People v McGuire
2026 NY Slip Op 04597
July 24, 2026
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
v
RICHARD MCGUIRE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
Decided on July 24, 2026
343 KA 24-01965
Present: Whalen, P.J., Curran, Ogden, Nowak, And Delconte, JJ.
EASTON THOMPSON KASPEREK SHIFFRIN LLP, ROCHESTER (BRIAN SHIFFRIN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
BRIAN P. GREEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (RYAN P. ASHE OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Douglas A. Randall, J.), rendered April 26, 2024. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree (two counts).
[*1]
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is reversed on the law, that part of the omnibus motion seeking to suppress physical evidence is granted, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to Monroe County Court for proceedings pursuant to CPL 470.45.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1], [12]), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [3]), criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (§ 265.02 [8]), and two counts of criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree (§ 220.50 [2], [3]).
Following a traffic stop, a search of defendant's vehicle and person uncovered, among other things, a firearm and crack cocaine. After a grand jury indicted him, defendant moved for, inter alia, suppression of all physical evidence on the ground that the stop and subsequent search were unlawful. In his omnibus motion, defendant contended, as relevant here, that "[u]pon information and belief, conversations with [d]efendant and a review of the [body worn camera footage], there is a question of fact as to the suspension of [d]efendant's license and the timing of the stop." Defendant also sought a judicial subpoena for the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) records that "[the] police would have accessed . . . and what information would have been provided as [it] is relevant to [d]efendant's [c]onstitutional challenge to the stop and search." County Court granted defendant a hearing and, before it began, defense counsel informed the court that he had put out a judicial subpoena to the DMV "for records that evidenced when [the Rochester Police Department] . . . had actually run [defendant] through their [database]" but the DMV had responded that it did not have any such records.
During the hearing, an officer testified that, at the time of the traffic stop, he was familiar with defendant and had spoken with him over a dozen times. The officer further testified that, when he observed defendant driving a motor vehicle, the officer brought up the DMV database on his mobile data terminal, i.e., in-vehicle computer, which indicated that defendant's driver's license had been suspended for failure to answer a summons. Based on that information, he and his police partner conducted the traffic stop. Defense counsel's cross-examination of the officer questioned the reliability of the information from the DMV database, eliciting, among other things, testimony that the database did not contain photographs of individuals for an officer to [*2]use in verifying that the DMV results were for the intended person. Critically, the People introduced no evidence establishing defendant's license suspension or the accuracy of the DMV database.
Defendant contends that the People were required to establish, at the suppression hearing, that defendant's license had been suspended, because defendant challenged the reliability of the DMV information, and that the court therefore erred in refusing to suppress physical evidence. We agree.
"It is well settled that, although 'a defendant who challenges the legality of a search and seizure has the burden of proving illegality, the People are nevertheless put to the burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct in the first instance' " (People v Walker, 221 AD3d 1568, 1568 [4th Dept 2023], quoting People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]). As relevant here, a vehicle stop is permissible when based on probable cause that the driver has committed a traffic violation (see People v Hinshaw, 35 NY3d 427, 430 [2020]; Walker, 221 AD3d at 1568).
Under the "fellow officer rule" (see generally People v Palacios, — NY3d —, —, 2026 NY Slip Op 02360, *1-2 [2026]; People v Rosario, 78 NY2d 583, 588 [1991], cert denied 502 US 1109 [1992]), "[a] police officer is entitled to act on the strength of a radio bulletin or a telephone or teletype alert from a fellow officer or department and to assume its reliability" (People v Lypka, 36 NY2d 210, 213 [1975]), and the same rule applies to the DMV database accessible on an in-vehicle computer (see Walker, 221 AD3d at 1569; see generally Rosario, 78 NY2d at 588). "[T]he probabilities are that such detailed information of the type in these communications does not find its way onto the police air waves [or mobile data terminal] without substantial basis" (Lypka, 36 NY2d at 214; see Rosario, 78 NY2d at 588).
