People v. Reyes

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Reyes

141 A.D.2d 433, 529 N.Y.S.2d 775, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7258

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 28, 1988

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 141 A.D.2d 433 (People v. Reyes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Reyes, 141 A.D.2d 433, 529 N.Y.S.2d 775, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7258 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1988).

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Judgment of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Richard Lee Price, J.), rendered July 15, 1987, convicting the defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal trespass in the second degree and sentencing him to a definite term of imprisonment of one year, affirmed.

The defendant was originally sentenced to a term of 10 months, and he moved to vacate the sentence since the maximum permissible was six months, pursuant to Penal Law § 70.15 (1). The prosecutor cross-moved to sentence the defendant as a second crime offender, which motion the court had originally denied. The cross motion was granted, and the defendant was sentenced to one year.

The dissent contends that vindictiveness played a part in the increase in the sentence. (See, North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711.) The point is misconceived. Once the second offender provision is invoked, the enhancement of sentence is proper. There is no constraint against it. (Cf., Matter of Kisloff v Covington, 141 AD2d 319.)

The defendant knew he could be subject to a second crime offender contention. (Cf., People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153.) Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Ross, Kassal and Smith, JJ.

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Judgment of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Richard Lee Price, J.), rendered July 15, 1987, convicting the defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal trespass in the second degree and sentencing him to a definite term of imprisonment of one year, affirmed.

The defendant was originally sentenced to a term of 10 months, and he moved to vacate the sentence since the maximum permissible was six months, pursuant to Penal Law § 70.15 (1). The prosecutor cross-moved to sentence the defendant as a second crime offender, which motion the court had originally denied. The cross motion was granted, and the defendant was sentenced to one year.

The dissent contends that vindictiveness played a part in the increase in the sentence. (See, North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711.) The point is misconceived. Once the second offender provision is invoked, the enhancement of sentence is proper. There is no constraint against it. (Cf., Matter of Kisloff v Covington, 141 AD2d 319.)

The defendant knew he could be subject to a second crime offender contention. (Cf., People v Green, 68 NY2d 151, 153.) Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Ross, Kassal and Smith, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

141 A.D.2d 433, 529 N.Y.S.2d 775, 1988 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7258, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-reyes-nyappdiv-1988.

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