VALLÉE, J.
Defendant was accused by indictment in two counts with violating section 653f of the Penal Code in that he “solicit[ed] ” Casper Berger (Count I) and Albert Levin (Count III)
“to
offer and accept and join in the offer and acceptance of a bribe.” He was also accused in two counts of grand theft. In a jury trial he was found guilty of the offenses charged in Counts I and III and not guilty of grand theft (Counts II and IV). Judgment was pronounced and defendant sentenced to state prison. The sentence was suspended and he was granted probation.
Defendant appeals from the order granting probation and from the order denying his motion for a new trial. He did not appeal from the judgment. An appeal lies from an order granting probation only when the court suspends the imposition of the sentence and not when judgment is pronounced and the court suspends execution of the sentence. (Pen. Code, § 1237.) The appeal from the order granting
probation must be dismissed. A rather extended statement of the evidence is essential to a determination of the points made.
Count I
In 1952 William Ferguson was business representative of the Bartenders Union. Dick Stovall was secretary-treasurer of the union. Ferguson had known Stovall for some time. In October or November 1952 Stovall told Ferguson he could obtain eight new liquor licenses, each purchaser would have to pay $5,500, everything above $2,500 would be divided between them, and cash would have to be paid for the license.
Later Jay Teale, who was working as a bartender at a bar on Pico Street in Los Angeles, told Ferguson he knew someone who might want a license. Ferguson went to the bar on Pico where he met the owner, Casper Berger, who was operating with a wine and beer license. Teale was present. Ferguson told Berger what the proposition was and, according to Ferguson, Berger agreed to buy a liquor license for $5,500. Ferguson then told Stovall about the arrangement he had made with Berger
•
and Stovall told Ferguson to tell Berger to go down and apply for a new license, which Ferguson did. Later Stovall told Ferguson that Berger had applied in the wrong name. Berger was known to Stovall as Don Eego. Ferguson testified Berger paid him $5,500 in cash less the regular fee for obtaining the license. Stovall was present. The $5,500 was placed in an envelope which Ferguson put in his pocket. Ferguson and Stovall then went to the Moose Lodge where a meeting was in progress. Defendant was at the meeting.
Stovall told Ferguson to give defendant the envelope containing the $5,500. Ferguson did so at the back end of the meeting hall while the meeting was in progress. Ferguson did not say anything to defendant and defendant said nothing to him. Ferguson testified there was no understanding between himself and defendant; he had no conversation with defendant “about splitting the difference between twenty-four or twenty-five hundred dollars and the purchase price.”
Stovall gave Ferguson $300 for the part he had in the transaction. Ferguson was displeased, complained to Stovall, but got no satisfaction. Ferguson then saw defendant, told him how much Stovall had given him (Ferguson), that he did not think it was right, and asked him to intercede in his behalf. Defendant said he would speak to Stovall. Defendant
and Ferguson went to the union hall and defendant went into Stovall’s office alone. Stovall gave Ferguson another $100. Defendant, Stovall, and Ferguson then had a conversation in which defendant said “That the license cost more than was thought at first it would cost, that I [Ferguson] was receiving more than anyone else, that in the future any licenses that I sold I could pay four thousand and sell them for whatever I could get.”
Berger testified that in 1952 Ferguson and Stovall, who were together, told him the price of a license would be $6,000 less $262.50, the regular cost of a license for half a year; Stovall told him to go to the Board of Equalization, see Viggo Hansen, whose name Stovall wrote on a piece of paper, and make application for a new license. He did, saw Hansen, told him his name was Casper Berger, had a conversation with him, but did not file an application. . He told Stovall what he had done, that Hansen would not let him file. Berger also testified: “I found out that Dick Stovall gave my name as Don Bego. He didn’t know my legal name. So then he said, ‘Well, wait until you hear from me. Everything will be all right.’ And then I believe he called me up, perhaps a couple of days later, and told me to go back to the Board of Equalization and see Mr. Moran and fill out an application for a new license, everything will be all right”; he went back, saw Moran who told him to make out an application, that he should not have any trouble, if he did to see him (Moran) and he would take care of everything; he told Moran his name was Casper Berger; before he left the Board of Equalization he received a “notice of intention” to post on the window of his bar, which he did. While the notice was posted he paid Stovall and Ferguson $6,000 less the $262.50 he had paid for the license; he paid it in cash because both Stovall and Ferguson told him it had to be paid that way; 45 days later he received a new license.
