People v. Masters

2020 IL App (4th) 190714-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 17, 2020
• Docket: 4-19-0714
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 190714-U November 17, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in NO. 4-19-0714 4th District Appellate the limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Adams County GAVIN MASTERS, ) No. 15CF362 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Robert K. Adrian, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court reversed and remanded for further postconviction proceedings where defendant’s postconviction petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim.

¶2 In June 2019, defendant, Gavin Masters, filed a postconviction petition alleging,

in part, defendant’s aggregate 115-year prison sentence violated the eighth amendment of the

United States Constitution. In September 2019, the trial court entered an order dismissing the

postconviction petition at the first stage of proceedings.

¶3 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his

postconviction petition at the first stage of proceedings where the petition alleged the gist of a

constitutional claim that his sentence violated the eighth amendment of the United States

Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. For the following

reasons, we reverse and remand the trial court’s judgment. ¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In November 2015, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and

attempted first degree murder. The jury further found the State proved the allegation defendant

personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused the death of another. The trial court

sentenced defendant to consecutive sentences of 70 years’ imprisonment on the first degree

murder conviction and 45 years’ imprisonment on the attempted first degree murder conviction.

¶6 In June 2019, defendant filed a postconviction petition. Defendant alleged his

aggregate sentence of 115 years’ imprisonment violated the eighth amendment because it was a

mandatory de facto life sentence. In the petition, defendant acknowledged he was 18 years old at

the time of the offense and a facial challenge to his aggregate sentence under the eighth

amendment failed. However, defendant alleged a record needed to be developed sufficiently to

address his claim that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) applied to his particular

circumstances. The petition alleged defendant was less mature and had an underdeveloped sense

of responsibility, was more vulnerable to negative influences and pressures, and his character

was less fixed making his actions less likely to be indicative of irretrievable depravity.

¶7 In September 2019, the trial court dismissed the postconviction petition. The

court found defendant’s sentencing claim frivolous and without merit because defendant “was 18

years of age at the time the offenses were committed [and] a de facto life sentence does not

violate the state o[r] federal [c]onstitution.”

¶8 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of his postconviction

petition. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider. In part, the court pointed out the

statutory minimum sentence was a de facto life sentence and reiterated that a de facto life

sentence for an 18-year-old did not violate the state or federal constitution.

-2- ¶9 This appeal followed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his

postconviction petition at the first stage where the petition alleged a gist of a constitutional claim

that his sentence violated the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

¶ 12 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to

122-7 (West 2016)) provides a collateral means for a defendant to challenge a conviction or

sentence for a violation of a federal or state constitutional right. People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140,

143, 809 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (2004). At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, the trial

court must determine, taking the allegations as true, whether the defendant’s petition is frivolous

or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2016). A postconviction petition

may be summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit “only if the petition has no

arguable basis either in law or in fact.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 912 N.E.2d 1204,

1209 (2009). At this stage of proceedings, the trial court acts in an administrative capacity and

screens out postconviction petitions lacking legal substance or obviously without merit. People

v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9, 980 N.E.2d 1100. “To survive dismissal at this initial stage, the

postconviction petition ‘need only present the gist of a constitutional claim,’ which is ‘a low

threshold’ that requires the petition to contain only a limited amount of detail.” People v. Harris,

366 Ill. App. 3d 1161, 1166-67, 853 N.E.2d 912, 917 (2006) (quoting People v. Gaultney, 174

Ill. 2d 410, 418, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106 (1996)). We review de novo the summary dismissal of a

postconviction petition. Id. at 1167.

-3- ¶ 13 Defendant challenges his sentence, arguing that, as applied to his specific

circumstances, his 115-year aggregate sentence violated the eighth amendment of the United

States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Defendant

argues the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development highlighted in Miller

applies to both juveniles and young adults.