"But where on a motion to suppress, a challenge to the [officer's] action is made, the presumption of probable cause that originally cloaked that action disappears from the case" (Lypka, 36 NY2d at 214; see Rosario, 78 NY2d at 588; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 375 [1983]; People v Rogers, 152 AD2d 947, 948 [4th Dept 1989], lv denied 74 NY2d 851 [1989]). If a defendant raises a "specific challenge" to the reliability of certain transmitted information, that information may not be relied upon by the suppression court (People v Dodt, 61 NY2d 408, 416 [1984]; see People v Arefaine, 221 AD2d 979, 979 [4th Dept 1995], lv denied 87 NY2d 919 [1996]). "[B]are reliance on an unsubstantiated hearsay communication from the instigating officer or department will not suffice for probable cause" (Lypka, 36 NY2d at 214). "[T]he People must demonstrate that the sender or sending agency itself possessed the requisite probable cause to act" (id.; see Dodt, 61 NY2d at 416). "The pertinent inquiry in all situations has been directed to the nature and reliability of the information possessed by the person or agency transmitting the information" (Rosario, 78 NY2d at 588-589).
We conclude that defendant's motion papers were sufficient to raise a specific challenge to the content of the DMV information, based on "the face of the pleadings, the context of the motion and defendant's access to information" (People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 422 [1993]; see Dodt, 61 NY2d at 416). Here, defendant specifically challenged the reliability of the DMV information when he contended that "there is a question of fact as to the suspension of [d]efendant's license" as part of his argument that the stop and subsequent search were unlawful and when he sought a judicial subpoena for the DMV records (cf. People v Shabazz, 99 NY2d 634, 636 [2003], rearg denied 100 NY2d 556 [2003]). In addition to questioning the suspension of his driver's license, defendant explained that "[the p]olice allege that at some point they accessed the New York State Department of Vehicle database through their [mobile data terminal] device in their vehicle." Defendant made clear that the materials sought via the judicial subpoena were "relevant to [d]efendant's [c]onstitutional challenge to the stop and search." The dissent concludes, without any basis in the record, that the subpoenas "sought only metadata" concerning the timing of the officer's consultation of the DMV database. Although we agree that defense counsel appears to have also challenged the timing of the officer's review of the DMV information located on the mobile data terminal, by seeking records "evidencing when [the] police would have accessed the . . . DMV database," defense counsel also wanted to identify "what information would have been provided." Certainly, defendant was not limited to one argument or challenge before the court. Contrary to the dissent's view, we conclude that [*3]defendant mounted a specific challenge to the reliability of the DMV information in his motion papers (see Dodt, 61 NY2d at 416; cf. People v Fenner, 61 NY2d 971, 973 [1984]).
We further disagree with our dissenting colleagues' suggestion that defendant was required to supply his driver's abstract or make some additional offer of proof in order to place reliability at issue. That is not required under the law; rather, it is defendant's challenge, not an offer of documentary proof, that shifts the burden to the People (see Landy, 59 NY2d at 375; Lypka, 36 NY2d at 214; Walker, 221 AD3d at 1569; cf. People v Peters, 136 AD2d 750, 751 [2d Dept 1988], lv denied 72 NY2d 864 [1988]; People v Bryant, 187 Misc 2d 259, 263 [Crim Ct, NY County 2001]).
Upon that specific challenge and contrary to the dissent's conclusion, "the presumption of probable cause that originally cloaked [the officer's] action disappear[ed] from the case" and "bare reliance on an unsubstantiated hearsay communication from . . . [the DMV could] not suffice for probable cause" (Lypka, 36 NY2d at 214; see People v Jones, 95 NY2d 721, 727-728 [2001]; cf. People v Jenkins, 47 NY2d 722, 724 [1979]). Under the circumstances of this case and although the dissent points to the discovery provided by the People, "the absence of any factual allegations [by defendant] with respect to [the DMV information] conveyed to the arresting officer cannot be held against defendant" (Jones, 95 NY2d at 728). The motion papers as well as defense counsel's quest for the pertinent DMV records expressly detailed "defendant's lack of access" to the information relied upon by the officer (id.). In other words, "defendant could not be required to allege facts about which he had no knowledge" (id. at 729; see generally Mendoza, 82 NY2d at 429; cf. People v Duval, 36 NY3d 384, 391 [2021]).
We conclude that the court erred in refusing to suppress the physical evidence obtained as a result of the stop, inasmuch as the People failed to meet their burden of establishing the reliability of the information the officer received from the DMV database (see Walker, 221 AD3d at 1569-1570). Because our determination results in the suppression of all evidence supporting the crimes charged, the indictment must be dismissed (see id. at 1570; People v Suttles, 214 AD3d 1313, 1314 [4th Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 936 [2023]; People v Reedy, 211 AD3d 1629, 1630 [4th Dept 2022]). In light of our determination, we do not reach defendant's remaining contentions.
