People v. Ramsey

2019 IL App (3d) 160759

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 30, 2019
• Docket: 3-16-0759
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2019 IL App (3d) 160759

Opinion filed August 30, 2019 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 9th Judicial Circuit, ) Hancock County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-16-0759 v. ) Circuit No. 96-CF-46 ) DANIEL RAMSEY, ) The Honorable ) Rodney G. Clark, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices O’Brien and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.

____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 The defendant, Daniel Ramsey, was convicted of numerous criminal offenses for which

he received the death penalty. While a postconviction petition was pending, his death sentence

was commuted to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Ramsey amended his

postconviction petition, alleging that Governor Pat Quinn violated his constitutional rights by

failing to consider his young age and other mitigating factors. The circuit court granted the

State’s second-stage motion to dismiss the postconviction petition, ruling, inter alia, that an executive commutation could not be judicially reviewed. On appeal, Ramsey argues that the

court erred when it dismissed his postconviction petition at the second stage. We affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 The facts of this case have been set out by our supreme court in People v. Ramsey, 239

Ill. 2d 342 (2010). We repeat only those facts necessary for the disposition of this appeal.

¶4 Ramsey was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)

(West 1996)), three counts of attempted murder (id. §§ 8-4(a), 9-1(a)), one count of aggravated

criminal sexual assault (id. § 12-14(a)), one count of home invasion (id. § 12-11(1)), and one

count of residential burglary (id. § 19-3(a)). He was 18 years old at the time he committed his

crimes. He received the death penalty in addition to several prison terms.

¶5 On appeal to the supreme court, his convictions were reversed, and the case was

remanded for a new trial. People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154 (2000).

¶6 On remand, Ramsey pled guilty to the intentional and felony murders of two individuals,

the attempted murder of three individuals, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and home

invasion. At sentencing, he once again received the death penalty in addition to several prison

terms. On appeal to the supreme court, his convictions and sentences were affirmed. Ramsey,

239 Ill. 2d 342.

¶7 In February 2011, Ramsey filed a pro se postconviction petition. While that motion was

pending, in March 2011, the death penalty was abolished in Illinois. Subsequently, Governor Pat

Quinn commuted Ramsey’s death sentence to natural life in prison without the possibility of

parole.

¶8 Ramsey amended his postconviction petition and argued, inter alia, that the commutation

of his sentence violated his constitutional rights under the eighth amendment of the United States

2 Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution in that the new

sentence failed to consider his young age and other mitigating factors.

¶9 Ramsey’s petition was advanced to the second stage of postconviction proceedings, in

which the State filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit court granted the State’s motion, ruling,

inter alia, that Governor Quinn’s commutation order was not subject to judicial review.

¶ 10 Ramsey appealed.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, Ramsey argues that the circuit court erred when it dismissed his

postconviction petition at the second stage. He claims that his petition made a substantial

showing of a constitutional violation because his commuted sentence did not consider his young

age and other mitigating factors, as required by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and

associated Illinois cases, thereby violating his constitutional rights under the eighth amendment

of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois

Constitution.

¶ 13 During the second stage of postconviction proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of

making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458,

473 (2006). “At the second stage of proceedings, all well-pleaded facts that are not positively

rebutted by the trial record are to be taken as true, and, in the event the circuit court dismisses the

petition at that stage, we generally review the circuit court’s decision using a de novo standard.”

Id.

¶ 14 In relevant part, article V, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[t]he

Governor may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses on

such terms as he thinks proper.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, § 12. The power to commute a sentence

3 is the power to remove a sentence imposed by the judiciary and replace it with a lesser sentence.

People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457, 474 (2004). In Snyder, our supreme court

stated:

“The pardon power given the Governor in article V, section

12, is extremely broad. *** Even before the ‘on such terms as he

thinks proper’ language was added to the constitution, this court

had recognized that the Governor’s clemency powers granted by

the constitution ‘cannot be controlled by either the courts or the

legislature. His acts in the exercise of the power can be controlled

only by his conscience and his sense of public duty.’ ” (Emphasis

added.) Id. at 473 (quoting People ex rel. Smith v. Jenkins, 325 Ill.

372, 374 (1927)).

Further, our supreme court noted that the only restriction it had found on the exercise of the

clemency power was that the Governor could not change the crime for which the individual had

been convicted. Id. at 475.

¶ 15 One year after Snyder, our supreme court reiterated that “[t]he clemency power granted

by the Illinois Constitution is not subject to control by the courts or the legislature, but can be

controlled only by the Governor’s conscience and sense of public duty.” (Emphasis added.)

People v. Mata, 217 Ill. 2d 535, 541 (2005). Ramsey relies heavily on Mata in this appeal.

¶ 16 In Mata, a jury had found the defendant guilty of first degree murder. Id. at 539. The

State sought the imposition of the death penalty, arguing that a particular aggravating factor was

present, and the jury found that the State met its burden of proving that factor beyond a

4 reasonable doubt. Id. The circuit court then imposed the death penalty. Id. Mata appealed her

conviction and sentence to the supreme court. Id.

¶ 17 While the resolution of her appeal was pending, Mata filed a petition for commutation of

her death sentence, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the aggravating factor was present and, therefore, she was not eligible for

the death penalty. Id. at 540. Mata’s commutation petition was granted by the Governor in 2003,

who imposed a natural life sentence. Id. Mata’s appeal was then transferred to the appellate

court, where Mata argued that she was entitled to a new sentencing hearing based on the

aforementioned aggravating-factor issue. Id. The appellate court dismissed Mata’s appeal as

moot after ruling that she was challenging an executively imposed sentence, which was not

subject to appellate review. Id.

