2025 IL App (1st) 220625-U Nos. 1-22-0625 & 1-23-1609 (cons.)
FIRST DIVISION August 11, 2025
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 90 CR 24789 ) ROBERT ORNELAS, ) ) The Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Nicholas R. Ford and James B. Linn, ) Judges Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in dismissing defendant’s successive postconviction petition at the second stage of proceedings and denying defendant leave to file two other successive postconviction petitions where defendant could not satisfy the cause element of the cause and prejudice test.
¶2 In these consolidated appeals, defendant Robert Ornelas appeals the second-stage dismissal
of a successive petition for postconviction relief filed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act)
(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)) and the denial of two motions for leave to file successive
postconviction petitions. On appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court erred in not 1-22-0625 and 1-23-1609 (cons.)
advancing the petitions because he made a substantial showing that his mandatory sentence of
natural life imprisonment was unconstitutional as applied to him, an 18-year-old emerging adult,
under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant was charged by indictment with the first degree murders of Jay Mosqueda and
Robert Cheeks (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, ¶ 9-1(a)(1)-(2)) with a firearm. Following a 1996 bench
trial, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment. The facts
of the case have been detailed in this court’s order on direct appeal and those related to prior
collateral proceedings. See People v. Ornelas, 295 Ill. App. 3d 1037 (1998); see also People v.
Ornelas, 2012 IL App (1st) 102100-U. Thus, we will only recount the facts necessary to resolve
the issue on appeal.
¶5 A. Pretrial Proceedings and Bench Trial
¶6 Prior to trial, defendant filed separate motions to quash his arrest and suppress an
inculpatory statement he made to the police, arguing collectively that the police lacked probable
cause to arrest him, his statement to police was involuntary because he was under the influence of
narcotics and was obtained as a result of physical, psychological, and mental coercion. The court
denied both motions, finding the police had probable cause to arrest defendant, he gave the
statement voluntarily and was not under the influence of narcotics when he did so, and he was not
abused or coerced by the police.
¶7 At trial, the State presented evidence that on November 11, 1990, Mosqueda and Cheeks
were killed while sitting in a vehicle. They had gunshot wounds to their face and neck,
respectively, and two spent shotgun shells were on the ground. The forensic pathologist testified
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that Mosqueda died from a shotgun wound to his face, Cheeks died from multiple shotgun wounds,
and the manner of both deaths was homicide. During the course of the police investigation,
defendant gave the officers a statement in which he admitted to the killings, but claimed he
discharged the firearm in self-defense. Defendant relied upon a theory of self-defense during his
case-in-chief. The court found defendant guilty of all counts of first degree murder.
¶8 B. Sentencing
¶9 Defendant waived his right to have a jury determine whether the death penalty would be
imposed. The trial court found that defendant was eligible for the imposition of capital punishment,
because he was 18 years old at the time of the offense and was found guilty of four counts of the
first degree murder of two victims.
¶ 10 At a sentencing hearing, the State presented, inter alia, evidence that defendant had
committed several violations while incarcerated in the Cook County Department of Corrections,
including striking a corrections officer with a door panel and throwing his lunch at him, possessing
two jail made knives or “shanks” in his jail cell, and fighting with other inmates. The State also
presented the victim impact statement of Mosqueda’s sister wherein she described how his death
impacted her and her desire for the court proceedings to end.
¶ 11 Sarah Vasquez (Sarah), defendant’s sister, testified in mitigation that defendant became
withdrawn when he turned 13 years old, became involved with gangs, and began taking drugs.
Defendant participated in psychological inpatient treatment, including family counseling, which
improved his attitude and grades. Approximately a year after further outpatient treatment was
completed, defendant “backslid.” She requested the court show leniency, and stated that his family
could “help him through all this.”
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¶ 12 Defendant’s father, Francisco Ornelas (Francisco), testified in mitigation that he had a
“problem” with alcohol for the first 14 years of defendant’s life and was violent toward him. He
encouraged defendant “never to run away from a fight.” Even though Francisco joined Alcoholics
Anonymous and became sober, his relationship with defendant “was broken up.” Defendant
“backslid” after outpatient treatment, but was never violent toward his family and never stole from
them. Francisco stated that he failed defendant as a father, and asked the court for mercy.