All concur except Curran and Delconte, JJ., who dissent and vote to affirm in the following memorandum: We respectfully dissent and vote to affirm inasmuch as we conclude that defendant's specific contention on appeal—i.e., that suppression was warranted on the ground that the initial traffic stop of his vehicle was improperly based on unreliable hearsay evidence—was not raised before County Court at the suppression hearing by defendant and therefore "the burden never shifted to the People to come forward with proof [at the hearing] establishing the reliability of that [evidence]" (People v Shabazz, 99 NY2d 634, 636 [2003], rearg denied 100 NY2d 556 [2003]). In a nutshell, defendant's motion papers were factually and legally insufficient to place the basis for suppression at issue, and, consequently, defendant's contention—which forms the basis for the majority's reversal—is not preserved inasmuch as he did not object to the alleged hearsay evidence relied on to support the initial stop (see CPL 470.05 [2]).
The facts of this case are not generally in dispute. An officer of the Rochester Police Department was on patrol in a police vehicle when he observed defendant at a gas station pumping gas into a motor vehicle. The officer was very familiar with defendant—he knew him by his "government name"—and had spoken with him over a dozen times and seen him on over 50 occasions. Indeed, most recently, the officer had spoken to defendant about two or three weeks before the day in question. Additionally, the officer had completed approximately 10 "field information forms" documenting his prior interactions with defendant and, consequently, he was able to recognize defendant's date of birth. In other words, the record amply establishes that the officer was personally familiar with defendant at the time of the traffic stop.
The officer and his police partner proceeded to follow defendant's vehicle after it left the gas station. While following defendant, the officer used his vehicle's mobile data terminal (MDT) to access the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) database and, upon consulting that resource, he determined that defendant did not have a valid driver's license. Approximately three [*4]minutes later, the officer's partner activated the emergency lights on the police vehicle and proceeded to stop defendant (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511). As a result of the traffic stop, the police found defendant to be in possession of 31 grams of crack cocaine. Following an inventory search of his vehicle, the police also found defendant to be in possession of a weapon. The ensuing indictment charged defendant with, inter alia, two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1], [12]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [3]).
Defendant's omnibus motion sought, inter alia, suppression of tangible evidence (see CPL 710.60). Critically, in seeking suppression, defense counsel sought a probable cause hearing regarding the traffic stop because, "[u]pon information and belief, conversations with [d]efendant and a review of the [body-worn camera (BWC) footage], there is a question of fact as to the suspension of [d]efendant's license and the timing of the stop." Defendant did not provide any evidence in support of that assertion in his motion papers. In opposition, the People contended, inter alia, that defendant's motion papers were insufficient to warrant a hearing on his request for suppression of tangible evidence. Additionally, the People specifically alleged in their response that defendant's driving privileges were suspended as of the time of the initial vehicle stop.
Thereafter, the court conducted the requested suppression hearing, during which the officer testified about, inter alia, the events leading up to the traffic stop. Defendant did not object to any of the testimonial evidence adduced by the People that supported the traffic stop. In a lengthy oral decision, the court refused to suppress tangible evidence, concluding, inter alia, that the police had probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle because they "had reasonable cause to believe that . . . defendant was driving . . . with a suspended driver's license." Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of, inter alia, two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. This appeal ensued.
It is well settled that, when a defendant challenges the legality of a police-initiated traffic stop, the burden is on the People, in the first instance, to establish the legality of the police conduct being challenged (see People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]; People v Walker, 221 AD3d 1568, 1568 [4th Dept 2023]). As relevant here, a vehicle stop is permissible when it is based on probable cause that the driver has committed a traffic violation (see People v Hinshaw, 35 NY3d 427, 430 [2020]; People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349-350 [2001]).
In establishing probable cause under those circumstances, the People may rely on information obtained via a government database—including DMV records—to establish that a defendant is operating a vehicle in violation of the law (see People v Bushey, 29 NY3d 158, 164 [2017]; Walker, 221 AD3d at 1568-1569). In light of the majority's analysis and to the extent that the parties in their briefs rely on the "fellow officer rule," we assume, arguendo, that the rule applies here to the DMV information obtained by the officer from the MDT. As the Court of Appeals recently explained, "[u]nder the fellow officer rule, even if an arresting officer lacks personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, the arrest will be lawful if the officer acts upon the direction of or as a result of communication with a superior or fellow officer or another police department provided that the police as a whole were in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause to make the arrest" (People v Palacios, — NY3d —, —, 2026 NY Slip Op 02360, *1 [2026] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 113 [1996]).
