People v. Morris

848 N.E.2d 1000, 219 Ill. 2d 373, 302 Ill. Dec. 436, 2006 Ill. LEXIS 610

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Decided: April 20, 2006
• Docket: 99676
• Status: Published

Opinions

JUSTICE McMORROW

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, and Garman concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Karmeier dissented, with opinion.

OPINION

The defendant, Richard Morris, was convicted of first degree murder and other offenses and sentenced to death. While his case was pending before this court on direct appeal, then-Governor George H. Ryan issued a clemency order which stated that defendant’s death sentence was commuted to natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release. Thereafter, this court retained jurisdiction of the case, reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. See People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137 (2004).

On remand, the State indicated that if defendant should be convicted following retrial, it would again seek a sentence of death. Defendant, relying on the former Governor’s clemency order, moved the circuit court to bar the State from pursuing the death penalty. In a written order, the circuit court granted defendant’s motion. The State then sought, and was granted, direct appeal to this court under Supreme Court Rule 302(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

Background

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant was convicted of first degree murder, aggravated vehicular hijacking and aggravated kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to death on the first degree murder conviction and his case was appealed directly to this court (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(b); 134 Ill. 2d R. 603). Oral argument was held and the case was taken under advisement.

On January 10, 2003, while defendant’s case was still under advisement, former Governor George H. Ryan gave a public speech at Northwestern University Law School in which he announced that he was exercising the clemency authority given him under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, § 12), and “commuting the sentences of all death row inmates.” See Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University Law School (January 11, 2003); People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457, 462 (2004). In the speech, the former Governor discussed several problems that he believed existed with the death penalty in Illinois and stated that he was granting a “blanket commutation” because, in his view, the “Illinois capital punishment system is broken.” Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University Law School (January 11, 2003); Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 468. The same day that he delivered the speech, the former Governor issued clemency orders for each of the death row inmates, including defendant. Defendant’s clemency order stated:

“Whereas, Richard Morris B—65709 was convicted of the crime of Murder, Case #96 CR 00123—01 in the Criminal Court of Cook County and was sentenced January 29, 1999 to Death and whereas it has been represented to me that said Richard Morris B—65709 is a fit and proper subject for Executive Clemency.

Now, Know Ye, that I, GEORGE H. RYAN, Governor of the State of Illinois, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution of this State, do by these presents:

COMMUTE THE SENTENCE OF Richard Morris

Sentence Commuted to Natural Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Release[.]”

Following the issuance of the clemency orders, the Illinois Attorney General filed an original action in this court which challenged the validity of the orders with respect to two categories of death row inmates. See Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457. The first category consisted of a group of inmates who had failed to sign or otherwise consent to their clemency petitions. The Attorney General maintained that, pursuant to statute, the Governor had no authority to grant clemency to these inmates. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 462-63. The second category consisted of a group of inmates who had been sentenced to death, but whose sentences had been reversed on direct appeal or in postconviction proceedings. These inmates were awaiting new sentencing hearings at the time the clemency orders were issued. For most of the inmates in this category, the clemency orders stated that their sentences were “Commuted to a Sentence Other Than Death for the Crime of Murder, So that the Maximum Sentence that may be Imposed is Natural Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief [sic].” See Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 464. The Attorney General maintained that the Governor had no authority to grant a preemptive commutation to these “unsentenced” inmates and that he had improperly encroached upon the judiciary’s sentencing powers in doing so. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 463-64.

This court rejected the Attorney General’s challenges to both categories of inmates. With respect to the “unsentenced” inmates we stated:

“This is a difficult question with little to guide us, but we believe that the grant of authority given the Governor under article Y, section 12, is sufficiently broad to allow former Governor Ryan to do what he did. As set forth above, the Governor’s clemency powers, which attach upon an adjudication of guilt, allow him to mitigate or set aside the punishment for the crime by issuing a pardon. Pardons may be full or partial, removing some or all of the legal consequences of a crime, and may be absolute or imposed with conditions. Further, the Governor can grant a reprieve for any sentence imposed and may commute any sentence imposed to a lesser sentence. In this situation, what former Governor Ryan essentially did was to grant the inmates listed in count II a partial pardon by pardoning only the possible capital consequences of the offense. As we noted, a partial pardon exonerates a defendant from some but not all of the punishment or legal consequences of a crime. Black’s Law Dictionary 1113 (6th ed. 1990); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 107 S.W3d 193, 196 (Ky. 2003) (construing power of the governor to issue ‘pardons’ under state constitution as including power to issue partial pardons). The Governor’s pardon power allows him to remove or mitigate the consequences of a crime, and that is what he did here by removing the maximum sentence for these defendants in future sentencing hearings. We deem it irrelevant that the Governor used the term ‘commutation’ in his clemency orders, because we believe that it is the substance, not the terminology, of the clemency orders that controls. See Ex parte Black, 123 Tex. Crim. 472, 474, 59 S.W.2d 828, 829 (1933) (construing governor’s clemency order to be a ‘reprieve’ even though governor used the word ‘furlough’; ‘it is the substance of the proclamation of the governor and not the name by which it is designated, that controls its effect’). We emphasize the limited nature of our holding. We hold only that the Governor’s constitutional authority to issue pardons after conviction is sufficiently broad to allow him to reduce the maximum sentence the defendant is facing. In such a situation, the Governor is exercising his power to prevent or mitigate punishment by pardoning the defendant from the full extent of the punishment allowed by law.” Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 476-77.

