NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2025 IL App (3d) 250164-U
Order filed July 3, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-25-0164 v. ) Circuit No. 23-CF-2056 ) JOHNATHAN NATHANIEL MOSLEY, ) Honorable ) Amy B. Christiansen, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Davenport and Bertani concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The court erred in continuing to deny pretrial release based on defendant’s high likelihood of willful flight.
¶2 Defendant, Johnathan Nathaniel Mosley, appeals the Will County circuit court’s decision
to continue detaining him under section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024)) based on his high likelihood of willful flight. We
reverse and remand.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 On November 13, 2023, defendant was charged with aggravated battery (Class 3) (720
ILCS 5/12-3.05(c), (h) (West 2022)). The State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release,
alleging defendant had a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution under section 110-
6.1(a)(8) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8) (West 2022)). The petition indicated that
defendant had “multiple Failure to Appear Warrants issued” and had a prior incident in which he
fled from the police during arrest. It also stated that defendant had “been put on various
sentences where he has been terminated unsatisfactorily which goes to show that the Defendant
is not inclined to follow orders of Pretrial Risk.”
¶5 The factual basis provided that officers were dispatched to a gas station for a report of a
battery and spoke to the victim. The victim told officers an unknown male later identified as
defendant asked for her number, and she would not give it to him. She then walked up to the
register, and defendant walked up and shoved her. “Defendant began to call [the victim] a
‘bitch,’ walked up to her again and punched her on the head causing a laceration to her lip.”
Defendant then began throwing items from the shelves at her and said he would be back to
“shoot (this) place up.” An independent witness corroborated the incident. When driving to the
scene, officers observed defendant who matched the description given by the 911 caller. The
victim identified defendant as her attacker. While being escorted to the squad car, defendant
refused the officer’s orders to stand and walk to the vehicle. Once in the vehicle, he began hitting
his head against the partition, screaming, and stating he was being “beat up” by the officers.
Defendant continued to exhibit erratic behavior when transported to the hospital and during
booking.
¶6 Defendant’s pretrial risk assessment indicated that he lived with his aunt and had resided
in his current residence for 10 years. He was a Level 2 risk, with Level 6 being the highest level
2 risk. The assessment indicated that defendant had “[t]wo or more failures to appear.” The
assessment solely listed two failures to appear in a prior misdemeanor driving-while-license-
suspended case. Defendant did not appear for pretrial on March 1, 2018, and he failed to appear
after his conviction on July 30, 2018. Defendant had 19 prior convictions, including convictions
for burglary, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, aggravated assault, aggravated battery of a
peace officer, retail theft, and domestic battery.
¶7 A hearing was held on the petition on November 13, 2023. The State provided the
information set forth above and argued that defendant was a flight risk. Defense counsel asserted
that defendant was not a flight risk and had only missed a few court dates. He argued that
defendant’s “failures to appear” referred to by the State involved one case in which defendant
failed to appear for a pretrial and posttrial hearing. In response, the State indicated that, when
interacting with defendant, the officers discovered that defendant had multiple failure to appear
warrants in cases in 2012, 2014, and 2015. The court granted the State’s petition finding that it
met its burden by clear and convincing evidence. In doing so, it stated in part,
“So here is what I have. I have multiple failures to appear in these matters. I have
in 17 TR 73234 there was pretrial failures to appear, post-conviction failures to
appear. In 18 DV 481, it was terminated unsatisfactorily. 18 CF 1167 terminated
unsatisfactorily. The defendant didn’t follow what he was supposed to.”
The court mentioned that defendant fled the scene of the crime in another incident. The court
further found that there were no conditions to mitigate the risk of flight. Defendant appealed, and
this court affirmed. People v. Mosley, 2024 IL App (3d) 230686-U.
¶8 On March 13, 2025, defendant filed a pro se motion for pretrial release, which is the
subject of this appeal. In the motion, defendant alleged that he did not pose a high likelihood of
3 willful flight to avoid prosecution. Regarding his prior failures to appear, defendant indicated
that he had obtained additional evidence showing that he had sought to cure his prior failures to
appear or was in jail at the time. Attached to the motion were a number of exhibits, including:
(1) a letter from the Du Page County Sheriff’s office indicating defendant was in custody from
May 23, 2018, to January 15, 2019; (2) a court file history printout showing a warrant was issued
for failure to appear on January 12, 2015, and the warrant was quashed on January 26, 2015; and
(3) a court file history printout showing a warrant was issued for failure to appear on December
10, 2012, and defendant moved to quash the warrant on December 13, 2012.
