversation”). Similarly, this court has previously found that a reasonable motorist would not feel free to leave or ignore the officer’s request following the conclusion of a lawful traffic stop when the officer “injected his request for consent [to search the vehicle] into the seamless transition between mandatory and ‘consensual’ interaction.” People v. LaPoint, 353 Ill. App. 3d 328, 333 (2004).
Consequently, it must be determined whether Sergeant Blanks had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the second Terry stop, which culminated in a request for consent to search defendant’s vehicle. I believe the articulable suspicion formulated during the traffic stop survives and is not extinguished by issuing a traffic citation.
It seems clear the officer provided the trial judge with an articulable basis for his request to search based on observations gathered during the traffic encounter. Applying Terry to the trial court’s factual determinations, the officer’s decision to request consent to search was constitutionally justified.
The Terry decision has been applied under so many circumstances it is often overlooked that the suspicious actions in Terry were the innocent activities of strolling up and down the street and peering into store windows in broad daylight. This innocent behavior piqued an officer’s suspicion and he briefly detained the men and then found a concealed weapon.
In this case, Sergeant Blanks explained to the judge that defendant’s behavior, his fumbling through the glove box, dropping items, and failing to locate the insurance card, aroused his, Blanks’, suspicions. Blanks explained that defendant exhibited “more physical stress than most people” in mumbling with a low volume and casting long, averted gazes. Blanks testified that his suspicion was “piqued” because he could see and smell a newer air freshener. The officer found it unusual, based of his training and experience, that defendant’s stress and nervousness persisted once a written warning was promised. Nothing occurred during the stop to negate this reasonable suspicion.
Justice McDade’s thoughtfully written dissent raises valid concerns shared by our supreme court regarding drug interdiction and traffic stops. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the smell of air freshener alone is insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion because, “[w]hile air fresheners may be used to mask the odor of contraband, air fresheners are also used in cars to mask other odors such as cigarette smoke.” People v. Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d 504, 510 (2003), overruled on other grounds, 543 U.S. 405, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005). Also, nervousness, without more, is an insufficient basis for detaining a defendant. Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 510.
However, we may not substitute our evaluation of the facts for that of the trial judge. The trial court did not look to these two factors in isolation. Rather, the trial court found Sergeant Blanks had a reasonable, articulable suspicion based on a totality of the circumstances. Those circumstances included defendant exhibiting an unusual level of stress during the traffic stop, which did not subside even after defendant learned he was only being issued a warning ticket. That unusual level of stress, combined with Blanks’ observation of a new air freshener, and taking into account Sergeant Blanks’ vast training and experience in drug interdiction, was sufficient to provide Blanks with a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The court reasoned:
“I have to look at it as an officer with Trooper Blanks’ experience would look at it. *** [Blanks] has 17 years of experience or more. It’s not like *** somebody that is a rookie that just came on. And I have to look at that. That’s the totality of the circumstances. I have a trooper here that has been — has significant training, and I’m well aware [Blanks] has been in court many, many times in these situations, and obviously from his testimony here, [Blanks] knows what he’s doing. He can describe the — the scent of — of cocaine. He can describe masking agents and *** he’s very well versed in — in cocaine trafficking or in controlled substance trafficking.”
The United States Supreme Court has specifically sanctioned the totality-of-the-circumstances approach employed by the trial court in this case. In United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740, 750, 122 S. Ct. 744, 751 (2002), the Court specifically criticized the “sort of divide-and-conquer analysis” that examines each of the officer’s observations independently for a reasonable explanation, finding this analysis is a sharp departure from the totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 750, 122 S. Ct. at 751. The Court explained that the totality-of-the-circumstances approach “allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 749-50, 122 S. Ct. at 750-51, quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981). The inquiry for the trial court was whether this officer, not just any officer, had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for the second seizure. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 749-50, 122 S. Ct. at 750-51, quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 629, 101 S. Ct. at 695.