¶ 18 However, on appeal, the supreme court ruled that Mata’s argument—which implicated

her constitutional right to the due process of law—was not moot. Id. at 545-48. The court held

that while challenges to an executively imposed sentence are moot, nonsentencing issues are not.

Id. at 548. Because Mata’s challenge was “to the sufficiency of proof on the functional

equivalent of an element of the offense” and therefore implicated her due process right

guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, the executive commutation could not preclude her

from seeking the relief she requested. Id.

¶ 19 Ramsey does not raise the same type of nonsentencing claim that was raised in Mata.

However, classifying Ramsey’s claim simply as a sentencing issue that is unreviewable would

potentially inflict a great injustice upon him individually and upon constitutional rights more

broadly.

5 ¶ 20 A significant aspect of the analysis in Mata was that our supreme court acknowledged an

individual’s due process rights are not subordinate to the Governor’s clemency power: “[I]n the

event of a conflict between the Governor’s clemency power granted by the Illinois Constitution

and a defendant’s right guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the

constitutional right to due process of law must prevail.” Id. at 546-47. We believe it follows that

the judiciary is not absolutely foreclosed from reviewing whether an executively imposed

sentence is unconstitutional. As the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Florida has recently explained:

“executive clemency is not immune from judicial review if it

violates the Constitution. More than a century ago, the Supreme

Court invalidated a pardon that President Wilson issued. Burdick v.

United States, [236 U.S. 79, 95 (1915)]. The Court observed that

while the Constitution provides the President a broad pardon

power, individuals also have rights under the Fifth Amendment

that cannot be violated. [Id. at 93-94]. A court’s role should be ‘to

preserve both [constitutional provisions],—to leave to each its

proper place.’ Id. More recently, Chief Justice Burger echoed this

reasoning, writing that executive officials may impose conditions

on clemency decisions so long as ‘any condition … does not

otherwise offend the Constitution.’ Schick v. Reed, [419 U.S. 256,

266 (1974)]. By extension, the clemency decision itself—the

object of any condition—must abide by the Constitution.

***

6 *** No serious person would argue that an act of executive

clemency that, for example, is motivated by race cannot run afoul

of the Constitution simply because it is an act of executive

clemency.” (Emphases added.) Hand v. Scott, 285 F. Supp. 3d

1289, 1303-04 (N.D. Fla. 2018).

¶ 21 Likewise, in this case, we see no justice in a rule mandating a reviewing court to look the

other way in a situation in which the Governor may have imposed an unconstitutional sentence.

It is not the fact that Miller is a court case, or even that it is a United States Supreme Court case,

that drives the issue here. It is that Miller has construed the imposition of a mandatory life

sentence without the possibility of parole as a violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments,

and therefore unconstitutional, when it is imposed on a minor without considering the impact of

his or her youth and other associated mitigating factors. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. Put another way,

the Governor is not being constrained by the courts or the legislature but by his oath to uphold

the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Accordingly, we address whether Ramsey’s due

process rights were violated when Governor Quinn imposed on him a prison sentence of life

without the possibility of parole.

¶ 22 Regarding his eighth amendment claim, there is nothing in Ramsey’s situation to warrant

an extension of Miller. As noted above, Miller clearly only applied to juveniles. Id. Our supreme

court has made clear that the line between juveniles and adults presently remains at 18 years of

age. People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 58-61. Because Ramsey was 18 and had crossed that

line when he committed his crimes, his eighth amendment claim fails. Id. ¶ 61.

¶ 23 Regarding Ramsey’s proportionality claim under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.

1970, art. I, § 11), we see nothing in the record to indicate that Governor Quinn’s executively

7 imposed sentence shocks the moral sense of the community, despite Ramsey’s protestations to

the contrary. See People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002) (noting that one of the three forms

of proportionality review is whether “the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so

wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community”). To

support his proportionality argument, Ramsey relies heavily upon People v. House, 2019 IL App

(1st) 110580-B, ¶¶ 63-64, in which the First District found that a mandatory sentence of life in

prison without the possibility for parole shocked the moral sense of the community for a 19-year-

old defendant. The First District based its decision in part on evolving science regarding brain

development, which has the effect of blurring the line drawn at 18 years of age that demarcates

adulthood for legal purposes. Id. ¶¶ 55-56. However, the facts of House are markedly different

from those in the instant case. Significantly, House was convicted on an accountability theory,

and he was not present at the scene of the murders; rather, he acted as a lookout nearby, and no

evidence was presented to indicate that he aided in the planning of the murders. Id. ¶ 46. In

contrast, Ramsey was a solo actor who sexually assaulted and killed one minor and then broke

into a residence and shot four other minors, killing one. These are not circumstances that warrant

the type of leniency House received. See id. ¶ 65. Under these circumstances, we reject

Ramsey’s proportionality claim.

¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that, although the sentence imposed by the Governor

when commuting a death sentence cannot be controlled by the courts or the legislature, his

exercise of clemency is not wholly unfettered. Executive commutations are constrained by

fundamental rights guaranteed by the United States and Illinois Constitutions, which the

Governor swore to uphold when he took his oath of office. We further hold that Ramsey’s

8 sentence of life without parole did not violate either constitution, and we affirm the decision of

the circuit court on that basis.

¶ 25 CONCLUSION

¶ 26 The judgment of the circuit court of Hancock County is affirmed.

¶ 27 Affirmed.

9 No. 3-16-0759

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Hancock County, No. 96-CF- 46; the Hon. Rodney G. Clark, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Tiffany Boye Green, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (David L. Franklin, for Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Leah M. Bendik, Appellee: Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.