Berger further testified: “The Court: Either Mr. Ferguson or Mr. Stovall tell you at any time what they were going to do with this money that you gave them ? The Witness : When they took the money, they said they were taking it to the old man. They didn’t mention any names. The Court: When they counted the money, they said what? The Witness : Taking it to the old man to put in the safe. I didn’t know who the old man was. They mentioned no names. Q. By Mr. Bitzi [District Attorney]: Did Mr. Stovall say an[y] thing about Mr. Yiggo Hansen or Mr. Moran? A. Well,
they just told me to go up and everything will be taken care of; to make the application for the license. . . . Q. . . . Did Mr. Stovall say anything about Mr. Yiggo Hansen or Mr. Moran? A. He said, ‘Mr. Yiggo Hansen is kind of funny in a way. He doesn’t like to stick out his neck. He lets Moran do all the dirty work.’ ” Within an hour or two after he paid them the $5,737.60 Ferguson and Stovall returned and insisted the price was $6,000 net. After New Year’s he paid Ferguson $262.50 additional in cash.
Berger testified he is not acquainted with defendant; did not know him in 1952; had not met him in the intervening time; and never heard his name mentioned in connection with the transaction.
Count III
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VALLÉE, J.
Defendant was accused by indictment in two counts with violating section 653f of the Penal Code in that he “solicit[ed] ” Casper Berger (Count I) and Albert Levin (Count III)
“to
offer and accept and join in the offer and acceptance of a bribe.” He was also accused in two counts of grand theft. In a jury trial he was found guilty of the offenses charged in Counts I and III and not guilty of grand theft (Counts II and IV). Judgment was pronounced and defendant sentenced to state prison. The sentence was suspended and he was granted probation.
Defendant appeals from the order granting probation and from the order denying his motion for a new trial. He did not appeal from the judgment. An appeal lies from an order granting probation only when the court suspends the imposition of the sentence and not when judgment is pronounced and the court suspends execution of the sentence. (Pen. Code, § 1237.) The appeal from the order granting
probation must be dismissed. A rather extended statement of the evidence is essential to a determination of the points made.
Count I
In 1952 William Ferguson was business representative of the Bartenders Union. Dick Stovall was secretary-treasurer of the union. Ferguson had known Stovall for some time. In October or November 1952 Stovall told Ferguson he could obtain eight new liquor licenses, each purchaser would have to pay $5,500, everything above $2,500 would be divided between them, and cash would have to be paid for the license.
Later Jay Teale, who was working as a bartender at a bar on Pico Street in Los Angeles, told Ferguson he knew someone who might want a license. Ferguson went to the bar on Pico where he met the owner, Casper Berger, who was operating with a wine and beer license. Teale was present. Ferguson told Berger what the proposition was and, according to Ferguson, Berger agreed to buy a liquor license for $5,500. Ferguson then told Stovall about the arrangement he had made with Berger
•
and Stovall told Ferguson to tell Berger to go down and apply for a new license, which Ferguson did. Later Stovall told Ferguson that Berger had applied in the wrong name. Berger was known to Stovall as Don Eego. Ferguson testified Berger paid him $5,500 in cash less the regular fee for obtaining the license. Stovall was present. The $5,500 was placed in an envelope which Ferguson put in his pocket. Ferguson and Stovall then went to the Moose Lodge where a meeting was in progress. Defendant was at the meeting.
Stovall told Ferguson to give defendant the envelope containing the $5,500. Ferguson did so at the back end of the meeting hall while the meeting was in progress. Ferguson did not say anything to defendant and defendant said nothing to him. Ferguson testified there was no understanding between himself and defendant; he had no conversation with defendant “about splitting the difference between twenty-four or twenty-five hundred dollars and the purchase price.”
Stovall gave Ferguson $300 for the part he had in the transaction. Ferguson was displeased, complained to Stovall, but got no satisfaction. Ferguson then saw defendant, told him how much Stovall had given him (Ferguson), that he did not think it was right, and asked him to intercede in his behalf. Defendant said he would speak to Stovall. Defendant
and Ferguson went to the union hall and defendant went into Stovall’s office alone. Stovall gave Ferguson another $100. Defendant, Stovall, and Ferguson then had a conversation in which defendant said “That the license cost more than was thought at first it would cost, that I [Ferguson] was receiving more than anyone else, that in the future any licenses that I sold I could pay four thousand and sell them for whatever I could get.”