Defendant in the case at bar was one of the death row inmates who did not sign his clemency petition. Consequently, his case remained under advisement in this court, pending the resolution of the Attorney General’s complaint in Snyder. Following our decision in Snyder, we retained jurisdiction of defendant’s case and entered judgment on defendant’s direct appeal. See Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137.

In Morris, we concluded that defendant’s trial counsel committed fundamental and indefensible errors during the course of trial. As a result, “there was a breakdown of the adversarial process during defendant’s trial such that there was no meaningful adversarial testing of defendant’s case.” Morris, 209 Ill. 2d at 188. Accordingly, we held that defendant was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. We reversed defendant’s convictions, and remanded the cause for a new trial.,Morris, 209 Ill. 2d at 188.

On remand, the State indicated that, despite the clemency order entered by former Governor Ryan, it again intended to seek the death penalty against defendant. In response, defendant filed a “Motion to Preclude the State From Seeking Imposition of the Death Penalty.” In support of this motion, defendant pointed to this court’s discussion regarding the “unsentenced” inmates in Snyder. Defendant noted that, in Snyder, we concluded that the clemency orders entered for the “unsentenced” inmates were, in essence, partial pardons which removed the maximum sentence possible, i.e., death, for those inmates. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 476-77. Defendant maintained that his clemency order also acted as a partial pardon which removed the death penalty as a possible sentence if he were again to be convicted. According to defendant, “[t]he governor’s clemency order was not conditional. It was absolute. The governor did not qualify his order by granting the defendant clemency from the death penalty only if his conviction were affirmed on appeal, or by stating that the clemency order would not apply to any inmate whose conviction was subsequently reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial.”

The State, in reply, noted that the clemency orders for the “unsentenced” defendants discussed in Snyder differed from defendant’s. As noted, the clemency orders for the “unsentenced” inmates stated that their sentences were “Commuted to a Sentence Other Than Death for the Crime of Murder, So that the Maximum Sentence that may be Imposed is Natural Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief [sic].” See Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 464. The State maintained that the foregoing language indicated that the Governor intended to restrict the outcome of future judicial proceedings for the “unsentenced” inmates. In contrast, the State noted, defendant’s clemency order states only that defendant’s sentence is commuted, without any further qualifying language. Thus, according to the State, the Governor had no intention to limit the sentence that defendant could receive following retrial and the State was free to pursue the death penalty against defendant.

In addition to arguing that his clemency order was, in substance, a partial pardon, defendant also contended in his motion that the imposition of the death penalty on retrial would violate his due process rights and the statutory prohibition against increasing a sentence on remand under section 5—5—4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5—5—4(a) (West 2004)). Defendant further maintained that the State’s action in seeking the death penalty on retrial constituted prosecutorial vindictiveness.

Following argument, the circuit court granted defendant’s motion. With respect to defendant’s argument that his clemency order acted as a partial pardon, the circuit court stated:

“Resolution of this issue must necessarily rest upon a determination of the Governor’s intent in his grant of clemency. As the supreme court has recognized, the pardon power given the Governor in article V, section 12, is extremely broad. [Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 473.] In construing a governor’s clemency order, it is the substance not the terminology of the order that controls. People v. Collins, [351 Ill. App. 3d 959, 962 (2004)]. Here, the Governor’s public announcement on January 10, 2003, that he was granting blanket clemency informs our understanding of his intent, ‘...today I am commuting the sentences of all death row inmates.’ [Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University Law School (January 11, 2003).] The State misreads the teaching of People ex rel. Madigan. Under the supreme court’s rubric and rationale in interpreting the Governor’s exercise of power, it is reasonable to conclude that he intended to grant a partial pardon to all of the inmates then residing on death row. His actions accordingly served to invoke the fundamental protections provided by the double jeopardy clause and to bar the State from again seeking a sentence of death against this defendant.”

The circuit court also agreed with defendant’s contention that imposition of the death penalty would violate his due process rights and section 5—5—4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections. However, the circuit court rejected defendant’s argument regarding prosecutorial vindictiveness. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion and barred the State from seeking the death penalty.

The State then sought, and was granted, direct appeal to this court under Rule 302(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b)). We subsequently granted leave to former Governor Ryan to file an amicus curiae brief.