¶ 14 In a progression of cases involving juvenile sentencing, the United States

Supreme Court has held the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the

death sentence for juveniles convicted of murder (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79

(2005)), mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of

nonhomicide offenses (Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010)), and mandatory life

sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of murder (Miller, 567 U.S. at

489). The Supreme Court determined “that children are constitutionally different from adults for

purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 471. The Supreme Court identified three principal differences

between juveniles and adults. First, a child’s underdeveloped sense of responsibility and lack of

maturity led to “recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.” Id. Second, juveniles are

more vulnerable to outside pressure and negative influences. Id. Third, a child’s character is

less fixed and less likely to demonstrate an inability to be rehabilitated. Id.

¶ 15 The Illinois Supreme Court has taken this line of cases further. In People v.

Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40, 91 N.E.3d 849, the supreme court held Miller applied to

discretionary life sentences without parole for juvenile defendants. And in People v. Buffer,

2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40, 137 N.E.3d 763, the supreme court held Miller also applied to de facto life

sentences of more than 40 years. Finally, the supreme court has raised the possibility the

rationale in Miller might apply on a case-by-case basis to young adult offenders who were over

-4- the age of 18 at the time of the offense. People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 37, 53, 120 N.E.3d

900.

¶ 16 As noted above, defendant raises an as-applied challenge to his sentence. The

distinction between a facial and as-applied constitutional challenge is crucial. “A party raising a

facial challenge must establish that the statute is unconstitutional under any possible set of facts,

while an as-applied challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional as it applies

to the specific facts and circumstances of the challenging party.” Id. ¶ 38.

¶ 17 In Harris, the Illinois Supreme Court heard a similar argument from an

18-year-old defendant who challenged his 76-year mandatory minimum sentence under the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 35. The defendant argued the

sentencing scheme that resulted in a mandatory aggregate sentence of 76 years’ imprisonment

was unconstitutional as applied to his circumstances. Id. ¶ 36. The defendant argued it shocked

the moral sense of the community to impose a mandatory de facto life sentence given the facts of

his case, including his youth and other mitigating factors. Id. In support of his argument, the

defendant relied on Miller to argue the emerging science showed brain development continued

into the early twenties and the reasoning from Miller should be extended to his case because he

was just 18 years old at the time of the offense. Id. ¶ 37.

¶ 18 The supreme court found the defendant’s as-applied challenge was premature

because the record was not sufficiently developed in terms of the defendant’s specific facts and

circumstances. Id. ¶¶ 39, 46. The supreme court noted Miller did not directly apply to the

defendant who, at the age of 18, was no longer a juvenile. Id. ¶ 45. Accordingly, the court

concluded that “[t]he record must be developed sufficiently to address [the] defendant’s claim

that Miller applies to his particular circumstances.” Id. The court further concluded remand was

-5- unnecessary where the defendant could raise his claim in a collateral challenge. Id. ¶ 48. We

note that the supreme court, in Harris, determined the defendant could raise an as-applied

challenge under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution but rejected the

defendant’s facial challenge under the eighth amendment. Id. ¶ 53. The court noted an

as-applied challenge under the eighth amendment “would fail for the same reason as his

challenge under the Illinois Constitution failed, because no evidentiary hearing was held and no

findings of fact were entered on how Miller applies to him as a young adult.” Id.

¶ 19 In Harris, the court relied upon its earlier analysis of these issues in People v.

Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, 43 N.E.3d 984. In Thompson, a 19-year-old defendant attempted to

raise an as-applied constitutional challenge to his mandatory life sentence for the first time on

appeal from the dismissal of a petition for relief under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2010)). Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 1. He argued the

eighth amendment considerations addressed in Miller should apply with “ ‘equal force’ to

individuals between the ages of 18 and 21.” Id. ¶ 21. The defendant relied on the evolving

science regarding juvenile maturity and brain development in support of this position. Id. ¶ 38.

The court held the defendant’s as-applied challenge under Miller was forfeited because it was not

the type of challenge recognized as being exempt from the typical rules of forfeiture. Id. ¶ 39.