Berger testified that in 1952 Ferguson and Stovall, who were together, told him the price of a license would be $6,000 less $262.50, the regular cost of a license for half a year; Stovall told him to go to the Board of Equalization, see Viggo Hansen, whose name Stovall wrote on a piece of paper, and make application for a new license. He did, saw Hansen, told him his name was Casper Berger, had a conversation with him, but did not file an application. . He told Stovall what he had done, that Hansen would not let him file. Berger also testified: “I found out that Dick Stovall gave my name as Don Bego. He didn’t know my legal name. So then he said, ‘Well, wait until you hear from me. Everything will be all right.’ And then I believe he called me up, perhaps a couple of days later, and told me to go back to the Board of Equalization and see Mr. Moran and fill out an application for a new license, everything will be all right”; he went back, saw Moran who told him to make out an application, that he should not have any trouble, if he did to see him (Moran) and he would take care of everything; he told Moran his name was Casper Berger; before he left the Board of Equalization he received a “notice of intention” to post on the window of his bar, which he did. While the notice was posted he paid Stovall and Ferguson $6,000 less the $262.50 he had paid for the license; he paid it in cash because both Stovall and Ferguson told him it had to be paid that way; 45 days later he received a new license.
Berger further testified: “The Court: Either Mr. Ferguson or Mr. Stovall tell you at any time what they were going to do with this money that you gave them ? The Witness : When they took the money, they said they were taking it to the old man. They didn’t mention any names. The Court: When they counted the money, they said what? The Witness : Taking it to the old man to put in the safe. I didn’t know who the old man was. They mentioned no names. Q. By Mr. Bitzi [District Attorney]: Did Mr. Stovall say an[y] thing about Mr. Yiggo Hansen or Mr. Moran? A. Well,
they just told me to go up and everything will be taken care of; to make the application for the license. . . . Q. . . . Did Mr. Stovall say anything about Mr. Yiggo Hansen or Mr. Moran? A. He said, ‘Mr. Yiggo Hansen is kind of funny in a way. He doesn’t like to stick out his neck. He lets Moran do all the dirty work.’ ” Within an hour or two after he paid them the $5,737.60 Ferguson and Stovall returned and insisted the price was $6,000 net. After New Year’s he paid Ferguson $262.50 additional in cash.
Berger testified he is not acquainted with defendant; did not know him in 1952; had not met him in the intervening time; and never heard his name mentioned in connection with the transaction.
Count III
Albert Levin testified: In 1952 he owned a café in Los Angeles; he had a license to serve whisky, wine, and beer; he had known Paul Bershin about 10 years; in the latter part of 1952 Bershin asked him if he would like to buy a license; Bershin took him to see defendant; defendant told him he could get a new license for $3,500; he (Levin) did not have any place where he could use the license at the time; Bershin suggested he could use his (Bershin’s) place of business; he saw defendant two or three days later when defendant told him the price would be $4,000, to go to the Board of Equalization, see Boyd Moran, and tell him a friend sent him; he went to the board, filled out an application, and saw Moran; Moran asked him “Who sent you?” He replied, “A friend”; a month or two later he received a license; he paid Bershin $4,000 in the presence of defendant; Bershin gave the money to defendant; there was no bar in the place for which the license was issued; he later sold the license for $6,000; he knew the fee for a license was $525.
Bershin testified he introduced Levin to defendant. Just prior to that, he and Levin had been to the Board of Equalization about obtaining a license. When he introduced Levin to defendant, he told defendant Levin “would be interested in one of them whiskey licenses.” Defendant said a license would cost $3,500, that “There are licenses being issued but you and me both know that nobody is going to get a license for $525.” The license was issued for his premises, which was an office on which he had a lease.
Bershin further testified that about the time of the Levin transaction he was in front of defendant’s place with a Mr. Ennnard; defendant offered to secure a new license for Kin
nard for $3,500; he did not receive any money for his services in either the Levin or Kinnard transaction. Kinnard, called by the People, testified he did not want a liquor license in 1952; he did not see defendant about a license; and defendant never at any time offered to get him a license.
Viggo Hansen testified that in 1952 he was the district liquor control administrator for the Board of Equalization. The statutory fee for issuing a general on-sale liquor license was $525 a year. If applications were made during the last six months of the year the fee was reduced one-half. One of his assistants was Boyd Moran, who died some time after 1952. He did not know Casper Berger. An investigation report with respect to Berger’s application was introduced in evidence. It recites: “Approved, Boyd B. Moran, December 1st, 1952.”
On February 15, 1955, defendant had a conversation with Ferguson and Stovall at the Mardi Gras Café in Los Angeles. Prior to going to the Mardi Gras Café Ferguson met two investigators from the attorney general’s office. The investigators installed a small wire recorder, called a “minephone,” on Ferguson’s person. As he entered the café the recorder was turned on. After he left the café the recorder was turned off. He then contacted the investigators and they removed the recorder from his person. It was stipulated that a transcript of the recording could be read in evidence. In the conversation, Ferguson stated he was worried because two men from the attorney general’s office called at his house. Parts of the recording are set out in the margin.