¶ 13 Clarence Dixon testified that he was a friend of the Ornelas family and a retired Battalion
Chief for the Chicago Fire Department. Defendant was always respectful and polite to Dixon, and
was only dishonest regarding his drug usage. According to Dixon, the neighborhood defendant
lived in had changed over the past decade, and gangs had become more prevalent in the area.
¶ 14 The State argued in aggravation that defendant had a “short fuse” and was dangerous. The
State emphasized the brutality of the offense, and argued that natural life imprisonment, the
minimum sentence, was not appropriate for defendant’s actions and requested the imposition of
capital punishment.
¶ 15 Defense counsel argued in mitigation that defendant had no significant prior criminal
history, acted under provocation, and turned to drugs and gang involvement at a young age, in part
due to the difficulty of being the son of an alcoholic. Counsel argued that defendant attended
church five to six times a week during his incarceration, and was taking an art class. Counsel
concluded that the court should impose natural life imprisonment, “the only other choice” in the
case.
¶ 16 In allocution, defendant apologized to his family and the families of the victims, and
thanked his attorneys for fighting on his behalf.
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¶ 17 The court declined to impose the death penalty and imposed a sentence of natural life
imprisonment. It stated that it considered the factors in mitigation and aggravation and determined
that the mitigating factors precluded the imposition of the death penalty.
¶ 18 C. Direct Appeal
¶ 19 On direct appeal, defendant argued (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash
arrest, and (2) the State did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because he acted in self-
defense. We affirmed. Ornelas, 295 Ill. App. 3d 1037 (1998).
¶ 20 D. Initial Postconviction Petition
¶ 21 In 1999, defendant filed a postconviction petition through counsel, alleging ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for failing to (1) call a witness at his pretrial suppression hearing that
would testify that defendant’s statement was the result of physical abuse inflicted upon him by the
detectives, and (2) interview and call other witnesses who experienced systematic abuse known to
occur at Area 2. He also argued that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these
issues on appeal. The petition was advanced to third-stage proceedings, where the court dismissed
the petition after an evidentiary hearing. We affirmed where defendant did not establish the circuit
court erred in finding that his trial counsel’s suppression strategy was not unreasonable and,
regardless, defendant did not establish that he was prejudiced by it. Ornelas, 2012 IL App (1st)
102100-U.
¶ 22 E. Section 116-3 Motion for Forensic Testing
¶ 23 In 2014, defendant filed a pro se motion seeking the results of the forensic testing of his
sweater, which was purportedly tested prior to trial, but the results were never disclosed. The court
denied the motion. We affirmed, finding that defendant failed to present a prima facie case that
testing was warranted, and even if he had, further forensic testing would not have produced new,
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noncumulative evidence materially relevant to defendant’s claim of actual innocence. People v.
Ornelas, 2017 IL App (1st) 150130-U.
¶ 24 E. First Successive Postconviction Petition
¶ 25 On October 14, 2016, defendant filed a pro se successive postconviction petition, raising
multiple claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, insufficient evidence to
prove his guilt, and perjury by the State. Relevant here, defendant also argued that his natural life
sentence was unconstitutional, and cited People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580, vacated, No.
122134 (Nov. 28, 2018) (supervisory order), where we found that the imposition of a mandatory
natural life sentence for an emerging adult defendant was unconstitutional. Judge Nicholas Ford
denied defendant leave to file his successive petition in a written order.
¶ 26 Defendant appealed. On May 7, 2019, this court granted defendant’s agreed motion for
summary disposition, vacating the court’s judgment denying defendant leave to file his successive
postconviction petition and remanding the matter for further postconviction proceedings. People
v. Ornelas, Nos. 1-17-0230 & 1-17-1877 (cons.) (May 7, 2019) (disposition order). The matter
was transferred from Judge Ford to Judge James Linn.
¶ 27 On remand, the circuit court then advanced the petition to the second stage of proceedings
and postconviction counsel was appointed. Postconviction counsel filed two supplemental
successive postconviction petitions on August 23, 2019, and March 8, 2021, arguing that
defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional under the eighth amendment to the United States
Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. His March 8, 2021,
amended supplemental postconviction petition asserted that defendant was 18 years old at the time
of the offense, was a former gang member, and had been using drugs and alcohol habitually since
he was 12 or 13 years old. Further, his father also had a “drinking problem” that caused defendant
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to “rebel.” Postconviction counsel noted that the trial court did not acknowledge defendant’s youth
and attendant characteristics in imposing sentence. Additionally, counsel asserted that defendant
had completed several seminary and educational courses during his imprisonment.