The presumption of probable cause established by application of the fellow officer rule may be rebutted, however, where a defendant raises a "specific challenge" to the reliability of the information relied on by the officer to effectuate the challenged police action (People v Dodt, 61 NY2d 408, 416 [1984] [emphasis added]; see generally People v Lypka, 36 NY2d 210, 214 [1975]). Because "bare reliance on . . . unsubstantiated hearsay communication[s] . . . will not suffice [to establish] probable cause," where the defendant specifically challenges information on that basis, "the People must demonstrate that the sender or sending agency itself possessed the requisite probable cause to act" (Lypka, 36 NY2d at 214; see Dodt, 61 NY2d at 416).
Here, in reversing to grant suppression of tangible evidence, the majority concludes that [*5]the People did not meet their burden of establishing the reliability of the DMV information obtained from the MDT and relied on by the officer to conclude that defendant did not have a valid driver's license and support the initial traffic stop. Critical to the majority's analysis is its determination that defendant made a specific challenge to the reliability of the DMV information from the MDT. According to the majority, defendant made such a specific challenge based on his attorney's assertion in the omnibus motion requesting a suppression hearing on the basis that "there is a question of fact as to the suspension of [d]efendant's license."
We respectfully disagree, and we would conclude that the bald assertion in defendant's omnibus motion—without any more specific request or objection—is insufficient to constitute a "specific challenge" (Dodt, 61 NY2d at 416) to the reliability of the information relied on by the officer. In our view, the majority's conclusion is contrary to Court of Appeals precedent requiring the preservation of contentions for appeal. Indeed, we note that it is well settled that a defendant must preserve for appellate review suppression-related contentions either in the motion papers or at the suppression hearing itself (see People v Panton, 27 NY3d 1144, 1144-1145 [2016]; Shabazz, 99 NY2d at 636; People v Gonzalez, 55 NY2d 887, 888 [1982]; People v Martin, 50 NY2d 1029, 1031 [1980]). Here, defendant has done neither.
Initially, and although not an independent basis to affirm (see People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 430 [1993]), we note that defendant's motion papers were insufficient, on their own, to entitle defendant to a suppression hearing, inasmuch as, at best, they are general and conclusory and include no factual statements or allegations of illegality (see generally People v Battle, 109 AD3d 1155, 1156 [4th Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1038 [2013]; People v Dekle, 192 AD2d 471, 471 [1st Dept 1993], lv denied 81 NY2d 1072 [1993]; People v Pavesi, 144 AD2d 392, 393 [2d Dept 1988], lv denied 73 NY2d 981 [1989]). Defendant does not even expressly allege in his motion papers that there was a lack of probable cause to stop the vehicle, nor does he articulate any other legal basis to suppress tangible evidence. It stands to reason that if defendant's allegations were insufficient to support the grant of a hearing, they were also insufficient to constitute a specific challenge to the reliability of the information relied on by the officer who initiated the traffic stop. Although the court appears to have exercised its discretion, as a matter of judicial economy, to grant defendant an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress (see generally Mendoza, 82 NY2d at 429-430)—despite the People's objection to the motion papers' deficiency—the inadequacy of defendant's motion papers supports the conclusion that he failed to preserve the specific evidence-based issue he raises for the first time on appeal.
Regardless, we would conclude that defendant's motion was insufficient to raise a specific challenge to the officer's reliance on the DMV information obtained via the MDT, based on the face of the relevant papers, the context of the suppression motion, and defendant's access to information (see id. at 422). Defendant was indicted about one month after his arrest and, at his arraignment, he was served with a CPL 710.30 notice. He also was provided with numerous discovery disclosures from the People, including the BWC footage and the grand jury testimony that were thereafter referenced in defendant's motion papers. The suppression hearing was conducted over the course of two days with the officer testifying on the first day. The record also reflects that, between the time of the indictment and the start of the suppression hearing, defendant had been served with approximately 13 discovery disclosure cover sheets by the People, which included the supporting deposition for aggravated unlicensed operation of a vehicle in the third degree as well as the uniform traffic ticket.