¶9 A hearing was held on the motion on March 14, 2025. Defendant indicated that he had
only one uncured failure to appear, which he argued was insufficient to qualify him as a flight
risk. Defendant presented the exhibits attached to his motion. Defendant indicated that he cured
his failures to appear by going to the courthouse, paying a fine, and subsequently appearing. The
court found that continued detention was necessary. Defendant filed a motion for relief, which
was denied.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in continuing to detain him. Every
person charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may be denied only in
certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2024). The State must file a verified
petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the burden of
proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that
the defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to
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NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2025 IL App (3d) 250164-U
Order filed July 3, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-25-0164 v. ) Circuit No. 23-CF-2056 ) JOHNATHAN NATHANIEL MOSLEY, ) Honorable ) Amy B. Christiansen, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Davenport and Bertani concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The court erred in continuing to deny pretrial release based on defendant’s high likelihood of willful flight.
¶2 Defendant, Johnathan Nathaniel Mosley, appeals the Will County circuit court’s decision
to continue detaining him under section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024)) based on his high likelihood of willful flight. We
reverse and remand.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 On November 13, 2023, defendant was charged with aggravated battery (Class 3) (720
ILCS 5/12-3.05(c), (h) (West 2022)). The State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release,
alleging defendant had a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution under section 110-
6.1(a)(8) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8) (West 2022)). The petition indicated that
defendant had “multiple Failure to Appear Warrants issued” and had a prior incident in which he
fled from the police during arrest. It also stated that defendant had “been put on various
sentences where he has been terminated unsatisfactorily which goes to show that the Defendant
is not inclined to follow orders of Pretrial Risk.”
¶5 The factual basis provided that officers were dispatched to a gas station for a report of a
battery and spoke to the victim. The victim told officers an unknown male later identified as
defendant asked for her number, and she would not give it to him. She then walked up to the
register, and defendant walked up and shoved her. “Defendant began to call [the victim] a
‘bitch,’ walked up to her again and punched her on the head causing a laceration to her lip.”
Defendant then began throwing items from the shelves at her and said he would be back to
“shoot (this) place up.” An independent witness corroborated the incident. When driving to the
scene, officers observed defendant who matched the description given by the 911 caller. The
victim identified defendant as her attacker. While being escorted to the squad car, defendant
refused the officer’s orders to stand and walk to the vehicle. Once in the vehicle, he began hitting
his head against the partition, screaming, and stating he was being “beat up” by the officers.
Defendant continued to exhibit erratic behavior when transported to the hospital and during
booking.
¶6 Defendant’s pretrial risk assessment indicated that he lived with his aunt and had resided
in his current residence for 10 years. He was a Level 2 risk, with Level 6 being the highest level
2 risk. The assessment indicated that defendant had “[t]wo or more failures to appear.” The
assessment solely listed two failures to appear in a prior misdemeanor driving-while-license-
suspended case. Defendant did not appear for pretrial on March 1, 2018, and he failed to appear
after his conviction on July 30, 2018. Defendant had 19 prior convictions, including convictions
for burglary, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, aggravated assault, aggravated battery of a
peace officer, retail theft, and domestic battery.
¶7 A hearing was held on the petition on November 13, 2023. The State provided the
information set forth above and argued that defendant was a flight risk. Defense counsel asserted
that defendant was not a flight risk and had only missed a few court dates. He argued that
defendant’s “failures to appear” referred to by the State involved one case in which defendant
failed to appear for a pretrial and posttrial hearing. In response, the State indicated that, when
interacting with defendant, the officers discovered that defendant had multiple failure to appear
warrants in cases in 2012, 2014, and 2015. The court granted the State’s petition finding that it
met its burden by clear and convincing evidence. In doing so, it stated in part,
“So here is what I have. I have multiple failures to appear in these matters. I have
in 17 TR 73234 there was pretrial failures to appear, post-conviction failures to
appear. In 18 DV 481, it was terminated unsatisfactorily. 18 CF 1167 terminated
unsatisfactorily. The defendant didn’t follow what he was supposed to.”