¶ 28 During the pendency of proceedings, defendant’s initial postconviction counsel retired, and
a new postconviction counsel was appointed. On December 27, 2022, defendant’s second
postconviction counsel filed a third amended supplemental successive petition, arguing that
defendant’s mandatory life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution because he was the functional equivalent of a juvenile at the time of the offense.
Further, the sentencing court was unable to consider the evolving neuroscience regarding the brain
development of emerging adults at the time of sentencing because it was restricted to imposing
either the death penalty or natural life imprisonment. Counsel contended that the sentencing court’s
consideration of the statutory guidelines for determining whether the death penalty could be
imposed did not include the attendant characteristics of youth and the evolving neuroscience
regarding emerging adult offenders. Counsel attached affidavits from defendant’s family members
averring to the difficult circumstances of defendant’s youth, gang involvement, drug and alcohol
use, and immaturity at the time of the offense.
¶ 29 On July 26, 2023, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s successive petition,
arguing that Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its progeny did not provide cause for an
emerging adult defendant to raise a violation of the proportionate penalties clause in a successive
postconviction petition. See People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461.
¶ 30 On August 24, 2023, the court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. Defendant filed a
timely appeal, which was assigned appellate court case number 1-23-1609.
¶ 31 F. Second Successive Petition Proceedings
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¶ 32 On January 17, 2018, defendant filed a second pro se motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition, arguing that his natural life sentence was unconstitutional as applied to
him because he was 18 years old at the time of the offense, more like a juvenile than an adult, and
exhibited “evidence of rehabilitation potential.” Defendant contended that he established cause to
file the successive petition because Miller and its progeny were not available when he was
sentenced. Defendant also argued that he was actually innocent, the prosecution “collu[ded]” with
the Area 2 detectives in falsifying “an involuntary/coerced statement,” the detectives perjured
themselves during pretrial, trial, and postconviction proceedings, and his trial counsel was
ineffective.
¶ 33 On January 25, 2018, defendant filed the successive postconviction petition, arguing the
same points as in the motion. Defendant additionally contended that he was raised in “a community
and culture in which murder and violence [are] routine.” He described his violent youth, gang
history, and drug and alcohol use. Defendant stated that he feared the police, who beat and
threatened him, and he believed that they would murder him. He also described his rehabilitative
potential, including his work history, education, and community outreach during his
imprisonment. Defendant concluded by requesting a neuropsychological evaluation in order to
provide support for his sentencing claim.
¶ 34 Defendant attached, inter alia, articles summarizing current case law and neuroscience
regarding juveniles and emerging adults, his high school transcripts, letters extending job offers to
him upon his release from prison, and certificates of achievement and diplomas for education
completed during his incarceration.
¶ 35 On March 25, 2019, Judge Ford denied defendant leave to file his second successive
postconviction petition in a written order. In relevant part, the court found that defendant did not
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satisfy the cause and prejudice test for filing his successive petition because Miller did not apply
to defendant as an emerging adult.
¶ 36 On April 21, 2019, defendant mailed a motion to reconsider the court’s ruling, which was
filed on May 1, 2019. He attached an April 9, 2019, letter from his appellate counsel regarding the
agreed motion to remand his first successive petition for further postconviction proceedings
regarding the sentencing issue. The record on appeal does not contain any ruling on this motion.
¶ 37 Defendant filed a motion seeking leave to file a late notice of appeal in this court on May
5, 2022. The appeal was docketed under appellate court case number 1-22-0625. On June 3, 2022,
we denied defendant leave to file his late notice of appeal due to a lack of jurisdiction, but noted
that the order was without prejudice to defendant’s right to seek a supervisory order from the
Illinois Supreme Court. Defendant subsequently sought a supervisory order, and on September 26,
2023, the Illinois Supreme Court entered an order directing this court to vacate its June 3, 2022,
order denying defendant leave to file a late notice of appeal and to allow the motion for leave to
file the late notice of appeal. This court granted defendant leave to file late notice of appeal on
October 2, 2023, under appellate court case number 1-22-0625.
¶ 38 G. Third Successive Petition Proceedings
¶ 39 On July 7, 2020, defendant filed a pro se motion for a “new trial,” arguing in part that he
established cause to file a successive postconviction petition because new case law and scientific
research established that the brain of an emerging adult is similar to that of a juvenile. Defendant
also raised multiple claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, trial and
postconviction court error, and bias by the postconviction court.