However, in dicta, the court noted the defendant’s as-applied challenge was actually a facial

challenge because he relied exclusively on the evolving science of brain development, and the

record contained “nothing about how that science applie[d] to the circumstances of [the]

defendant’s case, the key showing for an as-applied constitutional challenge.” Id. ¶ 38.

¶ 20 Following Harris and Thompson, Illinois courts have confronted as-applied

challenges invoking the Miller rationale in postconviction proceedings. In People v. House,

-6- 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶¶ 17, 23, 142 N.E.3d 756, the appellate court considered the

second-stage dismissal of a 19-year-old defendant’s postconviction petition, in which he asserted

his mandatory life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause. After discussing the

evolving science regarding brain development and considering our supreme court’s decision in

Harris, the House court concluded the line demarcating 18 years of age as adulthood for legal

purposes was “somewhat arbitrary.” Id. ¶¶ 55-56. It held the defendant’s mandatory life

sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause and shocked the moral sense of the

community because of the “defendant’s age, his family background, his actions as a lookout as

opposed to being the actual shooter, and [his] lack of any prior violent convictions[.]” Id. ¶ 64.

The court noted the defendant’s age and his relative culpability created questions regarding the

“propriety of a mandatory natural life sentence for a 19-year-old defendant convicted under a

theory of accountability.” Id. ¶ 46.

¶ 21 Courts have distinguished House in cases where the defendant played a more

active role in the crime or received a discretionary rather than a mandatory sentence. See, e.g.,

People v. Ramsey, 2019 IL App (3d) 160759, ¶¶ 22-23, 143 N.E.3d 865 (rejecting an 18-year-old

defendant’s proportionality claim and noting he was the sole actor who committed the offenses);

People v. Handy, 2019 IL App (1st) 170213, ¶¶ 1, 41 (finding an 18-year-old defendant was not

entitled to a new sentencing hearing because he was an active participant in the crimes and

received a discretionary sentence).

¶ 22 In People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶¶ 1-2, the 19-year-old

defendant was convicted of first degree murder and received an aggregate 50-year term of

imprisonment. The defendant sought to file a successive postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 25. The

appellate court found the defendant established both cause and prejudice. Id. ¶¶ 31, 44. In

-7- determining the defendant established prejudice, the appellate court observed the defendant

could not have raised his as-applied challenge in his initial postconviction proceeding because it

predated Miller “and our supreme court has found that a ruling without a developed record is

‘premature.’ ” Id. ¶ 44. “ ‘Defendant has shown prejudice by establishing a “catch-22”—

without a developed record, he cannot show his constitutional claim has merit, and without a

meritful claim, he cannot proceed to develop a record.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Carrasquillo,

2020 IL App (1st) 180534, ¶ 109).

¶ 23 As the supreme court suggested in Harris, defendant has raised an as-applied

constitutional challenge to his sentence in his postconviction petition. The court in Harris

concluded the as-applied challenge was premature because the record was insufficiently

developed to determine how the Miller considerations applied to the defendant’s particular

circumstances. Here, defendant has raised his as-applied constitutional challenge to his sentence

in a postconviction petition and seeks reversal for an evidentiary hearing where he will be

afforded the opportunity to sufficiently develop the record on this point. Defendant asserts he

intends to introduce a report at the second stage and testimony at the third stage from an expert

witness. Specifically, defendant asserts a report of Dr. James Garbarino’s developmental

analysis will demonstrate the Miller principles apply to his circumstances.

¶ 24 Based on our review of the case law and defendant’s petition, we conclude

defendant has met the low bar of stating a gist of a constitutional claim in his postconviction

petition. Thus, we find defendant’s petition survives first stage analysis and should move to

second stage proceedings.

¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court erred by dismissing

defendant’s postconviction petition at the first stage as the petition met the low bar of stating a

-8- gist of a constitutional claim. Accordingly, we remand for further postconviction proceedings

consistent with the views expressed in this order.

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for

further proceedings.

¶ 28 Reversed and remanded.

-9-