The trial court considered Sergeant Blanks’ testimony and carefully pointed out many factors that supported finding a reasonable, articulable suspicion based on a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Drug couriers do not intentionally post clues or travel the interstate with destination and purpose signs displayed like Greyhound buses. Instead, drug couriers deliberately camouflage their illegal conduct in the guise of innocent activities to avoid apprehension. Meaningless minutiae that might go unnoticed by most civilians become the focus of a trained drug interdiction officer, leading to justification for further action. This is the benefit of police training and experience. An examination of such factors in isolation departs from the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, as stated by the Supreme Court in Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 750, 122 S. Ct. at 751. Here, based on a totality of the circumstances as found by the trial judge, the trial court’s finding of an articulable basis for the request to search is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and must stand.
However, the finding of an articulable basis does not end the inquiry. The analysis must proceed to determine if the four questions posed by Sergeant Blanks in this case converted the Terry stop into an illegal seizure. The record shows Blanks did not immediately ask for consent to search the vehicle. Rather, he posed several questions, each one serving as a building block for the next, logically progressing so that the last question could be asked in such a manner to make an affirmative answer more likely, if not inevitable. The first three questions the officer posed were short, succinct, and formulated to produce “yes” or “no” responses, which did not unduly delay the fourth and final question regarding consent to search. These brief inquiries are similar to the nature of questions asked by the officer in Terry and did not unfairly convert this brief investigative stop into an unconstitutional seizure of defendant or his vehicle.
As noted in the dissent, Blanks admitted that in approximately 3,000 traffic situations, his assessment of articulable factors of drug activity lead to the discovery of contraband in only 1,000 cases. While disconcerting and entirely relevant for the court’s consideration, Blanks’ admitted fallibility is only one factor the trial judge could consider. It was the trial judge’s obligation to determine the significance of this information.
It is well established a court may not consider the productive results of a completed search to bootstrap a finding of an articulable suspicion simply because the officer’s hunch was correct. However, a court would be equally in error were it to reject a search based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity merely because the officer had not found contraband in other, unrelated searches. Here, the court heard evidence that Blanks did not always discover contraband based on his suspicions. However, each case must be judged on its own unique facts. In this case, the trial judge properly determined that the search passed constitutional muster.
In his special concurring opinion, Presiding Justice Lytton concludes that the police-citizen encounter in this case qualifies as a third-tier “consensual encounter” under Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530. We reach the same destination in our analysis, finding defendant’s consent to search was both valid and constitutionally correct, based on separate paths when scrutinizing the three types of lawful encounters under Terry. While we may disagree as to whether the encounter constituted a second seizure or a consensual encounter, Presiding Justice Lytton and I both agree, based on separate legal grounds, that Blanks’ request for consent to search was constitutionally permissible under the fourth amendment. The request for consent was lawful, and defendant concedes his consent was voluntary.
While defendant admits his consent was voluntary, he argues that his consent to search was limited in scope. Sergeant Blanks testified defendant consented to his search of the entire vehicle. In contrast, defendant testified that Blanks only asked to search the trunk. However, it is undisputed defendant did not stop the officers from searching his car beyond the trunk.
The conflict in the testimony required the trial court to make a credibility determination. Matters of credibility are for the trial court to decide. This court should not rule on such matters because the trial court was in a position to observe the witnesses, assess their demeanor, and make credibility judgments based on a firsthand encounter with the witnesses. People v. Hornsby, 277 Ill. App. 3d 227, 230-31 (1995). Here, the record sustains the trial court’s finding that Blanks was a credible witness.
Sergeant Blanks’ consensual search was both productive and constitutional. Blanks’ discovery that the trunk did not contain antiques, as defendant indicated, added to his suspicion of criminal activity and justified further investigation. The investigation led to observations of a hidden compartment in the engine, which raised still more reasonable suspicion. Using a small probe, the officers ultimately discovered more than 24 pounds of cocaine sophisticatedly hidden in an automobile both operated and owned by defendant on the date of the traffic stop.
CONCLUSION
We hold the trial court properly determined Sergeant Blanks’ questioning and request for consent to search defendant’s vehicle following the conclusion of a legal traffic stop was lawful. We therefore affirm the order of the circuit court of Henry County denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
Affirmed.