People v. Redish

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Redish

262 A.D.2d 664, 693 N.Y.S.2d 191, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7572

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 28, 1999

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 262 A.D.2d 664 (People v. Redish) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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People v. Redish, 262 A.D.2d 664, 693 N.Y.S.2d 191, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7572 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Plug, J.), rendered May 20, 1996, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the record in this case does not demonstrate that a Batson violation occurred [665]*665during jury selection (see, Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; People v Childress, 81 NY2d 263). It is incumbent upon the party mounting a Batson challenge to “articulate and develop all of the grounds supporting the claim, both factual and legal, during the colloquy in which the objection is raised and discussed” (People v Childress, supra, at 268). Here, defense counsel failed to satisfy her obligation to articulate on the record a sound factual basis for her Batson claim, as she only noted the bare fact that the prosecution exercised five peremptory challenges against black venirepersons. In the absence of a record demonstrating other facts or circumstances supporting a prima facie case, the trial court correctly found that the defendant failed to establish a pattern of purposeful exclusion sufficient to raise an inference of racial discrimination (see, People v Bolling, 79 NY2d 317, 325; People v Morla, 245 AD2d 468; People v Lowe, 234 AD2d 564; People v Vidal, 212 AD2d 553).

Furthermore, the prosecution did not exhaust all of its peremptory challenges, and three black venirepersons remained on the jury (see, People v Harper, 124 AD2d 593). Accordingly, the burden of overcoming the inference of purposeful discrimination never shifted to the People (see, People v Durant, 250 AD2d 698). The fact that the trial court permitted the People, upon the prosecutor’s request, to offer facially-neutral reasons supporting the peremptory challenges does not render academic the issue of whether the defendant carried his initial burden to make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges were motivated by an intent to invidiously discriminate against black persons (see, People v Durant, supra; People v Ocasio, 253 AD2d 720). O’Brien, J. P., Krausman, Florio and H. Miller, JJ., concur.

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—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Plug, J.), rendered May 20, 1996, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the record in this case does not demonstrate that a Batson violation occurred [665]*665during jury selection (see, Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; People v Childress, 81 NY2d 263). It is incumbent upon the party mounting a Batson challenge to “articulate and develop all of the grounds supporting the claim, both factual and legal, during the colloquy in which the objection is raised and discussed” (People v Childress, supra, at 268). Here, defense counsel failed to satisfy her obligation to articulate on the record a sound factual basis for her Batson claim, as she only noted the bare fact that the prosecution exercised five peremptory challenges against black venirepersons. In the absence of a record demonstrating other facts or circumstances supporting a prima facie case, the trial court correctly found that the defendant failed to establish a pattern of purposeful exclusion sufficient to raise an inference of racial discrimination (see, People v Bolling, 79 NY2d 317, 325; People v Morla, 245 AD2d 468; People v Lowe, 234 AD2d 564; People v Vidal, 212 AD2d 553).

Furthermore, the prosecution did not exhaust all of its peremptory challenges, and three black venirepersons remained on the jury (see, People v Harper, 124 AD2d 593). Accordingly, the burden of overcoming the inference of purposeful discrimination never shifted to the People (see, People v Durant, 250 AD2d 698). The fact that the trial court permitted the People, upon the prosecutor’s request, to offer facially-neutral reasons supporting the peremptory challenges does not render academic the issue of whether the defendant carried his initial burden to make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges were motivated by an intent to invidiously discriminate against black persons (see, People v Durant, supra; People v Ocasio, 253 AD2d 720). O’Brien, J. P., Krausman, Florio and H. Miller, JJ., concur.

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262 A.D.2d 664, 693 N.Y.S.2d 191, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7572, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-redish-nyappdiv-1999.

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