Analysis

The principal dispute raised on appeal before this court is the nature of the clemency order entered in defendant’s case, specifically, whether the order acts as a partial pardon, such that the State is precluded from seeking the death penalty against defendant. The State does not dispute that the Governor has the authority to enter a partial pardon (see Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 476), and the State expressly acknowledges that “a partial pardon survives the reversal of the conviction.” However, as it did in the circuit court, the State contends that defendant’s clemency order is a commutation, not a partial pardon, and that the effect of the commutation does not survive the reversal of defendant’s conviction.

Defendant maintains, however, that interpreting his clemency order as anything other than a partial pardon would lead to absurd results. Defendant notes that one of the principal reasons former Governor Ryan gave for issuing the blanket clemency was the frequency with which defense attorneys were providing inadequate counsel during capital trials. Defendant observes that this was the same reason that his conviction was reversed by this court. Defendant argues that the former Governor could not possibly have intended for the death penalty to be imposed upon a defendant, such as himself, who has established one of the very things that led to the blanket clemency in the first place.

In addition, defendant maintains that the only difference between his case and those of the “unsentenced” inmates in Snyder who were partially pardoned is one of procedural posture—the “unsentenced” inmates had already had their death sentences overturned at the time the clemency orders were issued while defendant’s reversal came after the orders were announced. Defendant contends that, because there is no substantive difference between his case and the “unsentenced” inmates, the former Governor could not have intended that his case be treated any differently than their cases. Moreover, according to defendant, to treat his case differently than the “unsentenced” inmates’ cases would be directly contrary to the Governor’s announcement that he was performing a uniform, or “blanket,” clemency for all death row inmates.

The circuit court below resolved any confusion regarding the proper interpretation of defendant’s clemency order by referring to the speech given by the former Governor at the time the clemency orders were announced. The circuit court explained that the former Governor’s announcement “that he was granting blanket clemency informs our understanding of his intent.” Based on the speech, and this court’s holding in Snyder, the circuit court concluded that it was “reasonable to conclude that he [the former Governor] intended to grant a partial pardon to all of the inmates then residing on death row.” Accordingly, the circuit court held that the State was barred from again seeking a sentence of death against defendant.

The State, however, contends that the circuit court erred when it relied on the former Governor’s speech to discern his intent regarding defendant’s clemency order. The State notes that the Governor’s clemency power cannot be controlled by the courts or the legislature. From this, the State maintains that in order to ensure the constitutionally required separation of powers, judicial construction of clemency orders must be limited solely to the language of the order. The State contends that the circuit court in this case, when it tried to discern the former Governor’s intent by referring to the speech, “essentially assumed control of the governor’s clemency authority and concluded that defendant had received a partial pardon because it presumed that was what Governor Ryan intended.” Thus, according to the State, the circuit court’s order should be reversed and the State should again be permitted to pursue the death penalty.

Contrary to the State’s assertions, separation of powers principles have not been violated in this case. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that, in determining the intent of the legislature, a court “ ‘may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved.’ (Emphasis added.) Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308, citing People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000); Stern v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 179 Ill. 2d 160, 164 (1997); People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 345 (1992). See generally 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 48:03 (6th ed. 2000).” People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 502 (2003). There is no separation of powers violation when a court of law considers the reason for a statute or the purpose the statute is to achieve. Nor is there any separation of powers violation when a court of law applies these same principles of construction to the interpretation of a clemency order. In this case, the former Governor’s speech clearly set forth the reasons for the clemency orders, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose the clemency orders were meant to achieve. As such, the former Governor’s speech was properly considered by the circuit court.

Further, there is no question that the circuit court properly interpreted the meaning of the clemency order in light of the former Governor’s speech. In the speech, the former Governor states that the blanket clemency which he ordered was intended to be systemwide, that it was made in response to what he believed to be systemic problems, and that he intended the relief he was granting to extend equally to all inmates on death row. Governor George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University Law School (January 11, 2003). Moreover, in his amicus brief filed in this court, the former Governor expressly confirms that the circuit court properly understood the meaning of the speech. The former Governor states that he “expressed his intent clearly in his public address announcing his decision to grant blanket clemency,” to wit, “he issued clemency to relieve each inmate of the death penalty as a legal consequence of the offense he had committed.” Accordingly, it cannot reasonably be said, as the State contends, that the circuit court violated separation of powers principles in this case by “assuming] control of the governor’s clemency authority.”

The cardinal rule of construction when interpreting a clemency order is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Governor. See Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d at 476-77 (“it is the substance, not the terminology, of the clemency orders that controls”). Former Governor Ryan’s intent is unequivocal in this case. As explained in his speech and reaffirmed in his representations to this court, he issued clemency to relieve defendant “of the death penalty as a legal consequence of the offense he had committed.” To ignore that intent would be an inappropriate intrusion by this court upon the clemency power granted exclusively to the Governor under the Illinois Constitution. Accordingly, we conclude that the. State is precluded from pursuing the death penalty in this case.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.