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¶ 40 On August 24, 2023, Judge Linn recharacterized defendant’s pro se motion as a motion
seeking leave to file a successive postconviction petition, and denied the motion in a written order.
That day, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
¶ 41 On September 14, 2023, defendant filed a pro se motion to reconsider the denial of his
motion for new trial, arguing that the trial court did not properly review the motion, and abused its
discretion in recharacterizing it as a successive postconviction petition. Regardless, defendant
contended that he satisfied the cause and prejudice test to warrant further postconviction
proceedings. The circuit court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider in a written order on
October 5, 2023.
¶ 42 On June 20, 2024, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a supervisory order directing this court
to treat the notice of appeal filed on August 24, 2023, and assigned appellate case number 1-23-
1609, as a properly perfected appeal from the circuit court’s October 5, 2023, judgment denying
defendant’s motion to reconsider.
¶ 43 On June 25, 2024, we consolidated the appeals under appellate case numbers 1-22-0625
and 1-23-1609.
¶ 44 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 45 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his successive
postconviction petition at the second stage of proceedings, because he made a substantial showing
of a constitutional violation. Specifically, defendant contends that his mandatory sentence of
natural life imprisonment violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as
applied to him. He argues that we should remand the matter for a third-stage evidentiary hearing
where he made a sufficient legal and factual showing to warrant further proceedings.
¶ 46 A. Post-Conviction Hearing Act
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¶ 47 The Act provides a three-stage mechanism by which defendants can challenge their
convictions for violations of federal or state constitutional rights in collateral proceedings. 725
ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016); People v. LaPointe, 227 Ill. 2d 39, 43 (2007). “Successive
petitions are highly disfavored, and the statutory bar will be relaxed only when fundamental
fairness requires it.” People v. Figueroa, 2022 IL App (1st) 172390-B, ¶ 22.
¶ 48 Under section 122-1(f) of the Act, only one postconviction petition may be filed by a
defendant without leave of court. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016); People v. Lusby, 2020 IL
124046, ¶ 27. Leave of court “may be granted only if a [defendant] demonstrates cause for his or
her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results
from that failure.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016). 1 The defendant may demonstrate cause by
“identifying an objective factor that impeded his or her ability to raise” the claim during initial
proceedings, and prejudice by “demonstrating that the claim not raised” during the initial
proceedings “so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.”
Id.
¶ 49 The cause and prejudice standard is “more exacting” than review of an initial
postconviction petition. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 21. Both prongs of the
cause and prejudice test must be satisfied for a court to grant leave to file a successive petition.
See People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 25. Leave to file a successive petition should be denied
“when it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation submitted by the
1 Leave of court may also be granted where a defendant “asserts a fundamental miscarriage of justice based on actual innocence.” People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 42. Although defendant asserted an actual innocence claim in his second successive petition, he does not address this issue on appeal. -11- 1-22-0625 and 1-23-1609 (cons.)
petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as a matter of law.” People v. Smith, 2014
IL 115946, ¶ 35.
¶ 50 If a court grants the defendant leave to file the successive petition, the matter progresses to
second-stage proceedings, where the State may seek dismissal on any grounds, including the
defendant’s failure to prove cause and prejudice for not raising the claims in the initial
postconviction petition. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 26.
¶ 51 B. Standard of Review
¶ 52 In the case at bar, the circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s first
successive postconviction petition at the second stage of proceedings. The dismissal of a
successive postconviction petition without a third-stage evidentiary hearing is reviewed de novo.
People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 31. The circuit court additionally denied defendant leave to
file his second and third successive postconviction petitions. We also review a denial of leave to
file a successive petition de novo. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27.
¶ 53 C. Evolving Case Law Applying Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)
¶ 54 Defendant’s claim arises from Miller and its progeny, which establish that the eighth
amendment requires sentencing courts “to have discretion in sentencing juveniles after considering
the juvenile’s youth and the attendant characteristics of youth.” Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 54. The
basis for this requirement is that juveniles “have diminished culpability and greater prospects for
reform,” and are, thus, “less deserving of the most severe punishments.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Miller, 567 U.S. at 471. Miller discussed juveniles’ lack of maturity, recklessness,
vulnerability to peer pressure and negative external influences, and that they have characters and
traits which are “not as well formed as an adult’s” and, thus, “less likely to be evidence of
irretrievable depravity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In Illinois, the supreme court has
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expanded this rule to include de facto life sentences, defined as prison terms exceeding 40 years.