The court mentioned that defendant fled the scene of the crime in another incident. The court
further found that there were no conditions to mitigate the risk of flight. Defendant appealed, and
this court affirmed. People v. Mosley, 2024 IL App (3d) 230686-U.
¶8 On March 13, 2025, defendant filed a pro se motion for pretrial release, which is the
subject of this appeal. In the motion, defendant alleged that he did not pose a high likelihood of
3 willful flight to avoid prosecution. Regarding his prior failures to appear, defendant indicated
that he had obtained additional evidence showing that he had sought to cure his prior failures to
appear or was in jail at the time. Attached to the motion were a number of exhibits, including:
(1) a letter from the Du Page County Sheriff’s office indicating defendant was in custody from
May 23, 2018, to January 15, 2019; (2) a court file history printout showing a warrant was issued
for failure to appear on January 12, 2015, and the warrant was quashed on January 26, 2015; and
(3) a court file history printout showing a warrant was issued for failure to appear on December
10, 2012, and defendant moved to quash the warrant on December 13, 2012.
¶9 A hearing was held on the motion on March 14, 2025. Defendant indicated that he had
only one uncured failure to appear, which he argued was insufficient to qualify him as a flight
risk. Defendant presented the exhibits attached to his motion. Defendant indicated that he cured
his failures to appear by going to the courthouse, paying a fine, and subsequently appearing. The
court found that continued detention was necessary. Defendant filed a motion for relief, which
was denied.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in continuing to detain him. Every
person charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may be denied only in
certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2024). The State must file a verified
petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the burden of
proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that
the defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to
any person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate
this threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(e). When determining a defendant’s dangerousness and
4 the conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can
consider. Id. §§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5; People v. Mikolaitis, 2024 IL 130693, ¶¶ 20-21. When the
hearing on the State’s petition contains no live witness testimony, such as here, our review is
de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54.
¶ 12 For subsequent hearings like the one held in this case, the statute only requires the court
to find “continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any
person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to
prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024).
“Although this determination necessarily entails consideration of the threat or
flight risk posed by a defendant and the potential mitigation of such threat or
flight risk by conditions of release, the Code does not require the court to again
make specific findings that the State proved the three propositions by clear and
convincing evidence as required at the initial hearing.” People v. Mulbrandon
Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶ 13.
¶ 13 The Code defines “willful flight” as:
“intentional conduct with a purpose to thwart the judicial process to avoid
prosecution. Isolated instances of nonappearance in court alone are not evidence
of the risk of willful flight. Reoccurrence and patterns of intentional conduct to
evade prosecution, along with any affirmative steps to communicate or remedy
any such missed court date, may be considered as factors in assessing future intent
to evade prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-1(f) (West 2024).
In addition, section 110-3(c) of the Code provides that for the purpose of evaluating future risk
of willful flight “a nonappearance in court cured by an appearance in response to a summons
5 shall not be considered as evidence of future likelihood of appearance in court.” Id. § 110-3(c).
As we noted previously, “Based on the plain language of these two sections, *** courts can
consider recurring, uncured failures to appear as evidence of a high likelihood of willful flight
under the Code, but not an ‘isolated nonappearance.’ ” Mosley, 2024 IL App (3d) 230686-U,
¶ 11 (quoting People v. Perez, 2024 IL App (4th) 230967-U, ¶ 12).
¶ 14 Here, we find that the court erred in continuing to detain defendant. Of the four missed
court dates proffered, defendant cured two of the dates within a short period of time and was in
custody for another. Thus, only an isolated nonappearance remained. Mosley, 2024 IL App (3d)
230686-U, ¶ 11. This alone was not sufficient to show a “[r]eoccurrence and pattern[ ] of
intentional conduct to evade prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-1(f) (West 2024). Moreover,
unsatisfactory termination of probation does not indicate willful flight. While the State notes that
one of defendant’s exhibits included a sentence that said, “Out of County Warrant,” it is unclear
what that notation means, and the State made no argument or proffer about this warrant or any
other failures to appear. Thus, we find that the State failed to prove defendant was a flight risk
and the court erred in continuing to detain defendant. We thus remand for the court to release
defendant on any conditions it deems necessary.
¶ 15 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 16 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed and remanded.
¶ 17 Reversed and remanded.