It is
fairly inferable from the recording that defendant knew all about the activities of Ferguson and Stovall in connection with
the Berger and Levin transactions and that he participated therein. Ferguson said “At the time we got that—and
defendant broke in and said “Berger.” Defendant said that when the investigators came to see him he was “going to start
to dummy up on them”; that Ferguson did not have to bring Stovall or him (defendant) in; he could do anything Ferguson and Stovall wanted him to; all they could do was indict him.
Defendant testified: He was in the liquor business in 1952. He has known Stovall for many years. He met Ferguson about 1952. He does not recall the incident of collecting money in the Moose Hall “but it is very possible.” “Well, as I recall, if my memory serves me correct, there was a meeting going on and Mr. Stovall was the junior govenor [sic] of the lodge and I believe, if my memory serves me correctly, that Mr. Ferguson handed me an envelope and he says it’s for Mr. Stovall. I can’t be sure of that, and I put it in my pocket and after the meeting I presume I handed it back to Mr. Stovall. ” He did not get any of the money from the envelope. He had put numerous packages in his safe for Stovall. He did not know what the arrangement was between Ferguson and Stovall with respect to the sale of a liquor license. It is very possible that Ferguson went to him and told him he was
not getting his “cut.” It could be possible Ferguson told him the nature of the deal he had with Stovall. He went to see Stovall with Ferguson and told Stovall “one of his business agents was very angry and might cause him a great deal of trouble.” Defendant denied he told Ferguson that he (defendant) was not making much money out of those licenses; testified he “never was in those licenses”; denied ever receiving any money from Levin or Bershin for the purpose of securing a license for Levin. He was aware Moran and Hansen were with the Board of Equalization but did not know either of them personally.
Defendant further testified he talked to Ferguson and Stovall in the Mardi Gras about 5 or 10 minutes; he believed Ferguson said he was very worried abont some license transactions he had with Stovall; they said, ‘Well, we picked up money from a dozen different places, licenses,” he asked them for what purpose and they explained it to him and he said, “I’ll tell you one thing. If I was you, if you do have to go up, don’t perjure yourself. Either get up and tell the truth or leave it go.” Defendant denied saying in that conversation that if any investigators contacted him he was going “to dummy up on them.” He also denied making various other statements in the conversation which it appears from the recording he did make.
Every person who solicits another to offer or join in the offer of a bribe is guilty of a public offense; such offense must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness and corroborating circumstances. (Pen. Code, § 653f.)
Defendant first asserts the corpus delicti was not established as to either count charging solicitation of a bribe. He says the corpus delicti consists of the asking, the intent, and the contemplated overt act. The People say the first two elements comprise the corpus delicti. The People are right. Defendant asserts proof of the specific intent and of the contemplated overt act are wanting. When any person solicits another to offer or join in the offer of a bribe, the solicitor has committed the offense described in section 653f.
(People
v.
Woodward,
136 Cal.App. 149, 151-152 [28 P.2d 36].) The gist of the offense is the solicitation to offer or join in the offer of a bribe, and not the commission of bribery.
(People
v.
Humphrey,
27 Cal.App.2d 631, 637 [81 P.2d 588] ;
People
v.
Haley,
102 Cal.App.2d 159, 164-165 [227 P.2d 48].) The intent may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances. (Peo
ple
v.
Megladdery,
40 Cal.App.2d 748, 784
[106 P.2d 84].) A contemplated overt act is not an essential element of the offense denounced by section 653f. The offense “is complete when the solicitation is made, and it is immaterial that the object of the solicitation is never consummated, or that no steps are taken toward its consummation.” (Pe
ople
v.
Burt,
45 Cal.2d 311, 314 [288 P.2d 503, 51 A.L.R.2d 948]; anno: 51 A.L.R.2d 953, 956.) The intent of defendant to solicit another to offer and to join in the offer of a bribe to obtain liquor licenses as charged in Counts I and III was clearly established.
An accomplice is “one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.” (Pen. Code, § 1111.) Manifestly Ferguson and Bershin were accomplices.
Defendant claims Berger and Levin also were accomplices. He argues they knowingly participated and joined in the solicitations; that they were coconspirators. He then claims the provision of section 653f that the offense must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness and corroborating circumstances, was not satisfied as to either count. He argues that an accomplice is not a witness within the meaning of section 653f. He argues further that there was no corroboration of the testimony of the accomplices.