See People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41.
¶ 55 The supreme court has not “foreclosed” emerging adults, like defendant, from raising as-
applied Miller-based proportionate penalties challenges to mandatory life sentences in initial
postconviction petitions based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain
development. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 (citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44
(concerning a 19-year-old defendant sentenced to a term of natural life)); People v. Williams, 2024
IL 127304, ¶ 29. Such a claim requires an evidentiary record as to how the evolving science
regarding maturity and brain development applies to the defendant’s specific circumstances.
People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 29.
¶ 56 However, recent supreme court rulings have established that Miller and its progeny do not
provide “cause” for emerging adult offenders to file successive postconviction petitions arguing
proportionate penalties claims directed at their sentences. See Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶¶ 38-44
(denying leave to file successive petition for the defendants, emerging adult offenders, who argued
that their sentences violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution).
¶ 57 Mindful of this framework, we turn to the merits of defendant’s argument on appeal.
¶ 58 C. Whether the circuit court erred in not advancing defendant’s successive petitions
¶ 59 As an initial matter, we note that the three successive postconviction petitions at issue
in these consolidated appeals contained multiple constitutional claims, including ineffective
assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. On appeal, defendant only advances the
proportionate penalties argument from his successive petitions. Thus, we find that the remaining
claims in his petitions are forfeited on appeal. See People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 70.
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¶ 60 The court did not err in granting the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s successive
postconviction petition at the second stage of proceedings or denying him leave to file his
subsequent successive postconviction petitions. Upon remand, the circuit court advanced
defendant’s first successive postconviction petition to the second stage of proceedings.
Postconviction counsel was appointed and filed several supplemental successive postconviction
petitions. During the pendency of second stage proceedings, the Illinois Supreme Court published
People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, and People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, where it determined that
Miller did not provide cause for emerging adult offenders to raise a claim under the proportionate
penalties clause in successive postconviction petitions. See People v. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015,
¶ 31 (Miller “does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the
proportionate penalties clause in a successive postconviction petition”). For this same reason, the
court denied defendant leave to file his two subsequent successive postconviction petitions. As
defendant was unable to establish cause to file the successive petitions, the court did not err in not
advancing them.
¶ 61 Defendant acknowledges the Clark and Moore decisions, but contends that his case is
distinguishable because the three defendants in Clark and Moore all were subject to discretionary,
rather than mandatory, life sentences. Defendant argues that because the sentencing court was
unable to consider his youth and its attendant characteristics in sentencing him to a mandatory
natural life sentence, he has established cause to file a successive postconviction petition. He
further argues that he asserted individualized facts and circumstances which show that his sentence
violated the proportionate penalties clause, including facts related to his difficult childhood, gang
involvement, and alcohol and substance abuse.
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¶ 62 Defendant’s contention that Clark and Moore only apply to emerging adult offenders with
discretionary life sentences is not persuasive. The Clark court specified that case law related to
emerging adult offenders “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge
with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in
original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88; see Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 31 (Miller “does not
provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause
in a successive postconviction petition”); see also, People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶27. As
such, we have regularly found that emerging adults are foreclosed from raising Miller-based
proportionate penalties claims in successive postconviction petitions, regardless of whether their
sentences were discretionary or mandatory. See People v. Horshaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B,
¶ 62 (noting that the current case law “opened the door only wide enough to accommodate claims
involving mandatory life sentences that were raised in initial postconviction petitions (Emphasis
added.)”). Thus, defendant cannot establish cause for his failure to raise his proportionate penalties
claim in his initial postconviction petition because such a claim was always available to him as he
could have raised a proportionate penalties challenge in his initial postconviction petition and
“Miller was simply helpful support and not the basis for a new claim.” See id. ¶ 63. Having
determined that defendant cannot establish cause, we need not determine whether he provided the
required factual support to warrant further proceedings.
¶ 63 Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in dismissing defendant’s first successive
postconviction petition at the second stage of proceedings, and denying defendant leave to file his
two subsequent successive petitions.
¶ 64 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 65 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
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¶ 66 Affirmed.
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