It is our view that, from the face of the motion papers and its surrounding context, defendant had ample sources of information with which to allege sufficiently specific facts identifying any source of illegality and to challenge the reliability of the transmitted information that purportedly provided the officer with probable cause of a traffic violation. Defendant, however, clearly failed to do so, opting to rely on the conclusory statement of his attorney to speculate about the existence of an issue of fact, rather than setting forth information supporting his position that the transmitted information was unreliable.
Requiring defendant to be more precise, in order to raise a "specific challenge" (Dodt, 61 NY2d at 416) to the reliability of the transmitted information, is all the more justified given the significant amount of relevant information directly available to defendant at the time he made his motion (see Mendoza, 82 NY2d at 429). That information included, among other things, his [*6]personal knowledge of his driver's license status and access to his driver's license abstract. In other words, this is simply not a case where there is some "informational asymmetry" that would excuse defendant from making a sufficiently specific challenge to the reliability of the information at issue (People v Ehinmiakhena, — NY3d —, —, 2026 NY Slip Op 02363, *4 [2026, Wilson, Ch. J., dissenting in part]). Defendant had equal access to his driver's license record through the DMV (see New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, Get My Own Driving Record [Abstract], https://dmv.ny.gov/records/get-my-own-driving-record-abstract [last accessed July 8, 2026]) but failed to even allege in his motion papers that he had a valid license.
To the extent that the majority's analysis relies on defendant's issuance of subpoenas to the DMV, it does so entirely sua sponte inasmuch as defendant's brief makes no mention of the subpoenas in support of defendant's contention challenging the suppression ruling. Moreover, those subpoenas sought only metadata from the DMV with respect to whether the officer in fact checked the DMV database three minutes before initiating the stop of defendant's vehicle. In other words, defense counsel appeared to be concerned merely with whether the officer's actions were consistent with his testimony—i.e., whether he actually accessed the DMV database at the time he claimed, not whether the information contained in the database was accurate with respect to the status of defendant's driver's license. Of course, a subpoena would not have been required for defendant to obtain a copy of his driver's license abstract and, in any event, that is not what defendant's subpoena sought. Thus, any suggestion by the majority that defendant was precluded from obtaining his driver's license abstract from the DMV is simply incorrect.
Further, we conclude that any reliance by the majority on this Court's decision in People v Walker (221 AD3d at 1568-1569) is entirely misplaced and does not support reversal here. There, the defendant moved to suppress tangible evidence on the basis that the stop of the motor vehicle he was driving, allegedly because it was an uninsured vehicle, was unsupported by probable cause. Unlike in this case, however, the defendant in Walker made a specific challenge to the alleged basis for probable cause insofar as his motion papers alleged that the vehicle's insurance had not lapsed and, in further support of that assertion, attached documentary proof, in the form of a verification of insurance form showing that the vehicle had insurance at the time in question. Here, defendant not only failed to attach his driving record abstract or any other evidence that his license was valid at the time of the stop, but he also did not even allege, through defense counsel or his own affidavit, that his license was not suspended. Thus, rather than supporting the majority's position, Walker actually supports the conclusion that defendant did not do enough here to place the reliability of the DMV records viewed on the MDT at issue.
Thus, we would conclude that, because defendant failed to put the reliability of the DMV information into dispute, the presumption of probable cause under the fellow officer rule was not rebutted, and the People were never tasked with demonstrating the underlying reliability of the information establishing that defendant did not have a valid driver's license (see Dodt, 61 NY2d at 416; Lypka, 36 NY2d at 214).
Furthermore, nothing at the suppression hearing supports the conclusion that defendant specifically challenged the reliability of the evidence in question. At the hearing, the People relied on the officer's testimony that he received information from the DMV database, through the MDT, that defendant's driver's license had been suspended as a result of a failure to answer a summons. Thus, this is not a case in which the People failed to offer any evidence "regarding the contents of the communication received" (Dodt, 61 NY2d at 416). Rather, the officer testified to the specific content of the DMV information he received, including the reason that defendant's license had been suspended. In our view, it is significant that, at the hearing, defendant never objected to the People's evidence or called into question its reliability, to say nothing of requesting that the People provide any corroborating documentation. Indeed, quite to the contrary, defense counsel had the officer repeat his testimony involving the now-challenged evidence on cross-examination. Even at the close of the hearing, defense counsel did not voice any objection to the evidence relied on by the People or make any requests for corroborating evidence; he also did not submit any post-hearing memorandum regarding the issue.