A witness is a person whose declaration under oath is received as evidence for any purpose. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1878.) Section 1880 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies the persons who cannot be witnesses; an accomplice is not among them. The term “accomplice” is ordinarily used in connection with a witness in a criminal ease, a witness whose testimony, by the familiar rule of evidence, requires corroboration ' in order to convict. (Burdick, The Law of Crime, 305, § 226.) An accomplice is a competent witness; and accomplices are competent witnesses for and against each other. The witness’ complicity in the offense does not render him incompetent to testify; it only goes to his credibility. (58 Am.Jur. 112, § 156.) The question whether a person is an accomplice arises only when such person becomes a witness. An accomplice is a witness within the meaning of section 653f.
(Cf. People
v.
Humphrey,
27 Cal.App.2d 631, 640 [81 P.2d 588].)
We need not stop to inquire whether Berger and Levin
were accomplices.
If it be assumed that Berger and Levin were accomplices, there is sufficient corroboration of the testimony of Ferguson and Berger as to Count I and of the testimony of Bershin and Levin as to Count III.
The corroborating evidence is sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the trier of fact that the witness who must be corroborated is telling the truth. The corroborating evidence must be considered without the aid of the testimony which is to be corroborated, and it is not sufficient if it requires the interpretation and direction of such testimony in order to give it value.
(People
v.
MacEwing,
45 Cal.2d 218, 224-225 [288 P.2d 257];
People
v.
Goldstein,
136 Cal.App.2d 778, 787-790 [289 P.2d 581].) “ ‘The evidence tending to connect a defendant with the commission of the crime may be slight and, when standing by itself, entitled to but little consideration. [Citation.] The law does not require that the evidence necessary to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice shall tend to establish the precise facts testified to by the accomplice; and strong corroborative testimony is not necessary to support a judgment of conviction founded on the testimony of an accomplice. Even though circumstantial and slight, the evidence is, nevertheless, sufficient if it tends to connect the accused with the commission of the offense. [Citations.] The defendant’s own statements and admissions, made in connection with other testimony, may afford corroboratory proof sufficient to sustain a verdict. [Citations.] It is not necessary that the corroborating evidence should go so far as to establish by itself, and without the aid of the testimony of an accomplice, that the defendant committed the offense charged.’
(People
v.
Negra
(1929), 208 Cal. 64, 69-70 [280 P. 354].) ”
(People
v.
Harper,
25 Cal.2d 862, 876-877 [156 P.2d 249].)
A defendant’s admissions, active and passive, and his declarations constitute corroboration.
(People
v.
Wilson,
25
Cal.2d 341, 347 [153 P.2d 720] ;
People
v.
Goldstein,
136 Cal.App.2d 778, 789 [289 P.2d 581].) Inferences from defendant’s testimony may suffice to corroborate an accomplice.
(People
v.
Wilson, supra; People
v.
Griffin,
98 Cal.App.2d 1, 25 [219 P.2d 519].) The entire conduct of the parties, their relationship, acts, and conduct may be taken into consideration by the trier of fact in determining the sufficiency of the corroboration.
(People
v.
Henderson,
34 Cal.2d 340, 343 [209 P.2d 785].) The evidence of inculpatory participation need not be direct nor extend to every fact and detail. It may be circumstantial and is sufficient, even though slight, if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.
(People
v.
Wayne,
41 Cal.2d 814, 822 [264 P.2d 547].) The weight to be given corroborative evidence is a question for the trier of fact to determine.
(People
v.
McNamara,
103 Cal.App.2d 729, 738 [230 P.2d 411].)
We are of the opinion the corroborative evidence meets the test stated in
People
v.
MacEwing, supra,
45 Cal.2d 218, 222-225. Defendant’s association with Ferguson and Stovall at the time in question, his peculiar explanation of his relations and dealings with them, his meeting with Stovall on Ferguson’s behalf, the tape recording, his denial of statements made in the meeting at the Mardi Gras, his lack of memory and evasiveness in testifying,—all tend to connect him with the commission of the solicitation offenses.
(People
v.
Burt,
45 Cal.2d 311, 315 [288 P.2d 503, 51 A.L.R.2d 948] ;
People
v.
Gray,
52 Cal.App.2d 620 [127 P.2d 72];
People
v.
Woodward,
136 Cal.App. 149, 152-153 [28 P.2d 36].)
The court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. He asserts error. It is evident from what we have said that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
(People
v.
McGarry,
42 Cal.2d 429, 432-433 [267 P.2d 254].)
The appeal from the order granting defendant probation is dismissed. The order denying a new trial is affirmed.
Shinn, P. J., and Wood (Parker), J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 4, 1957.