People v. Rahilly

635 N.W.2d 227, 247 Mich. App. 108
CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 19, 2001
DocketDocket 227682, 229762, 229829
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 635 N.W.2d 227 (People v. Rahilly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Rahilly, 635 N.W.2d 227, 247 Mich. App. 108 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinions

Hood, J.

In these consolidated appeals, the prosecution appeals by leave granted from the trial courts’ orders removing or exempting defendants from the registration provisions of the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq. We reverse and remand.

In Docket No. 227682, defendant Adam Peter Rahilly pleaded guilty to a charge of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520e (contact). The complainant and defendant were college students. Defendant asked the complainant if he could kiss her, and she said no. Defendant touched the complainant’s breast. The complainant fell asleep with defendant behind her. When she woke up, defendant was on top of the complainant and digitally penetrated her. Defendant stated that he had been drinking and did [111]*111not recall the incident. Defendant was sentenced as a youthful trainee to twenty-four months’ probation pursuant to the Youthful Trainee Act (yta), MCL 762.11 et seq. Defendant registered in accordance with the provisions of the SORA. After he successfully completed the terms of his probation, defendant filed a motion to have his name removed from the SORA registry. The trial court granted the motion.

In Docket No. 239762, defendant Daniel Hams pleaded guilty to a charge of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520e, and indecent exposure, MCL 750.335a. Defendant exposed himself to several girls under the age of six years old at his parents’ home where his mother ran a baby-sitting service. Additionally, defendant removed the clothing of a 4V2-year-old girl and touched her vagina. Following the completion of ten months on an electronic tether and three years on probation while assigned to the status of youthful trainee pursuant to the yta, defendant moved for an exemption from registration under the SORA, and the trial court granted the motion.

In Docket No. 229829, defendant Timothy Michael Stanley pleaded guilty to a charge of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520e, and aggravated assault, MCL 750.81a. Defendant grabbed the complainant’s hand and forced it onto his genitals, then assaulted the complainant’s boyfriend. Defendant was sentenced to six months’ probation and assigned to the status of youthful trainee pursuant to the YTA. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to exempt him from registration under the SORA. We granted the prosecution’s applications for leave to appeal in each case and consolidated the appeals.

[112]*112The prosecution argues that there is no provision for removal from the SORA registry on the basis of participation in and completion of the requirements of the yta. We agree. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. People v Nimeth, 236 Mich App 616, 620; 601 NW2d 393 (1999). When resolving disputed interpretations of statutory language, it is the function of the reviewing court to effectuate the legislative intent. People v Valentin, 457 Mich 1, 5; 577 NW2d 73 (1998). When the language of the statute is clear, the Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. Id. We presume that every word has some meaning, and we must avoid any construction that would render any part of the statute surplus-age or nugatory. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 285; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). The Legislature is presumed to be aware of and legislate in harmony with existing laws when enacting new laws. Walen v Dep’t of Corrections, 443 Mich 240, 248; 505 NW2d 519 (1993). The omission of a provision from one part of a statute that is included in another part of a statute must be construed as intentional. That is, we “cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it placed in another statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply what is not there.” Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 210; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). Two statutes that relate to the same subject or share a common purpose are in pari materia and must be read together. People v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998). The goal of the in pari materia rule is to give effect to the legislative purpose found in the harmonious statutes. Id. When two stat[113]*113utes lend themselves to a construction that avoids conflict, that construction should control. Id.

The yta provides a mechanism for individuals who commit certain crimes between the time of their seventeenth and twenty-first birthdays to be excused from having a criminal record. People v Bobek 217 Mich App 524, 529; 553 NW2d 18 (1996), citing People v Dolgorukov, 191 Mich App 38, 39; 477 NW2d 118 (1991). Pursuant to MCL 762.11, an individual within the restricted age range may plead guilty of a specified offense, and the court having jurisdiction may assign the individual to the status of youthful trainee. Once having assigned the individual to the status of youthful trainee, the court may commit the individual to custodial supervision for not more than three years in a specially designated Department of Corrections facility, place the individual on probation for not more than three years, or commit the individual to the county jail for not more than one year. MCL 762.13. Thus, the individual assigned to youthful trainee status is nonetheless punished for the crime committed. The individual assigned to youthful trainee status derives a benefit from the status if he successfully completes the punishment imposed. MCL 762.14 provides in relevant part:

(1) If consideration of an individual as a youthful trainee is not terminated and the status of youthful trainee is not revoked as provided in section 12 of this chapter [MCL 762.12], upon final release of the individual from the status as youthful trainee, the court shall discharge the individual and dismiss the proceedings.
(2) An assignment of an individual to the status of youthful trainee as provided in this chapter is not a conviction for a crime and, except as provided in subsection (3), the individual assigned to the status of youthful trainee shall [114]*114not suffer a civil disability or loss of right or privilege following his or her release from that status because of his or her assignment as a youthful trainee.
(4) Unless the court enters a judgment of conviction against the individual for the criminal offense under section 12 of this chapter, all proceedings regarding the disposition of the criminal charge and the individual’s assignment as youthful trainee shall be closed to public inspection, but shall be open to the courts of this state, the department of corrections, the department of social services, and law enforcement personnel for use only in the performance of their duties.

In 1994, our Legislature enacted the SORA that required convicted sex offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies. People v Pennington, 240 Mich App 188, 191; 610 NW2d 608 (2000). In 1999, the SORA was amended. It continued to provide a database for law enforcement officers to track the whereabouts of sexual offenders. However, it expanded the notification provisions to allow public access to information regarding sex offenders. Id.-, MCL 28.728(2).

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Bluebook (online)
635 N.W.2d 227, 247 Mich. App. 108, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-rahilly-michctapp-2001.