In short, the hearsay evidence of defendant's suspended driver's license was unchallenged at the hearing and, therefore, when coupled with the exceedingly vague and nonspecific allegation in defendant's motion papers, we conclude that the burden never shifted to the People [*7]to come forward with proof of the reliability of the information and defendant's contention on appeal objecting to the reliability of the information is unpreserved for our review (see People v Bell-Scott, 162 AD3d 1558, 1559 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1169 [2019]; People v Rodriguez, 188 AD2d 564, 564 [2d Dept 1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 892 [1993]).
The decision of the Court of Appeals in People v Shabazz (99 NY2d 634) is illustrative on that point. There, both this Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant failed to challenge the reliability of the radio transmissions relied upon by the officers who stopped the defendant's vehicle (see id. at 636; People v Shabazz, 289 AD2d 1059, 1059 [4th Dept 2001]). The Court of Appeals held that, as a result of that failure, "the burden never shifted to the People to come forward with proof establishing the reliability of that information" and the defendant's "argument that the proof was deficient in that respect [was] unpreserved for review" (Shabazz, 99 NY2d at 636). The analysis should be the same here.
Viewed through that lens, the majority's reliance on the vague and conclusory statement in defendant's motion papers is patently insufficient. Given the limited nature of the information contained in defendant's papers, it was incumbent upon defendant at the hearing, in the face of evidence he now claims is unreliable, to make known his objection or request further evidence. By failing to do so, in circumstances where he did not adequately put the People on adequate notice of his challenge, defendant denied the People the opportunity to supply non-hearsay evidence supporting the conclusion that defendant's license was invalid at the time of the initial stop. To reiterate, just as in Shabazz, because of the failure of defendant to challenge the evidence at the suppression hearing, the burden did not shift to the People to provide proof establishing the reliability of the information, and defendant's contention is not preserved for review on appeal.
In our view, any other conclusion would defeat the purpose of the preservation requirement (see generally People v Miguel, 53 NY2d 920, 922 [1981]; Martin, 50 NY2d at 1031; People v Jacque-Crews, 213 AD3d 1335, 1336 [4th Dept 2023], lv denied 39 NY3d 1111 [2023]; People v Anderson, 173 AD3d 486, 486 [1st Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 927 [2019]). Defendant's principal contention on appeal is that the People improperly relied on "the hearsay information from the MDT," which he appears to suggest may be unreliable. By not preserving that specific contention in his motion papers or at the suppression hearing, defendant "effectively deprive[d] the People of a fair opportunity to present their proof on that issue" (Martin, 50 NY2d at 1031). Had defendant objected to the hearsay evidence or demanded more reliable evidence that defendant's license had been suspended, the issue could have been "avoided or promptly cured" (id.), such as through a certified copy of defendant's driver's license abstract (see People v Strauss, 136 AD3d 1340, 1341 [4th Dept 2016]; People v Maldonado, 44 AD3d 793, 794 [2d Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1035 [2008]).
Apart from the issue where we diverge from the majority, we have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and we would conclude that none warrants reversal or modification of the judgment. Consequently, because we conclude that defendant's contention is unpreserved (see CPL 470.05 [2]) and would decline to reach it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]), we would affirm the judgment on appeal.
Finally, we note that the majority provides no clarification concerning what evidence would be enough for the People to establish the reliability of the DMV information reviewed by the officer on the MDT. It merely concludes that what the People did here did not suffice. Notably, the majority's failure to provide guidance to parties in future cases strengthens our point about preservation and what parties must do to specifically raise the issue of reliability at a suppression hearing—clearly, had defendant more specifically articulated in his motion papers (or even at the hearing itself) that he was challenging the reliability of the underlying information relied on by the testifying officer, we would have a more adequate record that would allow for a more precise articulation of the applicable standard. Of course, it is also much more likely that, where a defendant does more to challenge the reliability of such evidence in specific terms, the People will respond in kind and do more to substantiate the reliability of the evidence. As it stands now, in the absence of any guidance from this Court, the parties in future cases are effectively incentivized to engage in chicanery—i.e., defendants will want to be as vague as possible in their suppression motions, hoping to catch the People unawares that defendant is [*8]challenging the reliability of similar evidence, and thereby secure suppression by the trial court or reversal on appeal. Even when acting in total good faith, under the majority's approach, parties will still have to make their best guess about what is sufficient to establish the reliability of information communicated to the police and obtained from computerized governmental databases and hope that the courts agree.
Entered: July 24, 2026
Ann Dillon Flynn
Clerk of the Court